JUDGMENT : P.K. Jaiswal, J. (1) This appeal is filed by the insurance company against the award dated 3. 11. 1997 passed by third motor accidents claims tribunal, shivpuri in claim case no. 93 of 1995, whereby the learned tribunal awarded a sum of rs. 63,750 to respondent no. 1 - claimant with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application till its realization. (2) The appellant in this appeal is challenging the award on the ground that the liability is limited as per the terms and conditions of act policy, exh. D1 and the learned tribunal committed legal error in holding that the insurance company is also liable to pay the amount of compensation. (3) The respondent no. 1 filed a claim petition under section 140 and section 166 of motor vehicles act, 1988 (for short 'the act') on 14. 7. 1995 on the ground that the deceased was working as a labourer and doing the work of loading and unloading of minerals. On 18. 4. 1995 he loaded the truck at the quarry and thereafter he was travelling in the truck to unload the said minerals at shivpuri. Due to rash and negligent driving by the respondent no. 2 the accident was occurred and respondent no. 1 sustained injuries on various parts of the body and fracture of his left hand. After accident he was treated at shivpuri hospital. As per x - ray report, exh. P5, his radius ulna mid shaft of left hand was fractured. He filed a claim petition claiming compensation of rs. 8,87,000. Kaptan singh, owner of the vehicle, respondent no. 3, in para 2 of his written statement averred that the claimant is a labourer and his earning was rs. 25 to rs. 30 per day. In para 3 he denied that on 18. 4. 1995, the respondent no. 1 was travelling in the truck and was working as labourer in the quarry. In para 5 and para 10 of the written statement it is averred that the vehicle is insured as per act policy (truck only) and no premium of labourer was paid and, therefore, insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured. (4) Mani ram, aw 1, in para 4 of his statement stated that his earning was rs. 90 to rs. 150 per day. (4) Mani ram, aw 1, in para 4 of his statement stated that his earning was rs. 90 to rs. 150 per day. This witness, in para 6 of his cross - examination, has deposed that chiman kirar, ashok from subhashpura, ahisram, klose singh kushwaha, karan singh parihar and others were also travelling in the vehicle. Ashok, pw 2, in his statement has deposed that the injured was getting rs. 90 per day. Dr. Govind singh, aw 3, who was member of the board and had issued permanent disability certificate vide exh.P6, has deposed that the disability is less than 40 per cent. He in para 3 of his cross - examination has deposed that claimant was not treated by him and due to disability the income of the claimant can be reduced up to 25 per cent. It is well settled that the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of insurance policy. From the oral and documentary pleadings of the claimants it is not the case of the respondent no. 1 that he was authorised representative of the owner of the goods nor he is owner of the goods. Sub - section (1) of section 147 of the act reads as under: "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. From the oral and documentary pleadings of the claimants it is not the case of the respondent no. 1 that he was authorised representative of the owner of the goods nor he is owner of the goods. Sub - section (1) of section 147 of the act reads as under: "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. - (1) in order to comply with the requirements of this chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub - section (2) - (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the workmen's compensation act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation. Explanation. - for the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. " (5) The full bench of madhya pradesh high court in the case of bhav singh v. Savirani, 2008 acj 1043 (mp) , has held that as per requirement of section 147 (1) of motor vehicles act, the insurer is not liable to cover any liability in respect of death of or bodily injury to an employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub - clauses (a) , (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the proviso to sub - section (1) of section 147 of motor vehicles act and further the insurer is liable only for the liability under the workmen's compensation act, 1923. Thus, the liability of the insurer to indemnify the insured in respect of death of or bodily injuries suffered by the passenger or an employee would be covered by the provisions of section 147 of the act or the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. (6) The supreme court in the case of ramashray singh v. New india assurance co. Ltd. , 2003 acj 1550 (sc) , has held that a cleaner employed on public service vehicle died in accident, the insurer is not liable as he was not specifically insured nor he was driver or conductor nor deputed to examine the tickets of passengers. (7) In the case in hand from the record there is nothing to show that the respondent no. 3 had paid any additional premium to cover the risk. The insurance policy only covers the person or classes of persons specified in the policy. (8) The apex court in the case of new india assurance co. (7) In the case in hand from the record there is nothing to show that the respondent no. 3 had paid any additional premium to cover the risk. The insurance policy only covers the person or classes of persons specified in the policy. (8) The apex court in the case of new india assurance co. Ltd. V. Vedwati, 