Judgement K. J. SENGUPTA, J. :- The above application has been filed by the applicants against the order of summary dismissal of the original application of the applicant. It appears that the learned Tribunal entertained the application, however, did not grant any relief, observing in substance that there has been alternative remedy against unauthorized occupation by one of the retired employees, which can be availed of under the provision of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act. 2. Before us none appears for respondent, so it is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the learned Tribunal should have entertained the application as the Tribunal of the Principal Bench at Delhi in past has entertained this kind of application and granted relief by passing appropriate order and it was also affirmed by the Hon'ble High Court at Delhi and in another matter in O.A. 2415 of 1989 in past this kind of application was also tested its maintainability, successfully right up to the Apex Court. 3. Mr. Mintu Kumar Goswami learned Advocate for the petitioner contends that Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act has no manner of application as the quarter and/or accommodation held by the employees of the first applicant cannot be termed or defined as a public premises. On the question of maintainability and jurisdiction of the Tribunal he has drawn our attention to Section 3(q) which is quoted hereunder. "Service Matters : In relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or as the case may be of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects. (1) Remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits. (2) Tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement, superannuation. (3) Leave of any kind. (4) Disciplinary matters or (5) Any other matters whatsoever. 4. He urges drawing our attention to the relevant portion of judgment of the learned Tribunal in O.A. 2415 of 1989. 5. (1) Remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits. (2) Tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement, superannuation. (3) Leave of any kind. (4) Disciplinary matters or (5) Any other matters whatsoever. 4. He urges drawing our attention to the relevant portion of judgment of the learned Tribunal in O.A. 2415 of 1989. 5. The preamble of the Act, which indicates the purpose of the legislation and makes it very clear that the Act is meant for adjudication or trial of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service, and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Though it may generally be so that the employees approach the Tribunal for redressal of their grievance, yet it does not necessarily mean that the claim cannot be lodged from the other side. If it were to be so assumed, then one of the parties to the dispute or claim would be left without any remedy as the act debars the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court of India. He further contends that the Bench while concluding above has also relied on a decision of the Division Bench of the Patna Bench of the Tribunal wherein the learned Tribunal has adopted the definition of the word "person" in Section 3(42) of General Clauses Act 1897. Thus it was held that the disputes and complaints which could be raised by either of the parties viz. employer or the employee. The above decision of the Principal Bench was taken to the Apex Court and the Apex Court dismissed SLP not interfering with the same. 6. He therefore, contends that this application is maintainable particularly when this question was not raised before the Tribunal. 7. We are of the view as because question, was not raised before the Tribunal it does not mean that this Court cannot examine this question to entertain the action under the said Act, initiated by the employer before us and also before Tribunal. 8. Before we decide this issue of jurisdiction of Tribunal in entertaining the application made by the employer, we are to examine various provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985. While doing so we are not only to see the preamble of the Act but the legislative history as well. 8. Before we decide this issue of jurisdiction of Tribunal in entertaining the application made by the employer, we are to examine various provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985. While doing so we are not only to see the preamble of the Act but the legislative history as well. From statement and object of reason it appears that admittedly this Tribunal has been formed under the provisions of Article 323-A of the Constitution of India that provides as follows : "Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government." 9. In exercise of the above power the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was enacted and published in Official Gazette on 25th January 1985 for the reasons and objects as follows :- "Since a large number of cases relating to service matters are pending before the various Courts. It is expected that the setting up of such Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively with service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the various Courts and thereby giving more time to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also provide to the person covered by the Administrative Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances." 10. Object of formation of Tribunal has been made clear in the preamble of the said Act which is set out hereunder : "An Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any Local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Article 323-A of the Constitution and of matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." 11. The aforesaid object sought to be briefly reflected in Section 14 of the Act which provides as follows : "Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court)............" 12. However, after the judgment of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 ) came into being the Division Bench of the High Courts can exercise jurisdiction as superior Court under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India to scrutinize judgment and order of the Tribunal in addition to the above appellate authority. 13. Section 19 of the said Act makes it clear which class of litigant can approach. We thus feel it appropriate to set out Section 19 in its entirety : Section 19 : "Applications to Tribunals. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Explanation :- For the purposes of this sub-section, "order" means an order made - (a) by the Government of a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Government; or (b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation (or society) referred to in clause (a). (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee (if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes, as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons. (4) Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject-matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules. 14. The word "person" used above would conclusively mean an employee retired or serving or prospective one, as the same is succeeded by the words "aggrieved by any order" and further that the employer cannot have any reason to be aggrieved by any action or order of employee which is evident from the language of the explanation of the word 'order'. This would also be clear again if one reads Section 20 : "Section 20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted :- (1) a Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of subjection (1) a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances, - (a) if a final order has been made by the Government of other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance or (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2) any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial". 