JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. By this writ petition, the Petitioners (six in numbers) are praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus for compelling the Respondents to pay interest on Rs. 2,01,795 (award) for the period from 1.8.1991 to 31.8.2000 under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and/or any other relevant provisions of law. 2. Heard Mr. A. Bimol, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners and also Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned CGSC appearing for the Respondents. 3. The admitted facts are that the writ Petitioners are the owners of the lands that had been acquired by the Government of Manipur for construction of State Highway named Churachandpur-Tipaimukh Road. In August 1970, the Officers and other personnel of 81 Road Construction Company of G.R.E.F, Government of India took possession of the Petitioners' lands without paying any compensation to them for construction of the said road. On 21.5.1984 the Petitioners approached this Court by filing writ petitions, i.e., CR Nos. 125 of 1984 to 130 of 1984 for compelling the concerned authority to perform their public duty and pay the necessary compensation with interest thereon to the Petitioners. This Court by a common judgment and order dated 8.9.1987 passed in the said CR Nos. 125 of 1984 to 130 of 1984, directed the authorities concerned to complete the land acquisition proceedings, assess the compensation and pay the amount of compensation to the Petitioners in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Land Acquisition Act. It is stated that as the authorities had failed to carry out the direction of this Court in the said judgment and order dated 8.9.1987, the Petitioner No. 1 on behalf of the other Petitioners filed a petition dated 11.5.1990 for initiating proceeding for contempt against the concerned authorities for willful disobedience or the direction or this Court in the common judgment and order dated 8.9.1987. This Court again passed an order on 31.5.1990 directing the concerned officers and authorities to complete the land acquisition proceedings and award compensation in favour of the Petitioners for the acquired lands within a period of three months. 4. This Court again passed an order on 31.5.1990 directing the concerned officers and authorities to complete the land acquisition proceedings and award compensation in favour of the Petitioners for the acquired lands within a period of three months. 4. Later on the Deputy Commissioner/Collector of Land Acquisition, Churachandpur, after completing the necessary acquisition proceedings and the procedures as prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act, made an award being No. DC(CCP)LA/86-21 Churachandpur, dated 7.7.1991 assessing the total amount of compensation and interest thereon from 1.8.1971 to 31.7.1991 aggregating to Rs. 6,81,415.80 paise (Rupees six lakhs eighty-one thousand four hundred fifteen and eighty paise) as payable to the Petitioners. But the BRTF/GREF authorities deposited only a sum of Rs. 1,78,503.00 with the DC/Collector towards the amount of compensation and interest thereon vide Bank Draft dated 9.10.1991. The Petitioners were paid only a sum of Rs. 1,78,503.00, which was received by them on protest. The balance amount of compensation and interest thereon amounting to Rs. 5,02,912.80 paise had not then been deposited with the DC/Collector, Churachandpur. 5. The Petitioners filed a writ petition being CR No. 1422 of 1992 before this Court for issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus compelling the Respondents to pay the entire amount of the said sward. The main relief sought for in the CR No. 1422 of 1992 read as follows: to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus compelling the Respondents to perform their public duty of paying the entire amount of the award dated 7.7.1991 and further interest from 1.8.1991 till the said balance is paid to the Petitioners within a specific period. The said CR No. 1422 of 1992 had been finally disposed of by passing judgment and order dated 10.12.1998 directing the Respondents to deposit the balance compensation money of Rs. 52,912.80 paise with the Collector Land Acquisition and Deputy Commissioner; Churachandpur District, Manipur within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the judgment and order. The figure, i.e., 52,912.80 paise appeared in the judgment and order dated 10.12.1998 passed in CR No. 1422 of 1992 had been corrected by a subsequent order as Rs. 5,02,912.80 paise. 52,912.80 paise with the Collector Land Acquisition and Deputy Commissioner; Churachandpur District, Manipur within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the judgment and order. The figure, i.e., 52,912.80 paise appeared in the judgment and order dated 10.12.1998 passed in CR No. 1422 of 1992 had been corrected by a subsequent order as Rs. 5,02,912.80 paise. In the said judgment and order dated 10.12.1998 passed in CR No. 1422 of 1992 there is a finding that no interest shall be awarded for the amount of compensation for the Petitioners' land acquired by the Respondents in view of the existing facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. The Respondents filed affidavit in opposition stating that as this Court while passing the final judgment and order dated 10.12.1998 disposing CR No. 1422 of 1992 filed by the. Petitioners had refused to grant interest on the award and also the said order of this Court dated 10.12.1998 passed in CR No. 1422 of 1992 had attained finality, the present writ petition is barred by the principles of res judicata. The Respondents in their affidavit in opposition had categorically denied the allegation and assertion of the writ Petitioners in the writ petition that their lands had been forcibly taken over by the Respondents for constructing the said road. 7. In the above factual background, the core questions to be decided in the present writ petition are that (a) whether in the given case of the present writ petition, the present writ petition praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondents to pay interest under Proviso to Section34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is barred by the principles of res judicata or not? and (b) whether the Petitioners have waived their right to claim interest on the said amount of compensation amounting to Rs. 2,01,795 under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the period from 1.8.1991 to 31.8.2000. 8. and (b) whether the Petitioners have waived their right to claim interest on the said amount of compensation amounting to Rs. 2,01,795 under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the period from 1.8.1991 to 31.8.2000. 8. Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is required to be looked into to see as to whether payment of interest under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a discretionary one or statutory requirement to pay interest on the amount of compensation or part thereof which is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken. Section34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is quoted hereunder: 34. Payment of interest. - When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of [nine per centum] per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. On bare perusal of Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is clear that under proviso to Section 34of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 it is the statutory requirement to pay interest if the amount of compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken. 9. For invoking the principles of res judicata in the subsequent suit or petitions, the essential requirements are that (a) earlier decision should be the decision of the court of competent jurisdiction; (b) the earlier decision should not be in contravention of the Act or Statute; and in absence of such essential requirements the earlier decision shall not operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings. Over and above, it is well settled law that a statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties by applying the principles of res judicata or the principles of estoppel. 10. As discussed above, payment of interest under proviso Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if the amount of compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, is a statutory requirement and refusal to issue such direction to pay interest in derogatory to proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is void. The Apex Court in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and Anr., AIR 1970 SC 794 and Bahadur Singh v. Muni Supral Das, (1969) 2 SCR 432 held that a decree or order passed in contravention of the Act is void and cannot be executed. 11. The Apex Court in Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) LRs. v. Jasjit Singh and Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 507 observed that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the grounds on which the decree made goes to the root of its jurisdiction or lacks of inherent jurisdiction is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass decree which cannot be cured be cured by consent or waiver of the party. The Apex Court is of similar view in Sayyed Ali and Ors. v. A.P. Wakf Board and Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 642 . The Apex Court in Ali's case (supra) observed that a plea of res judicata presupposes that there is in existence a decree or judgment which is legal but when the judgment is non est in law no plea for res judicata can be founded on such judgment. v. A.P. Wakf Board and Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 642 . The Apex Court in Ali's case (supra) observed that a plea of res judicata presupposes that there is in existence a decree or judgment which is legal but when the judgment is non est in law no plea for res judicata can be founded on such judgment. As discussed above this Court is of considered view that portion of the judgment and order of this Court dated 10.12.1998 passed in CR No. 1422 of 1992 for refusing the relief for interest on the award of compensation under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in the given fact of the present case is not in conformity with proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the existence of the order of this Court dated 10.12.1998 passed in CR No. 1422 of 1992 cannot operate as res judicata in the given fact of the present writ petition in granting the relief for interest under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. 12. It is fairly well settled that a statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties and also that the principles of estoppel or res judicata does not apply where to give effect to them would be counter to some statutory direction or prohibition. The direction for payment of interest on the compensation or any part thereof if not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken is a statutory direction under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. This being the position under the Act, i.e., Land Acquisition Act 1894, there should not be operation of principles of estoppel or principles of res judicata in issuing direction for payment of interest on such compensation. Reference may be made to Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424 wherein the Apex Court held that. "In view of the above ratio, it is seen that when the Legislature has directed to act in a particular manner and the failure to act results in a consequence, the question is whether the previous order operates as res judicata or estoppel as against the persons in dispute. "In view of the above ratio, it is seen that when the Legislature has directed to act in a particular manner and the failure to act results in a consequence, the question is whether the previous order operates as res judicata or estoppel as against the persons in dispute. When the previous decision was found to be erroneous on its face, this Court held in the above judgment that it does not operate as res judicata. We respectfully follow the ratio therein. The principle of estoppel or res judicata does not apply where to give effect to them would be to counter statutory direction or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. In view of the fact that land had already stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances, the question of divesting does not arise. After the vesting has taken place, the question of lapse of notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 would not arise. Considered from this perspective, original direction it self was erroneous and the later direction with reared to delivery of possession of the land, in consequence, was not valid in law. Further, it is made clear that the Respondents are entitled to interest at 9% for one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of deposit into court. The Respondents are not entitled to market value as on the date of award." 13. The Apex Court is of similar view in P.G. Eswarappa v. M. Rudrappa and Ors. 6 SCC 96. The Apex Court in P.G. Eswarappa's case (supra) held that the principles of estoppel or res judicata do not apply where to give effect to them would be counter to some statutory direction or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. 