JUDGMENT:- Totally there are four accused in this case and all the four accused stand convicted under Section 14(2) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986, and each one of them were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.3000/- and out of the total fine amount of Rs.12,000/-, Rs.8000/- was awarded as compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased Arumugam under Section 357(i) Cr.P.C. The conviction and sentence given by the trial court was also confirmed by the appellate Court. Now the first accused preferred Crl.R.C.No.746 of 1999, second and third accused preferred Crl.R.C.No.128 of 1998 and fourth accused preferred Crl.R.C.No.714 of 1999. 2. The first accused is a Galaxy Agency, second and third accused are the partners of the firm and the fourth accused is the Supervisor. One more accused connected in the same occurrence is the Chief Officer of a ship who was also prosecuted under Section 11(1) of the Act and pleaded guilty. The complaint is filed by the Deputy Director of Inspectorate of Dock Safety, Chennai. 3. The brief facts of the prosecution case is that the first accused was doing Dock loading of granite stones in the Greek Ship M V Silver Chariot. The employees engaged by the first accused were doing the loading operations with the help of Cranes which were attached to the ship. When they were lifting the Cargo, due to excess weight, the Cranes Nos.3 and 4 were secreted from the ship structure and fell down. While so, one of the Winch-men Arumugam was crashed by the Polycrane, sustained injuries and died. Totally there were seven cranes and Crane Nos. 3 and 4 to lift only 20 tonnes each and in total 40 tonnes. But the stone which was lifted weighed 41.43 tonnes which is termed as unsafe working load. 4. Mr.A.Sirajudeen, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that for the purpose of providing service of the labourers to the first accused, the Madras Dock Labour Board sends it labourers and therefore the first accused deemed to be a principal employer as per Section 2(g) of the Act and only the Madras Dock Labour Board should be considered as employer as per Section 2(f). Consequently as per Section 15 of the Act, the responsibility for compliance of regulation under the Act is placed only on the employer and not on the principal employer. Consequently as per Section 15 of the Act, the responsibility for compliance of regulation under the Act is placed only on the employer and not on the principal employer. The first accused here is only a principal employer as per Section 2(g) and not employer under Section 2(f) of the Act. The fourth accused is also an employee of Krishna and company and he was not a direct employee under the first accused. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Chief Officer of the ship was the supreme authority having absolute control over the granite and he could not be controlled by anybody. When the weight of the crane was in excess, the fourth accused informed the labourers not to operate the crane. The Chief Officer of the Ship voluntarily operated the crane and therefore the fourth accused is not liable. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that apart from the evidence of P.W.10, there is no other documentary evidence to show the capacity of the cranes and the experts have not certified the capacity of the crane. P.W.10 is not the competent person to give a certificate as he did not conduct any actual testing. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr.R.Subbiah submitted that the point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners have already been considered and rejected by both the trial Court and the appellate Court and this being the revisional jurisdiction, as no question of law is involved in this case, the revision has to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the first accused and his partners second and third accused are vicariously liable under Section 15 of the Act and also as per regulation 7(iv) (b) as an employer responsible for the violation of the regulations. The Supervisor who is also said to be engaged by another company comes under the definition of the dock worker, as per Section 2(e) of the Act. Dock worker includes even a person employed through any agency with or without the knowledge of the pre employer and whether for remuneration or not. 7. The learned counsel submitted that a conjoint reading of Section 2(e) and 2(f) of the Act would show that A.4 comes under the definition of Section 2(e) and A.1 to A.3 are coming under Section 2(f). 7. The learned counsel submitted that a conjoint reading of Section 2(e) and 2(f) of the Act would show that A.4 comes under the definition of Section 2(e) and A.1 to A.3 are coming under Section 2(f). The fourth accused also admitted while answering under Section 313 Cr.P.C that he was acting as a Supervisor on behalf of the first accused. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that even the Chief Officer of the ship whether he was prevented by the employee engaged by the employer to operate the crane or not also became the dock worker within the definition of Section 2(e) of the Act and as a co-worker A.4 is also liable. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that with regard to capacity of the crane, certificate Ex.P.11 has been issued by P.W.10 and he has also conducted periodical examination of the lifting complaints and issued certificate of the safe working load as 40 tonnes and further P.W.1 has stated that he has conducted examination based on the records. 