2007 acj 1043 (sc) , has held that the provisions of act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability therefore. (9) The full bench of kerala high court in the case of mathew joseph v. Janaki, 2007 acj 912 (kerala) , has held that the guidelines set by the apex court are unambiguous, viz. , that payment of premium alone can cast a corresponding duty on the insurer for rendering coverage on any such group, when they are not required to be mandatorily brought under insurance protection and insurance company is not liable for gratuitous passengers in transport vehicles including motor cycle only when a comprehensive policy or extended policy has been availed of by the owner of the vehicle. (10) Mr. N. D. Singhal, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1, on the other hand, opposed the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that respondent no. 1 - claimant was travelling in the vehicle as a representative of the owner of the goods and, therefore, the learned tribunal has not committed any error in holding that the insurance company is liable to pay the amount of compensation. In support of the said contention he placed reliance on the division bench decision of this bench in the case of ramshree v. Satyaprakash, m. A. No. 755 of 2000; decided on 6. 3. 2007. He drew my attention to paras 8, 9 and 10 which read as under: "(8) coming to the submissions raised by the insurer, it is clear that deceased were authorised representatives of the owner's goods. Owner of the goods was singhal crockery house, gwalior and the deceased were travelling to look after the crockery during the transit to prevent it from any damage. Thus, they were authorised representatives travelling in matador. Section 147 (1) (b) (i) of motor vehicles act, 1988, is quoted below: 147. Owner of the goods was singhal crockery house, gwalior and the deceased were travelling to look after the crockery during the transit to prevent it from any damage. Thus, they were authorised representatives travelling in matador. Section 147 (1) (b) (i) of motor vehicles act, 1988, is quoted below: 147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. - (1) in order to comply with the requirements of this chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub - section (2) - (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the workmen's compensation act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation. Explanation. - for the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged, was not in a public place at the time of accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. ' by way of amendment it has been incorporated in the aforesaid section that a policy of insurance has to comply with the requirement of covering the risk of death or bodily injury to any person including the owner of the goods or authorised representative carrying goods in the vehicle. There is no iota of doubt that risk of owner of the goods or his authorised representative is clearly covered under section 147 (1) (b) (i) as amended. (9) in view of the amended provision, policy of the insurance has to necessarily cover the risk of the authorised representative of the goods. Number of persons in the vehicle has not contributed to the accident at the time when it took place. There is no evidence to suggest that the number of persons in the vehicle had contributed to the accident as per the law laid down by the apex court in b. V. Nagaraju v. Oriental insurance co. Ltd. , 1996 acj 1178 (sc) , in that the apex court has followed the decision in skandia insurance co. Ltd. V. Kokilaben chandravadan, 1987 acj 411 (sc) , in view of the fact that there was 'breach of carrying humans in a goods vehicle more than the number permitted in terms of the insurance policy, it was laid down that the same cannot be said to be such fundamental breach so as to afford ground to the insurer to deny indemnification' unless there were some factors which contributed to the causing of the accident. The apex court has laid down in b. V. Nagaraju's case (supra) that exclusion term of the insurance policy must be read down to serve the main purpose of it to indemnify the insured. The apex court has laid down in b. V. Nagaraju's case (supra) that exclusion term of the insurance policy must be read down to serve the main purpose of it to indemnify the insured. My conclusion is fortified by the above decision of the apex court in b. V. Nagaraju (supra) and skandia insurance co. Ltd. (supra). The apex court in b. V. Nagaraju (supra) has laid down thus: ' (7) it is plain from the terms of the insurance policy that the insured vehicle was entitled to carry 6 workmen, excluding the driver. If those 6 workmen when travelling in the vehicle are assumed not to have increased any risk from the point of view of the insurance company on occurring of an accident, how could those added persons be said to have contributed to the causing of it is the poser, keeping apart the load it was carrying. Here, it is nobody's case that driver of the insured vehicle was responsible for the accident. In fact, it was not disputed that the oncoming vehicle had collided head - on against the insured vehicle, which resulted in the damage. Merely by lifting a person or two, or even three, by the driver or the cleaner of the vehicle, without the knowledge of the owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but not so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the contract, unless some factors existed which, by themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the accident. In the instant case, however, we find no such