JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 31.5.1995 passed by Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Gorakhpur Division, Annexure-12 to the writ petition and order dated 19.8.1995 passed by Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Kanpur Office, Annexure-15 to the writ petition and the order dated 31.12.1996 passed by Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation, Bombay, Annexure-19 to the writ petition. Further prayer is to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to permit the petitioner to function as assistant under them with all benefits of continuous service including arrears of salary and promotion. 2. The facts arising out of the writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed on 3.10.1985 as assistant. On 14.11.1991 the petitioner was posted as cashier at Branch No. 2 of the Life Insurance Corporation at Gorakhpur. From the date of initial appointment the work and conduct of the petitioner was satisfactory and there were no complaints whatsoever against the petitioner. On 6.1.1992 the petitioner was working as one of cashiers amongst three cashiers deputed for discharging duties at cash counter of Branch No. 2. At the end of working hours on 6.1.1992 all the cash collected by the three cashiers were pooled and thereafter counted in the present of Sri Radhey Shyam Mani, Higher Grade Assistant posted at the branch. After counting the aforesaid cash the same was entered in Daily Cash Book in the presence of Sri Radhey Shyam Mani and the same was counted and locked. At that point of time two other cashiers namely Sanjai Srivastava and Sri S.S.N. Tiwari were also present. The cash box were taken to safe kept in the Chambers of Branch Manager. The cash box was taken by one Sri N.P. Sharma, sub-staff and was accompanied by the petitioner, Sri Radhey Shyam Mani and Sri A.P. Srivastava, Administrative Officer. The same was kept in the safe and was locked up under the double lock with one key thereof being retained by Sri A.P. Srivastava the Administrative Officer and the other key of the same being retained by Sri Radhey Shyam Mani in their custody. After completion of the aforesaid certification the said fact was made in the branch Daily Cash Balance Book and the same was countersigned by the petitioner and Sri Radhey Shyam Mani and Sri A.P. Srivastava. After completion of the aforesaid certification the said fact was made in the branch Daily Cash Balance Book and the same was countersigned by the petitioner and Sri Radhey Shyam Mani and Sri A.P. Srivastava. At the time of making the aforesaid certification Sri Radhey Shyam Mani (holder of Key No. 1 of the safe) made the following certification : “MAIN PRAMANIT KARATA HOON KI UPROKT ROKAD, BAKSHE ME RAKHKAR ROKAD-BAKSHA TIJORI MEN RAKH DIYA GAYA HAI AUR MAINE TIJORI MEN TALA BAND KAR DIYA HAI.” 3. The other certification was made by Sri A.P. Srivastava, the Administrative Officer, the holder of Key No. 2 which is as follows : “MAIN PRAMANIT KARATA HOON KI ROKAD-BAKSHA TIJORI MEN RAKHA GAYA AUR TIJORI MEN TALA BAND KIYA GAYA.” 4. In the morning of 7.1.1992 office peon namely Gyan Prakash Misra while opening the branch found door of the chambers of Branch Manager unlocked and immediately he intimated this fact to the Assistant Branch Manager and Assistant Administrative Officer. The aforesaid officers waited for arrival of Sri A.P. Srivastava, Administrative Officer and thereafter it was found further that the lock of drawer of Sri A.P. Srivastava was broken. However, the safe was found to be in order. Thereafter, the safe was opened in the presence of several officers and employees including the petitioner. The cash box was brought out and upon counting of the cash it was found a short-fall of Rs. 1,40,806.46p. A first information report to this effect was lodged at Police Station Kotwali. On the basis of the aforesaid report a case was registered as Case Crime No. 5 of 1992 under Section 409, IPC. During the course of investigation by police, it was found that in the back portion of the building of the Corporation, the aforesaid cash amount was located and it was found and deposited. Thereafter a final report was submitted by the local police with regard to not having any hope for apprehending the culprit. After submission of the final report a charge-sheet was given to the petitioner on 25.8.1993 by the Senior Divisional Manager under Regulation 30 of Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulation, 1960. The said charge-sheet was accompanied by two documents namely the extract of Branch Daily Cash Balance Book dated 6.1.1992 and as also the Branch Daily Cash Balance Book dated 7.1.1992. No further document was enclosed with the charge-sheet. The said charge-sheet was accompanied by two documents namely the extract of Branch Daily Cash Balance Book dated 6.1.1992 and as also the Branch Daily Cash Balance Book dated 7.1.1992. No further document was enclosed with the charge-sheet. The petitioner submitted a reply denying the charges levelled against the petitioner. The Divisional Manager vide its order dated 30.11.1993 appointed one Sri B.B. Kapoor as enquiry officer to conduct the enquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner. During the course of enquiry the Inquiry Officer recorded the statement of Sri D.S. Singh, then Senior Branch Manager, Sri A.P. Srivastava, Administrative Officer, Sri Ram Krishna, Assistant Administrative Officer, Sri S.S.N. Tewari and Sri Sanjay Kumar (both cashiers) and Sri N.P. Sharma, Sub-Staff. An enquiry report was submitted on 30.8.1994 by the Inquiry Officer. On the basis of the enquiry report a show cause notice was issued on 17.1.1995 by the Senior Divisional Manager, calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the penalty of removal be not imposed. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the show cause notice dated 11.2.1995 and a supplementary reply was also submitted by the petitioner on 4.3.1995. By order dated 31.5.1995, the Senior Divisional Manager passed an order removing the petitioner from service. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed an appeal on 3.7.1995. Against the order of removal, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 16524 of 1995 before this Court which was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by order dated 19.8.1995. The petitioner aggrieved by the aforesaid order of dismissal of appeal submitted a memorial to the Chairman and that too was rejected by order dated 31.12.1996. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 5. As the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit have already been exchanged, therefore, with the consent of the parties, the present writ petition is being disposed of finally. 6. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate that the entire proceeding conducted against petitioner are based on conjecture and surmises and petitioner has been held guilty without any basis and without any evidence in support thereof. 6. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate that the entire proceeding conducted against petitioner are based on conjecture and surmises and petitioner has been held guilty without any basis and without any evidence in support thereof. All the cashiers posted at the branch office are allocated duties of cashier depending upon the availability of the cashiers on a particular date at the branch office. The senior Branch Manager prepared a panel of all assistants working at the said branch and duties of cashier were allocated to them in case of absence of any of the cashiers from the branch on a particular date. The key of the cash box was left in the custody of one of the cashiers (out of three cashiers) or the assistant discharging duties of cashier on the said date in rotation. It has been further submitted that there exists a further stipulation that the said key would not be left by the person concerned at the branch so that necessarily all persons who had discharged duties as cashier in the past have taken the key to the cash box along with them to their residences and any of them could have got a duplicate key prepared for the cash box. Before the Inquiry Officer, the office peon stated that occasionally he had seen Sri A.P. Srivastava, Administrative Officer taking out the key to the safe from the drawer from his desk itself. The order passed by the