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2008 DIGILAW 674 (AP)

Bollepelli Shankar v. Govt. of A. P.

2008-08-24

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2008
JUDGMENT : The petitioner was elected as a Sarpanch of Julapally Gram Panchayat, Kamanpur Mandal, Karimnagar District. On receiving certain allegations as to misappropriation against him, the District Collector, Karimnagar, 2nd respondent herein, initiated proceedings under Section 249 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short ‘the Act’). A show cause notice was issued on 01.09.2007, incorporating the allegations and requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 10.09.2007. The remarks of the Divisional Panchayat Officer were called for and on receipt of the same, the 2nd respondent issued show cause notice, dated 08.12.2007, under sub-Section (6) of Section 249 of the Act. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 27.12.2007. On a consideration of the same, the 2nd respondent passed an order, dated 29.01.2008, placing the petitioner under suspension for a period of three months, under Section (6) of Section 249 of the Act. The same is challenged in this writ petition. It is contended that the step under Section 249(6) can be taken only pending investigation into the charges. He pleads that the charges have already been investigated and there was no occasion for the 2nd respondent to pass the impugned order. Sri M. Srinivas Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the notice contemplated under Section 249(1) of the Act was already issued to the petitioner and the explanation was also submitted. He contends that the necessity to issue show cause notice or to pass orders under Section 249(6) of the Act would arise, if only the investigation into the charges against the Sarpanch is pending. He contends that the investigation has already been concluded, with the submission of explanation by the petitioner and enquiry by the Divisional Panchayat Officer. Learned Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj for respondents 1 to 4 and Sri P. Sridhar Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.5, on the other hand, submit that though there is some defect in the frame of the order, it is specifically passed in exercise of power under Section 249(6) of the Act. According to them, the period of three months had already elapsed and the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent to pass final order under Section 249(1) still subsists. There is a meticulous narration of the facts in the impugned order. Mention is made to the show cause notice, dated 01.09.2007, and the explanation submitted by the petitioner on 10.09.2007. According to them, the period of three months had already elapsed and the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent to pass final order under Section 249(1) still subsists. There is a meticulous narration of the facts in the impugned order. Mention is made to the show cause notice, dated 01.09.2007, and the explanation submitted by the petitioner on 10.09.2007. That exercise is obviously referable to Section 249(1) of the Act. On receipt of the explanation from the petitioner, the 2nd respondent got the matter verified through the Divisional Panchayat Officer, who, in turn, submitted the report on 01.11.2007. If according to the 2nd respondent, the investigation into the charges against the petitioner is concluded, with the submission of the report of the Divisional Panchayat Officer, dated 01.11.2007, he ought to have passed an order under Section 249(1) of the Act. On the other hand, if any further investigation is contemplated, he ought to have mentioned the same in the show cause notice, dated 08.12.2007, issued under Section 249(6) of the Act. Though that provision is mentioned, it was not indicated that any further investigation is pending. That, however, appears to be an inadvertent lapse. As long as the proceedings were initiated under Section 249(1) of the Act, the mere fact that there is any defect in the order passed under Section 249(6) of the Act would not have the effect of terminating the entire proceedings. The impugned order cannot be sustained, for the reason that it was not mentioned that it is passed pending investigation into the charges against the petitioner. It gives an indication as though the order of suspension is passed almost as a substantive penalty. At any rate, the three (3) months period had since elapsed. Hence, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. It is, however, left open to the 2nd respondent to take further steps under Section 249(1) of the Act. There shall be no order as to costs.