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Karnataka High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 701 (KAR)

Verupe Gowda v. Shankare Gowda

2008-11-14

A.N.VENUGOPALA GOWDA

body2008
Judgment :- (This RSA is filed under Section 100 of CPC against the judgment and decree dated 19.7.02 passed in R.A.No.32/94 on the file of the Addl Civil judge (Sr.Dn), Hassan, Dismissing the Appeal and conforming the judgment and decree dated 2.9.94 passed in O.S.No.84/92 on the file of the Munisff and Jmfc, Belur.) This appeal is by the original plaintiff, whose suit for partition and separate possession, was dismissed by the Trial Court and was also upheld by the first appellate Court. For convenience, in this judgment, the appellants would be referred to as plaintiffs and respondents would be referred to as defendants. 2. The basic facts of this matter is not in dispute. 3. The plaintiffs and defendants are full brothers, being the sons of Basavegowda. The two items of plaint schedule properties are agricultural lands which originally belonged to one Rudregowda, which was taken on lease for cultivation by the plaintiffs’ father. With coming into force of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (as amended by Karnataka Act 1/1974), (’the Act’ for short), and the prohibition of leases etc., under Section 5, the suit lands vested in the State Government under Section 44. On an application made by the 1st defendant in Form 7 under Section 48-A(1) of the Act, the Land Tribunal by an order dated 17.9.1981 has ordered for registration of the occupancy rights on him. Since the suit schedule properties were not partitioned, claiming a share of 1/4th each therein, the suit was filed. The 1st defendant contested the suit by filling written statement, which was adopted by the 2nd defendant. Relationship between the parties was not disputed. The averments made in the plaint with regard to the claim to the suite schedule properties was denied. It was contended that, Form 7 was filed by him after the partition in the family and the Land Tribunal ordered the registration of occupancy rights in his favour, that the same is his own property and hence is not available for partition. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the issues. 4. 2nd plaintiff deposed as PW.1. Two witnesses were examined as PWs. 2 and Exs.P1 to P13 were marked. Defendant 1 deposed as D.W.1, examined one witness as DW.2 and Exs. D1 to D11 were marked. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the issues. 4. 2nd plaintiff deposed as PW.1. Two witnesses were examined as PWs. 2 and Exs.P1 to P13 were marked. Defendant 1 deposed as D.W.1, examined one witness as DW.2 and Exs. D1 to D11 were marked. Considering the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court on its own appreciation has answered issues 1 to 5 in the negative and consequently dismissed the suit. The 1st Appellate Court, has dismissed the appeal. Questioning the said decrees, this second appeal has been filed. 5. This appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial question of law: Whether the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are not in conformity with Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reform Act, 1961 and the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1995(5) SCC 612 and this Court in ILR 2000 KAR 4809? 6. Sri. S. Shekar Shetty, learned counsel for the appellants contended that, application in Form 7 dated 21.12.1976 filed by one member of the family i.e., 1st defendant, for registration of occupancy rights should not have been consideration by the Courts below as his personal exclusive rights, inasmuch as, all the family members have rights over the tenanted land, since the land was cultivated on lease basis by the father of the parties even prior to the partition amongst the plaintiffs and defendants. He pointed out that, considering the particulars stated in Form 7,1st defendant was a minor and could not have obtained the property on lease and property having admitted been cultivated by the father of the parties, being a joint family holding, is liable for partition, which has gone unnoticed by the Courts below. He contended that, the Courts below have not considered the presumption arising under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act in respect of the entries found in the RTC’s at Exs. P2 to P6 and hence there is illegality. He further contended that, the Courts below have also not considered the statement of the 1st defendant in the Land Tribunal, marked as Ex.P13 and thus there is perversity and illegally in the matter of consideration and appreciation of the evidence. P2 to P6 and hence there is illegality. He further contended that, the Courts below have also not considered the statement of the 1st defendant in the Land Tribunal, marked as Ex.P13 and thus there is perversity and illegally in the matter of consideration and appreciation of the evidence. He further contended that, since the finding by the Courts below are vitiated on account of non-consideration of relevant evidence, such as Exs.P2 to P6 and P13 and since there