disciplinary authority inflicting the penalty of removal upon the petitioner as well as the appellate order have been passed mechanically without application of mind against the petitioner and objections raised by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer and against the enquiry report has not been considered. From the perusal of the enquiry report and the subsequent order, it is clear that the impugned orders are passed upon pure guess working without there being any cogent reason. It is also relevant to submit here that during the course of enquiry, the petitioner has made a request by making an application for the purposes of examination of Sri Radhey Shyam Mani. An application to this effect was filed on 2.6.1994 before the Inquiry Officer but the said request of the petitioner was rejected by means of the order dated 2.6.1994 itself. An application to this effect was filed on 2.6.1994 before the Inquiry Officer but the said request of the petitioner was rejected by means of the order dated 2.6.1994 itself. Sri Mani was one of the important witnesses who ought to have been examined during the course of disciplinary proceedings and refusal to do so or not to permit the petitioner to cross-examine Sri Mani is without any justification and has resulted in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The request of the petitioner was rejected only on the ground that as a request having been made belatedly, the ground of such rejection is totally misconceived and non-existent as enquiry proceeding was never concluded on 2.6.1994 nor the enquiry report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer. 7. It has further been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that a parallel proceeding was also initiated against Sri Radhey Shyam Mani for the same incident and by the same enquiry officer. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondent authority to have conducted a common enquiry in stead of two separate enquiries by the same officer. The petitioner has been discriminated as Sri Radhey Shyam Mani has only been inflicted the penalty of reduction of his basic pay by one stage. The petitioner is not in possession of the penalty order passed against Mr. Mani, the disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Mani with regard to the same incident which took place on 6/7.1.1992 with regard to the above specified shortage. From the record, it is also clear that Sri B.B. Kapoor was the Inquiry Officer against Mr. Mani, who was the Inquiry Officer of the petitioner. The petitioner has been discriminated for the same charges as Mr. Mani was awarded a minor punishment and the petitioner has been awarded punishment of removal. The petitioner has brought out the extract of the Life Insurance Corporation Account Manual which details the procedure pertaining to safety of cash and keeping of safe keys which is being reproduced below : “4. The Safe shall have double locking arrangements with two separate keys. The two keys shall be kept by two different persons. These persons shall be duly authorised by the Officer-in-Charge of the office and they shall be responsible for ensuring that the Cast Box/Boxes, containing Cash, Cheque Books, Stock of Stamps etc. The Safe shall have double locking arrangements with two separate keys. The two keys shall be kept by two different persons. These persons shall be duly authorised by the Officer-in-Charge of the office and they shall be responsible for ensuring that the Cast Box/Boxes, containing Cash, Cheque Books, Stock of Stamps etc. are safely locked in the safe, at the close of business of each working day and handed over to Cashier every morning. They will operate the keys personally and shall keep their irrespective keys in their personal custody during and after office hours. Both the persons holding the key Nos. 1 and 2 shall keep the keys in their personal custody and shall not leave the keys behind in the office premises under any circumstances. 5. The key No. 1 of the Safe with the safe is to be closed first, shall be kept by the person checking the cash, as per the office order issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Office.” 8. From the perusal of the aforesaid procedure, it is clear that it is the holder of keys No. 1 and 2 of the safe who bears all primary responsibility with regard to the safe custody of the contents therein and not the petitioner. While the petitioner has been removed from service but the penalty imposed upon Sri Radhey Shyam Mani is reversion by one stage in the pay scale and Sri A.P. Srivastava has only been given a warning. In such a way, petitioner has been discriminated. The holders of key Nos. 1 and 2 both after checking the currency in specific denomination made an entry in the Daily Cash Book which can be verified from Annexure 1 from the writ petition, which clearly goes to show that cash put in the cash box was counted in the presence of these two officers holders of keys No. 1 and 2 and after verification it was kept in the safe in the presence of these two officers. The statement of Sri Mani also states that the cash was checked and placed in the cash box by him before being placed in the safe. The statement of Sri Mani also states that the cash was checked and placed in the cash box by him before being placed in the safe. The statement to this effect that in the enquiry report the staff member has made a statement that the holder of key No. 2 Sri Srivastava never used to check the cash box before placing it in the safe and the safe is only with regard to the holder of key No. 2 and no such statement has been recorded with regard of holder of key No. 1. Therefore, it is evident that the holder of key No. 1 Sri Radhey Shyam Mani used to check the cash box before placing it in the safe which is apparent from the statement Anneuxre-3 to the writ petition. 9. Reliance has been placed upon three judgements reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 , Union of India v. H.C. Goel. Relevant paras are 20 and 27 which are quoted below : “20. This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311 (2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311 (2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence. In fact, the fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute his position in law. 27. Now, in this state of the evidence, how can it be said that the respondent even attempted to offer a bribe to Mr. Rajagopalan, Mr. Rajagopalan makes a definite statement that the respondent did not offer him a bribe. He merely refers to the fact that the respondent took out a paper from his wallet and the said paper appeared to him like a hundred rupee note double folded. Undoubtedly, Mr. Rajagopalan suspected the respondent’s conduct, and so, made a report immediately. But the suspicion entertained by Mr. Rajagopalan cannot, in law, be treated as evidence against the respondent even though there is no doubt that Mr. Rajagopalan is a straight-forward and an honest officer. Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the fact that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. Rajagopalan is a straight-forward and an honest officer. Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the fact that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the technical rules which govern criminal trials in Courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules. We have very carefully considered the evidence led in the present enquiry and borne in mind the plea made by the learned Attorney General, but we are unable to hold that on the record, there is any evidence which can sustain the finding of the appellant that charge No. 3 has been proved against the respondent. It is in this connection and only incidentally that it may be relevant to add that the U.P.S.C. considered the matter twice and came to the firm decision that the main charge against the respondent had not been established.” 10. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement reported in 1995 (5) SCC 762 , Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana. Relevant para is 11 which is quoted below : “11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel the Constitution Bench has held : “The High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.” 