JUDGMENT R.C.CHAVAN, J.:- The petitioners seek to have proceedings for acquisition of their lands bearing Survey Nos.25, 2811 and 28/2 at village Bhaipur, Tahsil Arvi, District Wardha quashed on the following grounds: (i) Petitioners had developed the said lands for being put to non-agricultural use and have entered into registered/unregistered agreements of sale of plots to prospective buyers. (ii) Public Notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was not published as required and record was manipulated to show that it was so published. (iii) There was no urgency to dispense with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act by exercising powers under Section 17(4) of the Act and consequently, notification under Section 4 itself was vitiated. (iv) Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made beyond the period of one year from the last date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. (v) The need for which petitioners' lands were sought to be acquired was fully satisfied and therefore, acquisition was unwarranted. 2.The petitioners have raised these challenges in the context of following facts which are either undisputed or cannot be disputed with reference to "record" which was "made available for our perusal". (a) After serving petitioners No.1 to 3 with notices, on 16.12.1998, a surveyor from the office of TILR, Wardha and an engineer from the office of Sub-Divisional Officer, Rehabilitation Sub-Division, Lower Wardha Project visited the lands under acquisition for joint measurement, and commenced measurement. Petitioners No.1 to 3 obstructed, stating that they did not want to give their land for rehabilitation of project affected persons from village Wathoda or for any other purpose. A panchanama was accordingly made and signed by petitioners no. 1 to 3 or their representatives. (b) On 5.2.1999 notification was issued by the Commissioner, Nagpur Division under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of said lands, dispensing with proceedings under Section 5-A by invoking powers under Section 17(4) of the Act. A copy of the notification was sent by a Deputy Commissioner, by his letter dated 8.2.1999 to Manager, Government Press, Nagpur for publication in official gazelle, reciting that he was forwarding the notification "without urgency clause", though the copy signed by Commissioner, which was with the letter enclosed, does contain urgency clause. (c) the notification was published in newspapers and Government gazette on 15.2.1999, 14.3.1999 and 18.2.1999 respectively. (c) the notification was published in newspapers and Government gazette on 15.2.1999, 14.3.1999 and 18.2.1999 respectively. Proclamation was issued on 28.7.1999 and was displayed among other places, on the notice board of Gram Panchayat and Talathi's Office in the village. Individual notices were duly served upon Petitioners No.1 to 3. (d) On 17.5.1999, Sub-Divisional Officer, Arvi declared petitioners no. 1 to 3 as occupants c1ass-1 in respect of said lands. On.8.12.1999, petitioners no.1 to 3 informed the Collector and "District Rehabilitation Officer" of their intention to sell these lands. On 5.1.2000, Petitioners No.1 to 3 sold the lands to petitioners No.4 to 8 by registered sale deeds. Names of petitioners no.4 to 8 were mutated on 31.01.2000. On 17 .02.2000, Petitioners No.4 to 8 applied to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Arvi for converting the land to non-agricultural use. On 9.3.2000 Town Planner. Wardha recommended grant of such permission. Between 21st and 31st March, 2000, petitioners No.4 to 8 paid requisite taxes to gram Panchayat, which on 22.3.2000 resolved that it had no objection to the application of petitioners No.4 to 8, which was pending before the Sub Divisional Officer. On 6.4.2000 petitioners no.4 to 8 entered into agreements to sell the plots to prospective purchasers. On 18.4.2000, even the Public Works Department conveyed that it had no objection for conversion of said lands to NA use. But on the same day the District Rehabilitation Officer applied brake to this enterprise by informing Sub Divisional Officer, Arvi that the lands were under acquisition. Petitioners no.4 to 8 claimed that they came to know for the first time that lands were under acquisition. (e) On 13.7.2000 declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued and the notification was published in official gazelle on 20.7.2000. (f) This petition was filed on 16.10.2000 and on 30.11.2000 stay for delivery of possession was granted by this Court, which has been since continued. 3.The petition was opposed by respondents no.3 and 4, Collector. Wardha and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Wardha by filing submissions on 2.12.2000, whereby it was contended that the Commissioner. Nagpur Division had, in exercise of powers under Section 17(4) of the Act, dispensed with the procedure contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. 3.The petition was opposed by respondents no.3 and 4, Collector. Wardha and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Wardha by filing submissions on 2.12.2000, whereby it was contended that the Commissioner. Nagpur Division had, in exercise of powers under Section 17(4) of the Act, dispensed with the procedure contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. It was stated in this reply, as also in reply to petitioners' additional rejoinder, that notification under Section 4 was duly published in the village too, as also that petitioners no. 1 to 3 had knowledge of impending acquisition proceedings as recorded in Annexures R-1 to 3 - notices dated 7.12.1998 of measurement which could not take place on 16.12.1998 as recited in panchanama (Annexure R-4). 4.Respondent no.5 Gram Panchayat and respondent no.6 Talathi of the village in their replies supported petitioners' contention that notification under Section 4 was not received in Gram Panchayat or Talathi 's office. In their rejoinder, petitioners also filed necessary documents/affidavits to support this contention. 5.The acquiring body was subsequently joined as respondent no.7 and comprehensively replied all the contentions raised. It points out, in the project costing about Rs.950.70 crores about Rs.27.69 crores have been spent on rehabilitation of project affected persons. 9.63 hectares of adjacent land (covered by same notification) had already been acquired. The project is expected to reach crest level and partial water storage would commence from June, 2008. Shifting families from village Wathoda has already commenced and stay to acquisition of these lands is holding up the project. By an additional affidavit it was pointed out that the villagers from Wathoda were to be rehabilitated on 59.68 hectares of land acquired from three villages. 6.The learned Additional Government Pleader Mrs. Dangre for respondents no. 1 to 4 and Mr. Palshikar, learned counsel for acquiring body (respondent no.7) questioned the locus of petitioners to file this petition. They submitted that petitioners no. 1 to 3 having sold the lands to petitioners no.4 to 8. do not have any subsisting interest in the lands and, therefore, cannot question the acquisition proceedings, whereas. petitioners No.4 to 8, because they were not persons interested on the relevant date. i.e. date of notification under Section 4, and secondly, as they too have admittedly entered into agreements to sell the land broken up into plots to several prospective buyers. For this purpose. petitioners No.4 to 8, because they were not persons interested on the relevant date. i.e. date of notification under Section 4, and secondly, as they too have admittedly entered into agreements to sell the land broken up into plots to several prospective buyers. For this purpose. the learned Additional Government Pleader relied on Judgments of the Supreme Court in V.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties reported at (1996)3 SCC 124 and Nandatai Vs. State of Maharashtra reported at (1996)6 SCC 407 . 7.Before proceeding to consider the ratio of the two decisions, it may be useful to refer to a few judgments cited by the counsel on what constitutes a binding precedent. In State of Haryana Vs. Ranbir reported at (2006)5 SCC 167 , in the context of an appeal against acquittal in a prosecution under the NDPS Act, the Court made the following observations in paragraphs 12 to 15 : "12 A decision, it is well settled is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The distinction between a dicta and obiter is well known. Obiter dicta is more or less presumably unnecessary to the decision. It may be an expression of a viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding effect. See ADM, Jabalpur Vs. Shivakant Shukla. It is also well settled that the statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi constitute obiter dicta and are not authoritative. (See Divisional Controller, KSRTC Vs. Mahadeva Shetty.) 