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Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 675 (ALL)

TRILOKI NATH TANDON v. A K BHATTACHARYA

2008-03-26

DILIP GUPTA

body2008
DILIP GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 has been filed by the landlord against that portion of the judgment and decree of the Judgment, Small Cause Courts by which the relief for eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute was denied. ( 2 ) SCC Suit No. 82 of 1984 had been instituted on 30th May, 1984 by Triloki Nath Tandon against Sri A. K. Bhattacharya with the allegation that the plaintiff was the owner and landlord of premises No. 17/3-J, Bihari Lal Estate, The Mall, Kanpur; that the agreed rate of rent of the accommodation in possession of the defendant situated within the aforesaid premises was Rs. 1500/- per month besides Rs. 250/- per month towards other amenities and privileges which formed part of the rent; that the building was constructed and completed on or about 30th September, 1972 and was assessed with effect from 1st October, 1972 but since the property was constructed substantially from out of the loans taken from the Life Insurance Corporation, the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "act) was not applicable; that the defendant had not paid rent from 1st October, 1983 upto 23rd May, 1984; that the tenancy had been terminated by the notice dated 21st April, 1984 sent under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act with effect from the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice and the tenant was asked to deliver possession of the accommodation and pay arrears of rent and that the said notice was served upon the defendant on 23rd April, 1984 but the tenant did not handover the vacant possession and nor did he pay the arrears of rent. The suit was, therefore, filed with a prayer that the defendant be evicted from the premises in dispute and the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of arrears of rent may be decreed. ( 3 ) A Written Statement was filed by the defendant. The suit was, therefore, filed with a prayer that the defendant be evicted from the premises in dispute and the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of arrears of rent may be decreed. ( 3 ) A Written Statement was filed by the defendant. It was stated that the suit accommodation was in the tenancy of M/s. Medimix and not in the tenancy of Sri A. K. Bhattacharya; that Sri A. K. Bhattacharya at the time of inception of the tenancy was the partner of M/s. Medimix; that the premises was taken on rent for manufacturing purposes; that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim rent from 1st October, 1983 to 23rd May, 1984 as rent up to 31st August, 1984 had been paid; that the notice dated 21st April, 1984 was not served on the defendant and alternatively the notice referred to in the plaint was illegal because the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes and the tenancy could have been terminated by giving six months notice and not one month notice. ( 4 ) THE learned Judge, Small Causes Courts framed ten issues and the same are as follows :- 1]. Whether the defendant was the tenant or M/s. Medimix was the tenant? 2]. Whether the provisions of the Act were applicable to the building in dispute? 3]. Whether the defendant was in arrears of rent w. e. f. 1st October, 1983 as claimed in the plaint? 4]. Whether the tenancy was taken for manufacturing purposes and if so what is the effect on the notice dated 21st April, 1984? 5]. Whether the notice dated 21st April, 1984 was served upon the defendant? 6]. Whether the alleged agreement mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Written Statement had been entered into between the parries and if so then its effect? 7]. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to Rs. 250/- for other amenities towards the rent? 8]. To what relief the plaintiff was entitled to? 9]. Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed under Order IX, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 10]. Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed as full details of the disputed premises had not been given? ( 5 ) WHILE deciding issue No. 1, the Small Causes Courts found that the defendant was the tenant and M/s. Medimix was not the tenant. 10]. Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed as full details of the disputed premises had not been given? ( 5 ) WHILE deciding issue No. 1, the Small Causes Courts found that the defendant was the tenant and M/s. Medimix was not the tenant. In respect of issue No. 2, the Small Cause Courts held that the provisions of the Act were not applicable since the building had been constructed from the loan taken from the Life Insurance Corporation and the suit had been filed within 15 years from the date on which the construction was completed. Issue Nos. 3 and 6 were decided together and it was held that the defendant had not paid rent from October, 1983 and the alleged agreement dated 5th September, 1985 had not been executed. Issue Nos. 4 and 5 were also decided together and it was held that the notice dated 21st April, 1984 had not been sent by the plaintiff to the defendant and nor was the said notice served upon the defendant and the notice was illegal. Issue No. 7 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to amount of Rs. 250/- per month as rent for other amenities. Issue Nos. 9 and 10 were decided against the defendant. While deciding issue No. 8, the Court held that the suit for eviction of the tenant was liable to be dismissed but the suit for payment of arrears of rent was liable to be decreed. The learned Judge, Small Causes Courts by the judgment and order dated 16th August, 1987, accordingly, dismissed the suit for eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute but decreed the suit for payment of rent @ Rs. 1750/- per month with