11. Another judgement relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is 1990 AWC 1544, Dr. S.S. Ahluwalia, Director Training and Placement G.B. Pant University, Nainital v. G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology Nainital and others and reliance has been placed upon paras 15, 16 and 23 to 25 which are quoted below : “15. From the above definition, it is, consequently clear that an employee can be held liable for misconduct only if it arises from ill motive. The very act of negligence of an employee cannot constitute misconduct. The question whether, in the instant case, misconduct arose from ill motive, has not been examined. If at all any action can be taken against the petitioner, it can be taken only, as already observed above, under sub-clause (1) of Clause (e) and the Authority has to come to the conclusion that the misconduct committed by the delinquent arose out of ill motive. The second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted to the limited extent that since the impugned order does not say that the misconduct arose out of ill motive, consequently, the impugned order is vitiated in law. But the matter has to be examined by the Authority concerned in the light of the definition of the word ‘misconduct’ quoted above. 16. So far as the third submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, this, in our opinion, is well founded. In the show cause notice, as has already been stated above, it has been stated that charge Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 stands proved. 16. So far as the third submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, this, in our opinion, is well founded. In the show cause notice, as has already been stated above, it has been stated that charge Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 stands proved. It was because of this specific view which the Authority took of the enquiry report that the action has been taken against the petitioner. We have examined the enquiry report which has been annexed as Annexure ‘CA-9’ to the counter affidavit of the University. In regard to charge No. 1, the finding of the Enquiry Officer is that the manner in which the favour was shown to M/s. P.D. Gooha and Sons only creates suspicion. It cannot, consequently, be said that charge No. 1 stands proved against the petitioner. It is only a case of suspicion. In regard to charge No. 2, the Enquiry Officer has held that he feels that serious doubts have been created regarding collusion of the Dean of Students’ Welfare with the contractor and to this extent, the Enquiry Officer found that there are serious doubts, but there is no finding of collusion. 23. As already observed above, none of the charges has been unequivocally established against the petitioner. It has also not been established that the petitioner has got some personal gain out of any of the acts done while functioning as Dean of the Students’ Welfare. 24. In view of the report and in view of the nature of the charges levelled against the petitioner, we are clearly of the opinion that it is not a case where the punishment of dismissal should have been awarded to the petitioner. It is not at all commensurate with the charges found against the petitioner. 25. In the result, the petition is allowed. The resolution of the Board of Management dated 21st December, 1988, is quashed. The order dated 28th December, 1988, communicating the decision of the Board of Management is also quashed. The matter is referred back to the Board of Management to consider the case of the petitioner afresh. The petitioner shall be given a copy of enquiry report as also an opportunity of being heard before the Board of Management takes a final decision in the matter. The matter is referred back to the Board of Management to consider the case of the petitioner afresh. The petitioner shall be given a copy of enquiry report as also an opportunity of being heard before the Board of Management takes a final decision in the matter. The petitioner shall be reinstated forthwith and shall be paid his arrears of salary within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the Authority concerned. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.” 12. In view of the aforesaid submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that now in view of the various judgements though there is a very limited scope and power of judicial review of such finding recorded by the disciplinary authority after submission of the enquiry report but there is a strict rule of evidence. Unless and until it is proved that the charges levelled against a charged employee is proved by the evidence and it should be upon reasons and object and if there is no charge or it has not been proved then no punishment can be awarded. In the aforesaid case the petitioner has been punished in a case of no evidence having been found against the petitioner for having embezzled the amount. Therefore, pressing upon the report of the Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority cannot punish the petitioner for the charges which have not been proved. As the material person has not been permitted to be examined by the petitioner in spite of the request in writing, the total proceeding is vitiated and the authorities below have no jurisdiction to impose a punishment of removal in such cases. Mr. Mani was the relevant witness who himself has stated this fact that : “KAL DINANK 6.1.92 KO SAMAY KARIB -4 BAJE SHAM KO KAISHIER SOM DATT NE KAISH MILAN KARKE MUJHE TATHA SRI A.P. SRIVASTAVA KO CHEK KARAKAR KAISH BOX MEN RAKHA ABHI KAISH BOX UTHAWAKAR CHAPRASI NAGENDRA SHARMA, KAISHIER SOM DATT NE MERE EVAM SRI A.P. SRIVASTAVA KI MAUJUDAGI ME SEF MEN RAKHA GAYA. SEF KI CHABI NO. 1 SE MAINE TATHA CHABI NO. 2 SE SRI A.P. SRIVASTAVA NE BAND KIYA, TATHA APANI APANI CHABHIYAN APANE PAS RAKHA ABHI GHAR CHALE GAYE.” 13. SEF KI CHABI NO. 1 SE MAINE TATHA CHABI NO. 2 SE SRI A.P. SRIVASTAVA NE BAND KIYA, TATHA APANI APANI CHABHIYAN APANE PAS RAKHA ABHI GHAR CHALE GAYE.” 13. In such a situation, the petitioner submits that the order passed by the respondents is liable to be quashed and petitioner be reinstated in service. 14. On the other hand Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation has submitted that the petitioner while working as a cashier on 6.1.1992, it was found that cash was missing from the Daily Cash Box of which he was holding the key on the next day when the Cash Box was opened. Consequently, a charge-sheet was given and after following a proper procedure a responsibility was fixed that it was the duty of the cashier to safeguard the money belonging to the Corporation. The petitioner was also charged for violation to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and has failed to serve the Corporation honestly and faithfully. Sri N.P. Sharma, Sri A.P. Srivastava, holder of Key No. 2 of the safe, Sri Ram Krishna, Assistant Administrative Officer, Sri Shiv Sampat Tiwari and Sri Sanjay Kumar Srivastava (both cashiers and Sri D.S. Singh) were examined as witnesses in support of the charges. The Daily Cash Balance Books dated 6.1.1992 and 7.1.1992 were taken into account by the Inquiry Officer which is apparent from paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the enquiry report. On the basis of the statement of the petitioner and on the basis of Ext. Ka 6 the Inquiry Officer has analysed the position and has taken a strong view that none of the witnesses in his evidence has confirmed the fact that they have seen while the said act of counting of cash was going on. In para 13 of the report the Inquiry Officer has formulated four eventualities and after adopting the process of elimination has come to the conclusion that it was only in case of eventuality No. 1 that such act as committed by the petitioner was possible. The holder of Key No. 2 as stated in his evidence that he never used to check the cash box before keeping the same in safe. As regards, Mr. Mani is concerned, in none of the statement of any of the witnesses there is any whisper about checking of the cash by Mr. R.S. Mani. The holder of Key No. 2 as stated in his evidence that he never used to check the cash box before keeping the same in safe. As regards, Mr. Mani is concerned, in none of the statement of any of the witnesses there is any whisper about checking of the cash by Mr. R.S. Mani. There is even no whisper about the suggestion given during the cross-examination about Sri Mani having checked the cash. Therefore, on the basis of the material available on record the Inquiry Officer has categorically found holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The appellate authority as well as reviewing authority all have considered the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer and have come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved and the punishment awarded to the petitioner is based on evidence and it is not on probability or guess work. It is wrong to say that the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer is not based on any evidence. 