13. In Director of Settlements A.P. Vs. M. R. Apparao it was held: (SCC pp. 650-51. para 7) "An 'obiter dictum' as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case hefore it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such a obiter may not have a binding precedent. ... but it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight." 14. We may usefully refer to an observation of Devlin, J. made in Behrens Vs. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. which is in the following terms: (All ER pp.593 1-594 C) [I]f the judge gives two reasons for his decisions, both are binding. It is not permissible to pick out one as being supposedly the better reason and ignore the other one; nor does it matter for this purpose which comes first and which comes second. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. which is in the following terms: (All ER pp.593 1-594 C) [I]f the judge gives two reasons for his decisions, both are binding. It is not permissible to pick out one as being supposedly the better reason and ignore the other one; nor does it matter for this purpose which comes first and which comes second. But the practice of making judicial observation obiter is also well established. A judge may often give additional reasons for his decision without wishing to make them part of the ratio decidendi; he may not be sufficiently convinced of their cogency as to want them to have the full authority of the precedent, and yet may wish to state them so that those who later may have the duty of investigating the same point will start with some guidance. This is the matter which the judge himself is alone capable of deciding, and any judge who comes after him must ascertain which course he has adopted from the language used and not by consulting his own preference. 15. Although the said observation of Devlin, J. has been subjected to some criticism, it throws some light on the subject; but may not be treated to be an authority." 8. In Oriental Insurance Company Vs. Meena reported at (2007)5 SCC 428 , while considering authorities cited, the Court clarified the effect of dicta of the Apex Court in the following words in paragraph 26 : "26. An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority ..... " 9. In Union of India Vs. Major Bahadur Singh reported at (2006)1 SCC 368 , the Court was considering effect of judgments in the context of a matter pertaining to appraisal of performance of an officer from the Armed Forces. It may be useful to reproduce the following observations of the Court In paragraphs 8 to 12 : "8. As has been rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellants V.P. Jal Nigam case has no universal application. The judgment itself shows that it was intended to be meant only for the employees of V.P. Jal Nigam only. 9. It may be useful to reproduce the following observations of the Court In paragraphs 8 to 12 : "8. As has been rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellants V.P. Jal Nigam case has no universal application. The judgment itself shows that it was intended to be meant only for the employees of V.P. Jal Nigam only. 9. The courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret status, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. Vs. Horton Lord Mac Dermott observed: (All ER p.14C-D) "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge .....”. 10. In Home Office Vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Lord Reid said: (All ER p.297 g-h) "Lord Atkin's speech .... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. Vs. Sandham (No.2) observed: (All ER p.1274 d-e) "One must not, of course construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;" and, in Herrington V s. British Railways Board Lord Morris said: (All ER p.761c): "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 11. Circumstantial, flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches, else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 10. We would revert to the two decisions on the question of locus of petitioners, alive to the caution sounded by the Apex Court while following judicial precedents. In V.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties, reponed at (1996)3 see 124 notification under Section 4 was issued on 8.3.1973, declaration under Section 6 was published on 9.10.1973, possession of land was taken on 5.7.1973, but no award was passed. Respondents purchased the property by sale deed dated 3.2.1989 and they staked their claim to compensation. In this context the Court observed in paragraphs 3 and 4 as under :- "3. Having regard to the facts of this case. we were not inclined to further adjourn the case not to remit the case for fresh consideration by the High Court. It is settled law that after the notification under Section 4(1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In this case, notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24/03/1973, possession of the land admittedly was taken on 05107/1973 and pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published later on 08/07/1973. In this case, notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24/03/1973, possession of the land admittedly was taken on 05107/1973 and pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published later on 08/07/1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances unless a notification under Section 48(1) is published in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section II-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply and the acquisition does not lapse. The notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no other provision under the Act to have the acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification under Section 48(1) was published and the possession is surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the land after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6 was published. 4. The next question is: whether the respondent is entitled to compensation and, if so, from what date and at what rate? The original owner has the right to the compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act. Conseauently, thouch the respondent acquired no title to the land at best he would be entitled to step into the shoes of the owner and claim payment of the compensation, but according to the provisions of the Act. (emphasis supplied) 11.The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners contended that the decision is unhelpful, since in that case possession was already taken and land vested in the State, while in the case at hand possession is yet to be taken. (emphasis supplied) 11.The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners contended that the decision is unhelpful, since in that case possession was already taken and land vested in the State, while in the case at hand possession is yet to be taken. In our view, this does not alterthe position that after notification under Section 4 is published transfer does not bind the State and qua the State transferee does not acquire any title. 12. Similar observations are to be found in Nandatai Vs. State, (1996)6 SCC 407 , where notification under Section 4 was published on 15.9.1992. In an arrangement worked out while divorcing the petitioner by divorce deed dated 2.6.1992, some of the land under acquisition was given to petitioner, who applied for mutation on 6.6.1992, but mutation was not effected. The question was, whether in the absence of notice to petitioner of enquiry under Section 5-A. the proceedings were vitiated. In this context, the Court observed as under: " It is true that sub-section (2) of Section 5-A as amended by Act 68 of 1984 envisages that notice on the owner or persons interested or any authorised persons on his behalf shall be given and a right of hearing also shall be given, on objections being filed. On such objections, after making such further enquiry, if any as he thinks necessary, the Land Acquisition Officer shall report in respect of the land whether notified under Section 4 or any different parcel of the land was needed for the public purpose of the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections together with the record of the proceedings held by him for decision of the Government. In this case since holder on record has already been given notice and he filed his objections after enquiry, he was heard. The omission to give notice to the petitioner who subsequently became owner of the property does not vitiate the enquiry conducted under Section 5-A nor is the enquiry violative of subsection (2) of Section 5-A. The High Court, therefore. was right in refusing to interfere with the declaration published under Section 6 and notification published under Section 1." (emphasis supplied). 