effect from 1st October, 1983 up to the date of presentation of the plaint. ( 6 ) THIS Revision was earlier allowed by this Court by judgment and order dated 26th October, 2004 and the decree passed by the Trial Court was modified to the extent that the suit for ejectment of the tenant from the disputed premises was also decreed in addition to the reliefs granted by the Trial Court. The defendant-tenant filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court and while granting leave, the Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 4589 of 2005. The defendant-tenant filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court and while granting leave, the Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 4589 of 2005. The judgment of the Supreme Court is quoted below:-"leave granted. Counsel appearing for the petitioners on 4th March, 2005 had contended before us that the Trial Court had non-suited the plaintiff-land-lord, respondent herein, on two grounds, namely, (i) that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short "the Act) had not been served on the petitioners-tenants, and (ii) that the premises had been let out for manufacturing purposes and therefore six months notice was required to be given instead of one months notice. The High Court has set aside the findings of the Trial Court on the requirement of issuance of six months notice but did not advert to or set aside the finding recorded by the Trial Court that notice under section 106 of the Act had not been served on the petitioners-tenants. We prima facie found substance in this submission and accordingly issued notice on 4th March, 2005. Respondent has put in appearance and filed her counter affidavit. Counsel appearing for the respondent has failed to show from the order of the High Court that the High Court has dealt with the finding recorded by the Trial Court with regard to service of the notice under section 106 of the Act or its validity. Counsel appearing for the respondent states that the impugned order of the High Court be set aside and the case be remitted back to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. Counsel for the petitioners has also no objection to remand the case. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. All contentions are left upon. The appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs. " ( 7 ) THIS Revision has accordingly came-up for hearing before this Court. ( 8 ) I have heard Sri P. K. Sinha, learned Counsel for the revisionist as well as Sri Sandeep Saxena, learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party and have perused the materials available on record. The appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs. " ( 7 ) THIS Revision has accordingly came-up for hearing before this Court. ( 8 ) I have heard Sri P. K. Sinha, learned Counsel for the revisionist as well as Sri Sandeep Saxena, learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party and have perused the materials available on record. ( 9 ) AS noticed above, the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed for payment of arrears of rent but the relief for ejectment of the defendant-tenant from the premises in dispute was declined. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the revisionist urged that the tenancy of the defendant had been duly terminated by the plaintiff by serving the notice dated 20th April, 1984 (wrongly mentioned as 21st April, 1984 in the plaint) by giving one month notice but the learned Judge, Small Cause Courts committed an illegality in coming to the conclusion that the notice terminating the tenancy had not been sent or served upon the defendant and that in any case, it was illegal since six months notice had not been given as was required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act where the lease is for manufacturing purposes. ( 11 ) SRI Sandeep Saxena, learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party, however, contended that there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Judge, Small Cause Courts while deciding issue Nos. 4 and 5 and, therefore, the revision is liable to be dismissed. ( 12 ) A perusal of the plaint of SCC Suit No. 82 of 1984 shows that in paragraphs 7 and 8, the plaintiff has stated as follows: - "7. That the defendants tenancy has been determined by valid notice dated 21. 4. 1984 duly served upon the defendant on 23. 4. 1984 with effect of expiry of one month i. e. 23. 5. 1984. 8. That the cause of action for the suit arose on expiry of 31. 10. 1983 when the rent of October 1983 fell due and also thereafter on each last day of the subsequent month when rent fell due and lastly on expiry of 23. 5. 1984 when the defendant failed to comply with the notice and also on each subsequent day to which the defendant is liable to pay mesne profits. 10. 1983 when the rent of October 1983 fell due and also thereafter on each last day of the subsequent month when rent fell due and lastly on expiry of 23. 5. 1984 when the defendant failed to comply with the notice and also on each subsequent day to which the defendant is liable to pay mesne profits. " ( 13 ) THE plaintiff had filed a number of documents along with the list dated 30th May, 1984. At Serial No. 1, was the copy of the notice dated 21st April, 1984 which was marked as Exhibit-17. The two postal receipts were also marked as Exhibits-18 and 19. A reply dated 19th May, 1984 was sent by the defendants lawyer Sri Rajeev Mohan to Sri Manoj, Advocate for the plaintiff with reference to the notice sent on behalf of Sri Tandon and the said reply was marked as Exhibit-21. ( 14 ) THE learned Judge, Small Causes Courts while deciding issue Nos. 4 and 5 observed that from a perusal of the notice (Ext. 17) sent by the plaintiff it was clear that it was dated 20th April, 1984 and the notice dated 21st April, 1984 of which mention was made by the plaintiff in the plaint was not filed