is wholly erroneous approach to the matter, the legal evidence may be re-appreciated to consider the substantial question of law. 7. Per contra, Sri. J. Chandrashekaraiah, learned counsel for the 1st respondent contended that, on material aspects of the matter there is concurrent findings by the Courts below, holding that, the suit schedule properties are not joint family properties of the parties, but is the property of the 1st defendant. He contended that, perusal of Ex.D1/P10 shows that, the occupancy rights was ordered to be registered in favour of the 1st defendant, which order has remained unchallenged. He contended that, plaintiffs being not rival applicants for grant of occupancy rights and the order granting occupancy rights i.e., Ex.D1/P10 in the name of the 1st defendant, having attained finality, cannot be indirectly questioned in the Civil Court which has no jurisdiction to decide, whether, the occupancy rights granted under Ex.D1/10 in the name of the 1st defendant is valid or not and hence the suit is not maintainable. Learned counsel contended that, there is matter any perversity not illegality committed by the Courts below in the matter of appreciation of the evidence on record of the suit and since the Courts below have concurrently found that, the suit schedule property is the exclusive property of the 1st defendant, no substantial question of law arises for consideration and consequently, this appeal is not maintainable. 8. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, considering the rival contentions and the record, the afore stated substantial question of law requires consideration. 9. 8. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, considering the rival contentions and the record, the afore stated substantial question of law requires consideration. 9. The trial Court has dismissed the suit mainly by holding that: (a)There was partition amongst the parties in respect of the family properties (Ex.P1) on 24.11.1974; (b) Form 7 for grant of occupancy rights was filed before the Land Tribunal after partition amongst the parties on 24.11.1974 and hence defendant 1 was not then a member of the joint family; (c) 1st defendant was not the manager of the family, since the father of the parties was alive upto 1980; (d) Plaintiffs could have preferred rival claim application for grant of occupancy rights in favour of the joint family; (e) Plaintiff have not proved that there was any agreement between them and the 1st defendant, to partition the suit land, after the conclusion of the Land Tribunal proceedings; (f) Suit land was not held by parties from 1.3.1974 till 17.9.1981 because of its vesting In the State Government and till occupancy right was ordered in favour of the 1st defendant; (g) The plaintiffs did not cite any authority to show that the previous cultivations by the father of the plaintiffs and defendants, should have been taken into consideration while conferring the rights; (h) In view of Section 44 of the Act, the property was not joint family property as on 1.3.1974 i.e., on coming into force of the Act; (i) The property was exclusively ordered in favour of the 1st defendant and that the property was not cultivated by the 1st defendant on behalf of the joint family; (j) Ex.P10 shows that the Land Tribunal has ordered the occupancy rights exclusively to 1st defendant and that there is no discussion therein regarding the tenancy of joint family or granting of occupancy rights to the joint family. 10. In the first appellate Court, plaintiffs had filed I.A.3 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for permission to produce additional evidence i.e., copy of Form 7 filed by 1st defendant before the Land Tribunal and the RTC extracts of the suit lands from 1964-65 onwards, showing the cultivation by their father. The said application was disallowed on the ground that, by receiving the documents, the case of the plaintiffs would not improve. The first appellate Court has committed material error and illegality in dismissing I.A.3. The said application was disallowed on the ground that, by receiving the documents, the case of the plaintiffs would not improve. The first appellate Court has committed material error and illegality in dismissing I.A.3. By receiving the documentary evidence sought to be produced along with I.A.3, which were undisputed documents, it would have enable the Court to know as to who was cultivating the suit property prior to the date of its vesting in the State Government on 1.3.1974, In as much as, Section 4 of the Act provided for the person who held the agricultural land and cultivating the same, to be a deemed tenant. 11. First appellate Court in its judgments has made a reference to the pleading of the parties, issues raised by the Trial Court and the evidence. It raised 3 points for consideration. 