13. It may be seen that in Nandatai's case, document creating title in her was prior to the date of Section 4 notification. Yet, only because she was not recorded as owner, she was held disentitled to question the acquisition proceedings. 13. It may be seen that in Nandatai's case, document creating title in her was prior to the date of Section 4 notification. Yet, only because she was not recorded as owner, she was held disentitled to question the acquisition proceedings. It is thus clear that transferees (petitioners No.4 to 8) cannot have a standing to challenge proceedings commenced by notification under Section 4 issued before transfer in their favour. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that since original owners (petitioners no. 1 to 3) too have joined the challenge, it cannot be said that petitioners no. 1 to 3 have no locus. He further submitted that question of locus had not at all been raised in the replies filed and therefore, could not now be raised. Relying on the judgment of Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Radhe Shyam Vs. State of Haryana reported at AIR 1982 P & H 519 he submitted that as persons interested even petitioners no.4 to 8 have locus. First, failure to raise a challenge in replies or submissions can bar a party from raising a factual contention. It cannot bar an argument based on implications of law to admitted facts. Secondly, the ratio of Judgment of Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court cannot be invoked in face of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court to the contrary referred to above. 14. The learned Additional Government Pleader Ms. Dangre submitted that since petitioners No.1 to 3 admittedly do not have any subsisting interest in the property they too cannot question the acquisition proceedings, and at worst petitioners No.4 to 8 may be entitled to claim compensation, on the analogy of decision in D.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners countered submitting that if title of petitioners No.4 to 8 is not recognized, it must be recognized as vesting in petitioners No.1 to 3. Having considered rival contentions, we are of the view that it may not be permissible to totally ignore the fact that petitioners No.1 to 3 have ceased to hold any interest in the lands in question. Acquisition is transfer of interest in the properties to the State. Having considered rival contentions, we are of the view that it may not be permissible to totally ignore the fact that petitioners No.1 to 3 have ceased to hold any interest in the lands in question. Acquisition is transfer of interest in the properties to the State. If persons who are to be recognized as owners, indicate clearly by a volitional act that they do not desire to continue to own and hold the property" it would not be possible to entertain their challenge to acquisition by the State. For, it should matter not to them as to who owns or enjoys the property, once they wash their hands off it. Therefore. we hold that petitioners lack the locus to challenge acquisition proceedings. 15. All the same, we would proceed to consider the challenges raised by them, since absence of locus in the petitioners need not be equated to lack of jurisdiction in the forum, in which case a further examination of pleas raised could have been avoided. 16. As the foregoing discussion on locus of petitioners to challenge acquisition proceedings would show, the fact that petitioners No.4 to 8 developed the land, laid plots and entered into agreements to sell the plots is irrelevant. Challenge to acquisition proceedings on these premises cannot at all be entertained. 17. The learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that other challenges by petitioners raise disputed questions of facts and wondered whether It would be appropriate for a writ court to go into such questions. The learned senior counsel for petitioners dispelled doubts in this regard by placing reliance on a judgment of Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Vs. M. C. Bhatinda reported at (1969)3 SCC 769 , where the court held in paras 14 to 16 as under: "14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition to limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, on for analogous reasons. 15. From the averments made in the petition filed by the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large number of allegations the appellants relied upon documentary evidence and the only matter in respect of which conflict of facts may possibly arise related to the due publication of the notification under Section 4 by the Collector. 16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a case in which in the interests of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit in reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit." In view of this, we have perused the original records while considering the various contentions raised. 18. 18. On behalf of petitioners, it was submitted that public notice was not given as required under section 4 and record was manipulated to show that public notice was so given. For this purpose petitioners relied on supporting statements made by respondents No.5 and 6, as also certified copy of the notice obtained by petitioners which is at page 121, Annexure-A to affidavit dated 28/01/2001 filed by one of the petitioners. The learned Additional Government Pleader showed the original notice from record which bears on the reverse endorsements of its having been duly published, falsifying claim of respondents No.5 n and 6. Just as petitioners allege that record was manipulated, it cannot be ruled out that n petitioners are taking advantage of mistake, or mischief in issuing an incomplete certified copy of the notice. Connivance of respondents No.5 and 6 likewise cannot be ruled out because the learned Additional Government Pleader stated that a departmental enquiry was held against respondent No.6 for his false statement supporting the petitioners and that he has been punished. Record of this action was also made available to us. In this background, as the discussion to follow would unfold, the possibility of connivance of functionaries at lower levels of the State in the enterprise of petitioners to make a fast buck cannot be ruled out. We have no reason to disbelieve the official record, since no one would have any personal interest in tampering with it. The petitioners have not chosen to name any official who must have indulged in manipulation and how he was to be benefited therefrom nor made said person as party herein. Taking any view of the matter we have no hesitation in rejecting the petitioner's story, and especially when connivance of respondents No.5 to 6 is writ large not only in their supportive stand, but also from the fact that they were arrayed as respondents in this petition, presumably to sing petitioners' tunes. When no relief was sought against them and when they had already stated in writing whatever petitioners wanted, their joinder as respondents can be explained only on the basis that they are accessories of the petitioners. In this view of the matter, we hold that public notice was given as required under section 4 and was displayed last on 29/07/1999. When no relief was sought against them and when they had already stated in writing whatever petitioners wanted, their joinder as respondents can be explained only on the basis that they are accessories of the petitioners. In this view of the matter, we hold that public notice was given as required under section 4 and was displayed last on 29/07/1999. In view of this factual conclusion drawn by us, it is not necessary to refer to judgments in Narendrajit Singh Vs. State reported at (1973)1 see 157 and Deepak Pahwa and others Vs. Lt. Governor reported at (1984)1 see 308 so far as they relate to publication of notification under section 4 and public notice of such notification. 