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2008 DIGILAW 686 (KAR)

A. Janardhan Shetty v. Shantamma

2008-11-10

L.NARAYANA SWAMY, V.GOPALA GOWDA

body2008
Judgment :- Gopalagowda, J. These appeals are filed by the appellants-petitioners being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 31.10.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing WP.No.23987/2005 along with connected writ petitions. 2. The appellant-petitioners claim to be the owners of land bearing Sy.No.76/1 of Nagawara Village. They are challenging the Notifications bearing Nos.CI.88 SPQ 2005 dated 30.4.2005 issued under Sec.3(1) of Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter called as KIAD Act) bearing No.Cl/88 SPQ 2005 dated 30.4.2005 issued under Sec.28(1) No.CI.88 SPQ, 2005 dated 30.4.2005 issued under Sec.28(4) No.CI 309 SPQ 2005 dated 24.9.2005 issued under Sec.28(4) of ‘KIAD Act' to declare the area comprised in Sy.No.76/1 of Nagawara Village as ,an Industrial Area and also for acquiring the land in question for the purpose of Industrial Estate is illegal, as the same is in contravention of KIAD Act, Karnataka Land Acquisition Act, Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act of 1961 and decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. 3. The case of the appellant in WA No.2002/2006 is that he claims to be the owner in land bearing survey No.76/1 Nagwara Village measuring two acres of land purchased and refers to the original suit No.4699/2003 instituted by him seeking permanent injunction against one Smt. Kamalamba and others who tried to interfere with his possession of the land in question. The suit was dismissed. Against which RFANo.4853/2004 was filed and this Court remanded the matter for fresh consideration to the trial Court and the matter is still pending consideration before the trail Court. 4. The appellant in WA No.2159/06 also claims that he is the rightful owner in possession of the house property constructed in the layout formed in the land bearing Sy.No.76/1 and they have obtained loan from HDFC Bank for construction of the house. It is their case that they had applied for regularisation of the unauthorised occupation of the land in their possession and enjoyment before the CMC, Byatarayanapura. Considering their request the concerned authority of CMC had called upon the appellant to pay betterment charges and property tax in respect of the property, which is in their occupation and enjoyment. Accordingly, they have paid the same and they are registered as Khatedars of their property. Considering their request the concerned authority of CMC had called upon the appellant to pay betterment charges and property tax in respect of the property, which is in their occupation and enjoyment. Accordingly, they have paid the same and they are registered as Khatedars of their property. They have also stated that issuing preliminary Notification and final Notification under the provisions of the KIAD Act in respect of the property in which the houses are constructed is in violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. On the same set of facts, the appellants in WA No.2224/2006 also claim to be the owners of their residential sites in the said land of the survey number, have challenged the Notifications issued and sought for the very same relief as prayed in the appellants in other writ appeals. 6. The appellants in WA No.99/2007 also claim to be the owners of the residential sites in the layout formed by Patel Munivenkatappa in the land bearing sy.No.76/1 of Nagawara village and the concerned Municipality is collecting taxes from them. They have also challenged the impugned Notifications. 7. These appeals are heard together. The common ground of attack is that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the relevant facts and legal grounds urged in the writ petitions. The acquisition proceedings are initiated by the State Government at the instance of ABB Ltd., through single window agency which is contrary to the provisions of KIAD Act. The action of the State Government in acquiring the properties in question in favour of ABB Ltd., in exercise of the eminent domain power by the State Government is not only arbitrary and illegal but also is in violation of Art.14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. Non consideration of this important aspect of case of the appellants by the learned Single Judge while examining the impugned final Notification is in violation of the principles of natural justice and also the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindusutan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs Darius Shapur Chennai 2005 (7) SCC 627 . According to learned Counsel, the legal principles enunciated in the said case is applicable to the facts and circumstances of these cases with all fours. 8. According to learned Counsel, the legal principles enunciated in the said case is applicable to the facts and circumstances of these cases with all fours. 8. It is further contended by the learned Counsel that issue of preliminary notification under Sec.28(1) of the KIAD Act by the State Government is without application of mind and the same is at the instance of ABB Ltd., which is not permissible in law. In support of this submission, the Learned Counsels for the appellants have placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of HG Sheela Vs State of Karnataka 2006(2) AIR Kar R 414, wherein the similar legal contentions were raised by the petitioner land owner in that case are considered and the same answered by this Court and held that the State Government cannot exercise its eminent domain power to acquire the land of private persons at the instance of the beneficiary. 9. The very same judgment has been relied on by the Learned Counsel for the first respondent in support of the proposition of law that the acquisition of land by Karnataka Industrial Development Board for the benefit of ABB Ltd., is for the reason that its project has been cleared through single window agency for establishment of an industry in the acquired land. According to him, the proposition of law as laid down in HG Sheela's case by this Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dolgobinda Paricha Vs Nimai Charan Misra & Ors AIR 1959 SC 914 and further he has placed reliance upon these decisions of the Apex Court viz. AIR 1967 SC 483 , AIR 1967 SC 1081 and another judgment of the privy council reported in AIR 1945 PC 156 and another decision of the Supreme court in CA 110/1996, wherein it is held that exercise of power by the State Government must have its subjective satisfaction and it can be challenged as ultra vires in a Court of law if, it could be shown that the State Government did not apply its mind to the facts of the case before issuing final Notification under Section 28(4) of KIAD Act. The said decisions are applicable to the facts of these cases for the reason that the preliminary Notification published under Sec.28(1) and Final Notification under Sec.28(4) by the State Government to acquire the land in favour of ABB Ltd., for its project as it has been approved by the Single Window Agency of the State Government. Therefore it is contended that before issuing the preliminary Notification, the political executive of the State Government under the Karnataka Business Transaction Rules 1977, framed by the Governor of Karnataka State in exercise of his powers under Article 166 of the Constitution of India should have followed. The State Government without applying its mind to the facts of the case even though the land in question was designated for residential purpose in the CDP by the planning Authority under the provisions of KT & CP Act of 1961, has been acquired for industrial purpose which action of it is illegal. The very fact that the land in question was designated for residential purpose is verified from the Comprehensive Development Plan, which was prevalent at the time of issuing the impugned Notifications. Therefore it is urged by the respective learned Counsel for the parties that political, Executive of the Industries & Commerce Department of State Government, did not apply his mind before issuing the impugned Notifications, therefore it is contended by them on behalf of the Appellants, that on this ground alone, the impugned Notifications are liable to be quashed. This aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge while examining the legality and validity of the acquisition Notifications. Therefore it is urged that in view of the above legal rounds the order passed by the learned Single Judge is erroneous in law, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside and requested to quash the acquisition proceedings by allowing these appeals. 10. Further it is also stated by the Learned Counsel for the appellants that under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, the State Government had designated the land in question for residential purpose in the CDP and the same was in force as on the date the impugned Notifications were issued by the State Government. 