contributory factor. In skandia's case, 1987 ac] 411 (sc) , this court paved the way towards reading down the contractual clause by observing as follows: when the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by it, by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The court cannot but opt for the former view. The court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by carter's breach of contract vide para 251. To quote: 'notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the "main purpose rule", which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor's contractual obligations. For example, in glynn v. Margetson and co. , (1893) ac 351, lord halsbury, l. C. Stated: it seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard. As its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are consistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract. Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the house of lords in suissee atlantique societe darmement martime s. A. V. N. V. Rot - terdamsche kolen central, (1967) 1 ac 361. Accordingly, wide exclusion clause will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract. ' (10) insurer cannot escape the liability merely on the basis of number of persons were more at the time of accident in the vehicle in question in the absence of evidence that it had contributed to the accident, there was no violation of the policy. The submission raised by mr. Bansal that it was necessary to pay the premium to cover the risk of authorised representatives of the owner of goods, in view of the amended provisions every policy has to. The submission raised by mr. Bansal that it was necessary to pay the premium to cover the risk of authorised representatives of the owner of goods, in view of the amended provisions every policy has to. Thus, i find no merit in the submission raised by the insurer to escape the liability. Liability has been rightly fastened on the insurer. " (11) In the case of ramshree, m. A. No. 755 of 2000; decided on 6. 3. 2007, the deceased were authorised representatives carrying the goods in the vehicle at the time of the accident, owned by singhal crockery house and they were to look after the goods during the course of transit to prevent it from the damage. (12) Here in the present case the facts are different. There is no pleadings that claimant was travelling as an authorised representative of the owner of the goods. No place is mentioned from where the mineral was extracted nor he disclosed the name of the owner or name of the quarry holder and, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 that claimant was authorised representative of the owner goods cannot be accepted. (13) In view of the law laid down by the supreme court in the case of new india assurance co. Ltd. V. Vedwati, 2007 acj 1043 (sc) and as per the terms and conditions the policy of the insurance does not cover any liability nor under section 147 (1) of the act the insurer will not be liable to indemnify the insured against such liability. The tribunal was unjustified in holding that the insurer had a liability to satisfy the award. (14) Learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 further submitted that he filed a cross - objection for enhancement of compensation. His contention is that disability of the respondent no. 1 is more than 40 per cent and after the accident the respondent no. 1 cannot work as a labourer. At the time of accident the respondent no. 1 was labourer and was earning rs. 90 per day. The amount of rs. 63,750 awarded by the tribunal is on the lower side. He submitted that as per the statements of aw 1 and aw 2 at the time of accident the earning was rs. 90 per day. In support of the said contention no written document has been filed by the respondent no. 1. 90 per day. The amount of rs. 63,750 awarded by the tribunal is on the lower side. He submitted that as per the statements of aw 1 and aw 2 at the time of accident the earning was rs. 90 per day. In support of the said contention no written document has been filed by the respondent no. 1. Considering the fact that in the year 1995 he was working as labourer, it can be safely held that his earning was rs. 2,500 per month, i. E. , rs. 30,000 per annum. As per statement of dr. Govind singh, aw 3, the disability is 25 per cent and, therefore, the tribunal has not committed any error in holding that due to the accident the appellant suffered permanent disability to the extent of 25 per cent. Due to such disability the loss of income of the appellant is rs. 7,500. After applying the multiplier of 17 the amount of compensation comes to rs. 1,27,500 (rs. 7,500 x 17). The cross - objection of the respondent no. 1 is partly allowed. The impugned award is enhanced from rs. 63,750 to rs. 1,27,500. The enhanced amount shall also carry interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the appeal. (15) For the above - mentioned reasons the appeal filed by the insurance company is allowed by holding that insurance company is not liable to pay the amount of compensation to the respondent no. 1. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 are liable to pay the amount of compensation to respondent no. 1. (16) Any amount deposited by appellant shall be refunded to him. The appellant is entitled to recover the amount of compensation paid by him from the owner of the vehicle in accordance with law. (17) In the result, the appeal of insurance company is allowed and cross - objections filed by the respondent no. 1 is partly allowed to the extent as indicated herein - above, but without any order as to costs. Orders accordingly.