19. This takes us to the next question, lamely that there was no urgency to dispense with enquiry under section 5-A of the Act by resorting to powers under section 17(4) of the Act. Shri. M. G. Bhangde, the learned senior counsel for petitioners submitted that even the Commissioner, who was to form opinion that urgency clause should be invoked, had in fact stated that urgency clause should not be invoked, as may be seen from letter dated 08/02/1999 of page 99 of the record of acquisition proceedings made available for our perusal. The learned Additional Government Pleader entered a faint demur. A perusal of the said letter however debunks the contention raised on behalf of petitioners. The letter is a cyclostyled form routinely used for sending notifications to Government Press for being published in Government Gazette, where blanks are filled in hand. For the sake of ready reference, we would reproduce the letter as under. The hand written portions thereof are underlined to distinguish them from the cyclostyled matter. "MEMORANDUM No. Desk-4.(1) LQN/ WAR/CR-14/99 Office of the commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur. Dated 8th Feb .. 1999. Subject: Land Acquisition Notification Village Bhaipur. The undersigned present compliments to Manager, Govt. Press and Book Depot, Nagpur and forwarding herewith this office Notification without urgency clause of even number dated U.22 on the above subject and request that the same may be published early in the Maharashtra Government Gazetted Part I supplement Nagpur Divisional and send 5 copies to this office and 5 copies to the Special Land Acquisition Officer/Sub Divisional Officer concerned. To be published on or before 18.2.99. Sd/-. Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur. To, The Manager, Govt. To be published on or before 18.2.99. Sd/-. Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur. To, The Manager, Govt. Press and Book Depot, Nagpur………” 20. We fail to see as to how use of a wrong cyclostyled form by a subordinate of the Commissioner, merely for forwarding a notification for publication to the press, should lead to the inference that the Commissioner was of the opinion that urgency clause should not be applied, when the notification under his signature clearly shows that he was of the opinion that the land was required to be urgently acquired. That such an argument should have been advanced is unfortunate. 21. It was next contended that the recitals about urgency in the notification are only routinely made and in fact do not show that there was such urgency as to even dispense with the enquiry under section 5-A. What has been recited in the notification is only to the effect that Commissioner was of the opinion that the lands were cultivable and their urgent acquisition was necessary, and therefore, under section 17(4) of the Act he directed that section 5-A of the Act would not apply to the proceedings. The learned senior counsel for petitioners submitted that this hardly satisfied the requirements of section 17(4) and in fact the delay in declaration under section 6 belied the existence of urgency. To support his contentions as to what would constitute urgency, he relied on a number of judgments. 22. In Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans, reported at (2004)8 see 14 the Apex Court was considering invocation of powers under section 17(4) of the Act to do away with enquiry under section 5-A in proceedings for acquisition of land for a festival which had its origin in Mughal regime. The High Court held against the State, quashed declaration under section 6 and remitted the matter for enquiry under section 5-A. On appeal by the Union of India, after considering provisions of sections 17(4) and 5-A of the Act, the Court expressed itself thus in paras 29 to 36 of the judgment: "29. A careful perusal of the above section shows that sut-section (1) of Section 17 contemplates taking possession of the land in the case of an urgency without making an award but after the publication of Section 9(1) notice and after the expiration of 15 days of publication of Section 9(1) notice. Therefore. A careful perusal of the above section shows that sut-section (1) of Section 17 contemplates taking possession of the land in the case of an urgency without making an award but after the publication of Section 9(1) notice and after the expiration of 15 days of publication of Section 9(1) notice. Therefore. it is seen that if the appropriate Government decides that there is an urgency to invoke Section 17(1) in the normal course Section 4(1) notice will have to be published. Section 6 declaration will have to be made and after completing the procedure contemplated under Sections 7 and 8, Section 9(1) notice will have to be given and on expiration of 15 days from the date of such notice the authorities can take possession of the land even before passing of an award. 30. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 contemplates a different type of urgency inasmuch as it should be an unforeseen emergency. Under this section if the appropriate government is satisfied that there is such unforeseen emergency the authorities can take possession of the land even without waiting for the fifteen-day period contemplated under Section 9(1). Therefore, in cases, where the Government is satisfied that there is an unforeseen emergency, it will have to in the normal course. issue a Section 4(1) notification, hold Section 5-A inquiry, make Section 6 declaration, and issue Section 9(1) notice and possession can be taken immediately thereafter without waiting for the period of 15 days prescribed under Section 9( 1) of the Act. 31. Section 17(4) as noticed above, provides that in cases where the appropriate Government has come to the conclusion that there exists an urgency or unforeseen emergency as required under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17, it may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply and if such direction is given then Section 5-A inquiry can be dispensed with and a declaration may be made under Section 6 on publication of Section 4(1) notification and possession can be made. 32. A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act shows that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry. 32. A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act shows that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry. It requires an opinion to be formed by the Government concerned that along with the existence of such urgency or unforeseen emergency there is also a need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry which indicates that the legislature intended the appropriate Government to apply its mind before dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It also indicates that mere existence of an urgency under Section 7(1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by itself be sufficient for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. If that was not the intention of the legislature then the latter pan of sub-section (4) of Section 17 would not have been necessary and the legislature in Sections 17(1) and (2) itself could have incorporated that in such situation of existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency automatically Section 5-A inquiry will be dispensed with. But then that is not the language of the section which in our opinion requires the appropriate Government to further consider the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry in spite of the existence of unforeseen emergency. This understanding of ours as to the requirement of an application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry does not mean that in each and every case when there is an urgency contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It is possible in a given case the urgency noticed by the appropriate Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) itself may be of such degree that it could require the appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A but then there is a need for application of mind by the appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Sections 17(1) and (2) of the Act. 33. 