10. Further it is also stated by the Learned Counsel for the appellants that under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, the State Government had designated the land in question for residential purpose in the CDP and the same was in force as on the date the impugned Notifications were issued by the State Government. Once the land is designated in the CDP for residential purpose it cannot be used contrary to the user stipulated in the plan except by amendment to it by following the procedure contemplated under the provisions of Section 14A of the KT & CP Act. In support of this proposition of law strong reliance is placed by the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants upon the decision of this Court in the case of H.G. Sheela referred to supra wherein reference has been made to Sec.4(c) of the KT & CP Act, 1961 and the decision of the Apex Court in 1996(1) SCC 443 wherein at para 19 it has been held as under: “One arm of law cannot be utilised to defeat the other arm of law Doing so would be opposed to public policy and bring the law into redicule." 11. Further reliance was placed by the Learned Counsel for the appellants on the very same judgment in support of their legal contention that the land use which is designated for the residential purpose in the CDP cannot be changed in exercise of the power by the State Govt. under Sec. 14-A(1) of KT & CP Act in support of this legal contention, catena of decisions of the Supreme Court namely AIR 1973 SC 921 , 2001 (9) SCC 232 , 2004(4) SCC 118, 1995 AIR SCW 4587 are relied upon by the Learned Counsel on behalf of the appellants. 12. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that issuance of the impugned Notifications by the State Govt. are not only in violation of the provisions of the KIAD Act and Land Acquisition Act, and it tantamounts to invading the fundamental rights of the appellants guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and human rights of the Appellants, as held by the Apex Court. 13. The Learned Counsel Mr. are not only in violation of the provisions of the KIAD Act and Land Acquisition Act, and it tantamounts to invading the fundamental rights of the appellants guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and human rights of the Appellants, as held by the Apex Court. 13. The Learned Counsel Mr. V. Lakshminarayan has requested this Court to permit him to make submissions as an intervenor in these case contending that similar legal questions have been raised in WA No. 1977/07 filed by him is pending consideration before this Court. Therefore the decision that may be rendered by this Court in these appeals will have a bearing on the appeals filed by him therefore requested this Court to permit him to make a few legal contentions in these appeals. His request was acceded and we have heard him also. 14. He places reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2008 (1) SCC 728 in support of the proposition of law that State Government is also enjoined with a duty to make an enquiry before issuing the final Notification declaring the proposed lands are acquired, wherefore an opportunity of hearing to the owners of the lands is required to be given. When the State Govt. intends to proceed with the acquisition of land of the land holders it must form an opinion that the lands which are going to be acquired are not good agricultural lands. The provision of Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act has laid down the statutory duty and bound by the procedure prescribed in law. If, it is not followed, it deprives valuable fundamental, constitutional and statutory rights of the land owners/interested persons. Further he has contended that the authorities must act within the four corners of the statute, while exercising their statutory power of acquisition of land of owners/interested persons. An opinion formed by the State Government, on the basis of an advice by an authority viz., Single Window Agency which is not provided in the statute and therefore accepting its opinion by the State Government to acquire the land has rendered the decision bad in law. A statutory authority is bound by the procedure laid down in the statute and must act within the four corners thereof, otherwise its action will be void-ab-initio in law. A statutory authority is bound by the procedure laid down in the statute and must act within the four corners thereof, otherwise its action will be void-ab-initio in law. Further he submits that the Expropriatory legislation, is well known, must be strictly construed by the State Government and its officers upon whom power is conferred to acquire land of a citizen are being compulsorily acquired by a State in exercise of its power of eminent domain, the essential ingredients thereof, namely, existence of public purpose and payment of compensation are principal requisites should be strictly followed. Elaborating his submissions, he would submits that in a case of acquisition of land for a private company, the existence of a public purpose being not a requisite criterion, other statutory requirements call for strict compliance as they are imperative in character. 15. The Learned Counsel for the land owners submit that on the basis of the representation given by the ABB Ltd., the State High Level Committee as per Annexure-R-1 has requested the State Government to acquire 1000 Sq.mts of land in favour of the above Co., and the acquisition Notifications have been issued under the guise of public purpose though it is a private purpose, without following the procedure contemplated under part VII of the Land Acquisition Act read with the statutory rules framed by the State Government for acquisition of land in favour of the Company which is mandatory. This important aspect of the matter has also not been considered by the Learned Single Judge, hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 16. The Learned Counsel further submitted that notice under Sec. 28(1) of the Act is required to be sent to the owners of the land in question or to the person interested therein. In this regard it is contended that even assuming that the appellants are not the owners, they are the interested persons as they have purchased the land is their claim and therefore they should have been given an opportunity of being heard before passing any order to declare the acquisition of land by issuing and publishing final Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act. Apart from this, the power that has been exercised by the Land Acquisition Officer is delegatee as per Rule 14 of the KIAD Rules, 1966 as provided under Section 31 of KIAD Act, which is impermissible in law for the reason that delegation of quasi judicial power by the State Government to the Land Acquisition Officer is totally impermissible in law. In support of this contention they have placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court Gullapani Nageshwar Rao. Vs Apsrtc AIR 1959 SC 308 . 17. The aforesaid submissions are rebutted by the learned Additional Government Advocate, inter alia contending that the acquisition of land is for public purpose and is in accordance with the Karnataka Industries (Facilitation) Act 2002 and the Rules framed there under to see that the industrial policy of the State Government is implemented to promote establishment of more industries in the Karnataka State to render employment to the unemployed youth. The acquisition notifications under the provisions of KIAD Act are issued & published by the State Government and an industrial estate is formed and allotted the acquired land in favour of ABB Ltd., the same is the public purpose in terms of the definition of Sec. 3(f)(i) of the Land Acquisition Act. 18. Further she submits that on the basis of the recommendations made by the State High Level Committee and Karnataka Udyog Mitra Ltd., the State Government after applying its mind has issued the acquisition Notifications. The same has been considered by the learned Single Judge with reference to the rival legal contentions urged by the Learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellants and rejected the writ petitions by assigning valid and cogent reasons in the impugned common order. Therefore, she submits that this court need not interfere with order impugned in these appeals in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power, as no substantial questions of law would arise in these appeals. 19. With reference to the above said rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties, we are required to examine and answer the correctness of the same. On the basis of rival legal contentions urged the following points that would arise for our consideration. 1. Whether the State Government has applied its mind before issuing Sec.28(1) and 28 (4) Notifications under the KIAD Act? 2. On the basis of rival legal contentions urged the following points that would arise for our consideration. 1. Whether the State Government has applied its mind before issuing Sec.28(1) and 28 (4) Notifications under the KIAD Act? 2. Whether the Land Acquisition Officer as a delegatee can consider the statement of objections filed by the owner after issuing and publishing Notification under Sec.28(1) of the Act and notices were served upon the interested persons of the acquired land, inviting objections and to consider their case by the State Government in exercise of its quasi-judicial exercise of power and its power can be transferred in favour of land Acquisition officer as its delegatee? 