15. Learned Counsel for the respondent has further submitted that in such circumstances, if it is found that there is some evidence against the petitioner and there is no violation of the procedure during the enquiry by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer has found that the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved, then there is a very limited scope of judicial review by this Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and awarding the punishment on the basis of enquiry is a total domain of the disciplinary authority and this Court cannot substitute the punishment. 16. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the following paragraphs of the various judgements which are reproduced below : (i) Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers, AIR 2000 SC 1508 : “8. The question is whether in view of such categorical findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal, the learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could reappreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. We have already pointed out that the learned Single Judge had erred in appreciating certain documents and the evidence in the case. We are clearly of the opinion that the learned single Judge had no material to characterise the judgment of the Tribunal as perverse. We have already pointed out that the learned Single Judge had erred in appreciating certain documents and the evidence in the case. We are clearly of the opinion that the learned single Judge had no material to characterise the judgment of the Tribunal as perverse. We will once again refer to certain important matters which would go a long way to decide the matter. The inference drawn from Ex. M1 that it was the Union, who wanted the canteen is far from truth. The subsequent evidence has got to be looked into on this aspect of the case. In Ex. M4, dated 23.4.1988, the Union has informed the bank about the new canteen promoters for the record of the bank. The inference drawn by the learned Judge from Ex. M5 that the canteen was not exclusive for the bank is based on a misconception. The evidence of MW1 clearly shows that the canteen is meant only for the bank. His evidence is as follows : “.........The canteen is meant only for the staff of the bank the canteen will remain closed on bank holidays........” The observation that the bank was running the canteen to retain good relationship between the union and the management is not appropriate and on the other hand, it only shows that the bank was implicitly bound to maintain the canteen. The learned single Judge has not given due weight to the two principles enunciated in the LIC case and undisturbed by the RBI case. We have already quoted those principles.” “19. The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully that he is not exercising any appealable jurisdiction over the awards passed by a Tribunal, presided over by a Judicial Officer. The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully that he is not exercising any appealable jurisdiction over the awards passed by a Tribunal, presided over by a Judicial Officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possible one taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the Award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of re-assessing the evidence and arriving at findings of ones own altogether giving a complete go-bye even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.” (ii) Chandravarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, AIR 1987 SC 117 : 16. This appeal challenges the said judgment and order. As mentioned hereinbefore two questions require consideration—how far and to what extent in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution and in this respect regarding power to deal with factual findings, the jurisdiction of the High Court is akin both under Arts. This appeal challenges the said judgment and order. As mentioned hereinbefore two questions require consideration—how far and to what extent in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution and in this respect regarding power to deal with factual findings, the jurisdiction of the High Court is akin both under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, can the High Court interfere with the findings of fact? It is well-settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate Court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law. This principle is well settled. In D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukharjee, 1953 SCR 302 at p. 305 : ( AIR 1953 SC 58 at p. 59), it was laid down by this Court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the Court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Art. 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate 21. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it if there is any mis-direction in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings were perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest of injustice [See Trimbak Gangadhar Telang (supra)]. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings were perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest of injustice [See Trimbak Gangadhar Telang (supra)]. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High Court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the appellate bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two views were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error." (iii) Rai Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and others, AIR 1997 SC 1908 : “6. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence as examined and to record a finding in that behalf? The judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” (iv) Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(II) LLJ 682 (SC) : “11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” (iv) Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(II) LLJ 682 (SC) : “11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel the Constitution Bench has held: “The High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.” (v) State of U.P. and others v. Nand Kishore Shukla and another, AIR 1996 SC 1561 : “7. It is settled law that the Court is not a Court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of the punishment. It is for the disciplinary authority to consider what would be the nature of the punishment to be imposed on a Government servant based upon the proved misconduct against the government servant. Its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the Court. It is for the disciplinary authority to consider what would be the nature of the punishment to be imposed on a Government servant based upon the proved misconduct against the government servant. Its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the Court. The only question is whether the disciplinary authority would have passed such an order. It is settled law that even one of the charges, if held proved and sufficient for imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority, the Court would be loath to interfere with that part of the order. The order of removal does not cast stigma on the respondent to disable him to seek any appointment elsewhere. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was wholly wrong in setting aside the order.” (vi) B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, JT 1995(8) SC 65) : "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice be complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ), this Court held at page 728 (of SCR): (at p 369 of AIR), that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. (vii) Union of India and others v. B.K. Srivastava, JT 1997 (8) SC 573 : "8. We find that fair treatment had been given to the respondent in the enquiry. There has been lawful exercise of power by the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. There has been abuse of power. In these circumstances, the Tribunal should have stayed its hands. It is no part of the function of the Tribunal to substitute its own decision when enquiry is held in accordance with rules and punishment is imposed by the authorities considering all the relevant circumstances and which it is entitled to impose." (viii) State of Tamilnadu v. S. Subramaniyam, 1996 (33) ATC 317 (SC) : "5. It is no part of the function of the Tribunal to substitute its own decision when enquiry is held in accordance with rules and punishment is imposed by the authorities considering all the relevant circumstances and which it is entitled to impose." (viii) State of Tamilnadu v. S. Subramaniyam, 1996 (33) ATC 317 (SC) : "5. The only question is whether the Tribunal was right in its conclusion to appreciate the evidence and to reach its own finding that the charge has not been proved. The Tribunal is not a Court of appeal. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was taken away by the power under Article 323A and invested the same on the Tribunal by Central Administrative Tribunal Act. It is settled law that the Tribunal has only power of judicial review of the administrative action of the appellant on complaints relating to service conditions of employees. It is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence has no application for the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and would come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is consistent view of this Court [vide B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 8 JT (SC) 65 : (1995 AIR SCW 4374), State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 : (1994 AIR SCW 3947) (para 7); Union of India v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357 : (1994 AIR SCW 2777) (at para 6); Govt. of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 (Para 4) : ( AIR 1995 SC 561 ) and Union of India v. B.S. Chaturvedi, (1995) 6 SCC 749 at 759-60]. In view of the settled legal position, the Tribunal has committed serious error of law in appreciation of the evidence and in coming to its own conclusion that the charge had not been proved. Thus we hold that the view of the Tribunal is ex facie illegal. The order is accordingly set aside. OA/TP/WP stand dismissed. (ix) Prabhu Dayal v. Regional Food Controller, Jhansi and others, 2006 (3) ADJ 440 (All) : “Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were vitiated. In effect he wanted the Court to re-appraise the evidence. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and others, JT 1997 (5) SC 298 clearly held as follows : ........in judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal, when the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence. Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court [vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan, JT 1994 (5) SC 337: (1994)6 SCC 302 (Para 7); Union of India v. Upendra Singh , JT 1994 (1) SC 658 : (1994) 3 SCC 357 (Para 6); Govt. of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian, JT 1994 (7) SC 492 : (1995)1 SCC 216 (Para 4) and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (at pp. 759-60): (x) Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Nikunja Behari Patnaik, 1996 (II) LLJ 379 : “7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the Bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank Officer. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgement in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him. Breach of Regulation is “misconduct” within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Enquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in number of instances respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a bank—for that matter, in the case of any other organisation—every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the Bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire where he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a Bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority—that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances—is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of the Banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Lesson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a Bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and over-drawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit-huge profit, as the High Court characterises it—they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgement. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class-I officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit-huge profit, as the High Court characterises it—they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgement. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class-I officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge No. 9 which has been held established in full is to the effect that in spite of instructions by the Regional Officer to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Enquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge No. 8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that in spite of reminders, the respondent did not submit “Control Returns” to the Regional Officer. We fail to understand how could all this be characterised as errors of judgement and not as misconduct as defined by the Regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24.” (xi) Bahadur V.K. v. S.B.I. and others, 2000(II) LLJ 76 : “13. Thus the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no mala fide intention on the part of the petitioner and there was no personal gain is not tenable. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred only to the concluding part of the findings but it is settled law that a document has to be read as a whole, and stray observations in a document or order cannot be read in isolation. As already stated by us above, a Bank runs on public confidence and no leniency can be shown where allegations of lack of integrity or devotion to duty are found proved against a Bank employee. In this respect greater integrity and devotion to duty is required from Bank employees as compared to employees of other organisations. Any leniency shown in such matters would be wholly uncalled for and misplaced, [vide Disciplinary Authority v. N.B. Patnaik, 1996(ii) LLJ 379]. 17. In this respect greater integrity and devotion to duty is required from Bank employees as compared to employees of other organisations. Any leniency shown in such matters would be wholly uncalled for and misplaced, [vide Disciplinary Authority v. N.B. Patnaik, 1996(ii) LLJ 379]. 17. In support of his contentions learned Counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on the cases State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Sri Prabhu Dayal Grover, JT 1995(7) SC 207, Thakur Dass Bhaskar v. L.I.C. of India, 1997 (77) FLR 679; Union of India and others v. Upendra Singh, 1994 (3) SCC 357 , Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer, Allahabad Bank and others, ( 1997 (II) LLJ 453 (All) (DB), Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, ( 1998 (I) LLJ 1217 ; S.B.I. v. T.J. Paul, 1999 (II) LLJ 514 (SC), Virendra Kumar v. L.I.C. Of India and another, (ESC (All) (DB) page 143 and Municipal Corporation v. Krishna Bihari and others, AIR 1996 SC 1249 . 18. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Counsel for the respondent-Corporation. 19. It is clear from the record that on 6.1.1992 the petitioner has discharged his duties as cashier at cash counter at Branch No. 2 of the respondent-Corporation. The cash collected on the said date was to be verified and counted and after keeping it in the cash box in the presence of keys-holder No. 1 and 2 and after entering in daily Cash Balance Book, it has to be kept in the safe. As it is clear from the record that the key of the safe was in custody of two persons namely Sri A.P. Srivastava, the Administrative Officer, holder of key No. 2 and Sri Radhey Shyam Mani, holder of Key No. 1. They have given a certificate to this effect that the cash after keeping in the cash box was kept in the safe. Since the First Information Report was lodged on the next day after a short-fall of Rs. 1,40,806.46 to the Police Station Kotwali, the police has submitted a final report without fixing a liability upon any person. It is also clear from the record that the cash was found in the premises of the office on the same day. 20. Since the First Information Report was lodged on the next day after a short-fall of Rs. 1,40,806.46 to the Police Station Kotwali, the police has submitted a final report without fixing a liability upon any person. It is also clear from the record that the cash was found in the premises of the office on the same day. 20. A finding has been recorded by the inquiry officer that there is no proof that the safe in which the cash box was kept, was in any manner disturbed. The inquiry officer has also recorded a finding that there is no possibility of duplicate key of the safe, as two different persons are having the possession of keys No. 1 and 2. The inquiry officer has nowhere recorded a finding fixing a liability to this effect that the petitioner was in any way responsible for the embezzlement of the amount mentioned above. The petitioner has submitted his written argument on 10.6.1994, before that date on 2.6.1994, the petitioner has submitted an application to cross-examine Sri Radhey Shyam Mani who was one of the key-holders of the safe but his application was rejected only on the ground that the application should have been filed earlier. The inquiry officer has not recorded any finding and reasons to this effect while rejecting the application. Sri Radhey Shyam Mani, one of the key holders, was the relevant person to state in the inquiry in spite of the fact that he has put in a note and certified that the money after counting was kept in the cash box and after that it was kept in the safe. In my opinion, Sri Radhey Shyam Mani was the main witness to be produced before the inquiry officer for the purpose of cross-examination by the petitioner. It is also clear from the record that Radhey Shyam Mani, holder of one of the keys of the safe was also proceeded with the disciplinary inquiry by the same inquiry officer but he was awarded a minor punishment. 21. One of the things is very relevant that there is no cogent reason on the basis of the statement and on the basis of the relevant record fixing a liability upon the petitioner. The petitioner has been punished only on the basis of the probability without any cogent evidence. 21. One of the things is very relevant that there is no cogent reason on the basis of the statement and on the basis of the relevant record fixing a liability upon the petitioner. The petitioner has been punished only on the basis of the probability without any cogent evidence. The inquiry officer has framed four issues to fix a liability upon the petitioner. The same was being reproduced below as under : (1) KAISH BOX MEIN 6.1.92 KO SEF BOX MEIN RAKHNE SE PURV DHAN NAHI RAKHA GAYA ATHWA AGAR RAKHA GAYA TO SEF BOX MEIN RAKHNE SE PURVA USE NIKAL LIYA GAYA. (2) KAISH BOX KI TALI RAKHNE WALA VYAKTI SEF BOX KI TALI RAKHNE WALE DONO VYAKTI TATHA OFFICE KI TALI RAKHNE WALE VYAKTI MILKAR KARYALAYA SAMAY KE PASHCHAT DHAN NIKAL SAKTE HAI. (3) BAND SEF BOX AUR KAISH BOX KO TOD-FOD KE DHAN NIKAL LIYA JAY. (4) KAISH BOX SEF BOX TATHA OFFICE TALI KI DUPLICATE TALIYAN BANWAYI JAY AUR INKE PRAYOG SE DHAN KO NIKAL LIYA JAY. 22. After framing the aforesaid issues regarding fixing liability the inquiry officer has recorded a finding that probability of issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is not possible as the keys of the safe are in possession of different persons and there is no possibility of making duplicate key. One of the witnesses Sri S.D. Singh has given a statement before the inquiry officer that it is not possible to have duplicate keys of the safe as well as the cash box. A finding to this effect has also been recorded that the cash cannot be taken out from the safe without connivance of all three persons namely key-holders No. 1 and 2 and the petitioner. 23. Upon question No. 1 a reasoning has been given by the inquiry officer that on 6.1.1992 the petitioner was working as paying cashier as he stated that after counting the cash he put the cash in cash box and it was kept in the safe. As the key of the cash box was in possession of the petitioner, it appears that cash was not kept in the cash box or after keeping the cash in the cash box, it was taken by the petitioner before keeping it in the safe. As the key of the cash box was in possession of the petitioner, it appears that cash was not kept in the cash box or after keeping the cash in the cash box, it was taken by the petitioner before keeping it in the safe. Only on basis of this probability, the enquiry officer has held that this possibility cannot be ruled out and it appears that the petitioner before keeping the cash in the safe box or after keeping it, he has taken out cash before keeping it in the safe. On this finding the petitioner has been held liable that he was involved in the embezzlement. On the basis of the aforesaid finding of the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority without taking into consideration the fact that an endorsement to this effect has been made by the holder of key No. 1 and 2 that cash was kept after counting in the cash box in their presence and then it was kept in the safe. The disciplinary authority has also failed to take into consideration that Sri Radhey Shyam Mani was the main witness and the application of the petitioner for the purpose of cross-examination has been rejected by the inquiry officer. In my opinion on the basis of possibility and probability without fixing a liability upon a delinquent employee and without any cogent reason, no punishment can be awarded. But the authorities below has failed to take into consideration this aspect of the matter whether on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the basis of evidence whether punishment can be awarded or not. It is also clear from the record that there is no financial loss to the Corporation. The amount in question was found in the back room of the corporation building. 24. Now the question for consideration by this Court is whether on the basis of the aforesaid probabilities without recording a finding fixing a liability upon the petitioner and without any cogent evidence on record, punishment of the dismissal or removal can be awarded. In A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 364, Union of India v. H.C. Goel (supra) the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in dealing regarding a public servant who was dismissed was considering the conclusion of a Government of which the impugned order of dismissal was passed. In A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 364, Union of India v. H.C. Goel (supra) the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in dealing regarding a public servant who was dismissed was considering the conclusion of a Government of which the impugned order of dismissal was passed. The Apex Court has held that conclusion on the question of fact cannot be successfully challenged even if it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it. The writ petition filed by the public servant who has been dismissed or otherwise dealt with as to attract Article 311 (2), the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rest is not supported by any evidence at all. The Apex Court has further held that it is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence. The Apex Court has further held that “we cannot ignore the fact that in carrying out said purpose, mere satisfaction, should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries. It may be that the technical rules which govern criminal trials in Court may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous case must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary inquiries held under the statutory rules.” 25. In A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 110, P.P. Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra it has been held that there is little scope of interference unless and until the finding is based on no evidence or it proceeds on mere conjecture and surmises. Para 5 of the aforesaid judgement is being reproduced below : “5. In A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 110, P.P. Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra it has been held that there is little scope of interference unless and until the finding is based on no evidence or it proceeds on mere conjecture and surmises. Para 5 of the aforesaid judgement is being reproduced below : “5. In an appeal under Section 38 of the Act this Court would not, as a general rule, interfere with the concurrent finding of fact by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Council unless the finding is based on no-evidence or it proceeds on mere conjectures and surmises. Finding in such disciplinary proceedings must be sustained by a higher degree of proof than that required in civil suits, yet falling short of the proof required to sustain a conviction in a criminal prosecution. There should be convincing preponderance of evidence.” 26. In A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 995, Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan it has been held that the report of the inquiry officer finding the delinquent official guilty could not be sustained as the charges were vague and it was difficult to make the charges fairly by the delinquent officer. The evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not at all bring home the guilt of the delinquent officer and in such circumstances the Apex Court has set aside the order of termination. The relevant paragraphs 14, 18 and 19 are quoted below : “14. Quite apart from that fact, it appears to us that the charges were vague and it was difficult to meet the charges fairly by any accused, Evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not at all bring home the guilt of the accused. 18. Having regard to the consequences with which the delinquent officer was charged and having regard to the nature of charge and the evidence of hand-writing expert and the absence of opportunity for cross-examination, and the conflicting nature of evidence of Chaturbhuj and nature of evidence given by Jiwan Dass, we are of the opinion that the report of the enquiry officer finding the appellant guilty should not have been sustained and the government should not have acted upon it. The High Court, in our opinion, with great respect, was in error in not bearing in mind these aspects which have been indicated hereinbefore. 19. The High Court, in our opinion, with great respect, was in error in not bearing in mind these aspects which have been indicated hereinbefore. 19. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. In the premises, the order and judgment of the High Court are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal. The appellant would also be entitled to his remuneration and salary for all this period. We do not know if during the pendency of this appeal the appellant has superannuated and retired. If that is so, he should be in service up to the date of superannuation with the entitlement of pensionary relief. If not, he should be re-instated.” 27. In A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 677, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and others, it has been held that normally the High Court and Supreme Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic inquiry but if the finding of ‘guilt’ is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. The relevant paragraphs 9 and 10 are quoted below : “9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 28. In A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1748, Narinder Mohan Arrya v. United India Insurance Co. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 28. In A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1748, Narinder Mohan Arrya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, the Apex Court has held that while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India regarding power of judicial review if the findings of disciplinary authority has to guilt of delinquent, the Court while exercising its power of judicial review has to see whether the sufficient material has been brought on record to sustain findings. The relevant observation has been made by the Apex Court in Para 45 of the said judgement. The same is being reproduced below : “45. The findings of the learned Single Judge to the effect that ‘it is established with the conscience (sic) of the Court reasonably formulated by an Enquiry Officer then in the eventuality’ may not be fully correct inasmuch as the Court while exercising its power of judicial review should also apply its mind as to whether sufficient material had been brought on record to sustain the findings. The conscience of a Court may not have much role to play. It is unfortunate that the learned Single Judge did not at all deliberate on the contentions raised by the appellant. Discussion on the materials available on record for the purpose of applying the legal principles was imperative. The Division Bench of the High Court also committed the same error.” 29. In such circumstances though there is a very limited power of judicial review upon the finding of the inquiry officer but the Court while exercising its powers of judicial review should also apply its mind as to whether sufficient material has been brought on record to sustain the findings. The conscience of the Court may not have much role to play but the discussion on material available on record for the purpose in applying the legal principles was imperative. 30. As regards the principles laid by the Apex Court in various cases from B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, JT 1995(8) SC 65, the Apex Court has continuously held that Court/Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. 30. As regards the principles laid by the Apex Court in various cases from B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, JT 1995(8) SC 65, the Apex Court has continuously held that Court/Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. When the conclusion reached by an authority is based on evidence, Tribunal or Court is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and to come to its own conclusion on the proof of charges. 31. But the Apex Court in various cases has further held that only consideration of the Court or Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on the evidence on record and supports the findings or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. 32. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the High Court while exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances and in any particular case cannot exercise the powers if the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have even recorded. In my opinion, in such circumstances the Courts hands are not tight to interfere with the conclusion or finding and to mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of the each case. 33. In the present case also the petitioner has been held responsible by the inquiry officer only on the basis of probability that it is possible that the petitioner before keeping the cash or after keeping the cash in the cash box has taken the such amount before keeping it in the safe. The inquiry officer has failed to take into consideration the endorsements of the holders of key No. 1 and 2 which are and have not been disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Further the petitioner has been denied a reasonable efficacious opportunity by denying and rejecting the application of the petitioner for producing Mr. Radhey Shyam Mani (one of the key holders) before the inquiry officer. In my opinion, this act of the inquiry officer is denial of proper opportunity to prove his case and this fact has also been ignored by the disciplinary authority while awarding the punishment. Radhey Shyam Mani (one of the key holders) before the inquiry officer. In my opinion, this act of the inquiry officer is denial of proper opportunity to prove his case and this fact has also been ignored by the disciplinary authority while awarding the punishment. 34. Further the effect of the aforesaid findings and the decisions as settled by the Apex Court that in such circumstances if the Court comes to a conclusion that the petitioner has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity and if there is some non-compliance of the relevant provisions of service Rules, this Court while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should remand the matter to the authorities below for the purpose of enquiry and awarding the punishment. But from the facts and circumstances of the present case the punishment awarded against the petitioner is on the basis of no evidence. There is no dispute to this effect that on the basis of some probabilities in the departmental proceedings if there is some evidence to this effect that this probability cannot be ruled out, recording a cogent reason and evidence, the punishment can be awarded. But in the present case in my opinion there is no evidence against the petitioner that he has embezzled the amount from the safe. The inquiry officer has recorded a specific finding to this effect that there is no possibility of having duplicate keys of the safe and cash box. The safe as well as the cash box was found in order. There was no sign that it was open. Therefore, if a finding to this effect has been recorded then in my opinion no punishment can be awarded. Further Sri Radhey Shyam Mani who was an officer has also been proceeded with the disciplinary inquiry has been awarded very minor punishment. Therefore, in such circumstances, the disciplinary authority should have in the facts and circumstances of the case awarded some minor punishment, if any. 35. In view of the above principles in decided cases it must be held whether the administrative decisions relating to punishment in the disciplinary cases is question as arbitrary under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury Principles as a secondary reviewing authority. If the Court is satisfied that the settled principles are followed, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for fresh decision. If the Court is satisfied that the settled principles are followed, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for fresh decision. Only in rare case where there has been long delay in the time taken in the disciplinary proceeding and time taken in the Court’s, in such extreme or rare cases, the Court can substitute its own view. 36. Another point for consideration by this Court in the present case is that the disciplinary proceeding was initiated in the year 1992 and the petitioner was removed from service on 31.5.1995. The petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed and the memorial filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed. 37. As discussed above, it is well settled by this Court as well as by the Apex Court that generally this Court should not interfere regarding the decision taken by the Administrative Authorities but in the present case as the alleged incident is of 1992. The Apex Court in a judgement reported in 2005 AIR SCW 5690, P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamilnadu Housing Board the Apex Court has quashed the disciplinary inquiry only on the ground that the petitioner has suffered mental agony and sufferings due to the pendency of the legal proceedings in Court. In Para 16 the Court has observed as follows : “16. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interest of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." 38. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." 38. In Canara Bank and others v. Swapan Kumar Pani and others, JT 2006(3) SC 472, the Apex Court has gone to this extent and quashed the High Court order by which the High Court had granted a liberty to the Bank to initiate a fresh enquiry. In that case, some charges were against bank employee, a charge-sheet was given in 1987, of an act committed in 1985. He was exonerated in the year 1989, then again a charge-sheet was issued in the year 1996 in that circumstances, when the High Court has quashed and given a liberty to the Bank for issuance of fresh charge-sheet, the Apex Court has quashed the said liberty given by the High Court only on the ground that there was delay in initiation in the proceedings. For the same set of charges, the charge-sheet is being given third time and the Apex Court has further held that if the High Court was of the opinion that new material purported to have been found were not sufficient for initiation of the enquiry in question, we fail to understand as to on what basis liberty was given to the Bank to initiate fresh enquiry more so when the misconduct, if any, was committed in the year 1985. 39. In a latest decision of the Apex Court reported in JT 2006 (4) 469, M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and others, the Apex Court has substituted the punishment only on the ground that there was a delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings as the incident in that case was of 1969-70. In Bijlani’s case (supra), the charge against the delinquent for non-maintenance of ACE-8 Register and non-supervision of working of the line. The Apex Court has held that as the enquiry officer or the appellate authority has not held that whether the appellant was required to prepare the ACE-8 Register and the disciplinary proceeding being a quasi-judicial in nature, there should be such evidence to prove the charge. The report of the enquiry officer is to be based on a relevant consideration of record. The report of the enquiry officer is to be based on a relevant consideration of record. Taking into all the facts and circumstances of that case, the Apex Court in spite of holding that jurisdiction of the Court in judicial review is very limited but instead of remitting back the matter to the disciplinary authority, has substituted the punishment only on the ground of delay.” 40. As observed in the present case it is borne out from the record that instance is of 1992. The petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 1995. From 1995, the petitioner is out of job due to the inaction of the respondents. From the record, it is also proved that it is a case of no evidence and petitioner has violated any provisions of Service Rules and has not maintained the proper integrity which was required to be maintained. From the record it is also clear that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witnesses in spite of the application before the inquiry officer. The petitioner has been made to suffer without any fault for a period of 13 years, therefore, in my opinion, as it is a case of no evidence awarding the punishment to the petitioner, the matter should have been remanded for the purposes of fresh inquiry. But in this case it will not be proper in the interest of justice to remand the case. 41. In view of the aforesaid fact, in my opinion, it is a case in which this Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India treating it to be a rare case no fruitful purpose would be served to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority. As it is a case of no evidence and the Apex Court has held that if the punishment is based on no evidence, the Court while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can quash the order of the Administrative Authority. As such, this Court is setting aside the order of termination dated 31.5.1995 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition), the Appellate Order dated 19.8.1995 and the order dated 31.12.1996 passed by Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation, Bombay, Annexure-19 to the writ petition. 42. As such, this Court is setting aside the order of termination dated 31.5.1995 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition), the Appellate Order dated 19.8.1995 and the order dated 31.12.1996 passed by Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation, Bombay, Annexure-19 to the writ petition. 42. In the facts and circumstances of this case, as the petitioner has suffered a lot, justice will be served if the petitioner is reinstated in service withholding the amount of 50% of back wages from the date of removal till the date of reinstatement. 43. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The orders dated 31.5.1995 passed by Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Gorakhpur Division, Annexure-12 to the writ petition and order dated 19.8.1995 passed by Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Kanpur Office, Annexure-15 to the writ petition and the order dated 31.12.1996 passed by Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation, Bombay, Annexure-19 to the writ petition are hereby quashed. The consequence of this order would be that the petitioner will be reinstated in service forthwith but keeping in view the facts and situation of the present case, as the petitioner has not worked, I direct that he will be entitled to only 50% back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. ———