ORDER :- This writ petition is filed for a writ of certiorari to quash Memo No.B/2/12190/93 dated 20.2.2001 passed by the respondent, whereby he rejected the application filed by the petitioners for determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") as barred by time. 2. Heard Sri K. Subrahmanya Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, leamed Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition and perused the record. 3. The lands of the petitioners, along with others, were acquired for the purpose of extension of Agricultural Market Yard at Nizamabad Town. The respondent passed award on 16.1.1976 fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.7,500/- per acre. The respondent referred the matter pertaining to one Akula Rajanna, whose lands were also acquired under the same notification, to the Civil Court under Sections 30 and 31 (2) of the Act as the said Rajanna died and his legal representatives failed to attend the enquiry. The reference was numbered as O.P. No.120 of 1976 and subsequently it was closed as Ajjam Linganna, who is the son of late Rajanna, though served with notice issued by the Civil Court, did not pursue the matter. Subsequently, the said Linganna filed an LA for reopening of the case and accordingly, the said O.P was reopened and renumbered as O.P. No.471 of 1993. After restoration and renumbering of the O.P, Linganna filed an LA for amendment of the form of reference to one under Section 18 of the Act and for enhancement of compensation awarded for the acquired land. The said I.A was allowed. The petitioners claimed that as they were not served with Section 12(2) notices, they could not avail their right to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act and that in O.P No.471 of 1993, they filed an application for their impleadment, which was allowed by the reference Court. The reference Court disposed of O.P. No.471 of 1993 on 15.6.1994 by fixing the market value of the acquired lands at Rs.50/- per square yard. The respondent filed A.S. No.1105 of 1994, against the said award and decree, in this Court. He also filed CRP No.2279 of 1995 and batch against the order of the reference Court impleading the petitioners and other land owners, who did not make a claim for reference under Section 18 of the Act. The respondent filed A.S. No.1105 of 1994, against the said award and decree, in this Court. He also filed CRP No.2279 of 1995 and batch against the order of the reference Court impleading the petitioners and other land owners, who did not make a claim for reference under Section 18 of the Act. By common judgment dated 10.3.1999 passed in CRP No.2279 of 1995 and batch and A.S. No.1105 of 1994, this Court allowed the said batch of CRPs and set aside the order impleading the petitioners and others. This Court also allowed the Appeal Suit and set aside enhancement of market value made in favour of Ajjam Linganna. The petitioners and other land owners filed SLPs in the Supreme Court against the orders in the said batch of CRPs. Ajjam Linganna also filed an SLP against the judgment of this Court. The Supreme Court in Ajjam Linganna and others v. Land Acquisition Officer-Revenue Divisional Officer, Nizamabad, 2001 (1) ALT 50 (sq, while confirming the orders of this Court in the batch of CRPs, however, set aside the judgment of this Court in A.S. No.1105 of 1994 and confirmed the award of the Civil Court. The petitioners approached the respondent for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act by way of an application dated 29.1.2001. The said application having been rejected, they filed the present writ petition. 4. At the hearing Sri K. Subrahmanya Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, made strenuous efforts to persuade this Court to hold that the application filed by the petitioners, for re-determination of compensation, is within time. The period of three months prescribed in Section 28-A of the Act, contends the learned Senior Counsel, will start running from the date of the judgment of the final appellate Court and not from the award of the reference Court in O.P. No.471 of 1993. The period of three months prescribed in Section 28-A of the Act, contends the learned Senior Counsel, will start running from the date of the judgment of the final appellate Court and not from the award of the reference Court in O.P. No.471 of 1993. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others, 2002 (5) ALD 113 (SC) = (2002) 7 SCC 273 , Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumari and others, AIR 1995 SC 2259 , and the judgments of this Court in Marri Venkaiah and others v. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), Srisailam Left Bank Chawrel Unit-2, Gandamvarigudem, Nalgonda District and others, 1994 (1) ALT 491 (DB) and Ganthula Seshagiri Rao v. Collector, East Godavari District, Kakinada and others, 2008 (4) ALD 792 . 5. Opposing the above contention, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition contended that the words ''within three months from the date of the award of the Court" shall be construed as the award of the reference Court as defined in Section 3(d) of the Act and that so construed, the application filed by the petitioners in the year 2001 is far beyond the time limit of three months from 15.6.1994, the date on which the reference Court disposed of the O.P. In support of her contention, she relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in D. Venkamma and others v. Special Tahsildar (LA) Unit-IV, Janagareddigudem, West Godavari District, (1996) I SCC 85 = 1996 (1) ALD (SCSN) 14 and Smt Bhagti (deceased) through her L.Rs., Jagdish Ram Sharma, appellant v. State of Haryana, respondent, AIR 1997 SC 1793 . 6. I have carefully considered' the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. 