33. An argument was sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants that once the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that there is an urgency or unforeseen emergency under Sections 17(1) and (2), the dispensation with inquiry under Section 5-A becomes automatic and the same can be done by a composite order meaning thereby that there is no need for the appropriate Government to separately apply its mind for any further emergency for dispensation with an inquiry under Section 5-A. We are unable to agree with the above argument because sub-section (4) of Section 17 itself indicates that the "Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply" (emphasis supplied) which makes it clear that not in every case where the appropriate Government has come to the conclusion that there is urgency and under sub-section (I) or unforeseen emergency under sub-section (2) of Section 17, the Government will ipso facto have to direct the dispensation of the inquiry. For this we do find support from a judgment of this Court in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad Vs. State of V.P. Wherein considering the language of Section 17 of the Act which was then referable to waste or arable land and the D.P. Amendment to the said section, this Court held thus: (SCR pp.436-37) "It will be seen that Section 17(1) gives power to the Government to direct the Collector, though no award has been made under Section 11, to take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purpose and such land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. If action is taken under Section 17(1), taking possession and vesting which are provided in Section 16 after the award under Section 11 are accelerated and can take place fifteen days after the publication of the notice under Section 9. Then comes Section 17 (4) which provides that in case of any land to which the provisions of sub-section (1) are applicable, the Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply and if it does so direct. a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). It will be seen that it is not necessary even where the Government makes a direction under Section 17(1) that it should also make a direction under Section 17(4). If the Government makes a direction only under Section 17(1) the procedure under Section 5-A would still have to be followed before a notification under Section 6 is issued, though after that procedure has been followed and a notification under Section 6 is issued the Collector gets the power to take possession of the land after the notice under Section 9 without waiting for the award and on such taking possession the land shall vest absolutely in Government free from all encumbrances. It is only when the Government also makes a declaration under Section 17(4) that it becomes unnecessary to take action under Section 5-A and make a report thereunder. It may be that generally where an order is made under Section 17(1 l, an order under Section 17(4) is also passed: but in law it is not necessary that this should be so. It will also be seen that under the Land Acquisition Act ah order under Section 17(1) or Section 17(4) can only be passed with respect to waste or arable land and it cannot be passed with respect to land which is not waste or arable and on which bui Idings stand." (emphasis supplied) 34. A careful reading of the above judgment shows that this Court in the said Nandeshwar Prasad case has also held that there should be an application of mind to the facts of the case with special reference to this concession of Section 5-A inquiry under the Act. 35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh Vs. Union of India wherein this Court held thus: (SCC p.342, para 7): "7. The object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh Vs. Union of India wherein this Court held thus: (SCC p.342, para 7): "7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made .... The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section SA." 36. It is clear from the above observation of this Court that right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired and he should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. Therefore, in our opinion, if the appropriate Government decides to take away this minimal right then its decision to do so must be based on material on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5-A." 23. Observations to the same effect were made in paras 15 and 16 of the judgment in Union of India Vs. Krishnan Lal reported at (2004)8 SCC 453 , which read as under: "15. These provisions clearly provide protection to a person whose land is to be acquired by providing right to object to the proposed acquisition of any land notified under Section 4: opportunity of hearing 1S also provided to show that the proposal to acquire the land was unwarranted; such opportunity available under Section 5-A cannot be denied except in case of urgency. 16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a landowner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-Aof the Act. The authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the landowners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act would be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, t100d or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen's property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State administration." 24. The learned senior counsel for respondent No.7 Acquiring Body, relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in State of V.P. Vs. Pista Devi reported at AIR 1986 SC 2025 . The question was of acquisition of lands for starting a housing scheme by a local authority. The learned senior counsel for respondent No.7 Acquiring Body, relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in State of V.P. Vs. Pista Devi reported at AIR 1986 SC 2025 . The question was of acquisition of lands for starting a housing scheme by a local authority. The High Court had set aside notification mainly on the ground that: " .... the case of urgency put forward by the State Government for dispensing with the compliance with the provisions of S.5-A of the Act had been belied by the delay of nearly one year that had ensued between the date of the notification under S.4 and the date of declaration made under S.6 of the Act.. .... In these context the Apex Court noted that: " ... .In this case there is no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the Government or any of the officers, nor do the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of Meerut city during the relevant time ..... " It further observed that: " ... .In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the decision of the State Government in resorting to S.17(1) of the Act was unwarranted. The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke S. 17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with S.5-A of the Act..." (emphasis supplied) 25. In Chameli Singh Vs. State of V.P., reported at AIR 1996 SC 1051 on which the learned counsel for respondent No.7 Acquiring Body placed reliance, lands were sought to be acquired for housing scheduled castes by issuing notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 on the same day, invoking urgency clause. As regards pre/post notification lethargy of the officials, the court observed in para 15 as under: "15. It would thus be seen that this Court emphasised the holding of an inquiry on the facts peculiar to that case. As regards pre/post notification lethargy of the officials, the court observed in para 15 as under: "15. It would thus be seen that this Court emphasised the holding of an inquiry on the facts peculiar to that case. Very often the officials, due to apathy in implementation of the policy and programmes of the Government, themselves adopt dialatory tactics to create cause for the owner of the land to challenge the validity or legality of the exercise of the power to defeat the urgency existing on the date of taking decision under Section 17(4) to dispense with Section 5-A inquiry." 26. The learned counsel therefore submitted that lethargy by officials cannot be allowed to obscure the urgent need for rehabilitating project affected persons. It is not necessary to refer to another judgment of Supreme Court in Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh reported at AIR 1997 SC 1467 , on which the learned counsel placed reliance where the court upheld simultaneous notification under sections 4 and 6 invoking urgency clause under section 17(4). 27. In A.P. Sareen Vs. State of V.P. reported at AIR 1997 SC 1284 , though powers under section 17(4) were invoked while issuing notification under section 4 on 27-07-1995, declaration under section 6 was not immediately published. Therefore, invocation of urgency clause was sought to be assailed. The Apex Court however rejected this challenge. It would therefore follow that invocation of urgency clause does not necessitate making declaration under section 6 immediately. 