3. Whether the preliminary Notification published is legal and valid in the absence of the prior issuance of Sec. 3(1) of KIAD Act Notification proposing to acquire the land in question for Industrial Estate in favour of ABB Pvt Ltd., Co.? 4. Whether non-compliance of statutory requirements under Sec. 28(3) of KIAD Act in not conducting an enquiry by the State Government by giving opportunity to the interested persons and over-ruling the objections of the owner by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is legal and valid? 5. Whether the acquisition of land on the recommendations of High Level Committee and Udyog Mitra Ltd., and State Government in favour of ABB Ltd., under KIAD Act, is legal and valid? 6. Whether the declaration of land acquired by issuing Final Notification under Sec. 28 (4) of KIAD Act is in conformity with the provision of Section 28(2) and (3) of KIAD Act read with CDP approved by the State Government under KT & CP Act of 1961? 7. Whether the findings and reasons recorded by the Learned Single Judge on various legal grounds urged in the writ petitions, in the impugned order are legal and valid? 8. What order? We answer the above said points in seriatum as hereunder by assigning the following reasons. ISSUES 1 TO 5 These issues are interrelated with each other therefore we answer the same together. 20. It is an undisputed fact that Sec. 3(1) Notification was issued under the KIAD Act by the State Government on 30-4-2005 in respect of the land measuring 3A 7 G of Sy.No.76(1). ISSUES 1 TO 5 These issues are interrelated with each other therefore we answer the same together. 20. It is an undisputed fact that Sec. 3(1) Notification was issued under the KIAD Act by the State Government on 30-4-2005 in respect of the land measuring 3A 7 G of Sy.No.76(1). This land has been declared as industrial area despite of fact that the same is shown as residential area in the CDP under the above provisions of the Act for the purpose of acquisition of land in favour of ABB Ltd., on the basis of the approval of their project by Udyog Mitra Ltd., and the State High level Committee which is the Single Window Agency of the State Government. 21. On 17.10.2008 we had directed the Additional Government Advocate to produce all the relevant records starting from Sec.3(1) Notification, as we are required to examine the legal contentions urged on behalf of the appellants who are claiming to be the owners interested persons of the acquired property in favour of M/s. ABB Ltd.,. 22. Since the relevant record in relation to the approval of acquisition of land by the political Executive as required under the provisions of Karnataka State Government Business transactions Rules, 1977 (hereinafter called as KSGBT Rules in short) not produced by the learned Additional Government Advocate, we are unable to find out as to whether the State Government represented by its political executive has applied his mind independently as to whether the land in question could have been acquired by it particularly when the said land has been designated for residential purpose in the CDP under the provisions of KT & CP Act. 23. Learned Senior Counsel on behalf the appellants have submitted that there is total non-application of mind on the part of the State Government represented by its political executive as required under KSGBT Rules before issuing and publishing Notification under Sec.28(1) of KIAD Act by placing reliance upon the decision of this court in H G Sheela's case referred to supra, which has been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in WA No.288/2006 and other connected cases vide judgment dated 30.10.2007. In H G Sheela's case the very same legal question was considered by the Learned Single Judge of this Court (decision rendered by me V.G.G.J) after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 914 and AIR 1967 SC 1081 and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder: AIR 1959 SC 914 "Opinion means something more than mere retailing of gossip or of hearsay; it means judgment or belief, that is a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question." AIR 1967 SC 1081 "8. It is true that the opinion of the State Government which is a condition for the exercise of the power under S.17(4) of the Act, is subjective and a Court cannot normally enquire whether there were sufficient grounds or justification of the opinion formed by the State Government under Section 17(4). The legal position has been explained by the Judicial Committee in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, 72 Ind App 241; (AIR 1945 PC 156), and by this Court in a recent case Jaichand Lal Sethia v. State of West Bengal, Crl. Appeal No.110 of 1966, D/-27.7.1966; (reported in AIR 1967 SC 483 ). But even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under S.17(4) of the Act in subjective terms the expression of opinion of the State Government can be challenged as ultra vires in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is malafide". "57. Whenever it appears to the Board that within its administrative area any building which is used or is intended or is likely to be used as a dwelling place is of such a construction or is in such a condition as to be unfit for human habitation, the Board may be resolution declare such building to be insanitary". The Judicial Committee set aside the declaration of the Improvement Trust on two grounds: (1) that though it was made in exercise of an administrative function and in good faith, the power was limited by the teens of the said Ordinance and, therefore, the declaration was liable to a challenge if the authority stepped beyond those terms, and (2) that the ground on which it was made was other than the one set out in the Ordinance. In another case-Ross Clunis v. Papadopoullos, 1958-1 WLR 546-the appellant challenged an order of collective fine passed under Regulation 3 of the Cyprus Emergency Powers (Collective Punishment) Regulations, 1955 which provided that if an offence was committed within any area of the colony and the Commissioner "has reason to believe" that all or any of the inhabitants of that area failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it and to render assistance to discover the offender or offenders it would be lawful for the Commissioner with the approval of the Governor to levy a collective fine after holding an inquiry in such manner as he thinks proper subject to satisfying himself that the inhabitants of the area had been given an adequate opportunity of understanding the subject-matter of the inquiry and making' representations thereon. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the only duty cast on the Commissioner was to satisfy himself of the facts set out in the Regulation, that the test was subjective one and that the statement as to the satisfaction in his affidavit was a complete answer to the contention of the respondents. In rejecting the contention the judicial Committee observed as follows: "Their Lordships feel the force of this argument, but they think that if it could be shown that there were no grounds upon which the Commissioner could be so satisfied, a Court might infer either that he did not honestly form that view or that in forming it he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts." In another case — R.V. Australian Stevedoring Industry Board (1952) 88 CLR 100 the High Court of Australia was called upon to review the conduct of a Board empowered to cancel the registration of an employer of dock labour if "satisfied" that he was unfit to be registered or had so acted as to interfere with proper performance of stevedoring work. It was held by the High Court that it was entitled to award prohibition against the Board if the Board was acting without any evidence to support the facts upon which its jurisdiction depended, or if it was adopting an erroneous test of the employer's liability to cancellation of his registration, or if it appeared likely to go outside the scope of its statutory discretion." 23(a). From the reading of the above paragraphs of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra, which ratio is with all fours applicable to the fact situation of these cases there is absolutely no application of mind on the part of the State Government represented by its political Executive before issuing and publishing Sections 28(1) & (4) Notifications. 24. In the cases on hand, as could be seen from the records of the State Government and the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, absolutely no enquiry was held by him after receipt of objections statement from the interested persons as required under Sec. 28(3) of the KIAD Act and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. 