JUDGMENT L.N. Mittal, J.:-This is appeal by Hakam Singh impugning judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.02.1995 of learned Special Judge, Bathinda, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short - ‘the Act’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month. 2. Brief facts of the case, as alleged by the prosecution, are as under :- Suit of one Lachhman Dass for recovery of Rs.12,200/- was decreed against Bhan Singh-complainant vide judgment and decree dated 03.10.1991 of learned Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda, along with interest from the date of suit till realisation. In execution petition, warrant of attachment (Ex.P-F) of tractor trolley of complainant Bhan Singh was issued and was entrusted to appellant Hakam Singh, who was then posted as Bailiff under Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda. On 04.03.1992, the appellant went to complainant’s village for effecting attachment in execution of the warrant of attachment. The complainant pleaded to the appellant that he had to file appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court and sought assistance from the appellant against attachment. The appellant told him that he would not show presence of the complainant and would manage to get some other date by making report to enable the complainant to file appeal in the meanwhile. The appellant asked the complainant to meet him on 05.03.1992 at 10:00 A.M. outside the Court Complex, Bathinda near Red Cross Dhaba and assured to extend benefit to the complainant. The appellant also warned the complainant that if he would not come accordingly, the appellant still had time to execute the warrant and would accordingly effect attachment by visiting the complainant’s village again and thereby complainant’s reputation would be lowered in the village and he would also face hardship in filing appeal. Accordingly, the complainant met the appellant at the aforestated date, time and place. The appellant demanded Rs.500/- as illegal gratification from the complainant so as to make favourable report saying that the warrant was still with him. The matter was ultimately settled for Rs.300/- as bribe. The complainant sought time of three hours to arrange the money. Accordingly, the complainant met the appellant at the aforestated date, time and place. The appellant demanded Rs.500/- as illegal gratification from the complainant so as to make favourable report saying that the warrant was still with him. The matter was ultimately settled for Rs.300/- as bribe. The complainant sought time of three hours to arrange the money. The appellant then went to Vigilance Bureau and made statement to Inspector Harbans Singh narrating the aforesaid facts and also presented three currency notes of Rs.100/- denomination each. Naib Singh, Clerk in the office of Deputy Commissioner, was joined as shadow witness. Necessary instructions were given to the complainant and the shadow witness. The currency notes were treated with Phenol Phthalein Powder. Demonstration was also given to the complainant. The notes were handed over to the complainant with necessary instructions. Requisite memo mentioning numbers of the currency notes also was prepared. The complainant accordingly went to the appellant and on his demand, gave him the tainted currency notes worth Rs.300/-. Naib Singh–shadow witness gave pre-arranged signal to the police party. Thereupon, police party apprehended the appellant. The tainted currency notes were recovered from the right side pocket of his pants. Numbers of the said currency notes tallied with the numbers of the currency notes mentioned in the above mentioned memo. Hand-wash and pocket-wash of the appellant in solution of sodium carbonate separately turned the solution pink. Both the solutions were sealed in separate nips and were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory from where report Ex.P-L was received that sodium carbonate and phenol phthalein were found in the solutions. At the spot, necessary investigation formalities were conducted by Inspector Harbans Singh, who prepared rough site plan Ex.P-M of the place of occurrence and recorded statements of witnesses. During investigation, photostat copy of service book of the appellant was collected and so also warrant of attachment and copy of movement register of the appellant. Orders relating to promotion and posting of the appellant as Bailiff (Ex.P-R and Ex.P-S) passed by Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda were also collected. Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda also passed Sanction Order Ex.P-N granting sanction under Section 19 of the Act for prosecution of the appellant for offence under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Act. Orders relating to promotion and posting of the appellant as Bailiff (Ex.P-R and Ex.P-S) passed by Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda were also collected. Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda also passed Sanction Order Ex.P-N granting sanction under Section 19 of the Act for prosecution of the appellant for offence under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Act. On completion of investigation, report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was submitted in the concerned court for prosecution of the appellant for the said offences. 3. Charge under Section 13(2) of the Act was framed against the appellant. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. To prove its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses. Naib Singh (PW-1), shadow witness and Bhan Singh–complainant (PW-6) and Investigating Officer Inspector Harbans Singh (PW-7) have broadly stated according to the prosecution version narrated herein above. Makhan Singh–Chowkidaar (PW-2) stated that the appellant had visited the village of the complainant and inquired about the complainant. The witness accompanied the appellant to the house of the complainant, who was not found present there, but complainant’s son was present. The appellant made report Ex.P-E on the warrant. The report was also signed by Makhan Singh–Chowkidaar. Rajinder Pal, Civil Nazar (PW-3) stated that the attachment warrant (Ex.P-F) was initially assigned to Mohinder Singh–Bailiff vide entry no. 563, photocopy Ex.P-G for execution, but thereafter the appellant came back on expiry of leave period and the warrant was marked to the appellant in the same entry. The warrant was returned on 05.03.1992 along with report Ex.P-E on its back. Photostat copy of entry Ex.P-G was seized by the police vide memo Ex.P-H. Balbir Singh (PW-4) was posted in Civil Nazar branch. He stated that warrant of attachment Ex.P-F was marked to Mohinder Singh–Process Server. Kewal Krishan (PW-5)–Additional Ahlmad stated that he had issued the attachment warrant Ex.P-F on 22.01.1992. Head Constable Harcharan Singh (PW-8), Constable Gurdev Singh (PW-9) and Constable Raghbir Singh (PW-10) tendered their respective affidavits Ex.PW-8/A, Ex.PW-9/A and Ex.PW- 10/A in evidence. Orders Ex.P-R and Ex.P-S of promotion and posting of the appellant as Bailiff and Report Ex.P-L of Forensic Science Laboratory were also tendered in evidence. 5. Head Constable Harcharan Singh (PW-8), Constable Gurdev Singh (PW-9) and Constable Raghbir Singh (PW-10) tendered their respective affidavits Ex.PW-8/A, Ex.PW-9/A and Ex.PW- 10/A in evidence. Orders Ex.P-R and Ex.P-S of promotion and posting of the appellant as Bailiff and Report Ex.P-L of Forensic Science Laboratory were also tendered in evidence. 5. The appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when he admitted that he was promoted and appointed and posted as Bailiff by Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda vide orders Ex.P-R and P-S. However, the appellant broadly denied all the other incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and claimed to be innocent. He alleged that on 04.03.1992, he had gone to the complainant’s village for execution of the attachment warrant and after joining Chowkidaar Makhan Singh, went to the house of the complainant, who was not present in his house but his sons Kaka Singh and Makhan Singh were present along with one Chand Singh. The appellant tried to attach the trolley found there but Sapurdar was not available and accordingly, appellant made report on the warrant correctly according to law. The appellant also stated that he gave back the attachment warrant with his aforesaid report in the office of Senior Sub Judge, much before his involvement in the instant case. The appellant denied having demanded or accepted any gratification. The complainant felt insulted on account of attachment warrant and therefore, got registered false case against the appellant. 6. In defence, the appellant examined Mahohar Lal Sharma (DW- 1)–Senior Assistant from the High Court, who proved Government instructions forwarded by the High Court to all the District and Sessions Judges, inter alia to the effect that the Vigilance Bureau shall not lay any trap against any officer/official, subject to the control of the High Court, without taking into confidence the Registrar of the High Court or the District and Sessions Judge concerned. The appellant also tendered in evidence copies of judgment and decree as well as plaint, application for leave to defend and execution petition in defence. 7. The learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 17.02.1995 held the appellant guilty under Section 13 (2) of the Act and convicted him accordingly. After hearing the parties on sentence, the learned trial court vide order of even date, sentenced the appellant as already noticed in the opening part of this judgment. 7. The learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 17.02.1995 held the appellant guilty under Section 13 (2) of the Act and convicted him accordingly. After hearing the parties on sentence, the learned trial court vide order of even date, sentenced the appellant as already noticed in the opening part of this judgment. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the instant appeal. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned State counsel and perused the records. 9. Bhan Singh–complainant has deposed in detail regarding prosecution version. He was subjected to very lengthy cross-examination but fully stood the test of cross-examination and his veracity could not be shaken in any manner. His statement is corroborated by shadow witness Naib Singh. The prosecution case is further proved by the testimony of Harbans Singh Inspector. Statement of all these three witnesses coupled with other evidence on record are sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is undisputed that warrant of attachment Ex.P-F was entrusted to the appellant as Bailiff for execution and the appellant visited the complainant’s village on 04.03.1992 for execution of the warrant. However, the appellant made report Ex.P-E regarding non-execution of the warrant. The appellant demanded illegal gratification from the complainant warning him that if the bribe was not paid, the appellant had sufficient time to visit the complainant’s village again and to effect attachment. The complainant was thus forced to pay the scaled down amount of Rs.300/- as illegal gratification to the appellant. Payment of the said amount by the complainant to the appellant is fully proved from the statements of Bhan Singh (PW-6) and Naib Singh (PW-1). Recovery of the said amount from the appellant is also proved by the statement of these two witnesses as well as statement of Harbans Singh Inspector. It is, therefore, manifest that the appellant demanded and accepted Rs.300/- as illegal gratification from the complainant. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Harbans Singh Inspector has admitted that before laying the trap, he had not obtained the permission of concerned District and Sessions Judge, and thereby, there has been breach of Government instructions on the subject. The Government instructions Ex.D-C to this effect do not have statutory force. These are administrative instructions. Mere breach thereof would not vitiate the entire proceedings or the prosecution of the appellant. The Government instructions Ex.D-C to this effect do not have statutory force. These are administrative instructions. Mere breach thereof would not vitiate the entire proceedings or the prosecution of the appellant. On the other hand, Harbans Singh has stated that he had sent information to the Deputy Commissioner, Bathinda before conducting the raid. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant next vehemently contended that vide movement register entry Ex.P-G, the appellant had already returned the attachment warrant with his report on 04.03.1992 and therefore, the appellant had no occasion to demand illegal gratification from the complainant for making a favourable report. The contention is devoid of merit. Entry Ex.P-G reveals that the warrant was allegedly returned on 04.03.1992, but Rajinder Pal, Civil Nazar (PW-3) stated that the warrant was returned on 05.03.1992. Moreover, the complainant could not be aware of the fact that the appellant had returned the warrant. On the contrary, the appellant told the complainant that the warrant was still with him and he had sufficient time to visit the complainant’s village again and to effect the attachment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant had no occasion to demand the illegal gratification from the complainant. Here it has to be noticed that attachment warrant Ex.P-F reveals that that execution petition was fixed for 07.03.1992 and therefore, the appellant had enough time to effect attachment even on 05.03.1992 or 06.03.1992. The complainant thus rightly believed the threat of the appellant and agreed to pay the illegal gratification. There is thus no merit in the aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the appellant. 12. It was next argued by learned counsel for the appellant that Makhan Singh, Chowkidaar (PW-2) has stated that the complainant was not found present when this witness along with appellant visited the house of the complainant whereas the complainant has stated that he was present there at that time and the appellant had met him. It was accordingly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that there is no other evidence regarding demand allegedly made by the appellant on 04.03.1992. The contention is devoid of substance. It is not even the case of the complainant that the appellant demanded illegal gratification on 04.03.1992 in the village of the complainant. It was accordingly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that there is no other evidence regarding demand allegedly made by the appellant on 04.03.1992. The contention is devoid of substance. It is not even the case of the complainant that the appellant demanded illegal gratification on 04.03.1992 in the village of the complainant. On the other hand, the complainant’s case is that he was asked by the appellant to meet him next day i.e. on 05.03.1992 outside the Court compound at Bathinda. It was in this meeting on 05.03.1992 that the appellant raised the demand of Rs.500/- as illegal gratification and the amount was then settled at Rs.300/-. 13. The appellant has alleged that the complainant felt insulted because the appellant had taken the warrant of attachment to the complainant’s village and therefore, complainant registered the instant case falsely. This plea of the appellant cannot be accepted because the appellant was not at fault in any manner in taking the attachment warrant to the complainant’s village for execution because the appellant was acting in the exercise of his official duty for execution of the warrant of attachment issued by the Court. Merely because the appellant had taken the attachment warrant for execution to the complainant’s village, it cannot be said that the complainant would implicate the appellant in a false case. Moreover, there is no reason why Naib Singh (PW-1) and Harbans Singh (PW-7) would also depose falsely against the appellant. They