and, therefore, when the notice which was the cause for filing the suit was not filed, the plaint was liable to be rejected. The Court also observed that in such circumstances, the notice dated 21st April, 1984 was not served upon the defendant. In the alternative the Court also observed that even if it was assumed that the notice which was sent by the plaintiff for determining the tenancy of the defendant was dated 21st April, 1984, then too the tenancy could not have been determined on the basis of the said notice as only 30 days time was given whereas six months time should have been given since the lease was for manufacturing purposes. ( 15 ) THE first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff had sent any notice to the defendant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for determining the tenancy of the defendant. ( 15 ) THE first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff had sent any notice to the defendant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for determining the tenancy of the defendant. ( 16 ) IT is not in dispute that the notice dated 20th April, 1984 (Ext 17) was sent by registered post by Sri Manoj Bose, Advocate, on instructions from his client Sri T. N. Tandon to Sri A. K. Bhattacharya and the address mentioned in the notice was 17/3-J, Bihari Lal Estate, The Mall, Kanpur. This notice was sent by registered post on 21st April, 1984 as is clear from Exhibit-18. This notice was also sent by Registered Post at another address namely F-33, Khapra Mohal, Kanpur and the postal receipt is Exhibit-19. The first notice was served upon the defendant but the second notice was returned back with the endorsement of the postman "refused". ( 17 ) THE notice dated 20th April, 1984 (Ext. 17) sent to the defendant by registered post on 21st April, 1984 as follows: "i am instructed by my client Shri T. N. Tandon resident of 24/18, Shyam Sunder Building, The Mall, Kanpur to write to you as follows: that the premises No. 17/3-T, Behari Lal Estate, The Mall, Kanpur is owned by my client of which you are tenant of the entire ground floor constructed portion at a rental of Rs. 1,750/= per month besides taxes. That you are in arrears of rent from 1st October, 83 to 31st March, 84 amounting to Rs. 10,500= 00 which you have failed to pay inspite of repeated demands and requests. That you are liable to pay a sum of Rs. 14069=58 plus Rs. 2,121=75 as excess water tax towards excess water consumption. The Bill from the Jal Sansthan has already been sent to you. The Taxes form a part of rent. You are called upon to pay the entire amount of Rs. 26,691=33 towards the arrears of rent and excess water tax to my client within a month of service of notice, failing which your position shall be that of a defaulter. That your are also liable to pay water tax @ 12-1/2% from 1. 4. 81 upto date and Drainage Tax @ 3% for the same period total amounting to Rs. 4,464=00. That your are also liable to pay water tax @ 12-1/2% from 1. 4. 81 upto date and Drainage Tax @ 3% for the same period total amounting to Rs. 4,464=00. The taxes are payable as per agreement at the inception of tenancy and under the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. That the premises is not governed by the provisions of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Since the building was constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of Loan from the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Your tenancy is terminated with effect from the expiry of thirty days from the service of notice and you are called upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the accommodation in your possession to my client at the expiry of thirty days from the date of service of notice, failing which my client shall initiate legal proceedings for your eviction, realisation of rent and taxes against you, at your entire risk, cost and responsibility. " ( 18 ) ON the record is the communication dated 19th May, 1984 sent by Rajeev Mohan, Advocate to Sri Manoj Bose, Advocate and a copy of the same has been marked as Exhibit-21. The first paragraph of this reply clearly states that the communication is with reference to the notice sent on behalf of Sri T. N. Tandon. The reply is as follows: "with reference to your notice sent on behalf of Shri T. N. Tandon I have been instructed to send you the following reply: 1. That my client Shri A. K. Bhattacharya is the tenant of whole ground floor of 17/3 J, Behari Lal Estate, The Mall, Kanpur at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month since the month of Dec. 1971. Your client began to harass my client and pressed for increasing rent. Under pressure my client increased the rent from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 750/- from the month of Feby. 1980. Your client was too greedy and pressed for further increase of rent. My client being a man of peaceful nature and being afraid of litigation further increased rent to Rs. 1500/- per month from Augt. 1982. The accommodation which is in the tenancy of my client was constructed in the year 1970 and the U. P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 became applicable in the year 1980 and the provisions of said Act are applicable. 2. 1500/- per month from Augt. 1982. The accommodation which is in the tenancy of my client was constructed in the year 1970 and the U. P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 became applicable in the year 1980 and the provisions of said Act are applicable. 2. That the rent of October and December 1983 was paid by my client to your client in cash and no receipt was issued by your client as promised by him. Moreover my client has incurred Rs. 3250/- for white-washing and repairs of which Rs. 3000/- is adjustable against him. Thus further rent has been paid to your client by my client and the rent alleged by your client is not due on my client. 