28. The learned senior counsel for petitioners submitted that judgment in State of V.P. Vs. Pista Devi, on which counsel for respondent No.7 Acquiring Body relied, had been considered by the Apex Court in Om Prakash Vs. State of V.P. reported at (1998)6 SCC 1 . In that case notification under section 4, issued on 05-01-1991 invoking urgency clause, and declaration under section 6 for acquiring lands for NOIDA in Ghaziabad District were assailed. In para II of the judgment the Court raised, among others, the following point: "11. In the light of the above rival contentions, the following points arise for our determination: 1. Whether the State authorities were justified in invoking Section 17(4) of the Act for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act." 29. The court recounted facts of the case in para 14 of the judgment. In the light of the above rival contentions, the following points arise for our determination: 1. Whether the State authorities were justified in invoking Section 17(4) of the Act for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act." 29. The court recounted facts of the case in para 14 of the judgment. It was averred by the petitioners that urgency clause was invoked only for depriving the petitioners of their right to hold possession till they got compensation. Declaration under section 6 was issued on 07-01-1992, long after section 4 notification, and that this conduct falsified claim of urgency, since no explanation for delay was forthcoming on record. Respondents therein sought to explain invocation of urgency clause by stating that they apprehended possibility of unauthorized construction. The Court concluded in para 16 that it was clear that there was no material before the State authorities for dispensing with 'enquiry' under section 5-A. The Court then considered decision in State of V.P. Vs. Pista Devi in para 20 of the Judgment in the following words: "20. It is no doubt true that the aforesaid decision of the three-Judge Bench of this Court was explained by a latter two Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of V.P. Vs. Pista Devi as being confined to the fact situation in those days when it was rendered. However, it is trite to note that the latter Bench of two learned Judges of this Court could not have laid down any legal proposition by way of a ratio which was contrary to the earlier decision of the three Judges Bench in Narayan Govind Gavate. In fact, both these decisions referred to the fact situations in the light of which they were rendered." After considering the relevant decisions, the Court concluded in para 25 as under: "25. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, therefore. the conclusion becomes inevitable that the action of dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in the present cases was not based on any real and genuine subjective satisfaction depending upon any relevant data available to the State authorities at the time when they issued the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with Section 5-A inquiry by resorting to Section 17 sub-section (4) thereof. The first point is, therefore. answered in the negative, in favour of the appellants and against the contesting respondents. The first point is, therefore. answered in the negative, in favour of the appellants and against the contesting respondents. " 30. It may also be useful to recount as to what turn the Its eventually took. In para 30, the Court observed that if it was to exercise jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution, that out of 494.26 acres of total land under acquisition, only about 50 acres of petitioner's land remained and that if notification under section 4(1) read with section 17(4) is set aside qua these pockets of lands, the entire development activity would come to a grinding hall, The Court therefore held as under: ",,,, Consequently, despite our finding in favour of the appellants on Point 1, we do not think that this is a fit case to set aside the acquisition proceedings on the plea of the appellants about non-compliance with Section 5-A at this late stage, It is also obvious that if on this point, the notifications are quashed for non-compliance of Section 5-A, that would open a Pandora's box and those occupants who are uptil now sitting on the fence may also get a hint to file further proceedings on the ground of discriminatory treatment by the State Authorities, All these complications are required to be avoided and hence while considering the question of exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, we do not think that this is a fit case for interference in the present proceedings with the impugned notifications""," 31. Eventually while dismissing the appeals, the court granted liberty to appellants to make representations to the State under section 48 of Land Acquisition Act for withdrawal from acquisition. 32. The learned Additional Government Pleader Ms, Dongre brought to our notice judgment in Bhagat Singh Vs, State of V.P. And others reported at (1999)2 SCC 384 which had considered judgment in Om Prakash, Land was sought to be acquired for a market yard by notification under section 4 issued on 05-10-1993 invoking urgency clause, dispensing with enquiry under section 5-A. Declaration under section 6 was issued on 06-10-1994. The High Court had rejected objections to invocation of urgency clause. After considering factual position the court held in para 10 that the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with enquiry under section 5-A was based on sufficient material. The High Court had rejected objections to invocation of urgency clause. After considering factual position the court held in para 10 that the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with enquiry under section 5-A was based on sufficient material. Refering to judgment in Om Prakash, petitioners were permitted to make representation under section 48 for withdrawal of acquisition proceedings in peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, indicating that such a course could not be treated as precedent. 33. In the earlier part of judgment we have referred to judgments on eliciting binding judicial precedents from pronouncements of Superior Courts. Applying principles emerging from those judgments to the decision relating to invocation of powers under section 17(4) for doing away with enquiry under section 5-A of the Act, discussed above, the following requirements/tests emerge ;- (1) Urgency in completing a project cannot be equated to urgency which makes It necessary to even skip enquiry under section 5-A of the Act. (2) The question of subjective satisfaction of an authority in forming the opinion that enquiry under section 5-A should be done away with is one of fact, to be determined with reference to totality of circumstances. (3) Pre-notification delay is not necessarily indicative of absence of urgency. (4) Failure to issue declaration under section 6 simultaneously, or soon thereafter too is not necessarily indicative of absence of urgency. (5) Skipping enquiry under section 5-A should not be routinely resorted to or allowed by courts, since it is the only opportunity afforded to owner of property to raise his objections to compulsory acquisition. 34. Application of these tests to the notification dated 05-02-1999. would indicate that, the notification itself does not disclose as to what was the urgency which persuaded the authority to form the requisite opinion. It was submitted on behalf of petitioners that though the Commissioner, who was the authority which formed such opinion was arrayed as Respondent No.2. no reply/affidavit/submission was filed by him. However. we do not see as to what difference such reply or affidavit would make. His saying something now before the Court cannot alter as to what was considered by him at the relevant time. 35. The learned Additional Government Pleader submitted. and rightly in our view, that a notification under Section 4 of the Act is a formal expression of intent of the authority, indicating what course the authority desires to take. His saying something now before the Court cannot alter as to what was considered by him at the relevant time. 35. The learned Additional Government Pleader submitted. and rightly in our view, that a notification under Section 4 of the Act is a formal expression of intent of the authority, indicating what course the authority desires to take. Therefore, it cannot exhaustively enumerate the process of formation of opinion that preceded his decision. She further submitted that adding requirements as to what must be enumerated in the notification would amount to prescribing what statute does not contemplate. All the same, in our view, when an authority is required or permitted to form requisite opinion, at least one sentence indicating why it formed such opinion to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, would be reasonably expected. Such an expression is missing from the impugned notification. Since the original record of the proceedings was made available for perusal of the Court, as also petitioners' learned counsel, we have gone through the same, but could not find any specific proposal having been placed before the Commissioner indicating urgency of such magnitude as to dispense with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It may, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the Commissioner's subjective satisfaction does not pass the muster. 