JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.—I have got the privilege to read the judgment prepared by my Lord Hon’ble the Chief Justice. With respect while concurring with the findings recorded by Hon’ble the Chief Justice, I wish to deal with the con troversy with my own separate reasoning. The controversy basically relates to interpretation of three Hon’ble Supreme Court judgments reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2002(5) ESC 1 (SC), TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka; (2003) 6 SCC 697 : 2003(4) ESC 509 (SC), Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka and (2005) 6 SCC 537 : 2005(3) ESC 373 (SC), P.A. Inamdar and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, in context to admission for B.Ed. Courses in non-aided private colleges situated in the State of U.P. 2. Hon’ble the Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sunil Ambwani), vide order dated 8.8.2007 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34114 of 2007, Tuples Educational Society and another v. State of U.P. and another, was pleased to frame the following questions by referring the controversy to Larger Bench : (1) Whether the admissions to private unaided (minority and non-minority) colleges imparting education for Bachelor of Education Courses recognised by NCTE and affiliated to the University can be made by any method other than by holding a common entrance test either by the State/Universities, or by all the colleges of the State coming together as provided in P.A. Inamdar’s case? (2) Whether the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge on 14.12.2006 in Writ Petition No. 5674 (M/S) of 2006, U.P. Management Association of Self-Finance Teachers Training Colleges v. State of U.P. and others has correctly appreciated the TMA Pai, Islamic Academy and P.A. Inamdar’s case and has laid down correct law? (3) Whether in the absence of any common entrance test held by all the colleges coming together or a common entrance test conducted by the State Government or all the Universities in the State the admissions can be made through the entrance examinations held by individual universities providing list of students through counselling to these colleges? (4) Whether the entire process of admissions to these colleges must be left to the supervision of the Justice H. N. Tilhari (Retd.) Committee constituted by the State Government in terms of the directions issued in P.A. Inamdar’s case? (4) Whether the entire process of admissions to these colleges must be left to the supervision of the Justice H. N. Tilhari (Retd.) Committee constituted by the State Government in terms of the directions issued in P.A. Inamdar’s case? The complexity of the situation may give rise to many other questions, which may be framed by the larger Bench to be considered in the matter.” 3. In pursuance of the order dated 8.8.2007, the petition was listed before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon’ble H.L. Gokhale, CJ. and Hon’ble Justice Anjani Kumar, J. The Division Bench after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, formed an opinion that questions raised by the Hon’ble Single Judge, should be heard by a larger Bench. Accordingly, vide order dated 12.9.2007, the Division Bench had directed that matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on administrative side to constitute a larger Bench. A copy of the order dated 12.9.2007 passed by the Division Bench is reproduced as under : “Hon’ble H.L. Gokhale, CJ. Hon’ble Anjani Kumar, J. Date September 12, 2007 P.C. 1. Heard Mr. Ravi Kant, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioners institutions. Mr. Devendra Arora appears for Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut. Mr. Abhinav Upadhyay, learned Standing Counsel appears for the State Government. 2. Mr. Upadhyay wants to file a counter affidavit on behalf of the State. 3. The submission of the respondents is that this is a controversy which ought to be decided by a larger Bench. 4. In these circumstances, the papers of the matter be placed before the Chief Justice on the administrative side to constitute a larger Bench.” In pursuance of the order passed by the Division Bench (supra), Hon’ble the Chief Justice was pleased to constitute the present Full Bench by subsequent order. 4. In other Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22568 of 2007, Gajendra Yadav and others v. State of U.P. and others, (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajes Kumar) while adopting for reference of aforementioned four questions, had added two more questions for adjudication by Larger Bench which for convenience are reproduced as under: "In these circumstances, I feel it appropriate to connect the present writ petitions along with Writ Petition No. 34114 of 2007 and to refer the matter to Full Bench. Justice Rajes Kumar) while adopting for reference of aforementioned four questions, had added two more questions for adjudication by Larger Bench which for convenience are reproduced as under: "In these circumstances, I feel it appropriate to connect the present writ petitions along with Writ Petition No. 34114 of 2007 and to refer the matter to Full Bench. I propose to frame the following issues based on the facts of the present writ petition: (1) Whether for the session 2005-06 the students admitted in the management of the private unaided Colleges imparting education for B. Ed. recognised U/NCTE and affiliated to Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur or the basis of their procedure of admission can be said to be properly and legally admitted students and entitled for the study examination and the declaration of the result. (2) Whether the decision of the Division Bench of Lucknow High Court in Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007, Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar University Agra v. S.S. College, Babarpur, Sikandara, Agra and another lays down the correct law and covers the issues involved in the present writ petition.” 5. When the Registry has brought into the notice of Hon’ble the Chief Justice the subsequent reference order dated 26.11.2007 passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajes Kumar, Hon’ble the Chief Justice was pleased to direct to place the question formulated by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajes Kumar before the Full Bench constituted in pursuance of the earlier order (supra). Brief Facts : 6. The Tuples Educational Society (in short the Society), had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34114 of 2007 challenging the Circular dated 13.6.2007 by which Chaudhary Charan Singh University Meerut (in short the Meerut University), had directed to submit the list of teachers and the staff of all the non-aided affiliated colleges and also directed that all admissions in B.Ed. Course in 2006-2007 session shall be done by counselling through Meerut University. Further prayer has been made to the effect that the members of the petitioner’s society may be permitted to admit the students on the basis of combined entrance test (in short CET) conducted by the petitioner’s society which claims to be representing the non-aided private educational institutions imparting B.Ed. Training affiliated to various universities in the State of U.P. 7. Further prayer has been made to the effect that the members of the petitioner’s society may be permitted to admit the students on the basis of combined entrance test (in short CET) conducted by the petitioner’s society which claims to be representing the non-aided private educational institutions imparting B.Ed. Training affiliated to various universities in the State of U.P. 7. The petitioner has relied upon the Apex Court judgment reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481 , TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, and the Division Bench judgment rendered by the Lucknow Bench of this Court dated 23.5.2007 in Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007 contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition. 8. Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior counsel argued on behalf of the petitioners in the present writ petition. The other set of writ petitions have been filed by the students of various non-aided colleges imparting B.Ed. Training. Relying upon the interim orders and the judgment delivered at Lucknow, it has been stated that the respective colleges in which students have been admitted have acted within the jurisdiction in view of the P. A. Inamdar’s case (supra). It has been stated that in view of the P.A. Inamdar’s case (supra), since no CET was held keeping in view the principles of Single Window system, these private institutions were entitled to admit the students in order of merit on the basis of academic qualification upto graduate level on their own. 9. Sri M. D. Singh Shekhar learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Indrasen Singh Tomer and Sri Shashi Nandan learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Namit Srivastava have defended the cause of students on one or the other grounds. Their submission is that the non-aided colleges were entitled to admit the students for B.Ed. Course and it was the duty of the University concerned to permit the students to appear in the annual examination. It has been pleaded that all the colleges in which the students pursuing the courses or claim admission, have been duly recognised by the NCTE and affiliated to various universities of the State of U.P. 10. During the course of hearing at Lucknow, Sri Prashant Chandra learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Akhilesh Kalra and Sri Manish Kumar, Sri Rituraj Awasthi, Sri Anupam Mehrotra, had opposed the reference in light of the Division Bench judgment and the order passed by Hon’ble Single (Hon’ble Mr. During the course of hearing at Lucknow, Sri Prashant Chandra learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Akhilesh Kalra and Sri Manish Kumar, Sri Rituraj Awasthi, Sri Anupam Mehrotra, had opposed the reference in light of the Division Bench judgment and the order passed by Hon’ble Single (Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Shukla). Sri H.G.S. Parihar while appearing in three writ petitions, during the course of argument admitted that the controversy involved in his cases, does not relate with the reference. 11. Sri Prashant Chandra learned Senior Counsel as well as Sri Manish Kumar learned counsel have challenged the validity of reference as well as the constitution of the present Full Bench. According to the learned counsel, Hon’ble Single Judges were not competent to make reference by framing questions of law in the manner they have done. According to them, the Division Bench judgment of this Court at Lucknow has got binding force and under the doctrine of ‘stare decisis’, Hon’ble Single Judges were not justified to make reference for constitution of larger Bench. Another argument while assailing the validity of reference advanced by Sri Prashant Chandra is that the Division Bench was not correct while passing the order dated 12.9.2007 by referring the controversy to Hon’ble the Chief Justice on administrative side for the constitution of larger Bench. The order dated 12.9.2007 passed by the Division Bench presided by Hon’ble the Chief Justice is unreasoned order hence bad in law. 12. Sri Prashant Chandra has also proceeded to advance argument that alternatively, at least Hon’ble the Chief Justice as well as Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anjani Kumar should not have been the members of the present Full Bench since their lordships had passed the order dated 12.9.2007 by referring the present controversy to Hon’ble the Chief Justice on administrative side for constitution of larger Bench. It was also submitted by Sri Prashant Chandra that the reference made by Hon’ble the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench (supra) is bad in law being per inqurium to the law laid down by the Apex Court and the Allahabad High Court Rules. 13. It was also submitted by Sri Prashant Chandra that the reference made by Hon’ble the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench (supra) is bad in law being per inqurium to the law laid down by the Apex Court and the Allahabad High Court Rules. 13. While challenging the validity of the reference and the constitution of Full Bench as well as on merit, raising the plea that the questions framed by Hon’ble the Single Judge does not call for adjudication by this Full Bench in view of the Division Bench order dated 23.5.2007 passed in Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007 and connected special appeals as well as the writ petitions and while defending the reference as well as constitution of Full Bench, the learned counsels for the parties have referred the cases to support their arguments namely, (2006) 11 SCC 521 , Jindal Vijaynagar Steel (SW Steel Ltd.) v. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd.; (2006) 9 SCC 1 , State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others; (2006) 6 SCC 258 , Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. and others; (2006) 11 SCC 696 , Union of India v. Rambir Singh and others; (2005) 6 SCC 404 , ICICI Bank and another v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay and others; (2005) 2 SCC 673 , Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Maharashtra and another; (2004) 11 SCC 26 (Extracts), State of Punjab and another v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. and another; (2004) 4 SCC 262, Govt. of A.P. and others v. B. Satyanarayana Rao (dead) by LRs. and others; (2004) 8 SCC 30 , Arya Samaj Education Trust and others v. Director of Education Delhi and others; (2003) 5 SCC 480 , Rajasthan Public Service Commission and another v. Harish Kumar Purohit and others; (2003) 11 SCC 679, ITC Bhadrachalam Paper Boards Ltd. v. State of A.P. and others; (2003) 7 SCC 410 , National Highway Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises and another; (2002) 10 SCC 437, Vishweshwaraiah Iron and Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani and others; (2002) 7 SCC 273 , Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others; (2002) 1 SCC 1 , Pradip Chandra Parija and others v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others; (2002) 10 SCC 710 , Dr. Chandra Prakash and others v. State of U.P. and another; (2002) 1 SCC 538 , S.H. Rangappa v. State of Karnataka and others; (2002) 4 SCC 578 , P. Ram Chandra Rao v. State of Karnataka; (2002) 10 SCC 101 , Arun Agarwal v. Nagrika Exports Pvt. Ltd. and others; (2001) 4 SCC 448 , Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangh and others; (1997) 10 SCC 258 , State Bank of India and others v. Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) and another; (1997) 8 SCC 767 , General Manager, Telecom v. A. Sriniwas Rao and others; 1987 (Supp) SCC 321, Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat and others; (1980) 4 SCC 125 , Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali and another; AIR 1983 SC 465 , Sher Singh and others v. State of Punjab; AIR 1968 SC 372 (V.55 C. 84), Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel and others; Manupatra, AIR 1960 SC 356 , (Equivalent Citation) State of Jammu and Kashmir and others v. Thakur Ganga Singh for self and on behalf of other shareholders of Jammu and Kashmir Mechanics and Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited and another; 2007 (25) LCD 886, Virendra Kumar v. Hon’ble Allahabad High Court of Judicature through its Registrar General, Allahabad and others; 1995 (13) LCD 252, Aligarh Muslim University v. 8th Addl. Distt. Judge Aligarh and others; (2005) 3 UPLBEC 2487, Ram Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others; 2004 (23) LCD 232, Provincial Medical Services Association U.P. and others v. State of U.P. and others; Manupatra : AIR 2006 All. 239 : (Equivalent Citation), Suo moto Action taken by the Court v. ICICI Bank Ltd., through its Chairman and others; Manupatra : AIR 2000 Ker. 417 : (Equivalent Citation), Babu Premarajan v. Superintendent of Police, Kasaragode and others; (1976) 1 SCC 852 , Ram Jivan v. Smt. Phoola (dead) by L.Rs. and others; (2004) 1 SCC 320 , M.P. AIT Permit Owners Assn. and others v. State of U.P. and others; AIR 2000 SC 1614 , Jaya Gokul Educational Trust and others v. Commissioner & Sect. to Govt. and others; (2004) 1 SCC 320 , M.P. AIT Permit Owners Assn. and others v. State of U.P. and others; AIR 2000 SC 1614 , Jaya Gokul Educational Trust and others v. Commissioner & Sect. to Govt. Higher Education and others; (1995) 4 SCC 104 , State of T.N. and others v. Adhiyaamun Educational & Research Institute and others; (1985) 4 SCC 92 , Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. Dharangadhra Municipality and others; (1983) 1 SCC 177 , T. Barai v. Henry Ah hoe and others; (2006) 9 SCC 650 , N. Birendra Singh v. L. Priya Kumar Singh and others; (1991) Supp. (2) SCC 421, H.C. Puttasmamy and others v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court Banglore and others; (1989) 3 SCC 396 , Sundarjas Kanya Lal Bhatija and others v. Collector; (2005) 5 SCC 420, Prof. (2) SCC 421, H.C. Puttasmamy and others v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court Banglore and others; (1989) 3 SCC 396 , Sundarjas Kanya Lal Bhatija and others v. Collector; (2005) 5 SCC 420, Prof. Yashpal and another v. State of Chhatisgarh; 1995 (13) LCD 252, Aligarh Muslim University v. VIII Additional District Judge, Aligarh; (2002) 10 SCC 101 , Arun Agarwal v. Nagrika Export (Pvt) Limited and others; (2003) 7 SCC 410 , National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises and another; (2006) 11 SCC 696 , Union of India v. Ranbir Singh and others; (2002) 1 SCC, Pradeep Chand Parija v. Pramod Chand Patnaik and others; (2002) 10 SCC 437, Vishweshwaraiah Iron and Steel Limited v. Abdul Gani and others; 2004 (8) SCC 30 , Arya ‘Samaj Education Trust and others v. Director of Education, Delhi and others; 2005 (3) UPLBEC 2487, Ram Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others; 2005 (23) LCD 232, Provincial Medical Sciences Association U.P. and others v. State of U.P. and others; 2007 (25) LCD 886 : Virendra Kumar v. Hon’ble Allahabad High Court of Judicature through its Registrar General, Allahabad and others; AIR 1983 SC 465 , Sher Singh and others v. State of Punjab; (1997) 8 SCC 767 , General Manager, Telecom v. A. Sriniwas Rao and others; (2001) 4 SCC 448 , Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Mumbai Shramik Sangh and others; (2002) 7 SCC 273 , Union of India and others v. Hansoli Devi and others; AIR 2005 SC 752 , Central Board of Dawoodi Bohara Community and others v. State of Maharashtra and others; 2007 (25) LCD 886, Virendra Kumar v. Hon’ble Allahabad High Court of Judicature through its Registrar General, Allahabad and others; (1997) 8 SCC 767 , General Manager, Telecom v. A. Sriniwas Rao and others; (2002) 1 SCC 538 , S.H. Rangappa v. State of Karnataka and others; (2002) 4 SCC 234 , Chandra Prakash and others v. State of U.P. and others; (2002) 4 SCC 578 , P. Ram Chandra Rao v. State of Karnataka; 2005 2 SCC 673 , Central Board of Dawoodi Bohara Community and others v. State of Maharashtra and others; (2002) 8 SCC 481 (II Judges) TMA, Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka; (2003) 6 SCC 697 , Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka; (2004) 8 SCC 139 , P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra; (2004) 8 SCC 213 , Modern Dentral College & Research Institute v. State of M.P.; (2004) 8 SCC 217 , Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka; Judgment dated 25.2.2005 delivered by the learned Single Judge (Hon’ble Justice Devi Prasad Singh) in Writ Petition No. 5668 (MS) of 2004 (Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Degree College v. State of U.P.) and connected writ petitions finally disposing of W.P. No. 4757 (MS) of 2004 and other connected writ petitions; (2005) 6 SCC 537 , P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra; (2006) 8 SCC 613, Hardev Motor Transport v. State of M.P.; (2006) 1 SCC 667 , State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and others; (2006) 6 SCC 72, Indian Bank v. Abs Marine Products (P) Ltd.; (2005) 5 SCC 420, Prof. Yashpal and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others; (2006) 9 SCC 1 , State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others; (1998) 4 SCC 409 , Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another; (1991) 4 SCC 584 , Union Carbide Corporation and others v. Union of India and others; (2005) 3 SCC 284 , Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and another; (1997) 5 SCC 201 , Ashok Kumar Gupta and another v. State of U.P. and others; AIR 1996 SC 906 , State of Kerala v. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar; 2006 (65) ALR 621, M. Meenakshi and others v. Metadeen Agrawal and others; 2007 (67) ALR 58, Srichand Jain v. State of U.P. through Collector, Saharanpur. 14. The foundation of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is based on three Apex Court judgments (supra) as well as the interim order and the final judgment rendered by Hon’ble Single Judge and the Division Bench of this Court at Lucknow. 15. It shall be appropriate to give brief description of dispute which may be divided into two parts. First Set of Litigation : 16. The first set of litigation relates to admission to B.Ed. Course in the self-finance non-aided educational colleges for the sessions 2005-2006. Admittedly, no State Level Entrance Test was conducted by the State Government or the association of non-aided colleges. In absence of common entrance test, the institutions imparting B.Ed. Education had proceeded to admit the students on their own. They declined to participate in the test conducted by the respective universities to whom they were affiliated. Admittedly, no State Level Entrance Test was conducted by the State Government or the association of non-aided colleges. In absence of common entrance test, the institutions imparting B.Ed. Education had proceeded to admit the students on their own. They declined to participate in the test conducted by the respective universities to whom they were affiliated. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court at Lucknow by judgment and order dated 23.5.2007 had dismissed the Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007 along with connected writ petitions and held that in absence of common entrance test, respective colleges were correct in admitting the student in the college on their own. The order dated 14.9.2005 and 31.10.2005 issued by the State Government on the basis of entrance test conducted by the respective universities was held to be unlawful and the judgment of Hon’ble Single Judge was upheld. Needless to say that the said two Government orders were set aside by the Hon’ble Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 22.2.2007, passed in Writ Petition No. 290 (M/S) of 2007, S.S. College Agra v. State of U.P. and others. In some of the writ petitions, relating to Chaudhary Charan Singh University, admissions were made by the individual colleges but the University had declined to permit such students to appear in the examination hence the students have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, in some cases, the students approached seeking admission in the respective institutions without following the entrance test conducted by the University. Keeping in view the order passed by the Division Bench at Lucknow, reference has been made to larger Bench by Hon’ble Single Judge in the manner discussed hereinabove. Second Set of Litigation : 17. In pursuance of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academy (supra), a committee for Fairness and Transparency in Admission Procedure ( in short, the committee), has been constituted in the State of U.P. under the Chairmanship of the then Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.N. Tilhari (Rtd.) a retired Judge of this Court. 18. The State Government has issued circular/order dated 15.2.2006 providing that a University shall hold common entrance test (in short, CET). Justice H.N. Tilhari (Rtd.) a retired Judge of this Court. 18. The State Government has issued circular/order dated 15.2.2006 providing that a University shall hold common entrance test (in short, CET). Against the order of the State Government dated 15.2.2006, the U.P. Management Association of Self-Finance Teachers Training College, Lucknow (in short, the Association) had approached the Committee assailing the State Government decision and claimed that the Association had got right to conduct State Level on its own. The Government order dated 15.2.2006 was issued keeping in view the provisions contained in NCTE Act and Regulations framed thereunder. After hearing Sri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Counsel the Committee rejected the claim of the Association vide its order dated 1.6.2006 on the ground that the provisions contained in NCTE Act and Regulations framed thereunder, have got statutory force and the decision taken by the State Government to hold common entrance test for the Universities for the admission to B.Ed. Courses, was lawful. 19. Feeling aggrieved with the order dated 1.6.2006 of the Committee, the Association filed Writ Petition No. 3022 (M/S) of 2006 at Lucknow and by an interim order dated 22.6.2006, the Government order dated 15.2.2006 as well as the order of the committee dated 1.6.2006 was stayed by the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court. However, liberty was given by the Hon’ble Single Judge to the Committee to verify the authenticity of the Association formed by the non-aided self-finance colleges of the State. The Committee has directed the Association to produce the testimonials including the list of members with intention to verify its right to hold State Level Common Entrance Test. 20. The Association again filed application before the Hon’ble Single Judge for clarification of the interim order passed in W.P. No. 3022 (M/S) of 2006. While clarifying its order Hon’ble Single Judge by subsequent order dated 12.9.2006, had opined that the Association was competent to hold the State Level CET but further observed that the Committee has no right to call a report from the Association to supply the list of members. However, liberty was given to the Committee to call report from Registrar of the Society. 21. Against the order dated 12.9.2006, the Association has preferred a petition for Special Leave to Appeal in the Apex Court which was registered as Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16405/2006. Notices were issued on 29.9.2006. However, liberty was given to the Committee to call report from Registrar of the Society. 21. Against the order dated 12.9.2006, the Association has preferred a petition for Special Leave to Appeal in the Apex Court which was registered as Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16405/2006. Notices were issued on 29.9.2006. The Apex Court has passed the following order on 19.10.2006 : “Heard both sides. The Special leave petition is dismissed.” 22. In Apex Court, during the course of argument, the Association claimed that 300 colleges are its members and they want to conduct entrance test in the last week of October, 2006. However, Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 19.10.2006. 23. It was submitted by Sri D.K. Arora learned Advocate General that when the fact was brought to the notice of Apex Court that all the institutions of the State of U.P. had not joined the Association and the Committee constituted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is seized with the matter, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. 24. On 25.9.2006, after hearing parties counsel, the Committee had rejected the claim of the Association. It has been observed by the Committee that only 15 members constitute the governing body and in Supreme Court, the list of 183 members was submitted and even if it was not found to be true hence, it shall not entitle the Association to conduct State Level Examination since all the colleges of the State had not joined the Association. 25. It was admitted before the Committee that there are 327 colleges in the State imparting B.Ed. Education. It was brought to the notice of the Committee that out of list of 183 institutions submitted in the Supreme Court, 40 colleges have not been affiliated to any University according to provisions of the U.P. Universities Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. Three colleges do not exist and seven names of the colleges have been repeated. Thus, out of 183, 50 names are deducted. The total number of colleges come to 133. Since all 327 colleges have not joined the Association, it lacks jurisdiction to hold CET even in pursuance of the judgment of the Apex Court Judgement in P.A. Inamdar’s case (supra). However, during the course of argument Sri P.S. Baghel, the learned counsel appeared for Poorvanchal University submitted that total unaided private colleges imparting B.Ed. Course is more than 400. 26. However, during the course of argument Sri P.S. Baghel, the learned counsel appeared for Poorvanchal University submitted that total unaided private colleges imparting B.Ed. Course is more than 400. 26. Feeling aggrieved with the findings of Committee, another clarification was moved in Writ Petition No. 3022 (M/S) of 2006. The Hon’ble Single Judge though observed that the colleges have right to hold examination but keeping in view that fresh cause of action has arisen the application was rejected on 22.11.2006 with liberty to file fresh writ petition. 27. In consequence to the order passed by the Committee, the Government has issued the order dated 7.11.2006 restraining the Association to conduct the Common Entrance Test in the State of U.P. 28. Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the Committee as well as the consequential Government orders, the Association had filed another Writ Petition No. 5674 (M/S) of 2006 which was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 14.12.2006 by the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court at Lucknow. While dismissing the Writ Petition No. 5674 (M/S) of 2006, the Hon’ble Single Judge held that all the three judgments of the Apex Court relate to admission in medical and technical education without considering the Act of the Parliament covering the field i.e., the National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 (Act No. 73 of 1993) (in short the NCTE Act) and the Regulations framed thereunder. Hon’ble the Single Judge has proceeded to hold that since the NCTE Act is a Central Act, and being a special Act, the admission to B. Ed. Course shall be regulated by the provisions contained therein. The finding recorded by the Committee through its Chairman Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.N. Tilhari in its report dated 25.9.2006 does not suffer from any impropriety or illegality. Hon’ble Single Judge (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sunil Ambwani) while making reference for constitution of larger Bench, took note of the judgment dated 14.2.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 5474 (M/S) of 2006. 29. In other judgment which is noticed by Hon’ble Single Judge while making reference for constitution of larger Bench, relates to an interim order dated 26.7.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 4408 (M/B) of 2006. 29. In other judgment which is noticed by Hon’ble Single Judge while making reference for constitution of larger Bench, relates to an interim order dated 26.7.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 4408 (M/B) of 2006. The State Legislature had promulgated U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 2006 under the title of the Uttar Pradesh Private and Professional Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fee) Ordinance, 2006, on 10.7.2006 to regulate the admission to non-aided private colleges. By an interim order dated 26.7.2006 the Division Bench of this Court at Lucknow has stayed the implementation of the Ordinance relying upon the Apex Court judgment in P.A. Inamdar’s case (supra). 30. While learned counsel for the parties proceeded to make their submissions, following questions were cropped up which basically relate to proper adjudication for reference made by Hon’ble Single Judges : (i) Whether on account of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in TMA Pai’s case (supra), followed by other two judgment (Islamic Academy and PA Inamdar’s case (supra), the Central or the State Government may be deprived from its Legislative power conferred by clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India? (ii) Whether Hon’ble Supreme Court in all three judgments (supra), had considered the provisions contained in NCTE Act and Regulations framed thereunder as well as the U.P. Universities Act? If not, its impact. (iii) Whether mandamus may be issued against the statutory provisions contained in NCTE Act and Regulations framed thereunder as well as the U.P. Universities Act? (iv) Whether one or more association may be formed to conduct admission test for B. Ed. Courses without subjecting the control of NCTE Act or the U.P. Universities or the Committee constituted in pursuance of the Apex Court judgment in Islamic Academy’s case (supra). Statutory Provisions : 31. It shall be appropriate that before considering the reference for adjudication, the statutory provisions may be taken into account. 32. The U.P. State Universities Act (in short the Universities Act), was promulgated by State Legislative Assembly to regulate academic and financial admission for higher education in U.P. and obtain presidential assent on 2.9.1973. The aims and objects were to provide equal opportunity in the field of higher studies to the peoples of the State with better academic atmosphere. 33. 32. The U.P. State Universities Act (in short the Universities Act), was promulgated by State Legislative Assembly to regulate academic and financial admission for higher education in U.P. and obtain presidential assent on 2.9.1973. The aims and objects were to provide equal opportunity in the field of higher studies to the peoples of the State with better academic atmosphere. 33. Under Sections 2 and 3 of the Universities Act, certain words like affiliated college, area of the University, associated college, autonomous college, Central Board of Studies, constituent college, existing University, Institute, management, registered graduate, University etc. have been defined. The word, ‘management’ has been defined as under : (13) ‘management’ in relation to an affiliated or associated college, means the managing committee or other body charged with managing the affairs of that college and recognised as such by the University : [Provided that in relation to any such college maintained by a Municipal Board or a Nagar Mahapalika, the expression ‘management’ means the education committee of such Board or Mahapalika as the case may be and the expression ‘Head of the Management’ means the chairman of such committee.]” 34. Section 4 of the Universities Act empowers the State to establish a new University for a particular area. Section 5 of the Universities Act empowers the University to exercise power in respect of area being specified in the schedule provided in the Universities Act. Section 6 of the Universities Act provides that the University shall be open to all persons irrespective of classes or creeds. Section 7 of the Universities Act defines powers and duties of the University and Section 7-A of the said Act deals with additional power and duties of certain universities. Under Section 10 of the Universities Act, the Governor is the Chancellor of the University. Admissions in Universities are regulated under Section 28 of the Act and sub-section (5-A) thereof, deals exclusively with the admission in Engineering Colleges. 35. Chapter VII of the Universities Act deals with affiliation and recognition of the colleges. Section 37 of the Universities Act, empowers the University of Agra, Gorakhpur, Kanpur, Meerut and other universities except the Universities of Lucknow and Allahabad, to recognise and affiliate colleges for higher education subject to fulfilment of necessary condition. 35. Chapter VII of the Universities Act deals with affiliation and recognition of the colleges. Section 37 of the Universities Act, empowers the University of Agra, Gorakhpur, Kanpur, Meerut and other universities except the Universities of Lucknow and Allahabad, to recognise and affiliate colleges for higher education subject to fulfilment of necessary condition. Section 38 deals with recognition of associated colleges by the Universities of Lucknow and Allahabad and such other Universities except the Universities of Agra, Gorakhpur, Kanpur or Meerut or the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya. The provisions relating to students of autonomous colleges has been given under Section 42 of the Universities Act. 36. Chapter VIII of the Universities Act deals with the admission and examinations. Section 45 of the said Act provides the conditions in compliance of which the students may be eligible for admission to the course of study for a degree. For convenience Section 45 is reproduced as under : “45. Admission of Students.—(1) No student shall be eligible for admission to the course of study for a degree unless— (a) he has passed— (i) the Intermediate Examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, or of any University or Board incorporated by any law for the time being in force; or (ii) any examination, or any degree conferred by any other University, being an examination or degree recognised by the University as equivalent to the Intermediate Examination or to a degree of the University; and (b) he possesses such further qualifications, if any, as may be specified in the Ordinances : Provided that the University may prescribe by Ordinances any lower qualifications for admission to a degree in Fine Arts. (2) The conditions under which students may be admitted to the diploma courses of the University shall be prescribed by the Ordinances. (3) The University shall have the power to recognise (for the purposes of admission to a course of study for a degree), as equivalent to its own degree, any degree conferred by any other University or, as equivalent to the Intermediate Examination of any Indian University, any examination conducted by any other authority. (4) Any student whose work or conduct is unsatisfactory may be removed from the University or an Institute or a constituent college or an affiliated or associated college in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinances.” 37. (4) Any student whose work or conduct is unsatisfactory may be removed from the University or an Institute or a constituent college or an affiliated or associated college in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinances.” 37. Power of State Government to regulate admission in medical engineering colleges in pursuance of power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Universities Act has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1992 (2) UPLBEC 1288, State of U.P. and others v. Dr. Anupam Gupta. 38. The Ordinance No. 1 of 2006 has been issued by the Legislature to regulate admissions to private aided and non-aided professional educational institutions including minority institutions. 39. The National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (Act No. 73 of 1993) was promulgated by the Parliament and was notified finally on 29.12.1993. The aims and objects of the Act are reproduced as under : “An Act to provide for the establishment of a National Council for Teacher education with a view to achieving planned and co-ordinated development of the teacher education system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education system and for matter connected therewith.” 