7. Under Section 28-A of the Act, the persons, who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector, but have not made an application to him under Section 18 of the Act, are entitled to move the Collector for re-determination of the compensation within three months from the date of the award of the Court. 7. Under Section 28-A of the Act, the persons, who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector, but have not made an application to him under Section 18 of the Act, are entitled to move the Collector for re-determination of the compensation within three months from the date of the award of the Court. Section 3(d) of the Act defined "Court" as a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed a Special Judicial Officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Therefore, the only question to be decided in this writ petition is whether the time limit of three months starts running trom the date of the award of the reference Court or from the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the SLPs filed by the petitioners and Ajjam Linganna. In my considered view, this aspect is no longer res integra in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in D. Venkamma's case (supra) and Smt Bhagti (deceased) through her L.Rs., Jagdish Ram Sharma's case (supra). 8. In D. Venkamma's case (supra), an identical issue arose for consideration of the Supreme Court. In that case, notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 3.1.1980, award was passed on 31.1 0.1981, compensation was received by the parties; in the reference made by certain aggrieved parties, the Civil Court enhanced the compensation by its decree dated 21.11.1983 and on appeal filed by the State and cross-objections filed by the claimants, the compensation was further enhanced by the High Court. Based on the judgment of the High Court, the petitioners before the Supreme Court filed an application before the Land Acquisition Officer for determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act on 16.5.1989. The said application was rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer and writ petition filed by the party was allowed' by a learned Single Judge of this Court. However, on appeal, the Division Bench reversed the said judgment. The said application was rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer and writ petition filed by the party was allowed' by a learned Single Judge of this Court. However, on appeal, the Division Bench reversed the said judgment. While considering the appeal filed along with the Special Leave Petition by the aggrieved claimant, the Supreme Court in Paragraph 3 held as under: "Section 28-A of the Act speaks of redetetmination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the "award of the Court" and provides that when the Court allows any amount in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the person or persons interested in all other lands covered by the notification under Section 4(1) and who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that he/they had not made an application, by a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of award of the Court, require the Collector to re-determine the compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. In other words, the foundation for making an application under Section 28-A is the award of the Court. The expression 'Court' has been defined under Section 3(d) to mean "a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction" and in an appropriate case "a special judicial officer" appointed by the Government to perform the functions of the Court. In other words, the Court of original jurisdiction which receives an order of reference pursuant to an application made under Section 18 is the civil Court of original jurisdiction. By necessary implication, judgment of an appellate Court made under Section 54 of the Act does not give right or cause of action to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act. (Emphasis added) 9. In Smt Bhagti (deceased) through her L.Rs., Jagdish Ram Sharma's case (supra), more or less an identical situation arose where the party who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act, without making an application under Section 28-A of the Act within the time limit from the decree of the reference Court waited till the disposal of the appeal by the High Court and filed his application, within 30 days from the date of judgment of the High Court. While dealing with the said case, the Supreme Court in Paragraph 4 held as under: "It is contended that the petitioner is entitled to re-determination of compensation on par with others and the question of limitation does not stand in the way. The question, therefore, is; as to when the limitation begins to run for the purpose of filing of an application under Section 28-A of the Act". The Amendment Act 68 of 1984, introducing Section 28-A had come into force with effect from September 24, 1984. Section 28-A envisages giving of benefit to a person who had accepted the award made under Section 11 without protest and did not avail of the reference under Section 18 for further enhancement and others had the award of enhanced compensation. He has been given right to make a written application to the L.A.O within 30 days from the date of the award of the Court excluding the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the award of the Court. It is now fairly well settled legal proposition that the award of the Court is the award of the reference Court under Section 18. That is clear from the statement of the objects and reasons as also from the unequivocal language used in Section 28-A(1) of the Act. It is equally well settled legal position that once time has begun to run, it will continue to run until it is stayed by an appropriate Court. The remedy, thereafter stands barred. The proviso to Section 