36. This takes us to consider the implications of this conclusion. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that it would be imperative to strike down the notifications dated 05-02-1999 in its entirety and in any case so far as it relates petitioners' lands. As rightly submitted by the learned Additional Government Pleader, even in the worst case, only the invocation of urgency clause may have to be quashed relegating the parties to the stage of enquiry under Section 5-A and quashing the declaration under Section 6 to that extent. 37. Though in Union of India Vs. Krishnan Lal, reported at (2004)8 SCC 453 . the Apex Court had found quashing part of notification relating to invocation of urgency clause unjust, it was so held in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that such partial quashing is impermissible. It may be seen that in Union of India Vs. the Apex Court had found quashing part of notification relating to invocation of urgency clause unjust, it was so held in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that such partial quashing is impermissible. It may be seen that in Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans, on which the learned Senior Counsel for petitioners had relied, the High Court had allowed the Writ Petition partly, and, while setting aside the decision to exclude Section 5A enquiry, had permitted appellants to continue proceedings afresh from the stage of Section 4 notification. This aspect had not been challenged by land owners and due to the turn of events in that case, the Court had no occasion to pronounce upon the propriety of such a course. 38. In U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation V s. Rishabh Ispat Ltd. & Others, reported at (2007)2 SCC 248 , on which Shri. Palshikar, the learned counsel for respondent No.7 Acquiring Body, placed reliance, this aspect has been dealt with. In that case notification dated 25-08-1981 under Section 4 of the Act, read with Section 17(4) (i.e. dispensing with enquiry under Section SA) was challenged, as also subsequent declaration under Section 6. It may be useful to quote relevant portion from the judgment itself as to what the High Court did. "14. The High Court negatived the contention and held that the notification under Section 4 of the Act issued on 25-8-1981 was in two parts. While the first part declared the need for acquisition of the lands in question for a public purpose. The second part dispensed with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The High Court had quashed only that part of the notification which dispensed with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act because there was no material on record to establish any urgency which could justify dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. On a reading of the judgment and order of the High Court it was held that the first part of the notification which was a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was not quashed…...” On behalf of land owners it was urged as under: "Mr. Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the claimants, placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in Raghunath Vs. Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the claimants, placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in Raghunath Vs. State of Maharashtra and submitted that once a Section 6 notification is issued, the notification under Section 4 is exhausted. Therefore, in the instant case the first notification issued under Section 6 of the Act having been quashed, the notification under Section 4 issued earlier got exhausted and, therefore, it became necessary for the State to issue another notification under Section 4 of the Act. There was no question of issuing a notification in continuation of the earlier Section 4 notification. According to him the second notification cannot be said to be in continuation of the first notification. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. Vs. Special Dy. Collector (Land Acquisition)." The Court dealt with these submissions in para 17 as under: "17. We have carefully considered these two decisions cited at the Bar and on a careful consideration of the principles laid down therein. it must be held that the claimants are not right in their contention. The submissions urged on their behalf proceed on the assumption that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act got exhausted after a notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued, which was later struck down by the High Court as invalid. Reliance placed on the decision in Raghunath Vs. State of Maharashtra is misplaced. In that case a similar submission was advanced on the basis of the decision of this Court in Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan VS. State of Gujarat where the question for consideration of the Court was whether there could be successive declarations in respect of various parcels of land covered by a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and whether once a declaration under Section 6 particularising the area in the locality specified in the notification under Section 4(1) was issued, the remaining nonparticularised area stood automatically released. It was in that context that it was observed that once a valid declaration under Section 6 is made, the scope of the notification under Section 4 will get exhausted. This Court in Raghunath, therefore, held that the aforesaid principles did not apply to a case where the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was proved to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason. This Court in Raghunath, therefore, held that the aforesaid principles did not apply to a case where the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was proved to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason. This Court referred to earlier three decisions of this Court reported in Girdharilal Amratlal Vs. State of Gujarat, State of Gujarat Vs. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi and State of Gujarat Vs. Bhogilal Keshavlal and held that where a notification under Section 6 is invalid, the Government may treat it as ineffective and issue in its place a fresh notification under Section 6 and that there is nothing in Section 48 of the Act to preclude the Government from doing & so. The decisions referred to by this Court clearly point out the distinction between a case where there is an effective declaration under Section 6 and a case where. for some reason the declaration under Section 6 is invalid. It further observed that in principle there was no distinction between a case where a declaration under Section 6 is declared invalid by the Court and a case in which the Government itself withdraws the declaration under Section 6 when some obvious illegality is pointed out. The Court therefore. upheld the order of the High Court and held that the issuance of a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act after withdrawin & the earlier one issued under Section 6 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the notification under Section 4 ineffective and infructuous. In Raghunath a notification had been issued under Section 4 of the Act followed by a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. but realising that the declaration was not valid since the objections filed by the petitioners had not been heard before making the declaration, the Government itself withdrew the notification under Section 6 of the Act and made another declaration after hearing objections under Section 5-A of the Act. We have no doubt that the same principle applies to the facts of this case. Reliance placed on Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. Vs. Special Dy. Collector (Land Acquisition) is also of no avail to the claimants because that case was decided on its own