10. This Court carefully considered the rival submissions made by both parties and perused all the records. With regard to capacity of the cranes, it is being purely a question of fact being considered by the two courts and also further in view of the evidence of P.W.10 and Ex.P.11, it is only to be held that capacity of the crane Nos.3 and 4 of each it was only to lift 20 tonnes and an attempt was made to lift a stone of 41.43 tonnes which was in excess. The next question is that whether the cranes were operated only by the Chief Officer of the ship without the help of the other dock workers. Though according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, that P.W.5 had admitted that A.4 directed the other labourers not to operate the crane, and the evidence of P.W.4 and 9 is they were not to operate the cranes when the weight of the stones was in excess. But P.W.9 who is one of the employee engaged by the accused firm stated in his evidence that there was an objection by the employees to lift the granite stones and the fourth accused/Supervisor allowed the Chief Officer of the ship to operate the crane and he had also sent four of the employees to give assistance in that process. But P.W.9 who is one of the employee engaged by the accused firm stated in his evidence that there was an objection by the employees to lift the granite stones and the fourth accused/Supervisor allowed the Chief Officer of the ship to operate the crane and he had also sent four of the employees to give assistance in that process. Again this is also a question of fact which had already been decided by two courts. 11. The next question is whether A.1 to A.3 are coming under the definition of 2(f) of the employer and thereby they are liable under Section 15 of the Act. 12. Section 2(e)(f)(g) are as follows: "2(e): 'dock worker' means a person employed or to be employed directly or through any agency (including a Director) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not for dock work.' 2(f): "employer" in relation to a dock worker, means the person by whom he is employed or is to employed on dock work, whether for remuneration or not, on dock work." 2(g): "Principal employer" in relation to a dock worker employed or to be employed by or through any agency (including a contractor) means the person in connection with whose work he is employed or it to be employed by such agency." 13. Section 15 of the Act is as follows: "If the person committing an offence made punishable by this Act or the regulations or any abatement thereof is a firm or other association of individuals or a company or a local authority, all or any of the partners or members or directors thereof as well as the firm, association of individuals, company or local authority shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence or abatement and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Provided that where a firm, association or company has given notices in writing to the Chief Inspector and the Inspector of the port where any dock work is being carried that it has nominated:- (a) in the case of a firm, any of its partners; (b) in the case of an association, any of its members; (c.) in the case of a company, any of its director, who is resident, in each case either in fact in charge of the management of, or holds the largest number of shares in, such firm, association or company, to assume the responsibility of the person in charge of any dock work for the purposes of this Act, such partner, member or director, as the case may be, shall, so long as he continues to so reside and be in charge or hold the largest number of shares as aforesaid, be deemed to be the person in charge of such dock work for the purposes of this Act unless a notice in writing cancelling his nomination or stating that he has ceased to be a partner, member or Director, as the case may be, is received by the Chief Inspector." 14. Regulation 7(4)(b) of the Act reads as follows: "It shall be the duty of every employer to comply with regulations 13,14,16(4), 17(4 and 5), 18, 20(2), 24(7&8), 25, 28, 29(2), 31, 32(3,6,8 &9), 33 to 39, 45(1), (2) & (3), 52(5), 53 to 56, 57(4)(e), (5), (6) & (8),58, 59(4), 61(9) and (10), 62(13), (17), 64 to 75, 77 to 82, 84(2), 85 except 85(12), 86, 87(2), 88(4 to 8), 89 to 93, 95, 98, 107, 109(2), 110, 114(4), 116 and 117." 15. Though it is the claim of the defence that the labourers were sent by the Dock Labour Board for A.1 for the work to be carried out and as such first accused is to be considered as a principal employer as per Section 2(g), as far as the fourth accused is concerned, he was supervising the work on behalf of the first accused and doing the work, which should be carried out by the first accused. Ex.P.4 is the letter from the first accused to the Senior Administrative Officer of the Madras Dock Labour Board, which is an intimation about the accident in which A.4 signed on behalf of the first accused. Ex.P.4 is the letter from the first accused to the Senior Administrative Officer of the Madras Dock Labour Board, which is an intimation about the accident in which A.4 signed on behalf of the first accused. Further in Ex.P.6, the letter sent by the Senior Administrative Officer to the Assistant Director, it is only mentioned that the deceased, driver of the board was employed by M/s Galaxy Agencies. As far as the fourth accused is concerned, first accused is the employer as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act. The fourth accused being employed to carry out the work of the first accused, it is to be held only as that fourth accused is the dock worker under Section 2(e) of the Act and the first accused is an employer as per Section 2(f) of the Act. The second and third accused being the partners of the firm, they are covered under Section 15 (a) of the Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that A.1 to A.3 are not the employers is to be rejected and the revisions filed by the petitioners are dismissed.