40. Section 2 of the said Act contains definition clause relating to various words, used in the Act. Sub-section (c) of Section 2 of the Act defines the meaning of ‘recognised institution’. Section 2 (h) of the Act, defines the word, ‘prescribed’, Section 2 (i) of the Act defines the word, ‘recognised’, Section 2 (j) defines the word, ‘regional committee’ and Section 2 (k) of the Act defines the word, ‘regulations’. Section 2 (l) of the Act defines the word, ‘teacher education’, Section 2 (m) of the Act defines the word, ‘teacher education qualification’, Section 2 (n) of the Act defines the word, ‘University’. Section 2 (l) of the Act defines the word, ‘teacher education’, Section 2 (m) of the Act defines the word, ‘teacher education qualification’, Section 2 (n) of the Act defines the word, ‘University’. For convenience, relevant sub-sections of Section 2 of the Act is reproduced as under : “(h) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under Section 31; (i) “recognised institution” means an institution recognised by the Council under Section 14; (j) “Regional Committee” means a committee established under Section 20; (k) “regulations” means regulations made under Section 32; (l) “teacher education” means programmes of education, research training of persons for equipping them to teach at pre-primary, primary, secondary and senior secondary stages in schools, and includes non-formal education, part-time education, adult education and correspondence education; (m) “teacher education qualification” means a degree, diploma or certificate in teacher education awarded by a University or examining body in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (n) “University” means a University defined under clause (f) of Section 2 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and includes an institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 of that Act;” 41. Section 12 of the Act deals with the functions of the Council. Under Section 3 of the NCTE Act, the Central Government by notifying in the official Gazette, established a Council called as the National Council for Teacher Education, in short NCTE. Section 12 lays down various functions of the Council. 42. Section 13 relates to inspection of the institution which are recognised or proposed to be recognised by the Council to impart education like B.Ed. courses etc. Section 14 mentions mandatory condition for recognition of institutions offering course or training in teacher education. Under Section 15 of the NCTE Act, the regional committee has been empowered to grant recognition to start new courses. The embargo has been placed for the examining bodies like universities provided no affiliation shall be granted unless recognition has been granted by the regional committee of the NCTE. Section 17 of the NCTE Act, lays down that in case institution is recognised by the regional committee or the NCTE the university concerned to which an institution has been affiliated shall derecognise such institution. Section 32 of the NCTE Act, empowers the council to frame regulation by publication in official Gazette not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder. Section 32 of the NCTE Act, empowers the council to frame regulation by publication in official Gazette not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder. Relevant portion of sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the NCTE Act, may be reproduced as under : “32 (2)(f) conditions required for the proper functioning of the institution and conditions for granting recognition under clause (1) of sub-section (3) of Section 14; (h) conditions required for the proper conduct of a new course or training and conditions for granting permission under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 15;” 43. In pursuance of power conferred under Section 32 of the Act, the Council had framed regulations in the year 2002 which was amended in 2005 providing norms and standards for secondary teachers education programme (i.e., B.Ed. Course). Regulations, 2002 provides that duration of B. Ed. programme shall be at least one academic year and the one unit shall admit 100 students to impart B. Ed. education. The Regulation provides that candidates with at least 45 marks in Bachelor’s/Master’s Degree with at least two school subjects at the graduation level shall be eligible for admission to B. Ed. course. According to Regulation 2002, the admission is to be made either on the basis of marks obtained by qualifying examination or by the entrance examination conducted by the University/State Government to which the institution is affiliated. The relevant portion of Regulation 2002 is reproduced as under : “Appendix-7 Norms and Standards for Secondary Teacher Education Programme (B.Ed.) 2. Duration and Intake (a) The B. Ed. programme shall be of a duration of at least one academic year. (b) There shall be a unit of 100 students for ensuring optimum utilisation of physical and instructional infrastructure and expertise of the teaching staff. Division into appropriate batches may be done at the institutional level for effective curriculum transaction. 3. Eligibility (a) Candidates with at least 45% marks in the Bachelor’s/Master’s Degree with at least two school subjects at the graduation level are eligible for admission. (b) Admission should be made either on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination or in the entrance examination conducted by the University/State Government, as per the policy of the State Government/University, to which the institution is affiliated. (c) There shall be reservation of seats for SC/ST/OBC, Handicapped, Women, etc. (b) Admission should be made either on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination or in the entrance examination conducted by the University/State Government, as per the policy of the State Government/University, to which the institution is affiliated. (c) There shall be reservation of seats for SC/ST/OBC, Handicapped, Women, etc. as per the rules of the concerned State Government.” 44. For degree education (M.Ed.), the NCTE Regulation provides for training of one academic year after B.Ed. with intake capacity of 40 students in one academic year. Candidate who possess 45% marks in B.Ed. course, shall be entitled for admission to M.Ed. course. 45. The NCTE, under the title of Norms and Standards for Secondary Teacher Education Programme leading to Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) Degree, makes certain variation providing that candidate possessing 50% marks either in the Bachelor’s Degree and/or in the Master’s degree or any other qualification equivalent thereto, shall be eligible for admission to the programme. The admission procedure has been maintained either on the basis of qualifying examination or the entrance test or any other selection process as per the policy of the State Government/U.T. Administration and the University. The relevant portion of the said Regulation is reproduced as under : “Norms and Standards for Secondary Teacher Education Programme leading to Bachelor of Education (B.Ed) Degree 3.0 Intake, Eligibility and Admission Procedure 3.1 Intake There shall be a unit of 100 students divided into two sections of 50 each for general sessions and not more than 25 students per teacher for a school subject for methods courses and other practical activities of the programme to facilitate participatory teaching and learning. 3.2 Eligibility 3.2.1. Candidates with at least 50% marks either in the Bachelor’s Degree and/or in the Master’s degree or any other qualification equivalent thereto, are eligible for admission to the programme. 3.2.2 There shall be relaxation of marks/reservation of seats for candidates belonging to SC/ST/OBC communities and other categories as per the Rules of the Central/State Government/U.T Administration concerned. 3.3 Admission Procedure Admission shall be made on merit on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination and/or in the entrance examination or any other selection process as per the policy of the State Government/U.T. Administration and the University.” 46. Regulation 3.2 provides the minimum marks which is 50%. Earlier, it was 45%. 3.3 Admission Procedure Admission shall be made on merit on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination and/or in the entrance examination or any other selection process as per the policy of the State Government/U.T. Administration and the University.” 46. Regulation 3.2 provides the minimum marks which is 50%. Earlier, it was 45%. However, it has been subjected to Regulation 3.3 which deals with the actual admission procedure. The word, ‘or’ as well as the word, ‘and’ has been used in disjunction. It is settled law that ‘or’ sometimes denors or may be used as and ‘and’ may be used as ‘or’. In the present case, it appears that admission shall be made in pursuance of qualifying examination. Such qualifying examination or the entrance examination shall be held in pursuance of the policy of the State Government. Thus, the examination can be held either by the State Government and in case the State Government decides, it can delegate such power to the Universities. The NCTE to its wisdom, had provided that admission procedure shall be in accordance with the policy decision taken by the State Government. Thus, instead of proceedings on its own, the NCTE delegated its power to the State Government. 47. It was submitted by Sri Prashant Chandra learned Senior Counsel that individual colleges have got right to admit candidates on the basis of qualifying marks obtained in qualifying examination i.e., graduation or post-graduation level but the submission of Sri Prashant Chandra seems to be not correct. While interpreting the statutory provisions, a meaning should be given to each and every word and not in isolation. 48. The State Government under the power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Universities Act, framed the Regulation in the year 1987 under the title of Uttar Pradesh State Universities (Regulation of Admission to Courses of Instruction for Degree in Education in Affiliated, Associated and Constituent Colleges) Order, 1987, to regulate admissions in B.Ed. and M.Ed. courses. The universities were empowered to accept application or organise their own entrance test in pursuance of power conferred by para-6 and 7 of the Regulation 1987 which is reproduced as under : "6. Application for Admission.—(1) Every candidate for admission to B.Ed. and M.Ed. courses. The universities were empowered to accept application or organise their own entrance test in pursuance of power conferred by para-6 and 7 of the Regulation 1987 which is reproduced as under : "6. Application for Admission.—(1) Every candidate for admission to B.Ed. classes shall apply in the manner hereinafter provided in the prescribed form to be obtained from the office of the Registrar of the concerned University on payment of Rs. 10 for each form. The last date for applying for admission shall ordinarily be the 31st day of May or such date in the month of June as the University may prescribe. (2) The candidate shall send the application form by Registered post to the Registrar of the University. (3) No application received in the office of the Registrar after such date as may be prescribed by the University in this behalf shall be entertained. 7. Examination for admission.—(a) Every University shall organise its own combined admission examination for admission to B.Ed. courses in its affiliated, associated and constituent colleges. The admission examination of all the Universities shall be organised on one and the same date as may be fixed by the State Government. 49. However, keeping in view the Apex Court judgment in Islamic Academy’s case (supra) and the Regulations framed by the Council under the NCTE Act, Order, 1987 was amended. The relevant amended provisions of para 7, 12, 14 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities (Regulation of Admission to Courses of Instruction for Degree in Education in Affiliated, Associated and Constituent Colleges) (Fourth Amendment) Order, 2005 are reproduced as under : “7. Every University shall organise its own combined admission examination for admission to B.Ed. courses in its affiliated, associated and constituent colleges. The admission examination of all the Universities shall be organised on one and the same date as may be fixed by the State Government. 7. (a) In case the entrance examination for admission to B.Ed. Course is conducted by the Association of self-financing institutions, the date of this examination shall be other than the date of examination conducted by the University. 12.(1) Separate merit lists for reserved and general seats shall be prepared on the basis of marks obtained in admission examination and the marks obtained under para 11 mentioned above. Course is conducted by the Association of self-financing institutions, the date of this examination shall be other than the date of examination conducted by the University. 12.(1) Separate merit lists for reserved and general seats shall be prepared on the basis of marks obtained in admission examination and the marks obtained under para 11 mentioned above. (2) If the marks obtained by two or more candidates on the basis of admission examination and para 11 are equal preference shall be given to the candidate of the same University or of college affiliated or associated with or constituent of the same University. If still the marks are equal then candidate being elder will be given preference. (3) If against the conduct of any candidate there is report in writing of District Magistrate or against whom criminal proceedings are in process in any Court of law or if candidate has been punished by any Court in any criminal case or if the candidate has been debarred from University Examination for two or more years due to use of unfair means the Principal of the college can refuse admission to such candidate with prior written approval of the Vice-Chancellor. (4) The criteria for preparing merit list on the basis of entrance examination conducted by the Association of self-financing institutions with prior permission of the University and under the supervision of the University shall be the same as provided above. 14.(a) The Principal of the concerned college shall give admission to the candidates after verifying their original certificates; (b) The provisional certificate specially for the marks under para 11 shall not be accepted; (c) The Principal has to take prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor before finally refusing admission to any candidate; (d) The University shall also prepare a waiting list. If any seat falls vacant within a month after the classes have started it will be filled from waiting list. If any seat falls vacant within a month after the classes have started it will be filled from waiting list. It shall be the responsibility of the University to intimate the college and the candidate to fill the vacant seats; (e) Every candidate selected for admission shall before admission have to furnish a certificate countersigned by the Chief Medical Officer in which it should be clearly mentioned that the candidate does not stammer and on account of any disease of the ear, eye or any other limb is not unfit to be a teacher; (f) Admissions under management quota shall be made by the college on the basis of the merit list of the students selected in the entrance examination conducted by the University concerned, which shall be prepared as per para 12 of the aforesaid order. But in case the entrance examination is conducted by the Association of the self-financing institutions with prior permission and under the supervision of the University admission under the management quota shall be made on the basis of the merit list of such an entrance examination also. But such option shall be exercised by the college concerned before commencement of the admission procedure only after seeking prior approval of the University concerned. For admission under management quota the college concerned shall publish notice for inviting admission applications in most widely circulated daily newspapers of the district concerned, which shall include the last date for submission of applications which shall last up to at least 15 days after the date of publication of such notice. The merit list shall be prepared on the basis of all the applications received till the last date. This merit list shall be approved by the University concerned and in accordance with the approved merit list, admissions of the students shall be made against the number of seats as determined by the State Government under the management quota. In case the students up to the number of seats determined under the management quota are not available, the same procedure shall be repeated to complete admissions. In case the students up to the number of seats determined under the management quota are not available, the same procedure shall be repeated to complete admissions. Only such students shall be eligible for applying under this admission procedure who have participated in the entrance examination conducted by the University and also whose names find place in the merit list declared by the University or whose names are published in the merit list of the entrance examination conducted by the Association of the self-financing institutions. Other provisions with regards to admissions under management quota shall be as above.” 50. It is settled law that every word of statute should be given a meaning. While interpreting a statutory provision the entire Section or whole of the statute, as the case may be, should be considered. According to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edition page 36) any construction which may leave without affecting any part of the language of a statute should ordinarily be rejected. Relevant portion from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edition page 36) is reproduced as under : “A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. Thus, where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one quarter sessions to another, it was observed that such a provision, though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight, could not be eliminated.” In view of above, the Court should always avoid interpretation, which would leave any part of the provision to be interpreted without effect. While doing so every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. According to Maxwell (supra at page 47), statutory language should not be read in isolation but in its context. 51. While doing so every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. According to Maxwell (supra at page 47), statutory language should not be read in isolation but in its context. 51. While referring a decision of House of Lord reported in AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, 1957 (1) All ER 49 (HL) in a famous treatise Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, the views of Lord Tucker has been discussed with approval as under (9th Edition page 34) : “In an appeal before the House of Lords, where the question was of the true import of a statute, the Attorney-General wanted to call in aid the preamble in support of the meaning which he contended should be given to the enacting part, but in doing so was met by the argument on behalf of the respondent that where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be controlled by the preamble which cannot be read. The House of Lords rejected the objection to the reading of the preamble. Although, ultimately it came to the conclusion that the enacting part was clear and unambiguous. VISCOUNT SIMONDS (LORD TUCKER agreeing) in that connection said : “I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use context in its widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy.” 52. Learned author (supra) again proceeded to consider the judgement of Australian High Court and views of Lord Steyn in a case reported in 2002 (4) All ER 654, R. v. National Asylum Support Service, (page 35) to quote : “As rightly pointed out by the High Court of Australia, “the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses context in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means—one may discern the statute was intended to remedy. LORD STEYN recently expressed the same view as follows : “The starting point is that language in all legal texts conveys meaning according to the circumstance is which it was used. It follows that context must always be identified and considered before the process of construction or during it. It is therefor wrong to say that the Court may only resort to evidence of the contextual scene when an ambiguity has arisen.” 53. Thus, the exposition ‘ex visceribus actus’ is a long recognised rule of construction. Words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are, therefore, not to be considered in isolation. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in, AIR 1992 SC 1 , Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India” has proceeded to hold as under : “However, it is suffice to say that while interpreting a statute the consideration of inconvenience and hardships should be avoided and that when the language is clear and explicit and the words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Act or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statute/Rules/regulations relating to the subject matter. Added to this, in construing statute, the Court has to ascertain the intention of the law making authority in the backdrop of the dominant purpose and underlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute is to be interpreted about any violence to its language and applied as far as its explicit language admits consistent with the established rules of interpretation." The aforesaid settled rule of interpretation has been affirmed by the Apex Court from time to time in various cases including 1974 (1) SCC 596 , M/s Gammon India Ltd and others v. Union of India and others (para 19), AIR 1978 SC 995 , M/s Punjab Beverages Ltd. Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand and another (para 5), AIR 2002 SC 829 , Kailash Chandra and another v. Mukundi Lal and others (para 10) and AIR 2000 SC 66 , Grasim Industries Ltd and another v. State of M.P. and (1985)1 SCC 591 , S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. V.R. Pattabiraman and others. 54. A close reading and scrutiny of the Order, 2005 indicates that it was issued by the State Government, in pursuance of the power conferred by the statutory Regulations framed by the NCTE and notified on 27.5.2005 and was amended by the State Government on 1.9.2007. The amended clause (c) of sub-para (1) of para 3 of the Order, 2005 provides that in case the entrance examination is conducted by the self-financing institution at State level, then the date of such examination shall be other than the date of the examination conducted by the University. The amended para-7 (a) and 14 (f) of the Order, 2005 are reproduced as under : “7. (a) In case the entrance examination for admission to B.Ed. Course is conducted by the Association of self-financing institutions at State level, the date of this examination shall be other than the date of examination conducted by the University. 14. (f) Admission under management quota shall be made by the college on the basis of the merit list of the students selected in the entrance examination conducted by the University concerned, which shall be prepared as per para 12 of the aforesaid order. 14. (f) Admission under management quota shall be made by the college on the basis of the merit list of the students selected in the entrance examination conducted by the University concerned, which shall be prepared as per para 12 of the aforesaid order. But in case the entrance examination is conducted by the Association of the self-financing institutions at State level with prior permission and under the supervision of the Entrance Procedure Determination Committee, admission under the management quota shall be made on the basis of the merit list of such an entrance examination also. But such option shall be exercised by the college concerned before commencement of the admission procedure only after obtaining prior approval of the University concerned/State Government. For admission under management quota the college concerned shall publish notice for inviting admission applications in most widely circulated daily newspapers of the district concerned, which shall include the last date for submission of applications which shall last up the at least 15 days after the date of publication of such notice. The merit list shall be prepared on the basis of all the applications received till the last date. This merit list shall be approved by the University concerned and in accordance with the approved merit list, admissions of the student, shall be made against the number of seats as determined by the State Government under the management quota. In case the students up to the number of seats determined under the management quota are not available, the same procedure shall be repeated to complete admissions. Only such students shall be eligible for applying under this admission procedure who have participated in the entrance examination conducted by the University and also whose names find place in the merit list declared by the University or whose names are published in the merit list of the entrance examination conducted by the Association of the self-financing institutions at State Level. Other provisions with regards to admissions under management quota shall be as above.” 55. A perusal of the Government order referred to hereinabove, indicates that the State Government has proceeded to take decision initially, in pursuance of the NCTE Regulations and thereafter in pursuance of the three Apex Court judgments. 56. Other provisions with regards to admissions under management quota shall be as above.” 55. A perusal of the Government order referred to hereinabove, indicates that the State Government has proceeded to take decision initially, in pursuance of the NCTE Regulations and thereafter in pursuance of the three Apex Court judgments. 56. Needless to say, the NCTE Act, being an Act of Parliament, shall be applicable being issued in pursuance of the powers conferred by the entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. A constitutional bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (1999) 7 SCC 120 , Dr. Preeti Srivastava and another v. State of U.P. and others, while considering the power of State Government under Entry 25 of List II of Schedule VIII and the entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution had proceeded to held as under : “35. The legislative competence of Parliament and the legislatures of the States to make laws under Article 246 is regulated by the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution. In the VIIth Schedule as originally in force, Entry 11 of List II gave to the State Government an exclusive power to legislate on “education" including universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III.” Entry 11 of List II was deleted and Entry 25 of List III was amended with effect from 3.1.1976 as a result of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act of 1976. The present Entry 25 in the Concurrent List is as follows : “25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour.” Entry 25 is subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is as follows : “66. Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.” Both the Union as well as the States have the power to legislate on education including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions as also coordination of such standards. A State has, therefore, the right to control education including medical education so long as the field is not occupied by any Union legislation. Secondly, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education. Because this is exclusively within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry 66 of List I. Thirdly, while considering the cases on the subject it is also necessary to remember that from 1977, education, including, inter alia, medical and university education, is now in the Concurrent List so that the Union can legislate on admission criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Article 254. 36. It would not be correct to say that the norms for admission have no connection with the standard of education, or that the rules for admission are covered only by Entry 25 of List III. Norms of admission can have a direct impact on the standards of education. Of course, there can be rules for admission which are consistent with or do not affect adversely the standards of education prescribed by the Union in exercise of powers under Entry 66 of List I. For example, a State may, for admission to the post-graduate medical courses, lay down qualifications in addition to those prescribed under Entry 66 of List I. This would be consistent with promoting higher standards for admission to the higher educational courses. But any lowering of the norms laid down can and does have an adverse effect on the standards of education in the institutes of higher education. Standards of education in an institution or college depend on various factors. But any lowering of the norms laid down can and does have an adverse effect on the standards of education in the institutes of higher education. Standards of education in an institution or college depend on various factors. Some of these are : (1) the calibre of the teaching staff; (2) a proper syllabus designed to achieve a high level of education in the given span of time; (3) the student-teacher ratio; (4) the ratio between the students and the hospital beds available to each student; (5) the calibre of the students admitted to the institution; (6) equipment and laboratory facilities, or hospital facilities for training in the case of medical colleges; (7) adequate accommodation for the college and the attached hospital; and (8) the standard of examinations held including the manner in which the papers are set and examined and the clinical performance is judged. 37. While considering the standards of education in any college or institution, the calibre of students who are admitted to that institution or college cannot be ignored. If the students are of a high calibre, training programmes can be suitably moulded so that they can receive the maximum benefit out of a high level of teaching...” 57. In the above case of Dr. Preeti Srivastava, Hon’ble the Constitution Bench further held that the minimum standards laid down by the Central statutes, have to be complied with by the State while making admission. It has further been held that under the University Act while laying down any criteria, it shall be necessary that minimum standards laid down by the Central statute should be followed. Para-39 of the said case (supra) is reproduced as under : "39. The respondents have emphasised the observation that admission has to be made by those who are in control of the colleges. But, the question is, on what basis? Para-39 of the said case (supra) is reproduced as under : "39. The respondents have emphasised the observation that admission has to be made by those who are in control of the colleges. But, the question is, on what basis? Admissions must be made on a basis which is consistent with the standards laid down by a statute or regulation framed by the Central Government in the exercise of its powers under Entry 66 List I. At times, in some of the judgments, the words “eligibility” and “qualification” have been used interchangeably and in some cases a distinction has been made between the two words—”eligibility” connoting the minimum criteria for selection that may be laid down by the University Act or any Central statute, while “qualifications” connoting the additional norm laid down by the colleges or by the State. In every case the minimum standards as laid down by the Central statute or under it, have to be complied with by the State while making admissions. It may, in addition, lay down other additional norms for admission or regulate admissions in the exercise of its powers under Entry 25 List III in a manner not inconsistent with or in a manner which does not dilute the criteria so laid down.” 58. The constitutional validity of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the NCTE Act was challenged and declared ultra vires by the Rajasthan High Court. Union of India filed an appeal in the Apex Court. The Apex Court had allowed the appeal and upheld the vires of Section 17 (4) of the NCTE Act in a judgment reported in (2002) 8 SCC 228 , Union of India and others v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers’ College. It was held by the Apex Court that Article 246 of the Constitution is the source of power to legislate the law and the entries in the three lists of Schedule VII, of the Constitution, are the “fields of legislation”. The Supreme Court rules that widest interpretation should be given to entries subject to condition that the meaning should not be extended beyond their reasonable connotation and the construction should not be so wide as to override or render otiose another entry. The Supreme Court rules that widest interpretation should be given to entries subject to condition that the meaning should not be extended beyond their reasonable connotation and the construction should not be so wide as to override or render otiose another entry. In the event of conflict between two entries, the true character of the enactment should be examined as a whole including its object, scope and effect by applying principles of “pith and substance”. Accordingly, declaration of invalidity of an educational certificate granted by derecognised institution from the council as envisaged by sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the NCTE Act was held to be intra vires. Union Legislature was held to be competent to legislate the law keeping in view the entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. It was further held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that derecognition of B. Ed. Course by NCTE cannot be nullified on the ground of failure to comply with the principle of natural justice. 59. In a case reported in (2003) 3 SCC 321 , St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education and another, the vires of Regulation 5 (e) (f) of the National Council for Teacher Education (Application for Recognition, the Manner for Submission, Determination of Conditions for Recognition of Institutions and Permission to Start New Course or Training) Regulations, 1995, framed by the NCTE was challenged on the ground that it is ultra vires to provisions of NCTE Act. In pursuance to power conferred by Section 32 of the Act, the impugned Regulation was notified on 29.12.1995 as reflected from para-8 of the judgment. 60. While upholding the vires of Regulations, Hon’ble Supreme Court in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (supra) held that the Regulation is a Rule or order prescribed by superior for the management of some business and employees as a rule for general course of action. Rules and Regulations are all comprised in delegated legislations. The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred by the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred by the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. What is permitted is the delegation of ancillary or subordinate legislative functions, or what is fictionally called, a power to fill up details. The legislature may, after laying down the legislative policy confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the framework of policy. The need for delegated legislation is that they are framed within care and minuteness. The statutory authority making the rule, after coming into force of the Act, is in a better position to adapt the Act to special circumstances. Delegated legislation permits utilisation of experience and consultation with interests affected by the practical operation of statutes. The specific power conferred by the statutes to make rules and regulations establish the pattern of conduct to be followed. Regulations are in aid of enforcement of the provisions of the statute. The process of legislation by departmental regulations saves time and is intended to deal with local variations. The power to legislate the statutory instrument in the form of rules and regulations is conferred by Parliament. The main justification for delegated legislation is that the legislature being overburdened and the needs of the modern-day society being complex, it cannot possibly foresee every administrative difficulty that may arise after the statute has begun to operate. Delegated legislation fills those needs. The regulations made under power conferred by the statute are supporting legislation and have the force of law and effect, if validly made, as an Act passed by the competent legislature. 61. The Apex Court further held (supra) that power conferred by Section 14 read with Section 32 of the NCTE Act to frame Regulation is intra vires to Act and does not suffer from any excessive delegation. 61. The Apex Court further held (supra) that power conferred by Section 14 read with Section 32 of the NCTE Act to frame Regulation is intra vires to Act and does not suffer from any excessive delegation. There shall be presumption that the vires of subordinate legislation is intra vires and if it is open to two constructions, one of which would make it valid and the other invalid, the Courts must adopt that construction which makes it valid and the legislation can also be read down to avoid its being declared ultra vires. The Apex Court further ruled in the St. Johns case (supra), that power conferred by Regulation on the State Government or Union territory, does not suffer from excessive delegation. It cannot, therefore, be urged that the power conferred on the State Government or Union Territory, while considering an application for grant of an NOC, is an arbitrary or unchannelled power. The State Government or the Union Territory has to necessarily confine itself to the guidelines issued by the Council while considering the application for grant of an NOC. Meaning thereby, while framing regulations, Council has got power to confer on the State Government or the Universities to discharge such function within the parameters provided by it keeping in view the statutory provisions contained in the NCTE Act. While upholding the validity of Council to frame regulation, the Apex Court in the case of St. John’s case (supra) observed that the impugned Regulations are perfectly valid and intra vires the Act. 62. In (2005) 4 SCC 89 , Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust v. Member Secretary, National Council for Teacher Education and another, the law laid down in St. John’s case (supra), has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court upholding the power of NCTE to frame Regulations in pursuance of power conferred by Section 32 of the Act. 63. 62. In (2005) 4 SCC 89 , Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust v. Member Secretary, National Council for Teacher Education and another, the law laid down in St. John’s case (supra), has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court upholding the power of NCTE to frame Regulations in pursuance of power conferred by Section 32 of the Act. 63. In (2005) 5 SCC 172 , Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others where the question relates to admission to Special BTC Training Course in the State of U.P. cropped up though, the Apex Court upheld the right of the State Government to impart Special BTC Training Course under the U.P. Basic Education Act by recognising the training but upheld the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which had set aside the Special BTC Training Course being not recognised by the NCTE keeping in view the provisions of Section 16 of the Act. It was held by the Apex Court that though the State Government is empowered to impart Special BTC Training Course in pursuance of statutory provisions but that can be done only with prior recognition by the Council under NCTE Act. The BTC Training Course formulated by the State Government was held to be contrary to the provisions of NCTE Act. 64. In (2006) 4 SCC 65 , National Council for Teacher Education and another v. Committee of Management and others, the Apex Court held the power of the Council to frame regulations in pursuance of powers conferred by Section 14 read with 32 of the NCTE Act. For convenience, relevant portion of para-16 thereof, is reproduced hereunder : “16. Regulations could be framed by the appellant under sub-section (1) of Section 32 read with Section 14 thereof. Section 14, as noticed hereinbefore, itself provides that the applications are required to be filed in such form and in such a manner as was determined by the Regulations. The Regulations could have thus also been framed in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Section 14, as noticed hereinbefore, itself provides that the applications are required to be filed in such form and in such a manner as was determined by the Regulations. The Regulations could have thus also been framed in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. We have, however, noticed hereinbefore that clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 specifically refers to Section 14 of the Act for the purpose of laying down the form and manner in which the applications for recognition are required to be submitted.” Their lordships at Apex Court further held that substantial compliance of Regulations is necessary even if they are held to be directory in nature. For convenience relevant portion of para-17 is reproduced hereunder : “17. For the aforementioned purpose, it is not necessary for us to determine the question as to whether the provisions of the Regulations are imperative in character or not. There cannot, however, be any doubt or dispute that even if they are directory in nature, substantial compliance thereof was necessary.” 65. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2006) 9 SCC 1 , State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others, wherein the validity of Regulation 2002, framed by the NCTE was in question. While relying upon the case of St. Johns (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “65. It is true that during the pendency of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute NCTE framed regulations called the NCTE (Form of Application for Recognition, the Time-limit of Submission of Application, Determination of Norms and Standards for Recognition of Teacher Education Programmes and Permission to Start New Course or Training) Regulations, 2002. 67. The above Regulations came into force from 13.11.2002 and they insisted that application should be accompanied by NOC from the State Government/Union Territory in which the institution is located. 68. In view of the fact, however, that according to us, the final authority lies with NCTE and we are supported in taking that view by various decisions of this Court, NCTE cannot be deprived of its authority or power in taking an appropriate decision under the Act irrespective of absence of no-objection certificate by the State Government/Union Territory. Absence or non-production of NOC by the institution, therefore, was immaterial and irrelevant so far as the power of NCTE is concerned.” 66. Absence or non-production of NOC by the institution, therefore, was immaterial and irrelevant so far as the power of NCTE is concerned.” 66. In the case of Sant Dnyaneshwar (supra), the Apex Court further held (para-76) that NCTE, under its guidelines, may permit the State Government to collect necessary data and material and make them available to it so that NCTE may take appropriate decision, in accordance with provisions contained in NCTE Act. In the same case Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that provisions contained in Universities Act, shall not be nullified but they shall apply to the institutions covered by the NCTE Act. It has further been held that once recognition is granted by NCTE then every university shall oblige to grant affiliation. Thus, controversy in the case of Sant Dnyaneshwar (supra), relates to affiliation of college and not the admission of students. 67. In a recent judgment reported in (2007) 6 SCC 276 , Union of India and another v. Shardindu, Hon’ble Supreme Court had affirmed the primacy of NCTE Act and upheld the enforceability of the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act relating to appointment of Chairperson of NCTE for the stipulated period of four years. 68. Thus, it has been the Consistent view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act, in pursuance of powers conferred by Section 14 read with Section 32, has got statutory and binding force and the NCTE has got right to receive information or delegate certain powers to State Government or its universities for the enforcement of the Act. However, while doing so, the State Government or the Universities have to function under the control and command of the NCTE Act and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. 69. The combined reading of constitution Bench judgment in the case of Preeti Srivastava (supra), and St. John Teachers Training Institute (supra) as well as various cases decided by Apex Court while deciding the controversy relating to interpretation of NCTE Act and Regulations framed thereunder, it shall be correct to hold that the order passed by the Council in pursuance of the powers conferred by NCTE and the Regulations framed thereunder shall have binding effect. In case Regulations framed under NCTE Act confer certain powers or discretion to the State Government relating to admission to B.Ed. In case Regulations framed under NCTE Act confer certain powers or discretion to the State Government relating to admission to B.Ed. Courses, then a consequential power exercised by the State Government shall be lawful, just and proper. In the present case, since the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act confer powers to the State Government to hold the entrance test in accordance with its policy then it shall not be unlawful for the State Government to frame appropriate Regulations to hold entrance test or confer certain power to universities constituted under the said Act to hold entrance test. While issuing an order in pursuance of provisions contained in sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. State Universities Act as held in Preeti Srivastava’s case (supra), the discretion exercised by the State Government must be within the four corners of the delegated powers conferred by the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act. The State Government, its authorities, local bodies of universities do not possess the jurisdiction to do anything in contravention of the provisions contained in NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. 70. The next question relates to interpretation of Apex Court judgments to ascertain the questions referred to larger Bench relating to their applicability for admission to B. Ed. courses. It shall be appropriate that all three Apex Court judgments (supra), may be discussed in brevity before arriving at any conclusion. TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 71. The case reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481 , TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (supra), has been decided by 11 Hon’ble Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court. The controversy was referred by a Constitution Bench of 5 Hon’ble Judges in a writ petition filed by Islamic Academy of Education and connected writ petitions where, the Bench had expressed its views while interpreting Article 30 of the Constitution that it did not clothe a minority educational institution with the power to adopt its own method of selection. The reference to larger Bench has been noticed in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra) in para 3 of the judgment which shall be appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion as under : “3. The reference to larger Bench has been noticed in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra) in para 3 of the judgment which shall be appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion as under : “3. When the cases came up for hearing before an eleven-Judge Bench, during the course of hearing on 19.3.1997, the following order was passed : Since a doubt has arisen during the course of our arguments as to whether this Bench would feel itself bound by the ratio propounded in—Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In Re ( AIR 1958 SC 956 : 1959 SCR 995 ) and Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717 : (1975) 1 SCR 173 it is clarified that this sized Bench would not feel itself inhibited by the views expressed in those cases since the present endeavour is to discern the true scope and interpretation of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, which being the dominant question would require examination in its pristine purity. The factum is recorded.” 72. Thus, the issue cropped up and referred to 11 Hon’ble Judges in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra). The submissions made by the parties before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), as is evident from perusal of para 7, 17 of the writ petition, also seem to relate to the interpretation of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution as noticed by leading judgment delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal the then Chief Justice. 73. In the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that affiliation and recognition to a Board of University subject to fulfilment of necessary condition may not be made compulsory. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in the Government aided institutions, the Government will have greater say in the administration including admission and fixing of fees but in the private unaided institutions, maximum autonomy in day to day administration should be given. Bureaucratic or governmental interference shall undermine its regulation. For convenience, the relevant portion of para 55 of the judgment in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), is reproduced as under : “55. Bureaucratic or governmental interference shall undermine its regulation. For convenience, the relevant portion of para 55 of the judgment in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), is reproduced as under : “55. ...There can be no doubt that in seeking affiliation or recognition, the Board or the university or the affiliating or recognizing authority can lay down conditions consistent with the requirement to ensure the excellence of education. It can, for instance, indicate the quality of the teachers by prescribing the minimum qualifications that they must possess and the courses of study and curricula. It can, for the same reasons, also stipulate the existence of infrastructure sufficient for its growth, as a prerequisite. But the essence of a private educational institution is the autonomy that the institution must have in its management and administration. There, necessarily, has to be a difference in the administration of private unaided institutions and the government-aided institutions. Whereas in the latter case, the Government will have greater say in the administration, including admissions and fixing of fees, in the case of private unaided institutions, maximum autonomy in the day-to-day administration has to be with the private unaided institutions. Bureaucratic or governmental interference in the administration of such an institution will undermine its independence. While an educational institution is not a business, in order to examine the degree of independence that can be given to a recognized educational institution, like any private entity that does not seek aid or assistance from the Government, and that exists by virtue of the funds generated by it, including its loans or borrowings, it is important to note that the essential ingredients of the management of the private institution include the recruiting students and staff, and the quantum of fee that is to be charged.” 74. Their Lordships at Apex Court further proceeded to hold that for admission to any professional institution, merit must play an important role. Excellence in professional education would require that greater emphasis be laid on the merit of a student seeking admission. Appropriate regulations for this purpose may be made keeping in view the other observations made in this judgment in the context of admissions to unaided institutions. For convenience, relevant portion of judgment of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), is reproduced as under : “58. Excellence in professional education would require that greater emphasis be laid on the merit of a student seeking admission. For convenience, relevant portion of judgment of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), is reproduced as under : “58. Excellence in professional education would require that greater emphasis be laid on the merit of a student seeking admission. Appropriate regulations for this purpose may be made keeping in view the other observations made in this judgment in the context of admissions to unaided institutions. 59. Merit is usually determined, for admission to professional and higher education colleges, by either the marks that the student obtains at the qualifying examination or school-leaving certificate stage followed by the interview, or by a common entrance test conducted by the institution, or in the case of professional colleges, by government agencies. 66. In the case of private unaided educational institutions, the authority granting recognition or affiliation can certainly lay down conditions for the grant of recognition or affiliation; these conditions must pertain broadly to academic and educational matters and welfare of students and teachers—but how the private unaided institutions are to run is a matter of administration to be taken care of by the management of those institutions.” 75. The case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), further provides that rules and regulations providing the procedure for admission to aided and unaided institutions may be different. At time of granting recognition, some sufficient discretion may be provided to management of unaided institution in the matter of admission by the management. This may be done by reservation of certain percentage of seats for admission by management. For convenience para 68 of the said judgment is reproduced as under : "68. It would be unfair to apply the same rules and regulations regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional institutions. It must be borne in mind that unaided professional institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration while, at the same time, they do not forego or discard the principle of merit. It would, therefore, be permissible for the university or the Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection while, at the same time, giving the management sufficient discretion in admitting students. This can be done through various methods. It would, therefore, be permissible for the university or the Government, at the time of granting recognition, to require a private unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection while, at the same time, giving the management sufficient discretion in admitting students. This can be done through various methods. For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be reserved for admission by the management out of those students who have passed the common entrance test held by itself or by the State/university and have applied to the college concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may be filled up on the basis of counselling by the State agency. This will incidentally take care of poorer and backward selections of the society. The prescription of percentage for this purpose has to be done be the Government according to the local needs and different percentages can be fixed for minority unaided and non-minority unaided and professional colleges. The same principles may be applied to other non-professional but unaided educational institutions viz. graduation and postgraduation non-professional colleges or institutes.” 76. While admitting the State right to legislate the statutory provisions, frame rules and regulations, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), held that unless rules and regulations are demonstrated to be violative of some constitutional provisions or provisions they should be adhered to. Viewing every action of Government scepticism and with the belief that it must be invalid unless proved otherwise, goes against the democratic form of government. Relevant portion of para 155 of the TMA Pai Foundation (supra) is reproduced as under : “155. It will be wrong to presume that the Government or the legislature will act against the Constitution or contrary to the public or national interest at all times. Viewing every action of the Government with scepticism, and with the belief that it must be invalid unless proved otherwise, goes against the democratic form of government. It is no doubt true that the Court has the power and the function to see that no one including the Government acts contrary to the law, but the cardinal principle of our jurisprudence is that it is for the person who alleges that the law has been violated to prove it to be so. It is no doubt true that the Court has the power and the function to see that no one including the Government acts contrary to the law, but the cardinal principle of our jurisprudence is that it is for the person who alleges that the law has been violated to prove it to be so. In such an event, the action of the Government or the authority may have to be carefully examined, but it is improper to proceed on the assumption that, merely because an allegation is made, the action impugned or taken must be bad in law. Such being the position, when the Government frames rules and regulations or lays down norms, especially with regard to education, one must assume that unless shown otherwise, the action taken is in accordance with law”. 77. While concluding the judgment and questions framed in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), the then Chief Justice, Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal, had observed that though every citizen has a right to establish and administer educational institutions under Articles 19 (1)(g) and 26 but it is subject to the provisions of Articles 19 (6) and 26 (a). However, minority institutions will have a right to admit students belonging to the minority group, in the manner as discussed in this judgment. 78. Out of 11 questions the answers given to question Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 are relevant to adjudicate the present dispute. For convenience, the same as given in para 161 of the judgment, is reproduced as under : Q.8. Whether the ratio laid down by this Court in St. Stephen’s case (St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 ) is correct? If no, what order? A. The Basic ratio laid down by this Court in St. Stephen’s College case, is correct, as indicated in this judgment. However, rigid percentage cannot be stipulated. It has to be left to authorities to prescribe a reasonable percentage having regard to the type of institution, population and educational needs of minorities. Q.9. Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 , (except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the scheme framed thereunder require reconsideration/modification and if yes, what? Q.9. Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 , (except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the scheme framed thereunder require reconsideration/modification and if yes, what? A. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan case [ (1993) 1 SCC 645 ] and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteering. Q.10. Whether the non-minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institution under Articles 21 and 29 (1) read with Articles 14 and 15 (1), in the same manner and to the same extent as minority institutions? and Q.11. What is the meaning of the expressions “education” and “educational institutions” in various provisions of the Constitution? Is the right to establish and administer educational institutions guaranteed under the Constitution? A. The expression “education” in the articles of the Constitution means and includes education at all levels from the primary school level up to the postgraduate level. It includes professional education. The expression “educational institutions” means institutions that impart education, where “education” is as understood hereinabove. The right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 26, and to minorities specifically under Article 30. All citizens have a right to establish and administer educational institutions under Articles 19 (1)(g) and 26, but this right is subject to the provisions of Articles 19 (6) and 26 (a). However, minority institutions will have a right to admit students belonging to the minority group, in the manner as discussed in this judgment.” 79. Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.N. Khare (later on, Hon’ble Chief Justice of India) while expressing his opinion, had concurred the judgment of the then Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal, and expressed His Lordship’s views over the questions separately. The then Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Mohammed Quadri had partly dissented with the judgment of the then Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. B.N. Kirpal. The then Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Ruma Pal also partly dissented with the judgment of the then Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. B.N. Kirpal. The then Hon’ble Mr. The then Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Mohammed Quadri had partly dissented with the judgment of the then Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. B.N. Kirpal. The then Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Ruma Pal also partly dissented with the judgment of the then Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. B.N. Kirpal. The then Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Variava (for himself and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan) had expressed their dissenting opinion to the views expressed by the then Hon’ble Mr. Justice Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri. However, Hon’ble Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal had delivered the judgment not only for himself but also on behalf of Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.B. Pattnaik, Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Rajendra Babu, Hon’ble Mr. Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan (present Chief Justice), and Hon’ble Mr. Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi as well as Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. Pasayat. 80. Accordingly, the view expressed by the then Hon’ble Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal being the majority opinion, has got the binding force. 81. Though observations made in the judgment are part and partial of the judgment co-relate with the ratio decided but the answers given to questions in para-161 of the TMA Pai Foundation (supra), seems to be final conclusion over the controversy involved and has got binding force under Article 141 of the Constitution being the majority opinion. Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 82. The TMA Pai Foundation (supra), could not satisfy the litigative mind of the private managements of the educational institutions. The management of unaided professional educational institutions which includes the minority and non-minority, again approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court through Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 (supra). While reconsidering the controversy in Islamic Academy of Education (supra), Hon’ble the Supreme Court consisting of five Hon’ble Judges held that the answers given in TMA Pai Foundation (supra), are merely a brief summation of the ratio laid down in the judgment. The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found out only on reading the entire judgment. In fact, the ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. 83. The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found out only on reading the entire judgment. In fact, the ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. 83. The question No. 3 framed by the Court which is relevant for the present controversy deals with the admission procedure. While interpreting the para 68 of the TMA Pai Foundation (supra), in Islamic Academy of Education (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under : “12. Paragraph 68 of the majority judgment in Pai case (T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 ) can be split into seven parts: Firstly, it deals with the unaided minority or non-minority professional colleges. Secondly, it will be unfair to apply the rules and regulations framed by the State Government as regards the government-aided professional colleges to the unaided professional colleges. Thirdly, the unaided professional institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration; while at the same time they should not forego or discard the principles of merit. Fourthly, it is permissible for the University or the Government at the time of granting recognition to require an unaided institution to provide for merit-based admission while at the same time giving the management sufficient discretion in admitting students. Fifthly, for unaided non-minority professional colleges certain percentage of seats can be reserved for admission by the management out of those students who have passed the common test held by itself or by the State/University and for applying to the college/University for admission, while the rest of the seats may be filled up on the basis of counselling by the State agency. Sixthly, the provisions for poorer and backward sections of the society in unaided professional colleges are also to be provided for. Seventhly, the prescription for percentage of seats in unaided professional colleges has to be done by the Government according to the local needs. A different percentage of seats for admission can be fixed for minority unaided and non-minority unaided professional colleges.” 84. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education (supra), again in para 16 proceeded to observe that common entrance test should be held by an association of all colleges. For convenience, relevant portion is reproduced as under : “16. A different percentage of seats for admission can be fixed for minority unaided and non-minority unaided professional colleges.” 84. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education (supra), again in para 16 proceeded to observe that common entrance test should be held by an association of all colleges. For convenience, relevant portion is reproduced as under : “16. ...We thus, hold that the management could select students, of their quota, either on the basis of the common entrance test conducted by the State or on the basis of a common entrance test to be conducted by an association of all colleges of a particular type in that State e.g. medical, engineering or technical etc. The common entrance test, held by the association, must be for admission to all colleges of that type in the State. The option of choosing, between either of these tests, must be exercised before issuing of prospectus and after intimation to the concerned authority and the Committee set up hereinafter. If any professional colleges chooses not to admit from the common entrance test conducted by the association then that college must necessarily admit from the common entrance test conducted by the State.” 85. In para 18 of the Islamic Academy of Education (supra) of the judgment, their lordships at Apex Court further held that the right of University or the State Government to provide for merit-based selection, is not only confined to granting recognition/affiliation. Such right will continue even after grant of such recognition or affiliation. For convenience, para 18 of the Islamic Academy of Education (supra), is reproduced as under : “18. Lastly, it must be mentioned that it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that paragraph 68 of the majority judgment only permits the University/State to provide for merit-based selection at the time of granting recognition/affiliation. It was also submitted that once recognition/affiliation is granted to unaided professional colleges, such a stipulation cannot be provided subsequently. We are unable to accept this submission. Such a provision can be made at the time of granting recognition/affiliation as well as subsequently after the grant of such recognition/affiliation.” 86. Subject to observations made hereinabove, Hon’ble Supreme Court had directed the State Government to appointment a permanent committee which shall ensure that the test conducted by the association of colleges is fair and transparent. Such a provision can be made at the time of granting recognition/affiliation as well as subsequently after the grant of such recognition/affiliation.” 86. Subject to observations made hereinabove, Hon’ble Supreme Court had directed the State Government to appointment a permanent committee which shall ensure that the test conducted by the association of colleges is fair and transparent. The committee shall be headed by the retired Judge of High Court which shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of the State. The detail guidelines have been provided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra), in para 19 of the judgment. The sum and substance is that the ample power has been given to the committee constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court of the State to secure the public interest by supervising entrance test conducted by the association of the private management in just, fair and transparent manner and also grant exemption to certain committees to conduct their own examination in certain cases. The committee has been empowered to adjudicate the controversy relating to management quota and the State quota. Those institutions have been exempted from common entrance test which have been following their own procedure for last at least 25 years. However, in para 20 of the judgment, their lordships of Apex Court further confined the life of permanent committee till appropriate law is legislated by the Parliament. For convenience, para 20 of the judgment of the Islamic Academy of Education (supra), is reproduced as under : “20. Our direction for setting up two sets of Committees in the States has been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which shall remain in force till appropriate legislation is enacted by Parliament. The expenses incurred on the setting up of such Committees shall be borne by each State. The infrastructural needs and provision for allowance and remuneration of the Chairman and other members of the Committee shall also be borne by the respective State Government.” P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537 87. The expenses incurred on the setting up of such Committees shall be borne by each State. The infrastructural needs and provision for allowance and remuneration of the Chairman and other members of the Committee shall also be borne by the respective State Government.” P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537 87. It appears that being not satisfied with the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education (supra), again the private managements of the institutions approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in conclusion thereof, a larger Bench consisting of 7 Hon’ble Judges, was constituted to interpret the judgment of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra). The case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), does not lay down any new law but it only interprets the earlier judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra). 88. In the case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), while considering the right of the Government to impose reasonable restrictions in pursuance of power conferred by Articles 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India coupled with minorities power under Article 29 (2) and 30 (1) of the Constitution, Supreme Court held that though institutions whether minority or non-minority, have got right to run educational institution, for charity or for profit, being an occupation, is protected by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution but that can be controlled or regulated by the State Government in pursuance of law enacted under Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The finding so recorded in the P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), is based on reply given to the question No. 10 and 11 in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra). Relevant portion of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), is reproduced as under : “91. The right to establish an educational institution, for charity or for profit, being an occupation, is protected by Article 19 (1) (g). Notwithstanding the fact that the right of a minority to establish and administer an educational institution would be protected by Article 19 (1) (g) yet the founding fathers of the Constitution felt the need of enacting Article 30.” 89. Notwithstanding the fact that the right of a minority to establish and administer an educational institution would be protected by Article 19 (1) (g) yet the founding fathers of the Constitution felt the need of enacting Article 30.” 89. In the case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), while upholding the right of the Government (Central and State) in pursuance of the powers conferred under Article 19 (6) to impose reasonable restriction in public interest, their lordships of Apex Court proceeded to observe as under : “107. ...While embarking upon resolving issues of constitutional significance, where the letter of the Constitution is not clear, we have to keep in view the spirit of the Constitution, as spelt out by its entire scheme. Education aimed at imparting professional or technical qualifications stands on a different footing from other educational institutions. Apart from other provisions, Article 19 (6) is a clear indicator and so are clauses (h) and (j) of Article 51-A.” 90. While interpreting para 67 of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), in the case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “110. In Islamic Academy the majority has (vide para 12) paraphrased the contents of para 68 by dividing it into seven parts. S.B. Sinha, J. has read the same para 68 by paraphrasing it in five parts (vide para 172 of his opinion). However, we have reproduced para 68 by dividing it into two parts. A reading of the majority judgment in Pai Foundation in its entirety supports the conclusion that while the first part of para 68 is law laid down by the majority, the second part is only by way of illustration, tantamounting to just a suggestion or observation, as to how the State may devise a possible mechanism so as to take care of the poor and backward Sections of the society. The second part of para 68 cannot be read as law laid down by the Bench. It is only an observation in passing or an illustrative situation which may be reached by consent or agreement or persuasion.” 91. The second part of para 68 cannot be read as law laid down by the Bench. It is only an observation in passing or an illustrative situation which may be reached by consent or agreement or persuasion.” 91. Though in para 125 of P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that in TMA Pai Foundation (supra), it was not held by the Apex Court to allow the State to regulate or control admissions in unaided professional educational institution so as to compel them to give a share of the available seats to the candidates chosen by the State as it would amount to nationalisation of seats. However, their lordship of Apex Court in TMA Pai Foundation (supra), has not held that in pursuance of power conferred by NCTE Act or the Regulations framed thereunder, the State Government or the Universities cannot hold entrance test or regulate the admission process to check exploitation or abuse of power by the private unaided institution meaning. Thus, the State or the Universities in case are being permitted under the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act, to hold admission then by complying the directions issued by the NCTE from time to time, such test can be held. 92. The power of State to interfere with the admission process and related matter, has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra), in para 134. It has also been upheld that education cannot be imparted by any institution unless recognised or affiliated with any competent authority created by laws such as, universities, board, Central and the State Government and for maintenance of excellence in education, State must in national interest, step in. Para 134 (supra) for convenience is reproduced as under : “134. However, different considerations would apply for graduate and postgraduate level of education, as also for technical and professional educational institutions. Such education cannot be imparted by any institution unless recognised by or affiliated with any competent authority created by law, such as a university, Board, Central or State Government or the like. Excellence in education and maintenance of high standards at this level are a must. To fulfil these objectives, the State can and rather must, in national interest, step in. The education, knowledge and learning at this level possessed by individuals collectively constitutes national wealth.” 93. Excellence in education and maintenance of high standards at this level are a must. To fulfil these objectives, the State can and rather must, in national interest, step in. The education, knowledge and learning at this level possessed by individuals collectively constitutes national wealth.” 93. Right of the Central vis-a-vis the State Governments, has further been upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra), in the concluding part of the judgment in para 155. For convenience, para 155 is reproduced as under : “155. It is for the Central Government, or for the State Governments, in the absence of a Central legislation, to come out with a detailed well-thought-out legislation on the subject. Such a legislation is long awaited. The States must act towards this direction. The judicial wing of the State is called upon to act when the other two wings, the legislature and the executive, do not act. The earlier the Union of India and the State Governments act, the better it would be. The Committees regulating admission procedure and fee structure shall continue to exist, but only as a temporary measure and an inevitable passing phase until the Central Government or the State Governments are able to devise a suitable mechanism and appoint a competent authority in consonance with the observations made hereinabove. Needless to say, any decision taken by such Committees and by the Central or the State Governments, shall be open to judicial review in accordance with the settled parameters for the exercise of such jurisdiction.” 94. Relying upon TMA Pai Foundation (supra), it was emphatically argued by the learned counsels that in absence of common entrance test, the individual institutions have got right to admit students on the basis of marks obtained in qualifying examination. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in case is accepted, then it shall amount to re-examine or re-interpret the findings recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in TMA Pai Foundation (supra). It is settled proposition of law that once a larger Bench Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court is considered and interpreted by another Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in subsequent judgments like in the present case in P.A. Inamdar (supra), then subsequent judgment will have got binding effect. It is settled proposition of law that once a larger Bench Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court is considered and interpreted by another Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in subsequent judgments like in the present case in P.A. Inamdar (supra), then subsequent judgment will have got binding effect. It shall neither be appropriate nor lawful for the High Court to take a different view than what has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of P.A. Inamdar (supra), while interpreting TMA Pai Foundation (supra) and Islamic Academy (supra). Even if something has not been considered or has been interpreted in different manner, then what has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), it is not permissible under law to this Court to take different view than what has been taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra). Validity of Reference : 95. House of Lords in England may overrule its own decision. Similarly, it has been consistent view of Indian Supreme Court that ordinarily, it follows its earlier judgments but in special circumstances, it may overrule its own earlier decision to meet out the constitutional requirement. It is a rule of policy and not of law which compel the Courts to follow its own decision. Neither the Judicial Committee of Privy Council nor the Supreme Court of United States nor the Supreme Court of Canada nor the High Court of Australia nor the Supreme Court of India is bound by its own previous decision. It may depart from it. The departure is done by a Bench of a larger number of Judges. It is the practice of this Court that when there is a conflict among two decisions of Benches or a Bench does not agree with the decision of another Bench it refers the case to a Bench of a larger number of Judges. This is what, which is reflected from the Rules of High Court (supra). 96. A Bench of five Judges of this Court presided by the then Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. C. Desai in a case reported in AIR 1966 All 73 (V 53 C 18) (FB), State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Firm Deo Dutt Lakhan Lal, while considering the law on the subject, observed that a larger bench means a Bench consisting of more Judges than the Bench giving earlier decision. Justice M. C. Desai in a case reported in AIR 1966 All 73 (V 53 C 18) (FB), State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Firm Deo Dutt Lakhan Lal, while considering the law on the subject, observed that a larger bench means a Bench consisting of more Judges than the Bench giving earlier decision. A Bench of two Judges is known as Division Bench and a Bench of three or more Judges as Full Bench. There is no law or Rule or even a convention that a Full Bench can consist of only three Judges. It can consist of three or any larger number of Judges. The principles of stare decisis is “a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” While referring an article, “Mr. Justice Jackson” published in 68 Harward Law Review p. 937 with reference to what was said by Felix Frankfurter, their Lordships observed to quote: “There must be certainty about the law but the certainty would be a false one if it leads to the conclusion that an error once having been made in a judgment must be followed in all subsequent cases.” 97. It was held by the Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in the case of Firm Deo Dutt (supra) that once Chief Justice of the High Court refers a controversy to a larger Bench may be in pursuance of the order passed on judicial side by a Single Judge or Division Bench, then such order or reference is not open for judicial review while considering the reference by the Bench concerned. To reproduce from Firm Deo Dutt (supra) in the words of Chief Justice Desai : “The Chief Justice passed the order on a judicial order passed by a Bench that to resolve the conflict between the two Full Bench decisions they may be referred to a larger Bench, e.g., a Bench of at least five Judges. It is not open to any member of this Bench to question that order of the Division Bench and I can only express surprise at the suggestion made by counsel that he can do so and that this Bench can hold that the order passed by the Chief Justice referring the special appeals to a Bench of five Judges was not proper or legal.” 98. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case relied upon by the learned counsel reported in AIR 1965 SC 1767 (V 52 C 304), Lala Shri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chand and another, had upheld the power of Hon’ble Chief Justice to constitute larger Bench on the reference made by the Single Judge in the following words : “It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be re-considered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety.” 99. The word ‘stare decisis’ i.e., the connotation of binding judicial precedent, fixing parameter, if any, for making reference to a larger Bench are all the devices evolved by the Courts for maintaining its own judicial discipline, decorum and propriety and to maintain its judicial comity. It is neither to be found in any statute nor in the Constitution. Self devised restrictions, controlling ones dispositions, insulating its possible outflow effecting others, are all stroll towards divinity, which is hall mark of a civilised society. It is this divine inheritance which has devolved on judiciary, gives it the splendour and strength. Such, including the principle of ‘stare decisis’ etc. are all natural concomitant of its inbuilt discipline. This gives stability and uniformity in the administrative law both to the subject and Courts. This keeps Courts within its bound and in spite of different opinion, they follow this procedure with respect. Otherwise any settled law could be unsettled any day. 100. A Full Bench of this Court in a case reported in AIR 1996 All 375 , Natraj Chhabigrih, Sigra v. State of U.P. and another, had proceeded to hold as under : “16. ...No one is infallible. So also we rendering judgments. Otherwise any settled law could be unsettled any day. 100. A Full Bench of this Court in a case reported in AIR 1996 All 375 , Natraj Chhabigrih, Sigra v. State of U.P. and another, had proceeded to hold as under : “16. ...No one is infallible. So also we rendering judgments. That is why, while maintaining the rigour of binding judicial precedent, if such judgment is perpetuating, continuing injustice, the error of which is apparent on the face of record or against any binding judicial precedent, against any constitutional or statutory provisions, contrary to any settled principle of law or even with the change of social fabric requires reconsideration being of public importance, to set back on the track another equally important principle is evolved by referring such matters to a larger Bench. Both principles of ‘stare decisis’ and ‘reference’ are not contrary but complementary to each, evolving and developing the law with an eye solely to render justice. All methodoligies, principles, procedures are coined by Judges in and to and are subservient to deliver justice to the subject. They are nor to be interpreted which restricts this reach.” 101. Thereafter, again their lordships had proceeded to hold that in an appropriate case to meet out the public requirement, Judges may refer a controversy to a larger Bench and doctrine of stare decisis shall not deter the Court from overruling its earlier decisions. To quote from Natraj Chhabigrih (supra) : “29. But there may be circumstances where public interest demands that the previous decision be reviewed and reconsidered. The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter the Court from overruling an earlier decision, if it is satisfied that such decision is manifestly wrong or proceeds upon a mistaken assumption in regard to the existence or continuance of a statutory provision or is contrary to another decision of the Court.” Their lordships held that while considering the question for reference a straight jacket formula cannot be framed. To quote from Natraj Chhabigrih (supra) : “43. The law of reference to a larger bench, apart from it being based on long practice in India is also enshrined in Rules of the Court as in present under Chapter V Rule 6 of the High Court Rules, framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. But they are all, as aforesaid, procedure to deliver justice. Thus, the parameter, viz. But they are all, as aforesaid, procedure to deliver justice. Thus, the parameter, viz. power to reference has not to be scrutinised in a very closed jacket formula.” 102. After considering various Apex Court judgments upto date in the case of Natraj Chhabigrih (supra), the Full Bench while delivering the unanimous judgment, upheld the jurisdiction of Judges of this Court to make a reference to a larger Bench in an appropriate case. 103. The power of Hon’ble Single Judge or Division Bench to refer a dispute or question of law framed by Hon’ble Single Judge, has been upheld by other Full Benches of this Court in the case reported in [2006 (62) ALR 65], Ram Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others; AIR 1969 All 484 , Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others. In the case of Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad Singh (supra) while interpreting the proviso of Rule 2 of Chapter V of the Rules of the Court, the power of Chief Justice or a Judge hearing a case to refer a larger Bench, has been upheld while deciding the identical controversy in tax matter. The relevant portion of the Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad Singh (supra) is reproduced as under : “12. The Letters Patent and after its repeal the rules of the Court provide for the manner in which the hearing of the cases is to be regulated. The proviso to Rule 2 Chapter V of the Rules of the Court reads : (a) provided that the Chief Justice may direct any case or class of cases which may be heard by a Judge sitting alone shall be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges and vice versa. (b) A Judge may, if he thinks fit, refer a case which may be heard by a Judge sitting alone or any question of law arising therein for decision to a larger Bench. The proviso applies to all the cases heard in the High Court. There is no doubt that the Chief Justice or a Judge hearing a case has the power to make a reference to a larger Bench and there is no reason for holding that this power can be exercised in respect of other cases but not in a reference under Section 5 of the Act.” 104. There is no doubt that the Chief Justice or a Judge hearing a case has the power to make a reference to a larger Bench and there is no reason for holding that this power can be exercised in respect of other cases but not in a reference under Section 5 of the Act.” 104. Otherwise also, a plain reading of Rules of the Court referred to hereinabove, indicates that while sitting singly, the Judges of this Court have got ample power to refer a case to a larger Bench either by framing questions of law or the entire case. Whenever the entire case is referred, the appropriate reasons should be assigned by the Hon’ble Judges while making so reference. Whenever a question of law is framed by Hon’ble Single Judge, after recording his satisfaction on the basis of material on record, then no grievance may be raised by the parties counsel to raise objection against the reference so made in pursuance of the powers conferred by the Rules of the Court. 105. Even literal interpretation of the Rules of the Court amply clears that Judges sitting singly for adjudication of a controversy may frame questions of law with a request to Hon’ble Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench for the purpose. 106. The using of word, ‘or’ used in sub-clause (b) of clause (9) of Rule 2 of the Rules of the Court is in disjunction. It deals with two situations : the first is reference of the entire case to a larger bench in case Hon’ble Judge deems fit and proper. The second situation may crop up whenever during the course of hearing Hon’ble Judge sitting singly, faces situation where substantial question of law arises and requires for reply by a larger Bench keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The satisfaction recorded by the Hon’ble Single Judge, shall be sufficient for reference to the larger Bench. However, while considering the question so referred, the larger Bench may record its opinion relating to necessity of adjudication by it. 107. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 , Pradip Chandra Parija and others v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others, while holding the right of Judges to refer a matter to a larger Bench observed as under: “5. 107. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 , Pradip Chandra Parija and others v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others, while holding the right of Judges to refer a matter to a larger Bench observed as under: “5. ...The learned Attorney-General submitted that the appropriate course for the Bench of two learned Judges to have adopted, if it felt so strongly that the judgment in Nityananda Kar was incorrect, was to make a reference to a Bench of three learned Judges. That Bench of three learned Judges, if it also took the same view of Nityananda Kar, could have referred the case to a Bench of five learned Judges. 8. We have quoted the relevant portion of the referral order in the present case. By a judicial order the matters before the Bench of two learned Judges were ordered to be placed before a Bench of five learned Judges. The Chief Justice, as master of the cause-lists, was required only to issue consequential administrative directions.” 108. In view of the above, once on judicial side, a reference is made by the Hon’ble Single Judge or the Division Bench or even the larger Bench of this Court in pursuance of the powers conferred under Rules of the Court, then ordinarily, Hon’ble the Chief Justice being the master of cause list, may issue consequential administrative directions and once such direction is issued for constitution of larger Bench, then it cannot be subjected to judicial review by litigants. 109. One of the objections raised by Sri Prashant Chandra learned Senior Counsel was that since the Hon’ble Chief Justice, and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anjani Kumar were the members of the Division Bench which referred the controversy to call the Hon’ble Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench, the Hon’ble Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anjani Kumar should not be a member of the present Bench, seems to be misconceived. A perusal of the order dated 12.9.2007 indicates that their lordships were impressed by the arguments advanced by the parties counsel and in consequence thereof, a decision was taken to refer the controversy to Hon’ble the Chief Justice on administrative side for constitution of Full Bench without expressing any opinion on merit. While referring the controversy on judicial side by the Bench vide its order dated 12.9.2007, no opinion was formed on merit in favour of either side. While referring the controversy on judicial side by the Bench vide its order dated 12.9.2007, no opinion was formed on merit in favour of either side. In such situation, it is not improper to be the member of Full Bench with inclusion of Hon’ble Judges who referred the disputes for constitution of Full Bench. There appears to be no violation of any judicial propriety, ethics or decorum. Nothing has been brought on record nor any case law has been cited which may substantiate the arguments advanced by the learned counsels. Accordingly, the objections raised by the learned counsel Sri Prashant Chandra and Sri Manish Kumar, do not seem to be sustainable. 110. Learned counsel has relied upon the cases challenging the validity of reference namely, (2006) 11 SCC 521 , Jindal Vijaynagar Steel (SW Steel Ltd.) v. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd.; (2006) 6 SCC 258 , Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. and others; (2005) 2 SCC 673 , Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Maharashtra and another; (2003) 5 SCC 480 , Rajasthan Public Service Commission and another v. Harish Kumar Purohit and others; (2002) 10 SCC 710 , Dr. Chandra Prakash and others v. State of U.P. and another; (2002) 10 SCC 437, Vishweshwaraiah Iron and Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani and others; (2004) 8 SCC 30 , Arya Samaj Education Trust and others v. Director of Education, Delhi and others; 2005 (3) UPLBEC 2487, Ram Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others; 2005 (23) LCD 232, Provincial Medical Sciences Association U.P. and others v. State of U.P. and others; AIR 1983 SC 465 , Sher Singh and others v. State of Punjab; (1997) 8 SCC 767 , General Manager, Telecom v. A. Sriniwas Rao and others; (2001) 4 SCC 448 , Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Mumbai Shramik Sangh and others; (1998) 4 SCC 409 , Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another; (2002) 1 SCC 538 , S.H. Rangappa v. State of Karnataka and others; (2002) 4 SCC 578 , P. Ram Chandra Rao v. State of Karnataka. These cases relate to principle of stare decisis where Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judgments rendered by larger Bench or Bench by coordinate jurisdiction, shall be binding over all benches consisting of lesser number of judges or coordinate Bench. These cases relate to principle of stare decisis where Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judgments rendered by larger Bench or Bench by coordinate jurisdiction, shall be binding over all benches consisting of lesser number of judges or coordinate Bench. Their lordships have held that Bench of lesser strength cannot take a view contrary to or bypass that taken by larger or coordinate Bench. Their lordships further held that judicial discipline required that the judgment rendered by larger Bench should be followed in preference to subsequent decision of smaller Bench. It is necessary to maintain judicial discipline and decorum for consistency in law. However, it has not been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in these cases that judges are precluded to exercise powers under the Rules of the Court for referring a controversy to a larger Bench or Full Bench in the event of being satisfied relating to the involvement of substantial question of law of public importance. In the present case, a perusal of Division Bench judgment of this Court at Lucknow decided on 23.5.2007 passed in Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007 at the face of record shows that while allowing the special appeal the Division Bench has neither considered the provisions contained in NCTE Act and Regulations framed thereunder nor the power contained in the State Universities Act. It is unfortunate that the learned counsel for the parties including the State counsel, had not drawn the attention of the Division Bench towards various judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court referred in the preceding paras where the binding effect of NCTE Act and the Regulations have been considered. 111. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that while referring the matter to Full Bench no reasons have been assigned by the Division Bench in its order dated 12.9.2007, also does not seem to be sustainable. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the reference made by the Hon’ble Single Judge, the Division Bench has referred the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 12.9.2007 for constitution of Full Bench. The satisfaction recorded by the Hon’ble Single Judge while referring the matter to larger Bench was impliedly considered and concerned by the Division Bench and hence, it was not necessary to pass a detailed reasoned order. 112. The satisfaction recorded by the Hon’ble Single Judge while referring the matter to larger Bench was impliedly considered and concerned by the Division Bench and hence, it was not necessary to pass a detailed reasoned order. 112. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was not necessary for the Division Bench to pass a detailed reasoned order. Under the Rules of the Court on judicial side, Judges have got powers to refer the entire dispute to a Larger Bench for adjudication in accordance with law. Since the reference made by the Hon’ble Single Judge is based on reasoned order keeping in view its public importance the Division Bench has rightly referred the matter for consideration by the Full Bench and for that it was not necessary to pass a detailed and reasoned order. The order is based on the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. Discussion on merit : 113. It was vehemently argued by the learned senior counsels for the petitioners that under the Regulations 3.1 (a) the Committee of Management are empowered to admit the students on their own in absence of any combined entrance test. 114. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, since the Regulations framed by the NCTE have been held binding and it has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the NCTE Act has got right to delegate certain powers to State Government and its instrumentalities through its Regulations, the powers exercised by the State Government in consequence of the Regulations framed by the NCTE Act do not seem to suffer from any illegality or impropriety. It is also evident that the State Government from time to time, amended its Government orders, own Regulations framed under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Universities Act making it ‘at par’ with the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act. The provisions contained in the Regulations framed by the State Government in pursuance of powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Universities Act, is in addition to the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act without any conflict or repugnancy. Hence it cannot be said that the State has acted in contravention of Central Act like NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. Hence it cannot be said that the State has acted in contravention of Central Act like NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. Moreover, once NCTE Regulations itself provide that admission shall be done as per the policy of the State Government, the State Government cannot be held to have acted illegally while proceeding ahead to admit students through its universities. 115. It shall be relevant to recall that in all the three judgments of the Apex Court including P.A. Inamdar (supra), the provisions contained in NCTE Act and the Regulations have not been considered. Hence the judgments of the Apex Court which directly deal with the provisions of the NCTE Act and the Regulations, shall cover the field. 