25. It is the case of the appellants herein that after publication of Notification under Sec.28(1) of KIAD Act, the land Acquisition officer has to serve the notice upon them and has to conduct an enquiry under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act before declaring the acquisition of the proposed land under Section 28(4) of the Act. In this regard they have rightly placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd’s Darius Shapur Chennai (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions of Sec.4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. It is worthwhile to extract para 6, 9 and 10 from the aforesaid judgment which reads thus: "6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefore must be paid. 9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The Stale in its decision making process must not 'commit any misdirection in 'law'. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The Stale in its decision making process must not 'commit any misdirection in 'law'. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. 10. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh it was held: (SCC P477, para 16) "Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-eruptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons." 26. They have also relied upon the case of Om Prakash Vs. State Of UP (1998) 6 SCC 1 which para extracted in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., referred to supra, which para extracted as hereunder. "21. Our attention was also invited by Sri Shansi Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to a decision of a two Judge Bench of this Court in the case of State of Punjab V. Gurdial Singh wherein Krishna Iyer J., dealing with the question of exercise of emergency powers under Sec. 17 of the Act observed in para , 16 of the Report that save in real urgency where public interest did not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing, land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 and 19, burke an inquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Thus, according to the aforesaid decision of this Court, inquiry under Sec.5-A is not merely statutory but also has a flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution though right to property has now no longer remained a f rndamental right, at least observation regarding Art.14, 'Vis-a-vis, Sec.5-A of the Land Acquisition Act would remain apposite." Emphasis is laid by this Court 27. Again in the case of Hindustan Petroleum at paragraph 12 reference has been made to Union of India Vs Mukeshhans And The Para 35 has been extracted. "35. Again in the case of Hindustan Petroleum at paragraph 12 reference has been made to Union of India Vs Mukeshhans And The Para 35 has been extracted. "35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Sections 5-A of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within' the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India wherein this Court held thus: (SCC p.342, para 7) "7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made….. The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A." 28. Again at para 13 of the Hindustan Petroleum case, the Apex Court after referring to Mohinder Singh Gill Vs Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405 has extracted para 43 of the said decision, which reads thus: "43. Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch elivens, legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many .forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes it, applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the home of healthy Government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law Indeed, from the legendary days of Adam – and of Kautilya’s Arthashastra – the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not newfangled. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not newfangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case-law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American System." 29. The decision of Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Case reported in (2005) 7 SCC 636, the relevant paras extracted above in this judgment with all fours are applicable to the facts of these cases and therefore we should accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants regarding in not conducting enquiry before passing order and declaring the proposed land acquired by issuing Section 28(4) of KIAD Act and therefore the same is in violation of the provisions of Section 28(3) of KIAD Act and the principles of natural justice. 30. Since the appellants are the owners/interested persons of the land in question, giving personal hearing to them by the land Acquisition officer is mandatory as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. In the case on hand the objections filed by the appellants were rejected by the State Government represented by its political executive of the concerned Department without conducting an enquiry and without applying his mind independently. Accordingly we answer the points No.1 & 4 in the negative and in favour of the appellants. 31. With regard to point No.2 regarding the authority of the Special Land Acquisition Officer as a delegatee of the State Government in issuing the notice and submitting his report to the State Government under Sec.28(3) of KIAD Act before issuing and publishing the final Notification in the name of the State represented by its Secretary under Sec.28(4) is also examined by us in view of the statutory provisions of the KIAD Act and the nature of enquiry contemplated under Sec.28(3) of the Act with reference to land in question. Though the right to own the property by a person is deleted from Part III of the Constitution of India by virtue of the 42nd constitutional amendment under Sec. 191-A of the Amendment Act whereas provision has come into force w.e.f. July 1977 conducting an enquiry, considering the objections before forming an opinion and declaring the land acquired is mandatory. Though the right to own the property by a person is deleted from Part III of the Constitution of India by virtue of the 42nd constitutional amendment under Sec. 191-A of the Amendment Act whereas provision has come into force w.e.f. July 1977 conducting an enquiry, considering the objections before forming an opinion and declaring the land acquired is mandatory. On the part of the State Government as the acquisitions of land of the holders entails serious civil consequence. Acquisition of land by the State Government in exercise of its eminent domain power amounts to deprivation of statutory rights, fundamental rights and Constitutional rights of either the land owners or the interested person as they will be losing their valuable rights of occupation and livelihood. Therefore the power to make regulations by the State Government as provided under Sec.41 of the KIAD Act shall be construed strictly. Section 41 of the KIAD Act reads thus: "41(1) The Board, may, with the previous approval of the State Government, by Notification make regulations consistent with this Act and the rules made there under, to carry out the purposes of this Act." 32. Whether such delegation of quasi-judicial power could be conferred upon the Assistant Commissioner who is the land acquisition officer in the absence of any statutory provision to delegate such power is permissible in law under Section 31 of the Act is required to be examined by us in the light of a constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gollapalli Nagesh Rao Vs State of Apsrtc (Supra) wherein the constitutional bench has examined the provisions of the repealed Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 as amended by Act 100/1956. More or less a similar question fell for consideration before the Apex Court. The Apex Court held in para 31 as under: "31. The second objection is that while the Act and the Rules framed there under impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure." 33. In the instant case, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has issued a show cause notices as required under Sec. 28(2) to the land owners has considered the statement of objections filed by them and the decision is taken by the political executive on the basis of his report submitted by him in which it contained the recommendations made by the Principal Secretary to the Political Executive of the Industries and Commerce Department. The same is approved by the then political executive, the then Minister of the aforesaid department. Therefore it is clear that the political executive has not applied his mind independently, but he has approved the acquisition of and on the basis of the report of the Special Land Acquisition Officer attached to the KIADB rejecting the objection statement of the owners. The report submitted by the delegatee is bad in law, as he is not legally authorised to examine the tenability of objections taken by the owners to acquire the land of the owners. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such delegation of power to the Special Land Acquisition Officer is permissible in law, by issuing a Notification, delegation of power by the State Government can be made only in respect of the enumerated matters under Section 41 of KIAD Act. Under Sec.31 of the KIAD Act if it thinks fit to delegate any of its power under the Chapter to any of its officers, by rules made in this behalf. The said proviso is contrary to the decision of the constitutional Bench judgment referred to supra, which is binding upon all the persons including the State Legislature. Under Sec.31 of the KIAD Act if it thinks fit to delegate any of its power under the Chapter to any of its officers, by rules made in this behalf. The said proviso is contrary to the decision of the constitutional Bench judgment referred to supra, which is binding upon all the persons including the State Legislature. Therefore in exercise of the power under Sec.31 by the State Government to delegate, its powers to the Assistant Commissioner in charge of Land Acquisition, or to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, in the KIADB by way of amendment to the Rule 14 of Rules w.e.f 20-11-1983 is also contrary to the constitutional bench judgment referred to supra as the State Government cannot delegate its quasi judicial power to be exercised by itself under the Act, in favour of its Land acquisition officer. Therefore exercise of power by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in considering and rejecting the statement of objections of the owner to acquire the land in favour of a private company is illegal and as such accepting the same by the political executive on the recommendation of the Land Acquisition Officer and Principal Secretary and issuing and publishing final Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act is bad in law. Consequently, the acquisition of land covered in these Notifications are liable to be quashed. 34. Further the acquisition of land by the State Government in favour of KIADB is contrary to the CDP which was prevalent on the date as the land in question was designated for residential purpose approved by the State Government under the KT & CP Act in view of the catena of decisions of the Supreme Court namely (1996) 1 SCC 443 in respect of the following proposition at paragraph 19 of the said judgment which reads thus: "One arm of law cannot be utilized to defeat the other arm of law. Doing so would be opposed to public policy and bring the law into redicule;". The said decision with all fours is applicable to the fact situation. 35. In the CDP the lands are designated for various purposes such as agricultural, residential, industrial and other purposes by the town planning Authority under Section 21 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, which reads thus: "21. The said decision with all fours is applicable to the fact situation. 35. In the CDP the lands are designated for various purposes such as agricultural, residential, industrial and other purposes by the town planning Authority under Section 21 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, which reads thus: "21. Contents of the Comprehensive development Plan.- (1) The comprehensive Development Plan shall consist of a series of maps and documents indicating the manner in which the development and improvement of the entire planning area within the jurisdiction of the Planning Authority are to be carried out and regulated. Such plan shall include proposals, for the following namely.- (a) comprehensive zoning of land-use for the planning area, together with zoning regulations; (b) complete street pattern, indicating major and minor roads, national and state high ways, and traffic circulation pattern, for meeting immediate and future requirements; (c) areas reserved for agriculture, parks, play-grounds and other recreational uses, public open spaces, public buildings and institutions and areas reserved for such other purposes as may be expedient for new civic development; (d) widening of such road and highways in congested areas; (e) areas for new housing; (f) new areas earmarked for future development and expansion; and (g) the stages by which the plan is to be carried out." Under Section 22 of the Act, the CDP will be approved by State Government. Every change in land user and every development covered by the comprehensive development plan is subject to Section 14A which reads thus: "14-A. Change of land use from the outline Development Plan — (1) At any time after the date on which the Outline Development Plan for an area comes into operation, the planning Authority may, with the previous approval of the State Government, allow such changes in the land use or development from the Outline Development Plan as may be necessitated by topographical or cartographical or other errors and omissions, or due to failure to fully indicate the details in the plan or changes arising out of the implementation of the proposals in Outline Development Plan or the circumstances prevailing at any particular time, by the enforcement of the plan. Provided that.- (a) all changes are in public interest; (b) the changes proposed do not contravene any of the provisions of this Act or any other law governing planning, development or use of land within the local planning area; and (c) the proposal for all such changes are published in one or more daily newspapers, having circulation in the area, inviting objections from the public within a period of not less than fifteen days from the date of publication as may be specified by the Planning Authority." The object of the said Act is to provide for regulation for planned growth of residential zone and industrial zone by user of land for developmental purpose by executing the town planning and developmental schemes in the State of Karnataka. The State Government has to acquire the designated lands for establishment of industries by invoking its power of eminent domain power. The change of land use from residential to non-residential use after acquisition of the designated lands for residential purpose in exercise of State Government power under Section 14A of KT & CP is not permissible in law laid down by the Supreme Court in number of cases. 36. In the case of M.C. Mehta Vs Union of India & Others 2004(6) SCC 588 it has referred to the decisions of Verender Gaur Vs. State of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577 at para 40; Administrator, Nagar Palike Vs. Bharat (2001) 9 SCC 232 has been referred at para 42 and the case in Faquir Chand Vs. Ram Rattan Bhanot (1973) 1 SCC 572 has been extracted at paragraph 43. Paragraphs 40, 42, and 43 from M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Others extracted hereunder, which read thus: "40. In Zirender Gaur v State of Haryana, (1995) 2 SCC 577 :1995 AIR SCW 306 referring to Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations of Human Environment 1972, this Court observed that right to have living atmosphere congenial to human existence is a right to life. The State has a duty in that behalf and to shed its extravagant unbridled sovereign power and to forge in its policy to maintain ecological balance and hygienic environment. Where in the zonal plan, a land is marked out and reserved for park or recreational purpose, it cannot be allotted for building purpose though housing is a public purpose. The State has a duty in that behalf and to shed its extravagant unbridled sovereign power and to forge in its policy to maintain ecological balance and hygienic environment. Where in the zonal plan, a land is marked out and reserved for park or recreational purpose, it cannot be allotted for building purpose though housing is a public purpose. Further, it was observed that though the Government has power to give directions, that power should be used only to effectuate and further goals of the approved scheme, zonal plans, etc. and the land vested under the scheme or reserved under the plan would not be directed to be used for any other public purposes within the area envisaged there under Dealing with the contention that two decades had passed, it was held that self destructive argument to put a premium on inaction cannot be accepted. 42. In Administrator, Nagar Palika v. Bharat, (2001) 9 SCC 232 this Court observed that public interest has to be understood and interpreted in the light of the entire scheme, purpose and object of the enactment. The hazard to health and environment 0f not only the persons residing in the illegal colonisation area but of the entire town as well as the provision and scheme of the Act had to be taken into consideration. 43. In Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (1973) 1 SCC 572 : ( AIR 1973 SC 921 ) dealing with the use of premises in Delhi by a tenant contrary to the purpose for which they could be used terms of the lease between the landlord and the paramount lessor; this Court observed, while dealing with a landlord-tenant dispute that the policy of the legislature seems to be to put an end to unauthorized use of leased land rather than merely to enable the authorities to get back possession of the leased lands. While dealing with the provisions of the DD Act and clause (k) of the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it was noticed that the legislature has clearly taken note of the fact that the enormous extents of land have been leased by the three authorities mentioned in that clause, and has expressed by means of this clause its anxiety to see that these lands are used for the purpose for which they were leased. It was also observed that the authority may not be prepared to accept compensation but might insist upon cessation of the unauthorized use. Since most of the land used for industrial purpose in residential/non-conforming areas is leased land, it was even open to the authorities to cancel the lease on account of the misuser ". 37. The CDP prepared under Section 19 of the KT & CP Act by the Town Planning Authority keeping in view its objects. The objects of the Act are as hereunder: An Act to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. Whereas it is necessary and expedient:- (i) to create conditions favourable for planning and re-planning of the urban and rural areas in the State of Karnataka, with a view to providing full civic and social amenities for the people in the State, (ii) to stop uncontrolled development of land due to land speculation and profiteering in land, (iii) to preserve and improve existing recreational facilities and other amenities contributing towards balanced use of land; and (iv) to direct the future growth of populated areas in the State, with a view to ensuring desirable standards of environmental health and hygiene, and creating facilities, for the orderly growth of industry and commerce, thereby promoting general standards of living in the State; And whereas, in order to ensure that town planning schemes are made in a proper manner and their execution is made effective, it is necessary to provide that a local authority shall prepare a development plan for the entire area within its jurisdiction." 38. Section 14-A(1) clause (a) of the KT & CP Act confers power on the State Government for change of land use in the public interest. In the instant case declaration of acquisition of lands under Section 28(4) of the K.I.A.D Act as an ‘industrial area' under Section 3(1) of the Act in favour of ABB Ltd., company, which is a private company, cannot be said for a public purpose under the KIAD Act. In the instant case declaration of acquisition of lands under Section 28(4) of the K.I.A.D Act as an ‘industrial area' under Section 3(1) of the Act in favour of ABB Ltd., company, which is a private company, cannot be said for a public purpose under the KIAD Act. Therefore the question of change of land use from residential zone to industrial zone after issue of declaration of acquisition of land under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act in exercise of State Government power for change of land use under Section 14-A of the KT & CP Act cannot be considered as public purpose as contended by the Learned Counsel for the respondents. Therefore exercise of power by the State Government for change of land use at the time of execution of the project after acquiring the land as observed by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order has not examined the settled legal position in the cases referred to supra upon which strong reliance is placed by the Learned Counsel for the appellants with reference to Section 14-A of KT & CP Act, particularly the exercise of power by the State Government for change of land use only for the public purpose. Therefore the declaration Notification published under Section 28(4) of KIAD Act is in contravention of CDP and also the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. 39. Point No.6: This point is already examined by this Court in the judgment rendered by me (Justice V. Gopala Gowda) sitting in Single Bench in the case of H.G Sheela Vs. State of Karnataka & Others 2006(2) AIR Kar R 414, after referring to the various provisions of the KIAD Act, Regulations and answered similar question framed in that case as point No.3 and the same is answered against the State and the KIADB by recording reasons. After referring to the provisions of the KIAD Act and the regulations, at paragraph 19 of the said decision. In this case Learned Counsel Mr. After referring to the provisions of the KIAD Act and the regulations, at paragraph 19 of the said decision. In this case Learned Counsel Mr. V. Lakshminarayana who has intervened as intervenor and made certain legal submissions, by placing strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Devinder Singh and Others VS State of Punjab And Others (2008) 1 SCC 728 , wherein the Apex Court has considered Section 3(f) & Part I and Section 40(1)(aa), 42B Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. At para 12 of the above case, the words and Phrase Public Purpose' in the light of the aforesaid provisions and the Article 300A of the Constitution of India and Land Acquisition (Company Rules) 1963 Rule 4 are examined and answered by the Apex Court. Similar Rule is available under the Karnataka Land Acquisition Company Rules. The Apex Court in the above referred case, has interpreted the said provisions with reference to the meaning contained in Black's Law Dictionary, the word ‘Public Purpose' is explained at paragraph No.33, which portion is extracted, which reads as follows: "Para 33. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, it amounts to colourable exercise of power. Formation of opinion must precede application of mind. Such application of mind must be on the materials brought on record. The materials should be such which are required to be collected by the authorities entitled therefore. The authorities must act within the, four corners of the statute. An opinion formed even on the basis of an advice by an authority which is not contemplated under the statute renders the decision bad in law. A statutory authority is bound by the procedure laid down in the statute and must act within the four corners thereof. " (Emphasis is made by this Court) At paragraph 43 it has held as hereunder: "Para 43. Expropriatory legislation, as is well known, must be strictly construed. When the properties of a citizen are being compulsorily acquired by a State in exercise of its power of eminent domain, the essential ingredients thereof namely, existence of a public purpose and payment of compensation are principal requisites therefore: In the case of acquisition of land for a private company, existence of a public purpose being not a requisite criterion, other statutory requirements call for strict compliance, being imperative in character " 40. We must record in this judgment that it is not a case of the State that the acquisition of land in question was made in terms of Part VII of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Karnataka Acquisition of Land (Company Rules). It is rightly pointed out by Learned Counsel Sri. V. Lakshminarayana that ABB Limited is a private company. It can apply to the Industrial Area Board for allotment of Industrial plot as provided under Regulation No.4. If the lands are acquired by the state Government in favour of the KIADB Board to form industrial estate under the provisions of the Act, the Board has to follow the regulations for allotment of such Industrial in favour of a private limited company. But acquisition of land in favour of a Pvt. Company by the State Government without following the mandatory provisions regarding the procedure to be followed under the Land Acquisition Act & Rules in exercise of its eminent domain power, the acquisition of land is not for public purpose as provided under Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act in favour of a company. In fact he has also aptly placed reliance on the Decision of Supreme Court in Devinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab referred supra. In support of the proposition of law the Supreme Court in paragraph 20 has held thus: "20. The High Court proceeded on the basis that as the State formed an opinion that the purpose for which the provisions of the Act were taken recourse to is a public purpose, the provisions of Part II would apply in the instant case. We are not unmindful of the fact that the definition of "public/impose" as contained in Section 3(f) of the Act is an inclusive one. Therefore, the said definition need not be kept confined to the matters referred to therein. But with a view to ascertain as to what should be a public purpose, we may notice its dictionary meaning as contained in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., which is as under: "Public purpose- In the law of taxation, eminent domain, etc., this is a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the Government is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private interest, inclination, or liberality. The constitutional requirement that the purpose of any tax, police regulation, or particular exertion of the power of eminent domain shall be the convenience, safety, or welfare of the entire community and not the welfare of a specific individual or class of per sons. The term is synonymous with Governmental purpose. As employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit which is to follow; the essential requisite being that a public service or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as individuals. A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, a State, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business." Emphasis laid by this Court. 41. The Supreme Court in the very same judgment at paragraph 32 has referred to Somawanti Vs State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 151 with regard to the meaning of public purpose it is worthwhile to extract paragraph 40 from the said judgment which reads thus: "40. Though we are of the opinion that the courts are not entitled to go behind the declaration of the Government to the effect that a particular purpose for which the land is being acquired is a public purpose we must emphasise that the declaration of the Government must be relatable to a public purpose as distinct, from a purely private purpose. If the purpose for which the acquisition is being made is not relatable to public purpose then a question may well arise whether in making the declaration there has been, on the part of the Government a fraud on the power conferred upon it by the Act. In other words the question would then arise whether that declaration was merely a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act, and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge at the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a declaration the protection of Section 6 (3) will not extend. In other words the question would then arise whether that declaration was merely a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act, and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge at the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a declaration the protection of Section 6 (3) will not extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, provisions such as Section 6 (3) notwithstanding" Emphasis is laid by this Court. 42. Further the Supreme Court has held thus at para 33: "Para 33. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, it amounts to colourable exercise of power. Formation of opinion must precede application of mind. Such application of mind must be on the materials brought on record. The materials should be such which are required to be collected by the authorities entitled therefore: The authorities must act within the four corners of the statute. An opinion formed even on the basis of an advice by an authority which is not contemplated under the statute renders the decision bad in law. A statutory authority is bound by the procedure laid down in the statute, and must act within the four corners thereof " 43. In the case of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. Vs State of U.P (1980) 4 SCC 136 at paras 18 & 25, the Supreme Court has held thus: "18. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, the three entries were repealed. Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II were deleted and a single comprehensive Entry 42 in List III was substituted to read: ‘Acquisition and requisitioning of property'. Accordingly, the power to acquire property could be exercised concurrently by the Union and the States. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, the three entries were repealed. Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II were deleted and a single comprehensive Entry 42 in List III was substituted to read: ‘Acquisition and requisitioning of property'. Accordingly, the power to acquire property could be exercised concurrently by the Union and the States. Even if prior to the deletion of Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II an argument could possibly have been advanced that as power of acquisition of property was conferred both on Union and the States to be exercised either for the purpose of the Union or for the State it was incidental to any other legislative power flowing from various entries in the three lists and not an independent power, but since the deletion of Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II and substitution of a comprehensive entry in List III, it could hardly be urged with confidence that the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property was incidental to other power. It is an independent power provided for in a specific entry. Therefore, both the Union and the State would have power of acquisition and requisitioning of property. This position is unquestionably established by the majority decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, where Shah, J., speaking for the majority of 10 Judges held as under: (SCC p. 282, para 38) Power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III, and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists. In reaching this conclusion reliance was placed on Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh. It was, however, urged that the proposition called out from Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation case by Shah, I, in R.C. Cooper case is not borne out by the observation in the first mentioned case. In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation case° the challenge was to the Madras Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1949, on the ground that the Madras legislature was not competent to enact the legislation because at the relevant time there was no entry in the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to compulsory acquisition of any commercial or industrial undertaking. In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation case° the challenge was to the Madras Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1949, on the ground that the Madras legislature was not competent to enact the legislation because at the relevant time there was no entry in the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to compulsory acquisition of any commercial or industrial undertaking. This challenge failed in the High Court but on appeal the challenge was accepted by a Constitution Bench of this Court. Noll; it must be remembered that the impugned legislation in that case was a pre-Constitution legislation then governed by the Government of India Act, 1935. The challenge was that the State legislature had no power to enact a legislation for acquisition of an electrical undertaking. On behalf of the State the Act was sought to be sustained on the ground that the Act was in pith and substance a law with respect to electricity under Entry 31 of the Concurrent List and, therefore, the State legislature was competent to enact the same. After scrutinising the Act this Court came to the conclusion that in pith and substance the Act was one-to provide for acquisition of electrical undertaking and, therefore, the State legislature lacked competence to enact the same. Now, in that case the Advocate General of Madras in his effort to save the impugned legislation advanced an argument before the Constitution Bench that. There was implicit in every entry in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, an inherent power to make a law with respect to a matter ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry. His further argument was that each entry in the list carried with it an inherent power to provide for the compulsory acquisition of any property, land or any commercial or industrial undertaking, while making a law under such entry. This argument was in terms repelled relying upon an earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh. Repelling this contention of the Advocate General of Madras would mean that the power of acquisition of property is not ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry but in substance it is an independent power by itself. Repelling this contention of the Advocate General of Madras would mean that the power of acquisition of property is not ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry but in substance it is an independent power by itself. This also becomes clear from Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh cash wherein Das, J., in his concurring judgment repelled the argument of the learned Attorney-General appearing for the State contending that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a law made with respect to matters mentioned in Entry 18, List II and not in Entry 36, List II. Entry 18 in List II read: ‘Land and Land tenures, etc.' and it was contended that the impugned legislation was on the subject of land and land tenures and would cover acquisition of land also. Negativing this contention it was held that in that event Entry 36 in List II would become redundant. The pertinent observation is as under: In my opinion, to give a meaning and content to each of the two legislative heads under Entry 18 and Entry 36 in List II the former should be read as a legislative category or head comprising land and land tenures and all matters connected therewith other than acquisition of land which should be read as covered by Entry 36 in List II". Emphasis laid by this Court. 44. In paragraph 25 the Supreme Court has held: "25. There is thus a long line of decisions which clearly establishes i.e., proposition that power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separate power and is exercisable only under Entry 42, List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists. This power of the State legislature to legislate for acquisition of property remains intact and untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in Entry 32 List I a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific legislation." 45. This power of the State legislature to legislate for acquisition of property remains intact and untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in Entry 32 List I a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific legislation." 45. In view of the aforesaid legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the various decisions which are referred in Devinder Singh and Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., Cases, the said principles are applicable to the fact situation for the reason that the acquisition proceedings are initiated by the State Government at the instance of the KIADB in favour of ABB Limited which is a private limited company. Therefore invoking the provisions of Section 28 of the Act, by the State Government to acquire the land in favour of a private person is not permissible in law as the same is contrary to part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and also the Rule 4 of the Rules framed in exercise of the Power under LA Act. Therefore the above point framed by us is required to be answered in favour of the appellant and against the State and Board. Accordingly we answer the same in the affirmative. 46. Answer to point No.7: The last question which is required to be answered is question No.7: Whether the impugned order passed by the Learned Single Judge warrants interference in this matter on the ground of erroneous reasoning or error in law? Our answer is in the affirmative for the following reasons: 47. The Learned Single Judge has not formulated the points, but he has taken up the grounds and answered the same against the land owners and interested persons who are the appellants rejecting all the legal contentions urged by them in the writ petitions. Our answer is in the affirmative for the following reasons: 47. The Learned Single Judge has not formulated the points, but he has taken up the grounds and answered the same against the land owners and interested persons who are the appellants rejecting all the legal contentions urged by them in the writ petitions. In view of the foregoing findings and reasons recorded by us on each one of the points referred to supra in favour of the appellants against the State Government and KIAD Board the finding and reasoning recorded by the Learned Single judge in the impugned judgment by placing strong reliance on Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act Notification published on the basis of the recommendation of the Karnataka Gram Udyog Mitra Limited to establish and also the State Government High Level Single window Agency in favour of ABB Ltd., for establishment of Research and Industry development Institute in the land in question, Bangalore, being an industrial hub, therefore it is .a public purpose and issuance of the said Notifications by the State Government under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of KIAD Act, without following the procedure as required under Section 28(2) and (3) of the KIAD Act and erroneously held that the acquisition of land is for public purpose, which is contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court, which are adverted to by us while answering the relevant contentious points, whether the acquisition of land in question in favour of a private company is public purpose and further contention of the appellant and petitioners that the land in question cannot be used for Industrial purpose without change of land user in exercise of power under Section 14-A of KT & CP Act is rejected by following a decisions of the Supreme Court in Darshan Vs. State of Karnataka and others AIR 1996 SC 671 , Heggappanavar Markandappa Vs. State of Mysore [1974(1) KLJ 71) and the case in N. Somashekar & Others Vs. State of Karnataka 1997(7) KLJ 410, which finding and reasons are contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra. State of Karnataka and others AIR 1996 SC 671 , Heggappanavar Markandappa Vs. State of Mysore [1974(1) KLJ 71) and the case in N. Somashekar & Others Vs. State of Karnataka 1997(7) KLJ 410, which finding and reasons are contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra. Further the reason assigned at paragraph 16 of the impugned order with regard to ground No.2 that by the side of land in question, there is BEL Corporate Office is situated and with regard to the ground No.3 taking away livelihood of the appellant/petitioners is also rejected in not following the procedure by the state Government, as provided under Section 28(2) & (3) of the KIAD Act and without issuing notice to some of the interested persons and enquiry. The said finding and reasons of the Learned Single judge are contrary to Hindustan Petroleum Corporation case referred to supra. Wherein the Supreme Court has categorically held after interpretation of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India with reference to 300A Article, it has held that the above said provision of the Constitution, has to be placed on par with the fundamental rights, even after deletion of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India by 42nd Constitutional Amendment and further in support of our conclusion various decisions i.e., AIR 1997 SC 1236 , AIR 1999 SC 436 , AIR 1996 SC 594, ILR 1991 KAR.770 and the decision of this Court in H.G. Sheela Vs. State of Karnataka which decision is affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.Nos. 288 and 289/2006 referred to above and the decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore the finding and the reasons recorded by the learned single Judge rejecting the legal contention urged on behalf of the appellant/petitioners regarding non application of mind by the State Government before issuing notification under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act and issuing of the Notification under Section 3(1) of the Act without application of mind on the basis of the recommendation of Udyog Mitra Limited and the State High Level Committee and it also contrary to CDP, which is not permissible in law for the reasons recorded by us in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. Therefore we have to state that the findings and the reasons recorded in the impugned order by the Learned Single judge on the question of either public purpose or non-consideration of the statement of objections of the owners and not conducting enquiry and not taking into consideration the other relevant aspects namely the exercise of eminent domain power by the State Government in favour of the private company, the acquisition of land in favour of private company can be only under the provisions of Section 44B Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and under the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Company Rules) has not been followed. Therefore the findings and reasons recorded by the learned single judge in the impugned order are had in law and for the reasons stated supra on the remaining points and the finding and reasons recorded with regard to ground No.5, 6 and 7 by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order are also had in law and the same are contrary to the well established legal principles laid by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra. Therefore the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is violative of the fundamental rights and constitutional right guaranteed to the appellants under Articles 14, 19 and 21 read with 300A of constitution of India and also the statutory right of hearing before issuing & publishing the final Notification. For various other reasons which we have assigned in this judgment in answer to the contentious points formulated in this case extensively and answered the same with reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in favour of the Appellant/petitioners, hence the impugned order cannot be allowed to sustain and the same is liable to be set aside. 48. While parting with the judgment in this case we have to make certain observations. The appellant Janardhana Shetty in W.A.No.2002/2006 has filed civil litigation and the same is pending decision before the City Civil Court for its determination. In this case we have not decided any right of his ownership and we have confined our decision only with regard to the legal contentious points raised by him in this case as an interested person. For this limited purpose the judgment can be used and it should not be understood that the rights of the parties are decided by us in his case. For this limited purpose the judgment can be used and it should not be understood that the rights of the parties are decided by us in his case. The same is the position in so far as other appellants who are claiming as owners of the sites who have constructed houses and their rights for reconveyance and regularisation is still pending consideration before the Authority. We have not dealt with dispute with regard to the ownership of the land but we have examined their claim as interested persons to answer the contentions points. This judgment be confined only for this purpose and not beyond this and not more than that. With the above observation these appeals are allowed. The impugned Notifications are hereby quashed by allowing the writ petitions. Rule nisi is issued.