15. It is very clear that Section 19 cannot be invoked as a matter of course unless preconditions mentioned in Section 20 of the Act are satisfied. Therefore, it is absurd to conceive that employer has to exhaust its remedy against the employee who has no reason nor scope to pass order or to take decision against employer. Consequently the employer has no scope to make any representation. Thus this Act is really intended to enable the person as we have explained as above to approach the Administrative Tribunal initiating action and it does not enable the employer or the respondent who can only contest if action is brought against it. Of course, we hasten to add it does not mean employer cannot bring its disputes and grievance as against the employee, either retired or serving or prospective employee. There are various Acts which are meant for redressal of grievances of a classified litigants not for all. For examples, the Consumer Protection Act 1986 which is essentially for "the consumer" not for the seller or the supplier or the service provider to initiate action but while resisting any action of consumer the respondent can put up its own defence and claims against the claimants. Another legislation viz. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act appears to our mind for initiating action by the Banks and other Financial Institutions, the above Act does not enable borrower to initiate any action, but to resist action. However, subsequently, by way of amendment right to make counter-claim in addition to usual defence has been provided. 16. In our considered opinion power of the learned Tribunal under this Act can be exercised only when serving, retired and, prospective employee who seeks for enforcement of any right relating to recruitment and other service related disputes. We reading carefully the entire Act do not find any other plausible and reasonable object and/or interpretation of the said legislation. 16. In our considered opinion power of the learned Tribunal under this Act can be exercised only when serving, retired and, prospective employee who seeks for enforcement of any right relating to recruitment and other service related disputes. We reading carefully the entire Act do not find any other plausible and reasonable object and/or interpretation of the said legislation. The decision relied on by the applicant rendered in case of K. N. Bahuguha v. CSIR (W.P.C.) 597 of 1998 (Reported in 2007 (108) DLT 110) passed by Delhi High Court did not have any occasion to decide the aforesaid issues as this was not raised at all. Rather in the penultimate paragraph the Division Bench has observed amongst other as follows : "However, even if we assume that the petitioner is right in contending that the order of the CAT was not warranted, we are of the view that the conduct of the petitioner does not entitle him to avail the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 17. Thus no decision has been rendered on the question of jurisdiction. Only the question of conduct on fact was noted not the provision of law. Stress on conduct of litigant was attached relying on Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2889 ). The said Supreme Court judgment observed as follows : "The High Court and consequently this Court while exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India may not strike down illegal order although it would be lawful to do so. In a given case the High Court or this Court may refuse to extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the applicant....." 18. Therefore, the legal issue as to maintainability of the application by the employer was not decided. Hence this judgment is not a precedent at all for consideration. However, the judgment rendered on case of Principal Bench of Tribunal dated 23rd July 1992 addressed and decided the above issue. In our view this judgment is rendered on incorrect reading of the aforesaid Act. Moreover judgment of the Tribunal cannot be binding upon High Court, the SLP challenging the same was dismissed summarily. It is settled position of law summary dismissal of the SLP that too without reason cannot be a binding precedent. In our view this judgment is rendered on incorrect reading of the aforesaid Act. Moreover judgment of the Tribunal cannot be binding upon High Court, the SLP challenging the same was dismissed summarily. It is settled position of law summary dismissal of the SLP that too without reason cannot be a binding precedent. Effect of dismissal of SLP at the threshold is nothing but refusal to exercise discretion to grant special leave to entertain appeal. This sort of order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not decide any thing. Hence it is not the law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India to make it binding precedent. Therefore, we do not accept and approve of the decision rendered earlier in case of Council of Ceramic Research v. R. B. Lal (OA 2415 of 1989) as the learned Tribunal has not read the aforesaid provision of law correctly. We think bar created under Section 14 of the Act has to be read and understood in relation to and in connection with Sections 19 and 20 of the Act not otherwise meaning thereby it is applicable as against employee and employer is to free to choose any appropriate forum. We are also of the view reference to the definition of the word "person" is Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act 1897 is unwarranted. "Definition" given in this Act cannot be pressed for help everywhere and it is clear in the language of Section 3 of General Clauses Act which starts with the words "In this Act and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in this subject or context." 19. In our view definition of "Person" in the General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter G.C. Act) is an expansive one. In a decision of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 734 (743) in the context of Tax Laws it has been observed amongst other, expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provision of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect. We are of the opinion before any"definition" in G.C. Act is applied it has to be examined whether with use of this definition there appears to be any repugnancy to the subject and the context of Act concerned. 20. We are of the opinion before any"definition" in G.C. Act is applied it has to be examined whether with use of this definition there appears to be any repugnancy to the subject and the context of Act concerned. 20. In this connection Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1956 SC 354 may be good support. In this case (para 15) the Supreme Court did not allow to import definition of "Person" in the G.C. Act to express "person" mentioned in the Section 4 of Partnership Act, as it was found to be repugnant to the context and subject of the Act. We accordingly hold that if definition "person" given in G.C. Act is imported in the Tribunal Act the same would bring about repugnancy in the subject and context of the said Act. 21. Hence Division Bench of Tribunal of Patna Bench in O.A. No. 449 of 1987, as noted in case of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Sri R. B. Lal (O.A. 2415 of 1989) was not legally correct to apply definition of "person" in Section 3(42) of G. C. Act to define the same word mentioned in the Tribunals Act. We therefore conclude the meaning and expression of the word "person" cannot be anything except "employee" as explained by us in the earlier part of the judgment. 22. Thus we hold that the learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application but should have dismissed the same on the ground as not being maintainable by the respondent. We uphold the order of dismissal. However, we modify that it would be open for the applicant to approach before the appropriate forum for redressal of the grievance. We are of the view it is not for the Court or Tribunal to advise which forum would be appropriate and this advisory jurisdiction by Court or Tribunal is not called for in ordinary circumstances and should be avoided. 23. No order as to costs. 24. PRASENJIT MANDAL, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly.