JUDGMENT : Dipak Misra, J. (1) In this appeal preferred under section 37 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 (for brevity 'the act') the appellant has called in question the defensibility and sustainability of the order dated 22 - 7 - 2006 passed by the learned vi th additional district judge, bhopal. (2) The appellant, bharat sanchar nigam limited (bsnl) , a company incorporated under the companies act, 1956, is controlled by the government of india and the same came into existence as it was thought apposite by the central government to convert the telecom department of the government to a government company. The telecom department was entrusted with the functions of developing the telecom network throughout the country and also maintaining the same in order to ensure proper and smooth working of communication. (3) The respondent, m/s. Himachal futuristic communication ltd. Is a company incorporated under the companies act, 1956 having its registered office at new delhi. (4) The appellant floated a tender no. Mm/eb/1 - 02/of cable / tender/2001 - 02, dated 7 - 3 - 2001 for procurement of 2200 kms. Of 12 of cable wire. The tender in question was opened on 10 - 4 - 2001. The respondent company being the lowest bidder was allotted the purchase order for 660 kms. Of 12 of cable on hfcl vide order dated 4 - 7 - 2001. Before issuance of purchase order negotiation was made between the appellant and the respondent and a letter dated 4 - 6 - 2001 was issued by the respondent in favour of the appellant wherein it was mentioned as under : - XXX XXX XXX (5) The appellant did not agree with the offer made vide the aforesaid letter and, therefore, the purchase order on the basis of the said proposal was not issued. Further negotiation took place and in pursuance of the negotiation the respondent wrote a letter dated 20 - 6 - 2001 on following terms : "this has reference in the above and in continuation with our letter no. Hfcl/mktg/mb1/2001 - 02, dated 4 - 6 - 2001. Further negotiation took place and in pursuance of the negotiation the respondent wrote a letter dated 20 - 6 - 2001 on following terms : "this has reference in the above and in continuation with our letter no. Hfcl/mktg/mb1/2001 - 02, dated 4 - 6 - 2001. In view of our continued good relationship with mp telecom circle, we are hereby ready to accept the lower of the price offered vide our letter dated 04 - 06 - 2001 or the price finalized by the bsnl headquarter for supply of 12f cable for the year 2001 - 02. As bsnl headquarters has not tendered for accessories the price of accessories will remain as per our letter dated 04 - 06 - 2001. " (6) After receiving the aforesaid letter the appellant issued the purchase order dated 4 - 7 - 2001. Clauses 7 and 12 of the purchase order being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced below : "7. Prices - the rate of 12f optical fiber cable of rs. 1,10,000/ - per km will be provisional and the applicable rate will be the lower of the two i. E. , finalized rate of bsnl co. , new delhi during 2001 - 02 vide their tender enquiry no. Mm/of/01200/213 opened on 14 - 3 - 2001 and the rate finalized by this office of the same year. The total provisional value of order shall be rs. 7,26,00,000/ - (rupees seven crore twenty six lakhs only). The provisional unit prices rs. 1,10,000/ - per; km is inclusive of e. D. , st. And other statutory duties/levies etc. And packing and forwarding charges, freight and insurance charges. 12. Performance security - the firm should furnish b. G. Of rs. 36,30,000/ - (rupees thirty six lacs thirty thousand only) i. E. , 5% of rs. 7,26,00,000/ - which should be submitted within 15 days from the date of issue of this po and must be valid for minimum period of 2 years. " (emphasis supplied) (7) Clause 17 deals with the liquidity damages and is segregated in two parts i. E. , 17. 1 and 17. 2. They reads as under : - "17. Liquidity damages 17. " (emphasis supplied) (7) Clause 17 deals with the liquidity damages and is segregated in two parts i. E. , 17. 1 and 17. 2. They reads as under : - "17. Liquidity damages 17. 1 the date of delivery of the stores stipulated in the acceptance of the tender should be deemed to be the essence of the contract and delivery must be completed not later than the dates specified therein. Extension will not be given except in exceptional circumstances. Should, however, deliveries be made after expiry of the contract delivery period, without prior concurrence of the purchaser and be accepted by the consignee, such delivery will not deprive the purchaser of his right to recover liquidated damage under clause 17. 2 below. However, when supply is made within 21 days of the contracted original delivery period, the consignee may accept the stores and in such cases the provision of clause 17. 2 will not apply. 17. 2 should the tenderer fails to deliver the store or any consignment thereof within the period prescribed for delivery the purchaser shall be entitled to recover 0. 5 % of the value of the delayed supply for each week of delay or part thereof for a period up to 10 weeks and thereafter at the rate of 0. 7% of the value of the delayed supply for each week of delay or part thereof for another 10 weeks provided the delayed portion of the supply does not in any way hamper the commissioning of the system. Whether the delayed portion of the supplies materially hamper installation and commissioning of the system, l. D. Charges shall be levied as above on the total value of the purchase order. Quantum of liquidated damages assessed and levied by the purchaser shall be final and not challengeable by the supplier. " (8) As pleaded, the appellant issued another letter dated 7 - 8 - 2001 to the respondent amending the clause 7. The said amendment reads as under : - "the clause 7, prices may be read as under : (i) the rate of 12f optical fiber cable of rs. 1,10,000/ - per km will be provisional and the applicable rate will be the lower of the two i. E. , finalized rate of bsnl co. , new delhi during 2001 - 2002 vide their tender enquiry no. 1,10,000/ - per km will be provisional and the applicable rate will be the lower of the two i. E. , finalized rate of bsnl co. , new delhi during 2001 - 2002 vide their tender enquiry no. Mm /of / 072001/00230, dated 24 - 7 - 2001, to be opened on 10 - 8 - 2001 and the rate already finalised by this office of same year. The clause 11 payment is amended as under : (ii) considering the downfall trend of rate of 12f tender opened in various circles, the payment clause under 11 is hereby amended as 70% payment of the bill claimed shall be made till the finalization of bsnl hq tender enquiry no. Mm/of/072001/000230, dated 24 - 7 - 2001 to be opened on 10 - 8 - 2001. " (emphasis added) (9) The respondent in response to the same communicated as under : - "it is shocking to see a change in price condition received through fax now. Your price is not acceptable to us and we look forward to confirmation for rs. 1,10,000 per km the final prices for execution of the order without further delay. We wish to bring to your kind notice that we had earlier supplied 225 km of optical fibre cable against your po no. Mmwe - 11 - 02/po/hfcl/ofc and accessories/2000 - 01/2, dated 28 - 9 - 2000 at a very low rate although the optical fibre prices were very at that point of time. Nevertheless, since the order was accepted by us, it was executed to honour commitment even if it mean net loss to us. In view of the above facts, you would appreciate that change in price during the validity of an order beyond the terms specified is totally unjustified. You are, therefore, requested to withdraw your letter of 07 - 8 - 2001 and confirm the unit price of rs. 1,10,000/ - per km to enable us to adhre to our production and delivery schedule. " (10) Thereafter, the appellant issued a communication dated 17 - 8 - 2001 which reads as under : - "with reference to your letter no. Cited above, it is intimated that the po was issued at provisional rate of rs. 1,10,000/ - per km to enable us to adhre to our production and delivery schedule. " (10) Thereafter, the appellant issued a communication dated 17 - 8 - 2001 which reads as under : - "with reference to your letter no. Cited above, it is intimated that the po was issued at provisional rate of rs. 1,10,000/ - per km with the condition that the rate of 12f will be provisional and the applicable rate will be the lower of the two i. E. , finalised rate of bsnl co. , new delhi during 2001 - 2002 vide their tender enquiry no. Mm/of/01200/213 opened on 14 - 3 - 2001 and the rate finalised by this office of same year "tender enquiry dated 14 - 3 - 2001, has been cancelled by bsnl, hq. , new delhi due to heavy reduction of price of fiber. In this context it is intimated that the requirement of bsnl, hq, new delhi still exists and a short tender notice has been given which will be opened on 10 - 08 - 2001. The case of finalisation of rate 12f cable is still in process at bsnl, new delhi. As such, change in price during the validity of an order is not imposed on your firm rather an amendment to the effect has been necessitated due to cancellation of tender dated 14 - 3 - 2001, which is quite logical and justified. In view of the above, your request for rate of of cable rs. 1,10,000/ - can not be considered and you are requested to supply the cable as per terms and conditions of the pw and amendment dated 7 - 8 - 2001. " (11) Thereafter, the appellant by letter dated 8 - 10 - 2001 wrote as under: - " (3) the rate of rs. 1,10,000/ - was still on higher side and as such, further negotiation became imperative and you were called for further negotiations. You of your own, agreed for price condition given in p. O. I. E. , lower of rs. 1,10,000/ - or the final rate of bsnl co. , new delhi against tender enquiry no. Mm / of/01200213, opened on 14 - 3 - 2001. So to say "reluctantly agreed for price condition" is out of place. Xxx xxx xxx xxx (7) not agreed. The tender dated 14 - 3 - 2001 of bsnl co. 1,10,000/ - or the final rate of bsnl co. , new delhi against tender enquiry no. Mm / of/01200213, opened on 14 - 3 - 2001. So to say "reluctantly agreed for price condition" is out of place. Xxx xxx xxx xxx (7) not agreed. The tender dated 14 - 3 - 2001 of bsnl co. , new delhi was cancelled and/refloated on short tender notice for the same 12f optical fibre cable, which has been opened on 10 - 8 - 2001. It may be noted that the very purpose of finalization of rate could not be served due to cancellation of bsnl tender dated 14 - 3 - 2001 and the tender process in bsnl co. Is still in progress. As such, there is no change on price clause during the validity period. Rs. 1,10,000 cannot be taken as final rate of 12f of cable till finalization of tender in bsnl, h/q, new delhi. " (12) Thereafter, the appellant by letter dated 27 - 9 - 2001 communicated to the respondent regarding amendment of clauses 7 and 11. The said amendments read as follows : - "the clause 7, prices : (i) the rate of 12f optical fibre cable has been fixed rs. 56,402 per km which has been finalised by bsnl co. , new delhi vide their tender enquiry no. Mm/of/ 072001/000230, dated 24 - 7 - 2001 opened on 10 - 8 - 2001 and is lower than the provisional rate of rs. 1,10,000/ - per km given in the p. O. The total value of order shall be rs. 3,78,85,320/ - (rs. Three crore seventy eight lacs, eighty five thousand, three hundred, twenty only) in place of rs. 7,26,00,000/ -. The clause 11 payment: (ii) 95 % payment of the bill claimed shall be made on proof of despatch of equipment from works to the consignee and balance 5 % shall be paid on receipt of equipment by the consignee in good condition. The amendment supercedes the earlier amendment no. Mm/ep - 11 /02/po/ hfcl/ofc - 12/2001 - 02/79, dated 7 - 8 - 2001. " (13) As placed on record the appellant vide letter dated 8 - 4 - 2002 issued a further communication which is to the following effect : - "with reference to your above citation letter the payment of cable which was made @ rs. Mm/ep - 11 /02/po/ hfcl/ofc - 12/2001 - 02/79, dated 7 - 8 - 2001. " (13) As placed on record the appellant vide letter dated 8 - 4 - 2002 issued a further communication which is to the following effect : - "with reference to your above citation letter the payment of cable which was made @ rs. 57402 per km is in order and as per undertaking given to this office vide your letter no. Hfcl/ marketing/bpl/2001/15, dated 20 - 6 - 2001 reiterated as "we are hereby ready to accept the lower of the prices offered vide our letter dated 4 - 6 - 2001 or the prices finalised by the bsnl head quarter for the supply of 12f of cable for the year 2001 - 02. Since the tender invited by bsnl h/q and re - invited after its cancellation were within the same year 2001 - 02 hence lower of the two rate which is rs. 57402/ - per km is confirmed. " (14) Because of the aforesaid correspondence a dispute arose as regards the rate between the parties and the matter was referred to an arbitrator for adjudication. The learned arbitrator passed the arbitral award on 9 - 3 - 2004. The respondent challenged the same before the learned district judge, bhopal and the court below encapsulated the controversy as under : - "11. The sole controversy moving around clause no. 7 of the purchase order dated 4 - 7 - 2001. It is agreed by the respondent that tender enquiry no. Mm/of/01200/213 opened on 14 - 3 - 2001, has already been cancelled by the respondent and the contention of the applicant is that when this tender enquiry has been cancelled then the provisional rates may be treated as lower one whereas the respondent is stressing upon the rates finalised by bsnl for the year 2001 - 02 is the ower rate for this year. " (15) As the clauses were not interpreted the learned trial judge directed the remit. (16) After the remand the arbitrator referred to the order dated 4 - 7 - 2001 and incorporation made and communications made by the claimant respondent herein whereby the respondent has stated that it was ready to accept the prices offered vide letter dated 4 - 6 - 2001 for the prices finalised by the bsnl. (16) After the remand the arbitrator referred to the order dated 4 - 7 - 2001 and incorporation made and communications made by the claimant respondent herein whereby the respondent has stated that it was ready to accept the prices offered vide letter dated 4 - 6 - 2001 for the prices finalised by the bsnl. The arbitrator interpreted the letter dated 20 - 6 - 2001 as a continuation of the letter dated 4 - 6 - 2001 and opined that the same has to be read in juxtaposition with the clause 7 of the purchase order dated 4 - 7 - 2001. The learned arbitrator referred to the concept of purchase order; conception with regard to harmonious interpretation of the documents and eventually came to hold that the purchase order is clear and unambiguous and read with in conjunction with the communication the claim of the claimant is acceptable. The arbitrator further opined that the purchase order was unilaterally amended by the owner and the same is impermissible; that the supply of the material by the claimant cannot be held against him inasmuch as there was stipulation of liquidated damages and forfeiture of bank - guarantee whereas the owner had no obligation to accept the material. Being of this view the arbitrator accepted the rate and passed the aforesaid award which came to be challenged under section 34 of the 1996 act. The learned additional district judge by the impugned order has expressed the view that the interpretation placed upon by the arbitrator was correct and there was no justification to set aside the award applying the parameters of section 34 of the act. (17) We have heard mr. A. D. Agrawal, learned senior counsel along with mr. Abhay pandey for the appellant and mr. Biswajit bhattacharya and mr. R. P. Khare, learned counsel for the respondent. (18) Mr. Agrawal, learned senior counsel for the appellant has put forth the following contentions : (i) the arbitrator has fallen into grave error by making the purchase order dated 4 - 7 - 2001 as enforceable though a fortiori such a contract is void as per the provision of section 32 of the contract act. (18) Mr. Agrawal, learned senior counsel for the appellant has put forth the following contentions : (i) the arbitrator has fallen into grave error by making the purchase order dated 4 - 7 - 2001 as enforceable though a fortiori such a contract is void as per the provision of section 32 of the contract act. (ii) the learned arbitrator has illegally misconducted himself by not following the mandate of section 32 and if any award is passed in violation of any law that comes in conflict with the public policy and thereby invites the grounds that have been enumerated under section 34 of the 1996 act making the award vulnerable in law. (iii) the arbitrator had committed an error by treating the purchase order as if it provides the final rate though the term 'provisional' has been used in unequivocal manner in the said document. (iv) the arbitrator has failed to interpret the term 'provisional' in proper sense of the term and, therefore, the award is per se illegal inasmuch the interpretation placed by the arbitrator on the purchase order dated 4 - 7 - 2001 has travelled beyond the contract and ipse dixit has arrived at the agreed price which is not demonstrable on the material brought on record. (v) method adopted by the arbitrator is not supported by interpretative process and the same being beyond the permissible contour the award should have been set aside by the court below in exercise of power under section 34 of the act. (vi) in the case at hand from all spectrum the respondent company may only be entitled to reasonable compensation keeping in view the fact that the rate of goods which was finalised by the corporate office of the bsnl and also by m. P. Circle office at bhopal during the year 2001 - 02 at the rate of 57,402/ - per k. M. And the respondent company itself supplied more than 1500 k. M. Of of cable to the various circles of the bsnl including 600 k. M. To m. P. Circle itself and, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to say that the provisional rate has assumed the finality by virtue of not happening of one of the terms stipulated in the purchase order. In any case if a particular situation has not occurred the contract becomes as non - executable contract as postulated under section 31 of the contract act. (19) Mr. B. Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent company resisting the aforesaid submissions of mr. Agrawal has proponed the following submissions : - (a) the submission on behalf of the appellant that the contract is void one being hit by section 32 of the contract act is absolutely untenable since the contract had already been executed inasmuch as the supply as per the purchase order has been made. (b) the arbitrator has not travelled beyond the scope of the purchase order and the documents that have been brought on record and, therefore, no fault can be found with the award passed by the arbitrator. (c) because of the unilateral change in the rate which was not accepted by the respondent in the midway the respondent cannot be put to jeopardy and the appellant cannot take a ground that the contract was tentative and hence, it became void because of not happening of an event postulated in the purchase order. (d) the grounds enumerated under section 34 of the 1996 act are not attracted to the case at hand as the reasons ascribed by the arbitrator do not offend the public policy from any sphere that has been in the said provision. (e) the factual matrix would show that one of the conditions incorporated in the purchase order did not take place and hence, the provisional order as per the stipulation in the said document has attained finality. Thus, the interpretation placed by the arbitrator is in the realm of plausibility. (20) Before we advert to the rivaled contentions raised at the bar we think it seemly to refer to certain citations in the field. At the very out set we would like to clarify that the counsel for the parties have commended us to certain citations which are in the context of the provisions of arbitration act, 1940 and also arbitration and conciliation act, 1996. We take notice of them for the purpose of understanding the role of the court while dealing with the award under the 1996 act. We take notice of them for the purpose of understanding the role of the court while dealing with the award under the 1996 act. (21) In union of India vs. A. L. Rallia ram, air 1963 sc 1685 , the apex court has expressed thus : - "an award being a decision of an arbitrator whether a lawyer or a layman chosen by the parties, and entrusted with power to decide a dispute submitted to him is ordinarily not liable to be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous. In order to make arbitration effective and the awards enforceable, machinery is devised for lending the assistance is devised for lending the assistance of the ordinary courts. The court is also entrusted with power to modify or correct the award on the ground of imperfect form clerical errors, or decision on questions not referred, which are severable from those referred. The court has also power to remit the award when it has left some matters referred undetermined, or when the award is indefinite, or where the objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of the award. The court may also set aside an award on the ground of corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator, or that a party has been guilty of fraudulent concealment or willful deception. But the court cannot interfere with the award if otherwise proper on the ground that the decision appears to it to be erroneous. The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by the agreement. The award is the decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, and the civil courts which are entrusted with the power to facilities arbitration and to effectuate the awards cannot exercise appellate powers over the decision. Wrong or right the decision is binding if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievances in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement. " (emphasis supplied) (22) In m/s. Kapoor nilokheri co - op. Dairy farm society ltd. Vs. Wrong or right the decision is binding if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievances in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement. " (emphasis supplied) (22) In m/s. Kapoor nilokheri co - op. Dairy farm society ltd. Vs. Union of india and others, (1973) 1 scc 708 , their lordships while dealing with the scope of the interference by court under section 30 of the arbitration act, 1940 have ruled that in a case of arbitration where the appellant has specifically stated that his claims are based on the agreement and on nothing else and all that the arbitrator had to decide was as to the effect of an agreement between the appellant and the respondent, the arbitrator had really to decide a question of law by interpreting the document, the agreement and his decision is not open to challenge. (23) In hp state electricity board vs. R. J. Shah and company, (1999) 4 scc 214 , their lordships after referring to various earlier decisions opined as follows : - "26. In order to determine whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of jurisdiction what has to be seen is whether the claimant could raise a particular dispute or claim before an arbitrator. If the answer is in the affirmative then it is clear that the arbitrator would have the jurisdiction to deal with such a claim. On the other hand if the arbitration clause or a specific term in the contract or the law does not permit or give the arbitrator the power to decide or to adjudicate on a dispute raised by the claimant or there is a specific bar to the raising of a particular dispute or claim then any decision given by the arbitrator in respect thereof would clearly be in excess of jurisdiction. In order to find whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of jurisdiction the court may have to look into some documents including the contract as well as the reference of the dispute made to the arbitrators limited for the purpose of seeking whether the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to decide the claim made in the arbitration proceedings. (24) In rajasthan state mines and mineral ltd. Vs. (24) In rajasthan state mines and mineral ltd. Vs. Eastern engineering enterprises and another, (1999) 9 scc 283 , the apex court expressed the opinion that if an arbitrator has acted arbitrarily, irrationally and capriciously or beyond the terms of the agreement, the award passed by him is unsustainable as the same tantamount to acting beyond the jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator. (25) In arosan enterprises ltd. Vs. Union of india, (1999) 9 scc 449 , their lordships have expressed the view as under : - "the legislature obviously had in its mind that the arbitrator being the judge chosen by the parties, the decision of the arbitrator as such ought to be final between the parties. Reappraisal of evidence by the court is not permissible and as a matter of fact exercise of power by the court to reappraise the evidence is unknown to proceedings under section 30 of the arbitration act. In the event of there being no reasons in the award, question of interference of the court would not arise at all. In the event, however, there are reasons, the interference would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless of course, there exist a total perversity in the award or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. In the event however two views are possible on a question of law as well, the court would not be justified in interfering with the award. (emphasis supplied) (26) In ch. Ramalinga reddy vs. Superintending engineer and another, (1999) 9 scc 610 , the apex court has held as under : - "19. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment in jajodia (overseas) (p) ltd. Vs. Industrial development corpn. Of orissa ltd. And upon the observations made therein that the court should be very circumspect about setting aside an award reached by an arbitrator, for parties had agreed that disputes that may arise or had arisen between them should be resolved not by a court of law but by arbitration. We agree, but circumspection does not mean that the court will not intervene when the arbitrator has made an award in respect of a claim which is, by the terms of contract between parties, plainly barred. " (27) In indu engineering and textiles ltd. Vs. We agree, but circumspection does not mean that the court will not intervene when the arbitrator has made an award in respect of a claim which is, by the terms of contract between parties, plainly barred. " (27) In indu engineering and textiles ltd. Vs. Delhi development authority, (2001) 5 scc 691 , the apex court has observed as under : - "the scope for interference by the court with an award passed by the arbitrator is limited. Section 30 of the arbitration act, 1940 (for short 'the act') provides in somewhat mandatory terms that an award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the grounds enumerated in the provisions. The three grounds set out in the section are : (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. Interpreting the statutory provision courts have laid stress on the limitations on exercise of jurisdiction by the court for setting aside or interfering with an award in umpteen cases. Some of the well recognised grounds on which interference is permissible are : (1) violation of principle of natural justice in passing the award; (2) error apparent on the face of the award; (3) the arbitrator has ignored or deliberately violated a clause in the agreement prohibiting dispute of the nature entertained; (4) the award on the face of it is based on a proposition of law which is erroneous, etc. " (28) In ispat engg. And foundry works vs. M/s. Steel authority of india ltd. , (2001) 6 scc 347 , it has been held thus : - "4. Needless to record that there exists a long catena of cases through which the law seems to be rather well settled that the reappraisal of evidence by the court is not permissible. This court in one of its latest decisions (arosan enterprises ltd. Vs. Union of india upon consideration of decision in champsey bhara and co. Vs. Jivraj balloo spg. And wvg. Co. Ltd. , union of india vs. Bungo steel furniture (p) ltd. , n. Chellappan vs. Secy. , kerala seb, sudarsan trading co. Vs. This court in one of its latest decisions (arosan enterprises ltd. Vs. Union of india upon consideration of decision in champsey bhara and co. Vs. Jivraj balloo spg. And wvg. Co. Ltd. , union of india vs. Bungo steel furniture (p) ltd. , n. Chellappan vs. Secy. , kerala seb, sudarsan trading co. Vs. Govt, of kerala, state of rajasthan vs. Puri construction co. Ltd. As also in olympus superstructure (p) ltd. Vs. Meena vijay khetan has stated that reappraisal of evidence by the court is not permissible and as a matter of fact, exercise of power to reappraise the evidence is unknown to a proceeding under section 30 of the arbitration act. This court in arosan enterprises categorically stated that in the event of there being no reason in the award, question of interference of the court would not arise at all. In the event, however, there are reasons, interference would still be not available unless of course, there exist a total perversity in the award or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. This court went on to record that in the event, however, two views are possible on a question of law, the court would not be justified in interfering with the award of the arbitrator if the view taken recourse to is a possible view. The observations of lord Dunedin in champsey bhara stand accepted and adopted by this court in bungo steel furniture to the effect that the court had no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case or to examine the documentary and oral evidence in the record for the purposes of finding out whether or not the arbitrator has committed an error of law. The court as a matter of fact, cannot substitute its own evaluation and come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. " (emphasis supplied) (29) In oil and natural gas corporation ltd. Vs. Saw pipes ltd. , (2003) 5 scc 705 , it has been ruled thus : - "12. Hence, the jurisdiction or the power of the arbitral tribunal is prescribed under the act and if the award is de hors the said provisions, it would be, on the face of it, illegal. The decision of the tribunal must be within the bounds of its jurisdiction conferred under the act or the contract. Hence, the jurisdiction or the power of the arbitral tribunal is prescribed under the act and if the award is de hors the said provisions, it would be, on the face of it, illegal. The decision of the tribunal must be within the bounds of its jurisdiction conferred under the act or the contract. In exercising jurisdiction the arbitral tribunal can not act in breach of some provision of substantive law or the provision of the act. 13. The question, therefore, which requires consideration is whether the award could be set aside, if the arbitral tribunal has not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 24, 28 or 31 (3) , which affects the rights of the parties? under subjection (1) (a) of section 28 there is a mandate to the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in india. Admittedly, substantive law would include the indian contract act, the transfer of property act and other such laws in force. Suppose, if the award is passed in violation of the provisions of the transfer of property act or in violation of the indian contract act, the question would be whether such award could be set aside? similarly, under sub - section (3) , arbitral tribunal is directed to decide the dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract and also after taking into account the usage of the trade applicable to the transaction. If arbitral tribunal ignores the terms of the contract or usage of the trade applicable to the transaction, whether the said award could be interfered? similarly, if the award is non - speaking one and is in violation of section 31 (3) , can such award be set aside? in our view, reading section 34 conjointly with other provisions of the act, it appears that the legislative intent could not be that if the award is in contravention of the provisions of the act, still however, it couldn't be set aside by the court. If it is held that such award could not be interfered, it would be contrary to basic concept of justice. If the arbitral tribunal has not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under the act, it would mean that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction and thereby the award would be patently illegal which could be set aside under section 34. 14. If the arbitral tribunal has not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under the act, it would mean that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction and thereby the award would be patently illegal which could be set aside under section 34. 14. The aforesaid interpretation of the clause (v) would be in conformity with the settled principle of law that the procedural law cannot fail to provide relief when substantive law gives the right. Principle is - there cannot be any wrong without a remedy. In m. V. Elisabeth and others vs. Harwan investment and trading Pvt. Ltd. 1993 supp. (2) scc 433, this court observed that where substantive law demands justice for the party aggrieved and the statute has not provided the remedy, it is the duty of the court to decide procedure by drawing analogy from other systems of law and practice. Similarly, in dhanna lal vs. Kalawatibai and others, 2002 (2) rcr (rent) 126 sc : (2002) 6 scc 16 , this court observed that wrong must not be left unredeemed and right not left unenforced. 14. The result is - if the award is contrary to the substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the act or against the terms of the contract, it would be patently illegal, which could be interfered under section 34. However, such failure of procedure should be patent affecting the rights of the parties. " (emphasis supplied) (30) In bharat coking coal ltd. Vs. Annapurna construction, (2003) 8 scc 154 , their lordships while dealing with the scope of interference by court under section 30 of the 1940 act expressed the view that the arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independent of the contract. Their lordships further opined that the arbitrator cannot travel beyond the parameters of the contract. The apex court made a distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. In this context it has been ruled thus : - "22. There lies a clear distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the role of the arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. In this context it has been ruled thus : - "22. There lies a clear distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the role of the arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled beyond the contract, he would be acting without jurisdiction, whereas if he has remained inside the parameter of the contract, his award cannot be questioned on the ground that it contains an error apparent on the face of the records. " their lordships further proceeded to hold as under : "40. However, as noticed hereinbefore, this case stands on a different footing, namely, that the arbitrator while passing the award in relation to some items failed and/or neglected to take into consideration the relevant clauses of the contract, nor did he take into consideration the relevant materials for the purpose of arriving at a correct fact. Such an order would amount to misdirection in law. " (31) In oil and natural gas corporation ltd vs. Schlumberger asia services ltd. , 2006 (3) arb. Lr 610 (delhi) the learned single judge of delhi high court after referring to chatenay vs. Brazilian submarine telegraph co. Ltd. , (1891) 1qb 19,reardon - smithlineltd. Vs. Hansen - tangen, (1976) 1 wlr 989, mccutcheon vs. David macbrayne ltd. , (1964) 1 wlr 125, summit investment inc. Vs. British steel corpn. , (1987) 1 lawyers lloyd's report 230, pioneer shipping ltd. Vs. B. T. P. Tioxide ltd. , (1982) ac 724, bahamas international trust co. Ltd. Vs. Threadgole, (1974) 1 wlr 1514 and the decisions rendered in the cases of saw pipes ltd. (supra) and j. C. Bhudharaja (supra) has expressed the view as under : - "39. The reason is that an arbitrator is the creature of a contract. He cannot live outside the contract. His mandate is limited by the contract. He cannot, therefore, travel outside the contract. 40. The principles aforesaid are easy to state, but as in the present case, their applicability is not free from legal intricacies. After all, when a word a phrase has to be interpreted, two equally reasonable persons may be at variance on the issue whether at all, a doubt exists. He cannot, therefore, travel outside the contract. 40. The principles aforesaid are easy to state, but as in the present case, their applicability is not free from legal intricacies. After all, when a word a phrase has to be interpreted, two equally reasonable persons may be at variance on the issue whether at all, a doubt exists. Reasoning of he who states that he has a bona fide doubt as to the meaning of a sentence may sound very logical in setting out the reasons - why he doubts. Equally forceful would appear the reasoning of the non - doubter when he justifies why he does not harbour a doubt. It could, therefore, well be argued that where an arbitrator gives reasons for the doubt or the ambiguity, the court has to then consider the justifiability of the reasoning which brings out a doubt or ambiguity. It could be argued that in relation to an arbitrator's award this would be immune to a legal challenge inasmuch as it is the exclusive domain of the arbitrator to ascribe meaning to a word, inasmuch as, meaning of a word is a question of fact, notwithstanding interpretation of a document being a question of law. " Thereafter, the learned single judge proceeded to state in paragraphs 43, 44 and 47 as under : - "origin of law of contract is to be found in the common law - judge made law. Principles of interpretation have been evolved by courts keeping in view equality, justice and good conscience at the forefront. They have found universal application in virtually all legal systems which have adopted the model of common law. Since, i am dealing with a contract, i would be failing in not nothing that the preamble to the indian contract act, 1872 records : "whereas it is expedient to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contracts. " 44. The legislature has clearly spoken that wherever the legislature through it expedient to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contracts, the indian contract act, 1872 has been enacted. It is thus not an enacting code. It is also not a consolidating code. The act does not profess to be a complete code. " 44. The legislature has clearly spoken that wherever the legislature through it expedient to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contracts, the indian contract act, 1872 has been enacted. It is thus not an enacting code. It is also not a consolidating code. The act does not profess to be a complete code. To the extent legislature has enacted, law of contract would be governed by the indian contract act, 1872, and wherever not the courts would be free to cull out common law principles and apply the same. Of course the said principles should not be in conflict with the statutory provisions of the indian contract act, 1872. Xxx xxx xxx 47. All judicial opinions refer to task of construing a contract as a task involving application of principles of interpretation. Thus, if an arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal ignores a well recognized principle of interpretation, such an award would be against public policy within the meaning of section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996, as understood and interpreted in saw pipers case thus calling for interference. " (emphasis added) (32) In hindustan zinc ltd. Vs. Friends coal carbonisation, (2006) 4 scc 445 , after referring to the decision rendered in the case of oil and natural gas corporation ltd. (supra) their lordships have expressed thus : - "24. The appellant has given calculation fully and correctly which shows that the escalation was only 11,42,203. 90. This was what was awarded by the trial court and this amount had been paid with interest of rs. 12,75,442 in all rs. 24,17,646 on 6 - 2 - 1999. In spite of our directions on 21 - 3 - 2006, the respondent has not given the actual calculations but has furnished only the final figure of claim. The respondent's memo makes it clear that the respondent wants the escalation to be calculated for supplies from 14 - 7 - 1992 with reference to the base price of washery grade ii coal and not with reference to washery grade i coal. This is impermissible. The order of the division bench is unsustainable as it failed to interfere with the portion of the award which is opposed to the specific terms of the contract. On the other hand, the trial court had correctly decided the matter. " (emphasis supplied) (33) In mcdermoit international inc. Vs. This is impermissible. The order of the division bench is unsustainable as it failed to interfere with the portion of the award which is opposed to the specific terms of the contract. On the other hand, the trial court had correctly decided the matter. " (emphasis supplied) (33) In mcdermoit international inc. Vs. Burn standard co. Ltd. And others, 2006 (2) arb. Lr 498 (sc) , in paragraph 55 it has been held as under : - "55. The 1996 act makes provision for the supervision role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in view circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So scheme of the provision again if it is desired. So scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration a they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it. " "119. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement, is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot, be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitration to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law (see: pure helium india (p) ltd. Vs. Oil and natural gas commission, (2003) 8 scc 559 = 2003 (3) arb. Lr 409 (sc) and d. D. Sharma vs. Union of india, (2004) 5 scc 325 = 2004 (2) arb. Lr 119 (sc) ". Vs. Oil and natural gas commission, (2003) 8 scc 559 = 2003 (3) arb. Lr 409 (sc) and d. D. Sharma vs. Union of india, (2004) 5 scc 325 = 2004 (2) arb. Lr 119 (sc) ". (34) In food corporation of india vs. Chandu construction and another, (2007) 4 scc 697 , it has been held that an arbitrator derives his authority from the contract and if he acts in disregard of the contract, he acts without jurisdiction. A deliberate departure from contract amounts to not only manifest disregard of his authority or a misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to a mala fide action. (35) In numaligarh refinery ltd. Vs. Daelim industrial co. Ltd. , 2007 (3) arb. Lr 378 (sc) , it has been ruled that if the arbitrator places interpretation on the clauses of agreement which is wholly contrary to law then in that case, there is no prohibition for courts to set things right but the court should not sit in appeal and normally should not interfere with the views of arbitrator in interpretation of terms of agreements interpreted by arbitrator when arbitrator is appointed with consent of parties. (36) Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties are to be tested. The principal submission of mr. Agrawal is that the documents would show that the contract is a contingent contract and as the particular event did not happen it has become void. To appreciate the said submission it is apposite to refer to sections 31 and 32 of the indian contract act, 1872. They read as under : - "31. Contingent contract defined. - a 'contingent contract' is a contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such contract, does or does not happen. 32. Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event happening. - contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens, cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void. " (37) On a reading of the aforesaid two provisions, we are of the considered opinion that the purchase order that was issued to the respondent would not come in the realm of contingent contract. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void. " (37) On a reading of the aforesaid two provisions, we are of the considered opinion that the purchase order that was issued to the respondent would not come in the realm of contingent contract. What was a condition, pertained to the rate and not the event of something happening for the purpose of execution. The rate was treated to be provisional and the same was to be finalised on certain conditions taking place. One such condition did not happen. A letter was issued by the appellant to the respondent determining the rate on the basis of another condition. The said condition was not stipulated in the contract. It is settled in law that unilateral change in a contractual matter is not permissible. It is urged by mr. Agrawal with immense vehemence that when the first limb of contract had failed, it has to be treated as a void contract. Per contra, mr. Bhattacharya would submit that the contract has been executed and an executed contract cannot be termed as void contract. In any case, in the case at hand, as we perceive, it is not a void contract. (38) In essentiality, we are disposed to think that the real cavil relates to the rate. Finality of the rate was dependent upon two things happening and the lower of the two rates was to be treated as final. As is manifest, the rate was finalised by the appellant on the basis of the rate fixed for the same year in the said office. The first condition did not happen as the tender in question was cancelled. The other rate has been taken into consideration. It is to be kept in mind that it was not a case where a part of the contract or a particular event could not happen as it was in the realm of impossibility. It is well settled in law that if an act or ommission takes place by either of the parties that is a question of fact and can be adverted to. As is demonstrable, in the case at hand, the owner cancelled the tender. This was a positive action by the appellant. It is a case where the things contemplated were capable of performance. It was within the total or absolute control of the owner. As is demonstrable, in the case at hand, the owner cancelled the tender. This was a positive action by the appellant. It is a case where the things contemplated were capable of performance. It was within the total or absolute control of the owner. It is not that the contract is silent about it. The purchase order had fixed the rate subject to happenstance of two events. The owner cannot do something or omit to do something and put the blame on the other party. The blame cannot be put on the respondent because of the same. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent could have stopped the supply. The arbitrator has referred to the clause 17 which deals with liquidated damages. The respondent was liable to pay liquidated damages in case of non - supply levied by the purchaser. Analysis of the arbitrator on this score cannot really be found fault with. (39) In saw pipes ltd. (supra) it has been laid down that an award can be set aside if it is patently illegal. Their lordships opined that if the award runs contrary to the substantive law which is in force in india it would be against the statutory provisions and hence, liable to be set aside. In the instant case, as is perceived, the reasons given by the arbitrator are reasonable and interpretation placed by him is neither perverse nor against any statutory provisions. As is understood from the above - quoted decisions if an interpretation of document is plausible, the court should not interfere. As we have scanned the terms of the purchase order we are inclined to think that the interpretation placed by the arbitrator is in the realm of possibility and plausibility. It is not a perverse interpretation. It is not against any kind of statutory provisions. The interpretation has been placed on the basis of the analysis of correspondences that have taken place between the parties. The correspondences made between them show how the provisional rate remained in vogue because one of the events did not happen and for not happening the owner was responsible because of the positive action taken by it. The interpretation has been placed on the basis of the analysis of correspondences that have taken place between the parties. The correspondences made between them show how the provisional rate remained in vogue because one of the events did not happen and for not happening the owner was responsible because of the positive action taken by it. (40) In view of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in holding that the interpretation being in the realm of plausibility and not contrary to any substantive law, the same does not invite the wrath or frown of section 34 of the 1996 act and hence, does not become liable to be set aside. The submission that the contract has become void, we are unable to accept, as it has been executed in entirety. Additionally, it only related to the prices and not to the supply. In any case the entire material had been supplied. The supply has been accepted by the owner. The dispute only relates to rate and hence, it cannot be termed as a void contract and by no stretch of imagination section 32 of the contract act would get attracted. Thus, the construction of the documents by the arbitrator is just and proper and does not offend any public policy. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any error in the award passed by the arbitrator and the stamp of approval given to it by the learned trial judge. (41) Resultantly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.