12. A perusal of the reasoning portion in the judgment of first appellate Court shows that, it has not re-appreciated the evidence and has not recorded any independent findings, other than with respect to I.As2. and 3. The first appellate Court has not acted as per the provision in Order 41 of Rule 31(c) CPC. There is short fall in discharge of the obligation placed in law on the first appellate Court. It is settled position of law that, the first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on question of law and facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reason in support of the findings. In my view, the judgment of the first appellate Court, falls short of the settled position of law. In the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari, Reported In (2001) 3 Scc 179 , it has been held that: First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. 13. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. 13. Indisputed facts are that, the suit properties originally belonged to one Rudregowda, from whom Basavegowda, father of the parties herein, obtained the same on lease, for cultivation prior to 1.3.1974, on which day, in view of the coming into force of the Act, the tenancy was abolished and the suit land vested in the Government under Section 44, subject to the rights under Section 45. During the life time of Basavegowda, the parties entered into a partition of the family properties (ExP1) on 24.11.1974. The suit schedule properties were not the subject matter of the said partition. Form 7 dated 21.12.1976 was filed by the 1st defendant claiming occupancy rights in respect of the suit properties, which were cultivated from the time of his father. Contents of Form 7 filed by the 1st defendant shows that, the land has been under the cultivation as a tenant for the past 15 years, from the time of his father. The statement made therein reads as follows: LANGUAGE The contention of 1st defendant before the Trial Court, noticed by the Trial Court at para 11 of its judgment, is also relevant to be noticed and the same reads thus; 11. The contention of the learned Advocate for the defendant is that even though his father was the tenant for under of years prior to filling the application by the first defendant, the occupancy rights have been granted in favour of the first defendant as he was the tenant for the year 1974-75. And also it is contended on behalf of the defendant No.1 that as per Karnataka land reform Act, the property in question have been vested in the government on 1.3.74. Hence, the property was no more under the possession of the father of the plaintiffs or the first defendant from 1.3.74 to 17.9.81 till granting the occupancy rights in view of the legal norms introduced by the statute. Hence, the property was no more under the possession of the father of the plaintiffs or the first defendant from 1.3.74 to 17.9.81 till granting the occupancy rights in view of the legal norms introduced by the statute. Hence there cannot be any doubt that, the property was cultivated by Basavegowda, father of the parties, as a tenant prior to and also as on 1.3.1974, when the property vested in the State Government under Section 44, subject to the rights under Section 45 of the Act. Basavegowda was deemed to be a tenant in terms of Section 4 of the Act. Since, one of the family members i.e., 1st defendant filed Form 7 and noticing the fact that, the land was a tenanted land and has vested in the State Government as on 1.3.1974 and is liable for registration of occupancy rights, the Land Tribunal has passed the order at Ex.D1/P10 in the name of 1st defendant. Exs. P2 to P6 which are not disputed, show that, the land was cultivated by Basavegowda as a tenant. The said entries have presumption under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, unless rebutted. It is not the case of the 1st defendant that, the entries made in Exs.P2 to P6 are incorrect. Even the RTC’s sought to be produced along with IA.3 in the first Appellate Court, for the period from 1964-65 onwards also show that, the cultivator was Basavegowda and not the first defendant. Indisputably, the name of defendant 1 has appeared in the RTC from 1974-75 onwards only. Both the Courts below have not considered Ex.P13, the statement of 1st defendant in the Land Tribunal which shows that, the property was cultivated from 1958. The said statement was recorded by the Land Tribunal on 10.8.1981 and the age of the 1st defendant shown therein is 37 years, when related back, the first defendant was about 13 years old, when he allegedly started cultivation by obtaining the land on lease, which is totally inconceivable. Being a minor, he could not have entered into a lease, much less being a member of joint family, cultivated the land independently and for himself at the tender age of 13 years. Being a minor, he could not have entered into a lease, much less being a member of joint family, cultivated the land independently and for himself at the tender age of 13 years. For not taking into consideration Exs.P2 to p6 and Ex.P13 and the effect of vesting of the property in the State Government under Section 44, while the land was under the cultivation of Basavegowda, the Courts below without noticing Sections 4 and 45 of the Act, have committed illegality. 