3. That as regards your demand of water tax and excess water charges I have to inform you that my client has been paying Rs. 250/- per month as charges of amenity including water tax and drainage tax. Your client uses daily 1000 gallons of water by lifting it to upper storey to water pump for self use and for use of tenant residing on the upper storey. 4. That my client has informed that your client has dis-connected the water connection which is an offence and my client is going to take legal action to this respect. 5. That it is wrong that building in dispute was built out of loan taking from Life Insurance Corporation. This fact has been introduced in order to exclude building from the purview of U. P. Urban Building Act. 6. That much excess amount of rent demanded by your client which is not in fact due on my client that your notice is vague and invalid. 7. That in any case my client does not want to enter into litigation with your client and wants to settle it mutually. You are therefore requested to advise your client to settle the matter with my client amicably. 8. That in case your client takes any legal action against my client, the same shall be defended at the risk, cost and responsibility of your client, which please note very carefully. You are therefore requested to advise your client to settle the matter with my client amicably. 8. That in case your client takes any legal action against my client, the same shall be defended at the risk, cost and responsibility of your client, which please note very carefully. " ( 19 ) IT is not the case of the defendant that the reply dated 19th May, 1984 is not in connection with the notice dated 20th April, 1984 sent by Sri Manoj Bose, Advocate on instructions received from his client Sri T. A. Tandon and all that has been stated is that the notice dated 21st April, 1984 was not received by the defendant. It is also not the case set up by the defendant that some other notice was sent by the plaintiff to which the reply dated 19th May, 1984 was sent. It is, therefore, clear that the date of notice in the plaint has been wrongly mentioned as 21st April, 1984 instead of 20th April, 1984. However, as noticed above, the notice dated 20th April, 1984 was actually sent by registered post on 21st April, 1984 as is clear from the postal receipts which bear the date as 21st April, 1984. A perusal of the reply dated 19th May, 1984 sent on behalf of the defendant also clearly shows that it is in reply to the notice dated 20th April, 1984. It also needs to be emphasised that the defendant in his cross-examination admitted that the notice dated 20th April, 1984 (Paper No. 7-Ga) was served upon him on 23rd April, 1984. Paper No. 7-Ga is the notice dated 20th April, 1984 which has been marked as Exhibit-17. It is, therefore, clear that the notice dated 20th April sent by registered post on 21st April, 1984 and received by the defendant on 23rd April, 1984 was sent by the plaintiff for termination of the tenancy on the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice ( 20 ) IT must also be remembered that the notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should not be construed in a pedantic and impractical way so as to pick holes and find fault with the notice. The aim of the interpretation should be only to ascertain whether the person receiving the notice understood the same. The aim of the interpretation should be only to ascertain whether the person receiving the notice understood the same. The Court should construe the notice in such a way that it should not be defeated by inaccuracies in the language of the notice, especially in matters of description of the premises, the name of the tenant or the name of the landlord or the date of expiry of the notice. ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court in Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu and others, air 1977 SC 1120 =1977 (3) ALR 40 (SC) (Sum. ). clearly observed that the notice to quit must not be construed with a desire to find faults in it and the relevant portion is as follows: "now, it is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. "the validity of a notice to quit" as pointed out by Lord Justice Lindley, L. J. in Sidebotham v. Holland, (1895) 1 QB 378. v "ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw". It must not be read in a hyper critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way. See Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy,45 Ind App 222=air 1918 PC 102. The notice to quit in the present case must be judged for its validity in the light of this well recognised principle of interpretation. " The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagabandas Agarwalla (supra) was followed in Bal Kissen Shaw v. Kanupada Bhowmick and others,air 1935 Cal. 129. and in Kizhakke Kuruvatteri Sankaran Nambiar and others v. Thirumangalathmeethal T. M. Thambayi Pilla, air 2004 Ker. 135 . ( 22 ) IN Bal Kissen Shaw (supra) it was contended by the tenant that the notice was invalid since it was mentioned in the notice that it was issued under section 102 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Calcutta High Court repelled this contention in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and it was observed: "even if the notice is taken as it is, still then the notice cannot be held to be legally invalid or insufficient. The Calcutta High Court repelled this contention in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and it was observed: "even if the notice is taken as it is, still then the notice cannot be held to be legally invalid or insufficient. As it has been held that a notice is to be viewed not with the purpose of giving it a meaning which will invalidate it but with the purpose of seeing that the notice be properly interpreted as valid. Reference may be made in this connection to the observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1977 SC 1120 . " ( 23 ) IN Kizhakke Kuruvatteri (supra) the Kerala High Court also, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, observed that the notice to quit has to be liberally construed and, therefore, even if the lease was terminated before one day prior to the last date of tenancy month, it was of no consequence. ( 24 ) THUS, the finding to the contrary recorded by the learned Judge, Small Cause Courts that the notice for termination of the tenancy was not sent by the plaintiff merely on the ground that the said notice is not dated 21st April, 1984 deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. ( 25 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is whether the aforesaid notice sent under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was valid. The submission of the learned Counsel for the revisionist is that even if it is assumed that the lease was for manufacturing purposes then too in view of the fact that the tenancy was from month to month, the lease could be validly terminated on a months notice and the finding to the contrary recorded by the Trial Court that six months notice was required is against the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party, however, is that when the lease is for manufacturing purposes the tenancy can be terminated only by giving six months notice. ( 26 ) IT is not the case of the defendant-opposite party that the tenancy was not from month to month and indeed in the cross-examination the defendant clearly admitted that it was a month to month tenancy. ( 26 ) IT is not the case of the defendant-opposite party that the tenancy was not from month to month and indeed in the cross-examination the defendant clearly admitted that it was a month to month tenancy. It is, therefore, clear that the lease was not from year to year but was from month to month. ( 27 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be useful to refer the provisions of section 106 of the transfer of Property Act as amended in U. P. by U. P. Act No. 24 of 1954 and the same are as follows:- "section 106.-In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by thirty days notice. Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. " ( 28 ) A perusal of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act quoted above makes it clear that it is only in the absence of a contract to the contrary that a lease of immovable property for manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by a six months notice. ( 29 ) THIS Court in Shyam Lal v. Vlth Additional District Judge, Agra and others,1989 (15) ALR 24. while examining a similar controversy observed: "the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is invalid, as six months notice is required because the lease was for manufacturing purposes. while examining a similar controversy observed: "the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is invalid, as six months notice is required because the lease was for manufacturing purposes. In Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Devi,1968 ALJ 721. it has held that in case it is proved from the pleadings of the parties that the tenancy was from month to month then it would be a case of a contract to the contrary, as provided under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, in such a case, six months notice for determining the tenancy would not be required. The decision in this case was affirmed by the Honble Supreme Court. The judgment is in Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Devi,1969 AIRCJ 440. (supra ). This question was recently considered by Honble A. N. Verma, J. in Smt. Ram Moorti Devi v. District Judge, Meerut,1982 (2) ARC 403. Relying upon the decision in the case of Binda Din v. Smt. Prandevi (supra), it was held that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act embodied a rule of construction for finding out the duration of a lease. If there was no other evidence and circumstances, the lease would be deemed to be from year to year terminable on six months notice were it is for manufacturing purposes. If there was an indication that the tenancy was from month to month, the lease would be liable to be terminated on a months notice even if it was for manufacturing purposes. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by Honble A. N. Verma, J. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 30 ) IT is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid decision that where the lease has been granted for manufacturing purposes but the tenancy is from month to month then the lease can be terminated under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by giving one month notice. The aforesaid decision has placed reliance upon an earlier decision of this Court which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The finding to the contrary recorded by the Small Cause Courts is, therefore, liable to be set aside and is, accordingly, set aside and it is held that the tenancy was validly terminated. The aforesaid decision has placed reliance upon an earlier decision of this Court which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The finding to the contrary recorded by the Small Cause Courts is, therefore, liable to be set aside and is, accordingly, set aside and it is held that the tenancy was validly terminated. ( 31 ) THE only ground on which relief of ejectment has been denied to the plaintiff is that the notice dated 21st April, 1984 had not been served upon the defendant and even it was assumed to have been served then too it was invalid. These findings have been set aside. In such circumstances the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of ejectment also. ( 32 ) THE civil revision is, therefore, allowed and the decree passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court is modified to the extent that the plaintiff Shall also be entitled to the relief of ejectment. ( 33 ) THERE shall be no orders as to costs. Revision Allowed. .