116. It is settled proposition of law that a thing should be done in a manner provided under the Act and the Statutes and not otherwise vide, Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253; Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 ; Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and others, AIR 1963 SC 1077 ; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and others, AIR 1964 SC 358 ; Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 (Para-34); Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and others, 1999 (8) SCC 266 ; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, 2000 (7) SCC 296 ; Dhananjay Reddy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 1512 ; Commissioner of Income Tax Mumbai v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala and others, 2002 (1) SCC 633 ; Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of M.P., AIR 2004 SC 486 ; and Ramphal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1657 . In the present case, in the absence of common entrance test by the Association of non-aided private educational Institutions, the other related statutory provisions should have been followed and were rightly followed by the State Government. In the absence of any specific statutory provisions or statutory order, the Association of the private management non-aided colleges were not entitled to admit the students on their own. Being affiliated colleges, it was incumbent on them to follow the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act coupled with the statutory provisions empowering the State Government and the Universities to deal with the subject. Being affiliated colleges, it was incumbent on them to follow the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act coupled with the statutory provisions empowering the State Government and the Universities to deal with the subject. No provision has been brought to the notice of this Court which empowers specifically the private management of aided institutions to admit students on their own. 117. It is also settled proposition of law that no mandamus under writ jurisdiction can be issued in derogation of Rules and Regulations. The Rules and Regulations and statutory provisions should be enforced in strict sense, vide case laws on the point namely, 2006 (4) SCC 1 , Secretary State of Karnataka v. Umadevi; 2006 (5) SCC 493 , National Fertilizer Limited v. Somvir Singh; 2006 (1) SCC 667 , State of U.P. v. Neeraj Kumar; 2004 (7) SCC 112 , A. Umarani v. Registrar Coop. Societies; 1992 (4) SCC 118 , State of Haryana v. Piara Singh; 1997 (1) SCC 245 , Union of India v. Mahendra Singh; (1997) 1 SCC 1 , Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar; 1992 (4) SCC 99 , Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Admn.; 1992 (4) SCC 33 , Director Institute of Management Development v. Pushpa Srivastava; 2003 (3) SCC 374 , Ramkrishna Kamat v. State of Karnataka; and 1996 (7) SCC 499 , Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. v. Dr. P. Sambasiva Rao. 118. Sri C.B. Pandey learned counsel who appeared for some of the Committee of Management, has rightly submitted that the case law cited on the point, directly dealing with a controversy and final decision taken relating to an issue, shall be binding unless and until set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The learned counsel has rightly relied on the Apex Court judgments in the cases namely, AIR 1996 SC 906 , State of Kerala v. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar; 2006 (65) ALR 621, M. Meenakshi and others v. Metadeen Agrawal and others; and 2007 (67) ALR 58, Srichand Jain v. State of U.P. through Collector, Saharanpur. 119. In the case of M. Meenakshi (supra), their lordships held that even a void order is required to be set aside by a Competent Court of law. The order may be void in respect of one person but may be valid in respect of another. 119. In the case of M. Meenakshi (supra), their lordships held that even a void order is required to be set aside by a Competent Court of law. The order may be void in respect of one person but may be valid in respect of another. Hence, it shall always be necessary that party aggrieved with such order, shall be required to approach appropriate forum for setting aside such order Meaning thereby, the regulatory powers delegated through NCTE Act and the Rules framed by the State Government at par, in pursuance of powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Universities Act, shall cover the field unless they are set aside by the Court of competent jurisdiction. 120. It is rightly submitted by Sri D.K. Arora, the learned Additional Advocate General as well as Sri P.S. Baghel that there shall not be implied repeal of Regulations framed under the NCTE Act or notification issued under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. State Universities Act. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of P.A. Inamdar (supra), shall not ipse dixit repeal the statutory provisions. In case, there is any repugnancy, ambiguity or violation of fundamental rights, then aggrieved party may impugn such alleged offending provisions under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. 121. The decision taken, Rules and Regulations framed in pursuance of the statutory provisions shall occupy the field unless they are declared ultra vires to Constitution or some statutory provisions. Apart from NCTE Act or the U.P. State Universities Act, the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and the University Grant Commission (Regularisation of Admission and Fees in Private Non-aided Profession Institutions) Regulations, 1997 also empowers the appropriate authority to deal with the subjects. Neither the Courts nor the Parliament may exclude or oust the jurisdiction of the State Legislature to discharge the constitutional obligation in terms of the constitutional provisions. The law promulgated by the State may occupy the field subject to test of repugnancy with the Central Acts. However, in the event of conflict, the Central Act shall prevail, vide Meghraj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1942 FC 27; Zaver Bhai v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 799 ; Teekaramji v. State of U.P., (1956) SCR 393; Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., 1957 SCR 423 ; Deepchand v. Union of India, (1959) Supp. However, in the event of conflict, the Central Act shall prevail, vide Meghraj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1942 FC 27; Zaver Bhai v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 799 ; Teekaramji v. State of U.P., (1956) SCR 393; Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., 1957 SCR 423 ; Deepchand v. Union of India, (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 8; T.S. Balliah v. T.S. Rangachari, (1969) 3 SCR 65 ; M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431 ; Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., 1980 (4) SCC 136 ; Synthetic & Chemical Ltd. v. State of U.P., ( 1990 (1) SCC 109 ; ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, 2002 (9) SCC 232 ; Prem Chandra Jain v. R.K. Chhabra, 1984 (2) SCC 302 ; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar, 1983 (4) SCC 45 and Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, 1990 (2) SCC 562 . 122. From the facts and material placed on record, it is evident that the Division Bench while deciding the Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007 and connected petitions, vide judgment and order dated 23.5.2007 had not considered the NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. The notification dated 27.5.2005 and 1.9.2005 issued by the State Government in pursuance of sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Universities Act, has not considered. The order issued by the State Government was neither impugned before the Division Bench or Hon’ble Single Judge. 123. There is one another aspect of the matter. The orders dated 14.9.2005 and 31.10.2005 which were impugned before the Hon’ble Single Judge in W.P.No. 290 (M/S) of 2007 and set aside by the judgment and order dated 22.2.2007, are not the Government orders issued in pursuance of the powers conferred by Article 162 of the Constitution of India or in pursuance of power conferred by Section 28 (5) of the U.P. State Universities Act. The orders dated 14.9.2005 and 31.10.2005 were issued in consequence of the Government Notification dated 1.9.2005 directing for the entrance test by the Universities on one date. The notification dated 1.9.2005 was issued in pursuance of powers under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Universities Act keeping in view the power conferred by the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act. The notification dated 1.9.2005 was issued in pursuance of powers under sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the State Universities Act keeping in view the power conferred by the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act. The Government order dated 14.9.2005 coupled with 31.10.2005 also make reference to Supreme Court order where special appeals were dismissed. Thus, it is obvious that the orders dated 14.9.2005 and 31.10.2005 impugned before the Hon’ble Single Judge (supra), were consequential orders, which were set aside by the Hon’ble Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 22.2.2007 and affirmed in Special Appeal by the Division Bench at Lucknow, vide judgment and order dated 23.5.2007. The attention of the Court was not drawn and the plea was also not raised by the State counsel that being the intra departmental communication or consequential orders, the writ petitions were not maintainable. 124. It is settled law that writ petitions filed against the consequential order shall not be maintainable vide, AIR 2003 SC 1216 , Government of Maharashtra v. Deokar’s Distillary (Para-78) and (2004 (3) ESC 1629, Ashok Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and others. 125. In view of the above, since the controversy adjudicated by the Hon’ble Single Judge, vide order dated 22.2.2007 as well as by the Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 23.5.2007 (supra) in Special Appeal No. 263 of 2007 relates to intra departmental communication or consequential orders, it does not lay down the correct law over the controversy in question. 126. Since the Division Bench has not considered the NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, they are per inqurium to statutory provisions. Per inqurium means a decision given in ignorance or forgetfulness inconsistent to statutory provisions or some authority binding on the Court, vide (2004) 4 SCC 590 , State v. Ratan Lal Arora; Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 2004 SC 2317 , Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. CBI, AIR 2006 SC 2449 . The Apex Court held that the judgment rendered without reference to bars or view expressed by superior Court or without analysing the statutory provisions, cannot be treated as binding precedent. 127. As discussed hereinabove, the power conferred to the Central and the State Governments to impose reasonable restrictions keeping in view the clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India, shall not extinguish. 127. As discussed hereinabove, the power conferred to the Central and the State Governments to impose reasonable restrictions keeping in view the clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India, shall not extinguish. The State and the Central Governments shall have powers to legislate the Law, frame appropriate Rules and Regulations within their jurisdiction keeping in view the Entry 25 of List II of Schedule VIII and the Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Of course, the State Government cannot go contrary to the provisions contained in NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. However, neither any argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the private parties nor the attention has been drawn towards any fact that the State Government has acted in contravention of provisions of the NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. 128. While interpreting the P.A. Inamdar and other judgment and considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the private respondents, we should not close our eyes to the settled proposition of law that an issue which has not been considered by the Court while delivering a judgment, cannot be said to be a binding precedent. The decision of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying it to a later case, the Court must carefully try to ascertain the true principles laid down by the decision of the Court. The Court should not place a reliance upon a decision without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed and it has to be ascertained by analysing all material facts and issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. The Court should not place a reliance upon a decision without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed and it has to be ascertained by analysing all material facts and issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. The judgment has to be read with reference to and in context with a particular statutory provisions interpreted by the Court as the Court has to examine as to what principle of law has been decided and the decision cannot be relied upon in support of the proposition that it did not decide vide, H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur and others v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 ; M/s. Amar Nath Om Parkash and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1985 SC 218 ; Rajpur Ruda Meha and others v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 ; C.I.T. v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363 ; Sarv Shramik Sangh, Bombay v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and another, (1993) 2 SCC 386 ; Haryana Financial Corporation and another v. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another, AIR 2002 SC 834 ; Mehboob Dawod Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 2 SCC 362 ; ICICI Bank and another v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, AIR 2005 SC 3315 ; M/s. Makhija Construction and Enggr. Pvt. Ltd. v. Indore Development Authority and others, AIR 2005 SC 2499 and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 234 . Keeping in view the binding nature of Regulations framed under NCTE Act as settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments (supra), the State Government has rightly acted while issuing orders from time to time to regulate admissions under the delegated powers conferred by the Regulations (supra). 129. In absence of common entrance test by common association, the other statutory option shall cover the field. There cannot be vacuum in the system permitting the unaided private institutions to move in accordance with their sweet will. Such incident shall be against constitutional mandate. The only option available to admit the students is according to powers conferred by the U.P. State Universities Act subject to repugnancy test with Central Acts. There cannot be vacuum in the system permitting the unaided private institutions to move in accordance with their sweet will. Such incident shall be against constitutional mandate. The only option available to admit the students is according to powers conferred by the U.P. State Universities Act subject to repugnancy test with Central Acts. The private unaided colleges shall not be entitled to admit the students in contravention to powers flowing from Regulations framed under the NCTE Act. The order passed by the State Government in pursuance of powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the U.P. State Universities Act read with the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act shall have statutory force to fill up the vacuum if any, to deal with the particular circumstance, situation or contingency. 130. There is one other aspect of the matter. According to Information ‘Diary, 2008’, published by the Government of U.P., the literacy percentage in the State of U.P. is as under : 1. Over all Literacy Percentage 56.3% 2. Male 68.8% 3. Female 42.2% 4. Rural 52.5% 5. Urban 69.7% Thus, over all almost 44% of peoples are illiterate. Almost 30-35% peoples are leading life of below poverty line. In such a situation, subject to constitutional limitations and repugnancy test (supra), it is the duty of the State Government to check the exploitation of the citizens from the institutions imparting education. 131. Article 37 of the Constitution of India provides that the directive principles of the State Policy under Part-IV shall be fundamental in governance of the country. Article 38 further provides that the State shall secure a social order for promotion of the welfare of the people. Article 39 (f) provides that State shall take necessary steps, provide opportunities and facilities in such a manner so that the childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. Article 41 further commands that within the economic capacity, the State Government shall make effective provisions for securing right to work and education. Article 46 further provides that State shall protect the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and weaker sections of the society from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Article 51-A (k) provides that it shall be the fundamental duty of the guardians or parents to provide opportunities for education to their children upto the age of 14 years. 132. Article 46 further provides that State shall protect the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and weaker sections of the society from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Article 51-A (k) provides that it shall be the fundamental duty of the guardians or parents to provide opportunities for education to their children upto the age of 14 years. 132. Therefore, the interpretation of constitutional provisions as well as the statutory provisions which may deprive the State to discharge its constitutional application, should be availed any may be against the public good. The State is accountable for violation of constitutional rights and not the private institutions. Accordingly, the State should not be deprived to discharge its constitutional duties directly or indirectly by interpreting the law against the constitutional mandate. 133. Since neither in the case of P.A. Inamdar (supra) nor in other case, the NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, were considered, the authorities cannot be faulted while taking decision in pursuance of powers conferred by Regulations framed under the NCTE Act. However, as informed by the State counsels from the current year, the State Government of U.P. has taken decision and issued an order for common entrance test for admission to B.Ed. Courses, it amounts sufficient compliance of the judgment of the Apex Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra). 134. The uncertainty prevailing in the year 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 for any reason whatsoever, shall not give a right to the Committee of Management of affiliated colleges to admit the students on their own. Since the Regulations framed under the NCTE Act confer powers on the State Government hence as discussed hereinabove, the State Government was correct by passing an order for admission of the students through the Universities or by entrance test conducted by the Universities to fill up the vacancies. 135. So many other judgments have been cited by either sides while defending or opposing the Division Bench Judgment of the Lucknow Bench (supra) and the questions referred. Since the controversy in question to the extent of reference has been dealt with in the manner discussed hereinabove, it is not necessary to consider other case laws which are either not relevant or do not applicable under the facts and circumstances of the present case. 136. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the reference is answered in the terms of judgment of Hon’ble the Chief Justice as concurred by Hon’ble Mr. 136. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the reference is answered in the terms of judgment of Hon’ble the Chief Justice as concurred by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anjani Kumar. ———