14. In the case of Veerabhadrappam And Others Vs. Virupaxappa Totappa Bilebal, reported in ILR 1998 Kar 2508, it has been held that, a joint family member seeking a partition of occupancy rights, granted to another member of the joint family in his name, wherein the grantee member claimed exclusive rights, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for partition and decide whether the occupancy rights granted by the Land Tribunal would enure to the benefit of the grantee alone or to all other joint family members. 15. In the case of Balawwa And Another Vs. Hasanabi And Others, reported in ILR 2000 Kar 4809 it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the Land Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to grant a relief of partition and it is only the Civil Court which can entertain a suit for partition and decide the matter. Considering an identical argument as has been advanced before me by the learned counsel for the defendants, it has been held as follows: 8. Looking at the provisions of Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and the relief which is sought for in the present case, it is difficult to hold that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to grant the said relief so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Under Section 48-A, the Tribunal can only grant the relief of declaring the occupancy right in favour of an appellant provided the pre-conditions for the same are satisfied, namely, that the land was in the possession of the tenant concerned on the relevant date. That being the position and the Tribunal under the Land Reform Act not having the jurisdiction to grant relief of partition, the Civil Court itself has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is, therefore, devoid of any force. 16. That being the position and the Tribunal under the Land Reform Act not having the jurisdiction to grant relief of partition, the Civil Court itself has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is, therefore, devoid of any force. 16. In my considered view, the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse, i.e., based on misreading of evidence and not considering the legal evidence on record. There is an essentially erroneous approach to the matter by both the Court below. Hence, I am constrained to re-appreciate the evidence. In view of the undisputed fact that, it is Basavegowda who was cultivating the suit properties as a tenant, prior to and also as on the date of vesting, i.e., 1.3.1974, any application filed in Form 7 subsequently, for registering occupancy rights by one of the family members, should enure to the benefit of all the members of the family. The entries in the RTC’s show that Basavegowda was the tenant of the suit property prior to and also as on 1.3.1974. It is only the vested property in respect of which, the occupancy rights can be ordered to be registered under Section 45. Undisputedly, 1st defendant’s name did not appear in the RTC prior to the vesting of the land in the State Government. The effect of vesting and the right of registration as an occupant has not been examined in accordance with law by both the Courts below. The Trial Court has held that, the plaintiffs have conceded for grant of occupancy rights in favour of 1st defendant, in support of which finding, absolutely there is no evidence on record. Its finding that, there is no rival claim, is without any merit, since the plaintiffs were not rival claimants, but the share in the land was claimed by them, on the ground that, the property was held on lease and cultivated jointly by Basavegowda and his children. The Trial Court has misdirected itself and has rendered illegal findings and the appellate Court has mechanically affirmed such findings. 17. In the case of B.L. Sreedhar And Others Vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) And Others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 578 , while considering an identical contention it has been held as follows; 10. The Trial Court has misdirected itself and has rendered illegal findings and the appellate Court has mechanically affirmed such findings. 17. In the case of B.L. Sreedhar And Others Vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) And Others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 578 , while considering an identical contention it has been held as follows; 10. First we deal with the stand of the appellant that on re-grant benefit enures to the members of the family. Learned counsel for the respondents fairly accepted this legal position and in our view rightly because of what has been said by this Court in Nagesh Bisto Desal and ors. V. Khando Tirmal Desal and ors. ( 1982 (2) SCC 79 ), Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Bangonda Kalgonda Patil and ors. (1989 Supp. (1) SCC 246), and New Kemilworth Hotels (p) Ltd. v. Ashoka Industries Ltd. and Ors. ( 1995 (1) SCC 161 ). Therefore, Indisputable legal position is that even if grant is made under the Act to any member of the family, the benefit enures to the whole family. (Emphasis supplied) 18. In the case of Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil And Others Vs. Balwant Alias Balsaheb Babusaheb Patil (Dead) By Lrs. And Heirs Etc., Reported in AIR 1995 SC 895 , it has been held as follows; 8. The same ratio proprio vigore would apply to the facts in this case as well. It is seen that by operation of S.3 Watans have been abolished and all the incidents attached to the watandari including the pre-existing custom, operation of law or any decree or order of the Court were nullified by statutory operation. Thereby, the incidents attached to the watan i.e. liability to render service as patel became extinct and the lands became ryotwari lands. Office of watan stood extinguished, the lineal primogeniture stood extinguished, the lineal primogeniture stood abolished and the land on regrant became the Hindu joint family property held by the watandar for and on behalf of the members of the joint Hindu family. All the members of the family became entitled to claim right to partition by survivorship. (Emphasis supplied) 19. In the case of Shivappa Tammannappa Karaban Vs. Parasappa Hanammappa Kuraban And Others, Reported In 1994, AIR SCW 5031, it has been held as follows; 5. …… This order is consistent with Sec. 5(3). All the members of the family became entitled to claim right to partition by survivorship. (Emphasis supplied) 19. In the case of Shivappa Tammannappa Karaban Vs. Parasappa Hanammappa Kuraban And Others, Reported In 1994, AIR SCW 5031, it has been held as follows; 5. …… This order is consistent with Sec. 5(3). Therefore, the right given to the appellant while making the regrant was only a pre-existing right namely the property attached to the office and shall continue to be enjoyed and belonged to the family and it is impartible by rule of primogeniture. But on account of abolition of the office and grant of ryotwari patta, they became partible subject to the conditions under Section 5(3). We hold that the appellant has no exclusive right to the property and accordingly, we do not find any illegality in the decree for partition granted by the courts below. (Emphasis supplied) 20. The suit property being an agricultural land, was a tenanted property as on 1.3.1974 having been under cultivation of Basavegowa, father of the parties. Being a tenanted land as on 1.3.1974, it vested in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act. By virtue of Section 45 and the application filed in Form 7, the land tribunal ordered for registration of occupancy rights under Ex.P1/D10, in favour of the 1st defendant, which was after the partition of the family properties under Ex.P1 between the parties. Indisputably, the suit properties were not the subject matter of family partition under Ex.P1. Being the property held by Basavegowa, for the benefit of the family members, in view of the order at Ex.P10/D1 the claim for share was put forth, which was not conceded by the 1st defendant contending that, there was a partition in the family under Ex.P1 and the properties which could be partitioned were partitioned between the plaintiffs and the defendants and thereafter, the parties having separated and after such separation, application having been made for grant of occupancy rights by the 1st defendant who continued to remain in possession and cultivation of the suit property, was granted in his favour and as such the same is liable for partition and is exclusive property of the 1st defendant. However, learned counsel for the 1st defendant admitted that, although when other properties which could be partitioned were partitioned under Ex.P1, but the property granted under Ex.P10/D1 which was vested in the State Government was registered in favour of defendant-1 only in the year 1981. As on the date, the partition under Ex.P1 took place, the suit property had not been ordered to be registered and had continued to be the tenanted property, subject to the provisions of the Act and hence could not have been partitioned. The lease having been prohibited by virtue of the amended Act, the property vested in the State Government, subject to the right of registration. According to the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, the acquisition of occupancy rights by the 1st defendant as per Ex.D1/P10, in the suit lands held by him, is altogether for himself, since the registration is exclusively made in the name of the 1st defendant and not for the joint family. I do not find merit in the contention for the reason that either the tenant himself or any member of the family which cultivated the land, could file Form 7 and seek registration of occupancy rights. 