facts. The first two notifications under Section 4 of the Act did not clearly indicate the land that was proposed to be acquired. Reliance placed on Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. Vs. Special Dy. Collector (Land Acquisition) is also of no avail to the claimants because that case was decided on its own facts. The first two notifications under Section 4 of the Act did not clearly indicate the land that was proposed to be acquired. That became clear only when the third notification was issued. This Court found that there were vital defects in the first two notifications and it was really the third notification which was effective under Section 4 of the Act. This Court observed that when there is a notification which purports to be by way of an amendment, the question whetherit is really one rectifying certain errors in the earlier one or whether its nature is such as to totally change the entire complexion of the matter would have to be considered on the terms of the relevant notifications. This Court, therefore, based its conclusion entirely on the language of the notification. It was also observed that this did not mean that wherever there are notifications by way of amendments. it is only the last of them that can be taken as the effective notification under Section 4 of the Act. The authority, therefore, is of no assistance to the claimants. The principles laid down in Raghunath clearly apply to the facts of the instant case and. therefore, the submission urged on behalf of the claimants must be rejected." (emphasis supplied) 39. It is thus clear that urgency clause can be severed and proceedings can be relegated to stage of enquiry under Section 5-A. The objections of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners to such a course on the grounds that it would do violence to the time table prescribed in Clause (ii) of first proviso to Section 6(1) and in Section 11-A of the Act cannot be accepted in view of explanation 1 to Section 6(1) and the explanation to Section 11-A which specifically provide for exclusion of period during which the proceedings are stayed by a Court, and such is the present case. 40. The learned Additional Government Pleader rightly submitted that in this case it is not necessary to relegate parties to the stage of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act since the petitioners admittedly do not have, and do not intend to have, any interest in the property. 40. The learned Additional Government Pleader rightly submitted that in this case it is not necessary to relegate parties to the stage of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act since the petitioners admittedly do not have, and do not intend to have, any interest in the property. For petitioners No.1 to 3 have washed their hands off by executing out and out sale and petitioners No.4 to 8 claim to have agreed to sell the land to numerous purchasers. The object of an enquiry under Section 5-A is to afford an opportunity to the owners on the relevant date to show as to why their property should not be acquired or why it is not suitable for acquisition etc. in order that "they" retain the property. Therefore, once having specifically stated that they do not intend to hold the property. it should not matter to them as to who occupies the same - persons to be rehabilitated by State or purchasers of plots from them. Therefore, they would have no locus in an enquiry under Section 5-A. and no objection to raise. Relegating parties to an empty formality now, when there is an urgency to rehabilitate villagers from Wathode as their village may face submergence this rainy season, would be unjust, Besides, we cannot be oblivious to the dictum of the Apex Court In Pista Devi's case (supra) that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that provision of housing accommodation (read rehabilitation of project affected persons) as a matter of national urgency. We see considerable force, nay an indefeasible logic, in what the learned Additional Government Pleader submitted. Therefore, there is no need to relegate parties back to the stage of enquiry under Section 5-A in these peculiar facts. 41. The objection that declaration under Section 6 was made beyond the period of one year, has to be rejected outright, since the last date of publication of Section 4 notification is 28-07-1999 and declaration under Section 6 was made on 13-07-2000. 42. The learned Senior Counsel for petitioners had adverted to objection on the ground that respondents' need has been satisfied by acquisition of adequate land. This was based on incorrect assumptions. The notification dated 05-02-1999 itself referred to acquisition of 16.65 hectares land from village Bhaipur for rehabilitating villagers of Wathoda. 42. The learned Senior Counsel for petitioners had adverted to objection on the ground that respondents' need has been satisfied by acquisition of adequate land. This was based on incorrect assumptions. The notification dated 05-02-1999 itself referred to acquisition of 16.65 hectares land from village Bhaipur for rehabilitating villagers of Wathoda. The petitioners found that letter dated 17-12-2002 by Rehabilitation Officer referred to need to rehabilitate 255 families for which 16.65 hectares of land was to be acquired. They point out that 23.85 hectares land from Haibatpur and 19.80 hectares land from Ambikapur is already acquired satisfying the need. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for respondent No.7 in all 965 families of Wathoda village are to be resettled in Bhaipur, Haibatpur and Ambikapur as shown in Annexure R-7/5, filed with affidavit dated 30-10-2007 by an Executive Engineer working with Respondent No.7. 43. This would also make it clear that out of in all 59.68 hectares of land sought to be acquired for rehabilitating villagers of Wathoda only 3.64 H, 1.38 Hand 1.38 H, in all 6.40 H, of petitioners' land remains to be acquired. It is almost 11l0th of land sought to be acquired, 91l0th of which is already acquired. It would not be permissible to indulge in jugglery to say that petitioners' land represents 2/5th of land to be acquired restricting the view to only lands from village Bhaipur. Viewed thus, analogy of facts in para 30 in Om Prakash's case is stark. 44. To sum up we hold that the petitioners have no locus to question acquisition of these lands. In spite of being aware that lands were to be acquired as recorded in panchanama dated 16-12-1996 and thereafter by service of individual notice of Section 4 notification. Petitioners No.1 to 3 got the lands corrected from occupancy Class-II to Class-1 for making them saleable and sold the same to petitioners No.4 to 8 after the notification. The petitioners No.4 to 8 took steps to have a layout made and all the authorities who are presumed to have knowledge of proposed acquisition by their act of commission and omission acceded to this dubious attempt of the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that petitioners have approached this Court with clean hands. Though reasons for dispensing with Section 5-A enquiry are not clear. Therefore, it cannot be said that petitioners have approached this Court with clean hands. Though reasons for dispensing with Section 5-A enquiry are not clear. since petitioners have no locus to challenge the acquisition, it is not necessary to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction to quash and set aside that part of Section 4 notification and declaration under Section 6, particularly because almost 91l0th of lands earmarked for rehabilitation have already been acquired. Stalling acquisition of petitioners' lands, which are just 1/10th of the total, would stall rehabilitation which has to be carried out in view of impending submergence this monsoon of 2008. Therefore, we would dismiss the petition. 45. Before parting with the judgment, we may observe that though petitioners may have approached the court by sleazily presenting facts in a manner that suited them, a prompt riposte by respondents to set the record straight would have saved the respondents at least a few of the eight years spent in this litigation. 46. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs. 47. At this stage the learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for stay of this judgment for eight weeks since an interim order was in force, considering the reasons, which led to dismissal of the petition indicated in the judgment, we do not consider it to be appropriate to stay the effect and operation of this judgment. Hence, prayer for stay is rejected. Petition dismissed.