had no malice or ill-will against the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant stressed that no independent witness was associated in the raid because even Naib Singh (PW-1) was a Clerk in the office of Deputy Commissioner. The argument cannot be accepted. Naib Singh in fact tried to tilt in favour of the appellant in cross-examination being local official like the appellant. Naib Singh otherwise had no axe to grind by deposing against the appellant falsely. Similarly, Harbans Singh (PW-7) also cannot be said to be interested witness merely because he had laid the trap to apprehend the appellant. He also had no motive to depose against the appellant falsely or to implicate him in a false case. 14. Naib Singh otherwise had no axe to grind by deposing against the appellant falsely. Similarly, Harbans Singh (PW-7) also cannot be said to be interested witness merely because he had laid the trap to apprehend the appellant. He also had no motive to depose against the appellant falsely or to implicate him in a false case. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that shadow witness Naib Singh (PW-1) has stated in the examination-in-chief itself that he did not know what conversation took place between the complainant and the appellant as he had not heard the said conversation. It was accordingly contended that except the testimony of the complainant, there is no other evidence of demand of bribe by the appellant. The argument, although apparently attractive, is in fact, fallacious. Bhan Singh–complainant has categorically deposed that the appellant had demanded illegal gratification in the manner noticed herein above. Then we have statements of Bhan Singh and Naib Singh regarding payment of the bribe amount of Rs.300/- to the appellant. Besides it, there are also statements of Naib Singh, Bhan Singh and Harbans Singh regarding recovery of the said bribe amount in the form of tainted currency notes from the appellant. All this evidence is sufficient to prove the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount by the appellant. In this context, learned State counsel also contended that presumption under Section 20 of the Act has also to be raised. There is considerable force in the contention. Section 20 (1) of the Act lays down that if it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained any gratification, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted the gratification as a motive or reward, as mentioned in Section 7 of the Act. In the instant case, it is fully proved from the statements of Naib Singh, Bhan Singh and Harbans Singh that the appellant received the amount of Rs.300/- as illegal gratification from the complainant and the said amount was recovered from the appellant. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the appellant accepted the said amount as illegal gratification. In this regard, reliance on behalf of the State has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hazari Lal vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported as AIR 1980 SC 874. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the appellant accepted the said amount as illegal gratification. In this regard, reliance on behalf of the State has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hazari Lal vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported as AIR 1980 SC 874. In that case, even the complainant had partly turned hostile but corroborated the statement of the police officer on some material particulars. Conviction of the appellant in that case was upheld. In the instant case, the prosecution is on a much better footing. All the witnesses have fully supported the prosecution case and have not turned hostile. The complainant has fully stood the ground in his lengthy cross-examination. He is fully corroborated by the testimony of the shadow witness Naib Singh (PW-1). There is also testimony of Harbans Singh Inspector (PW-7). All this evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Learned State counsel also cited a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M. Narsinga Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported as 2001 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 95. It was observed therein that the prosecution has to prove that the appellant has accepted the gratification and on proof thereof, there is presumption to be drawn under Section 20 (1) of the Act that the accused accepted the gratification as a reward as is the requirement of Section 7 of the Act, unless the contrary is proved. In the instant case, the contrary has not been proved in any manner. On the other hand, in the reported case, even the complainant and the shadow witness had turned hostile and obliged the appellant. Inspite thereof, conviction of the appellant was upheld. In the instant case, the prosecution is on much better footing. All the witnesses including the complainant and the shadow witness as well as the raiding officer have fully supported the prosecution case. Reference in this behalf may also be made to the case of Girja Prasad (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of M.P. reported as [2007(4) LAW HERALD (SC) 2660 ] : A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 3106. In that case also, presumption was raised under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (corresponding