21. “Tenant” has been defined in the Act under Section 2(34) as an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes (1) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4. Section 4 of the Act states that, a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such a land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not, one falling under Clauses (a) to (c) therein. Section 2(11) of the Act defines the word “to cultivate personally” means to cultivates land on one’s own account – (11) by the labour of any member of one’s family. Section 2(23) defines “permanent tenant” means a tenant who cultivates the land personally (b) whose name or the name of whose predecessor-in-title has been entered in the record of rights or in any public record or in any revenue record as a permanent tenant. In the instant case, name of Basavegowda appears in the record of rights as tenant. Section 2(23) defines “permanent tenant” means a tenant who cultivates the land personally (b) whose name or the name of whose predecessor-in-title has been entered in the record of rights or in any public record or in any revenue record as a permanent tenant. In the instant case, name of Basavegowda appears in the record of rights as tenant. As already noticed, the suit lands vested in the State on account of they being, under the cultivation of tenant as on 1.3.1974, the appointed day. The tenant or the permanent tenant, defined under the Act cannot be given a limited meaning, since, the name of the manager or kartha or some other family member only might have been entered in the record of right or in any other public record or any revenue record as tenant, who may file Form 7 and seek registration of occupancy rights, though it was the family, also comprising of himself which might have cultivated the land prior to the date of vesting. Hence, when the occupancy right is ordered to be registered in the name of a member of the family whose name appeared in the record of rights or in any other public or revenue record, it would enure to the benefit of the entire family. The moment occupancy right is registered or granted such property becomes partible. It is only the vested land under the Act, which can be ordered to be granted/registered as an occupant. The land in respect of which occupancy rights are registered/granted, the same would be with reference to the date of vesting in the State Government though the orders are passed by the tribunal subsequently. 22. The partition between the plaintiffs and the defendants in respect of the family properties as per Ex.P1 was on 24.11.1974. Indisputably, the suit properties were not partitioned under Ex.P.1, since it had vested in the State Government on 1.3.1974. The RTC shows the name of 1st defendant only from 1974-1975 i.e., after vesting. 1st defendant filed Form 7 on 21.12.1976 and the occupancy rights thereof were ordered to be registered in his name as per the order at Ex.P10/D1. Indisputably, the suit properties were not partitioned under Ex.P.1, since it had vested in the State Government on 1.3.1974. The RTC shows the name of 1st defendant only from 1974-1975 i.e., after vesting. 1st defendant filed Form 7 on 21.12.1976 and the occupancy rights thereof were ordered to be registered in his name as per the order at Ex.P10/D1. Since the property had vested in the State Government earlier to the family partition and since the occupancy rights were granted subsequently in the name of a member of the erstwhile joint family (1st defendant), it would enure for the benefit of the members of the entire family. Hence, I do not find merit in the contention that since Form 7 was filed after partition in the family and the occupancy right was registered thereafter, is not liable for partition with the members of the exstwhile family. The contention that plaintiff and other family members ought to have filed rival claim application in the Land Tribunal, is without merit, in view of my findings supra on the facts of the case and also the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the decisions to which, I have already made the reference. 23. The Courts below have not considered the relevant statutory provisions and the effect of the vesting of the land in the State Government and its registration thereafter in the name of a family member. The Courts below have also not addressed to the well settled principles of law regarding the partition of the properties held on lease and cultivated by the members of the erstwhile joint family. The law on the aspect having been well settled, has not been noticed and followed and hence there is apparent illegality committed, which calls for interference. For the foregoing discussion and the reasons, the impugned decree passed by the Courts below cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiffs is liable to be decreed. Hence, I pass the following: Order i) Appeal is allowed; ii) Judgment and Decree passed in RA 32/1994 dated 19.7.2002 by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Hassan, dismissing the appeal, is hereby set aside. iii) Judgment and Decree passed in OS 84/1992 dated 2.9.1994 by the Munsiff and JMFC, Belur, is hereby set aside. OS No.84/1992 shall stand decreed. Hence, I pass the following: Order i) Appeal is allowed; ii) Judgment and Decree passed in RA 32/1994 dated 19.7.2002 by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Hassan, dismissing the appeal, is hereby set aside. iii) Judgment and Decree passed in OS 84/1992 dated 2.9.1994 by the Munsiff and JMFC, Belur, is hereby set aside. OS No.84/1992 shall stand decreed. iv) It is declared that, the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/4th share each, in the suit schedule properties and a preliminary decree shall be drawn. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their respective costs.