28-A(1) only excludes the time actually taken in obtaining the certified copy, while computing the period of three months' limitation prescribed under Section 28-A(1). In other words, the time taken to obtain certified copy alone is to be excluded in computation of limitation of three months. The reference in Jose Antonio's case, (1995 AIR SCW 4735), was confined to the question as to which of the two awards, when there are more than one award passed by the reference Court in respect of the land covered under the same notification published under Section 4(1), would give cause of action and to the question (of) limitation to file application under Section 28A(1). In other words, the question therein was which of the two dates of two awards, furnishes the period of limitation of three months. In the present case in hand that question does not arise. In other words, the question therein was which of the two dates of two awards, furnishes the period of limitation of three months. In the present case in hand that question does not arise. There are no two awards of the reference Court. In Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 730 , a Bench of three Judges of this Court held that "it is obvious on a plain reading of subsection (1) of Section 28-A that it applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under Section 18. The determination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the Court in the reference under Section 18 and an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. The order of the High Court does not give right to file application under Section 28-A(1)." (Emphasis added) 10. In view of the above authoritative pronouncements, I am of the considered opinion that in the instant case the time began to run to make an application for determination from 15.6.1994 i.e., the date on which the Court, which necessarily means the reference Court, disposed of O.P. No.471 of 1993. Therefore, the rejection of the petitioners' application on the ground that the same is beyond limitation cannot be found fault with. 11. The learned Senior Counsel, however, placed heavy reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi (supra). In the said case, the issues, which were referred to the Larger Bench, are as follows: ' "1.(a) Whether dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay amounts, to 'not filing an application' within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? (b) Whether a person whose application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is dismissed on the ground of delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain an application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act? 2. Whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the award of the land Acquisition Collector and has not filed an application seeking reference under Section 18 is 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of Section 28-A?" 12. 2. Whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the award of the land Acquisition Collector and has not filed an application seeking reference under Section 18 is 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of Section 28-A?" 12. While answering issue l(a) and (b), the Supreme Court held that to bar a person from invoking the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, his application for reference must have been answered on merits and mere rejection of his application on the ground of delay cannot be a ground to deny him the benefit under Section 28-A of the Act. There cannot be any quarrel about the said proposition. Indeed following the said judgment, this Court in Guthula Seshagiri Rao v. Collector, East Godavari District and others, 2008 (4) ALD 792 , negatived the contention advanced on behalf of the Collector, East Godavari District that mere rejection of reference on the ground of delay by the reference Court does not bar the application under Section 28-A of the Act But, I do not see how the proposition laid down in the above mentioned Constitution Bench judgment comes to the aid of the petitioners in this case. Having carefully considered the said judgment, I am of the view that the issue referred to the said Bench and decided by it has no relevance to the issue arising in this case. Similarly, the judgment in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (supra), equally has no application, because in the said case, the question was which of the awards that could be made basis for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act. The Supreme Court held that having regard to the purpose and object for which Section 28-A of the Act has been inserted, a liberal approach has to be made and that all the benefits which were given in the latter awards shall be made available to the applicant under Section 28-A and not necessarily on the basis of the first of the awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer. This judgment is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioners. This judgment is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioners. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Marri Venkaiah's case (supra), equally has no application to this case, because in the said case the question that was decided was whether the limitation of three months starts running from the date of award or from the date of knowledge of the award. The Division Bench considering the beneficial nature of Section 28-A held that the said provision cannot be liberally construed and that it is only from the date of knowledge of the award that limitation starts running. 13. For the above mentioned reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. 14. As a sequel to dismissal of main petition, interim order dated 3.4.2001 is vacated and WPMP No.7638 of 2001 is dismissed. WVMP No.3054 of 2001 is disposed of as infructuous.