to Section 20 (1) of the Act of 1988). It was also held that police witnesses are not always to be disbelieved. vs. State of M.P. reported as [2007(4) LAW HERALD (SC) 2660 ] : A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 3106. In that case also, presumption was raised under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (corresponding to Section 20 (1) of the Act of 1988). It was also held that police witnesses are not always to be disbelieved. Credibility of a witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. In a given case, Court may not base conviction solely on the statement of a police official, but it is not the law that police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent witnesses. In the instant case, we have reliable statements of Naib Singh–shadow witness, Bhan Singh–complainant and Harbans Singh–Inspector. The same are sufficient to prove all the ingredients of the offence against the appellant. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant relying on two judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ram Prakash Arora vs. The State of Punjab reported as A.I.R 1973 S.C. 498 and Darshan Lal vs. The Delhi Administration reported as A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 218 contended that independent corroboration is required to convict an accused in a corruption case. The argument cannot be accepted. No such proposition of law was laid down in the aforesaid judgments. On the other hand, it was observed that in a proper case, the Court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused persons. It was in the facts and circumstances of those cases that it was observed that in a proper case, the Court may look for independent corroboration. In those cases, the evidence led by the prosecution needed independent corroboration. In the instant case, however, there is no need for any other independent corroboration as the statements of Naib Singh, Bhan Singh and Harbans Singh are credit worthy. As already noticed herein above, Naib Singh and Harbans Singh are also just like independent witnesses. Harbans Singh had no motive to implicate the appellant in a false case and to secure his conviction. Similarly, Naib Singh had no link with the complainant nor biased against the appellant. So, both these witnesses are just like independent witnesses. As already noticed herein above, Naib Singh and Harbans Singh are also just like independent witnesses. Harbans Singh had no motive to implicate the appellant in a false case and to secure his conviction. Similarly, Naib Singh had no link with the complainant nor biased against the appellant. So, both these witnesses are just like independent witnesses. It is worth mentioning that the fact that Naib Singh stated that he did not hear the conversation of the complainant and the appellant shows that he is a truthful and independent witness as he could lean in favour of the appellant and not favour of the prosecution. His testimony, therefore, is very reliable and trustworthy and inspires confidence. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Rajinder Pal–Civil Nazar (PW-3) has admitted in his cross-examination that all the process servers appeared before the Senior Sub Judge in connection with apprehension of the appellant and accordingly Vigilance Inspector was called by the Senior Sub Judge and so also this witness, and the witness was directed to show the report made by the appellant to the Vigilance Inspector. However, this admission of Rajinder Pal is of no help to the appellant. The appellant was working under this witness and obviously, the witness had sympathy for the appellant and made the aforesaid admission in crossexamination as suggested to him. However, no such suggestion was put to Harbans Singh–Inspector and therefore, the aforesaid statement of Rajinder Pal cannot be relied upon. If Rajinder Pal had been asked by the Senior Sub Judge to show the report as made by the appellant on warrant of attachment to Harbans Singh–Inspector, this fact should have been put to Harbans Singh–Inspector in his cross-examination. The very fact that the appellant did not date to put this fact to Harbans Singh–Inspector in his cross-examination reveals that the admission made by Rajinder Pal in crossexamination carries no value and was made only as favour to the appellant on account of being colleagues in the same office. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant also assailed the validity of sanction order Annexure Ex.P-N granted under Section 19 of the Act by Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda for prosecution of the appellant. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant also assailed the validity of sanction order Annexure Ex.P-N granted under Section 19 of the Act by Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda for prosecution of the appellant. It was argued that according to photostat copy of Ex.P-Q of Service Book of the appellant, he was initially appointed as Chowkidaar by District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda and then posted as Kahar (Water Carrier) and then transferred as Process Server by District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda to the establishment of Senior Sub Judge. It was accordingly contended that under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the appellant could be removed from service by the appointing authority i.e. District and Sessions Judge, or by some higher authority and therefore, sanction order should also have been passed by District and Sessions Judge or some higher authority but sanction has been granted by Senior Sub Judge, who is lower in rank to the District and Sessions Judge, and therefore, the sanction order is invalid. This argument is also without merit. It is correct that initial appointment of the appellant as Chowkidaar was by District and Sessions Judge. However, at the time of commission of offence, the appellant was posted as Bailiff. His appointment as Bailiff (by promotion) was admittedly and undisputedly made by Senior Sub Judge. Consequently, appointing authority of the appellant as Bailiff was Senior Sub Judge and not District and Sessions Judge. Consequently, Senior Sub Judge, being appointing authority of the appellant as Bailiff, was also competent authority to remove the appellant from service and therefore, sanction granted by the Senior Sub Judge for prosecution of the appellant is perfectly legal and valid and does not suffer from any infirmity and cannot be said to be invalid in any manner. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his contention, placed reliance on a judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Bhaurao Marotrao Manekar vs. State of Maharashtra reported as 1980 (2) S.L.R. 383 and also on a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Kumar vs. The Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway and others reported as A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 1912. In those cases, however, the sanction had been granted by a subordinate authority, to whom power had been delegated by appointing authority. In those cases, however, the sanction had been granted by a subordinate authority, to whom power had been delegated by appointing authority. These judgments are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand inasmuch as in the instant case, the appointing authority of the appellant as Bailiff (by way of promotion) was Senior Sub Judge and not District and Sessions Judge. Consequently, Senior Sub Judge was competent to remove the appellant from service as Bailiff and was therefore, competent to grant requisite sanction under Section 19 of the Act for prosecution of the appellant. 18. In addition to the aforesaid, reference may also be made to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the Act, which are reproduced hereunder :- “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), - (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby ; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice ; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, - (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction ; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 19. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, - (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction ; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 19. The aforesaid provisions lay down that no finding, sentence or order passed by Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal on the ground of any error in the sanction required under sub-section (1) unless in the opinion of the Appellate Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. For this purpose, ‘error’ includes competence of the authority to grant the sanction. In the instant case, no failure of justice has been occasioned by grant of sanction by the Senior Sub Judge and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of learned Special Judge cannot be reversed merely on the ground of the alleged incompetency of the Senior Sub Judge to grant sanction. I may hasten to add that as already discussed herein above, Senior Sub Judge was very much competent to grant the requisite sanction. 20. Inevitable conclusion of the aforesaid discussion is that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction does not warrant any interference in appeal. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial court deserves to be reduced. It was pointed out that the occurrence took place 16 years ago and the appellant is now aged over 66 years. He has already faced the criminal proceedings for over 16 years and he has lost his service in the year 1999 on account of the instant case. Learned counsel for the appellant cited a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Rashid B. Mulani reported as (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Crl.) 408 in support of his aforesaid contention. I have carefully considered the contention. Keeping in view the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial court warrants reduction. I have carefully considered the contention. Keeping in view the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial court warrants reduction. Keeping in view all the circumstances, the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant is reduced from rigorous imprisonment for four years to rigorous imprisonment for two years, while maintaining the sentence of fine and the sentence in default thereof. With reduction in sentence as aforesaid, the instant appeal stands disposed of accordingly. The appellant, who is on bail, shall surrender to his bail bonds or shall be arrested to undergo the remaining sentence. ----------------------