14. 6 SCC 96. The Apex Court in P.G. Eswarappa's case (supra) held that the principles of estoppel or res judicata do not apply where to give effect to them would be counter to some statutory direction or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. 14. For the foregoing discussions the first core question whether in the given case of the present writ petition, the present writ petition praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondents to pay interest under Proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is barred by the principles of res judicata or not is decided in favour of the Petitioners inasmuch as the statutory interest under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. 15. To the contra Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned CGSC appearing for the Respondents by referring to State of Assam and Anr. v. Jitendra Kumar Senapati and Anr., AIR 1981 SC 969 contends that in the given case of the present writ, writ Petitioners cannot claim interest on compensation under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The material fact in Jitendar Kumar Senapati's case (supra) was that there was an agreement between the parties which was reduced in writing by the Collector that the claimant further agreed that they will make no further claim in regard to the compensation for the same land provided actual payment is received within the period of 31st March 1969. As there was written undertaking to waive, abandon or disclaim their right for interest as provided in proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, their subsequent writ petitions for a direction to pay interest on the compensation under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act had been rejected by the Apex Court. The relevant portion of paras 1, 2 and 3 of the AIR in Jitendra Kumar Senapati's case (supra) are reproduced hereunder: 1....We, all the co-sharers interested in the land acquisition case for construction of quarters for Special Branch Staff of Police Department at Lawsohtun, Bishnupur, Shillong, hereby agree in response to the Government Letter No. 356/66/55 dated the 21st Feb, 1969 to accept the land acquisition cost of Rs. 4,41,202.45 p. (Rupees four lakhs forty-one thousand two hundred and two and forty-five paise only) subject to Government making payment within the 31st March, 1969 for our land measuring more or less 7.60 acres at Lawsohtun, Bishnupur, Shillong. We further agree that we will make no further claim in regard to compensation for the same land provided actual payment is received within the above period of 31st March, 1969. The agreement between the parties was reduced by the Collector to an award dated the 25th March, 1969 and on the very next day the sum of Rs. 4, 41,202.45 was paid to the Respondents. On 31st March 1969 the Respondents made an application to the Chief Secretary claiming interest at the rate of 12 1/2 per cent per annum on the amount last mentioned. As there was no response from the Chief Secretary, the Respondents applied to the Collector on 7th July, 1969 requesting him to pay interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6% per annum for the period from 30th March 1967 to 26th March 1969 under Section 34 of the Act which runs, thus: When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited. The Collector informed the Respondents by a letter dated 31st July 1969 that no action was necessary "at this stage." It was then that the Respondents knocked at the door of the High Court. 2. The High Court was of the opinion that the agreement between the parties covered only the amount of "compensation" as described in the various section of the Act including Sections 23 and 24 and that interest had to be paid on such compensation by reason of the statutory requirement enacted in that behalf by Section 34. 2. The High Court was of the opinion that the agreement between the parties covered only the amount of "compensation" as described in the various section of the Act including Sections 23 and 24 and that interest had to be paid on such compensation by reason of the statutory requirement enacted in that behalf by Section 34. The High Court, therefore, accepted the petition filed before it and held that the Collector was bound to pay to the Respondents, interest on the amount covered by the award at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 30th March 1967 (being the dale on which the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector) to the date of payment i.e., 26th March 1969. It directed the Collector to dispose of the petition dated the 7th July 1969 made to him by the Respondents in accordance with law. 3. The short point requiring determination by us is whether the agreement arrived at between the parties in February 1969 embraced only the "compensation" within the meaning of that term as used in the Act or covered also the payment of interest under Section 34 thereof. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the interpretation placed on the agreement by the High Court cannot be sustained and that the Respondents are not entitled to any interest on the sum already paid to them. 16. In Ambika Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 213 vide SCC page 221 para 18, the Apex Court observed: The aforesaid observations have been set out in detail in order to understand the true ratio of the said decision in the background of the facts of that case. It is true that this Court held that if the permission had been granted before the coming into operation of the 1980 Act and the forest land has been broken up or cleared, Clause (ii) of Section 2 of 1980 Act would not apply in such a case. But that decision was rendered in the background of the facts of that case. The ratio to any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. But that decision was rendered in the background of the facts of that case. The ratio to any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. See Lord Halsbury in Quin v. Leathern (1901) AC 495. But in view of the mandate of Article 141 that the ratio of the decision of this Court is a law of the land, Shri Govind Das submitted that the ratio of a decision must be found out from finding out if the converse was not correct. But this Court, however, was cautious in expressing the reasons for the said decision in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi, (1985) 3 SCC 643 . This Court observed in that decision that the result of taking the contrary view would be (SCC p.648, para 10) that while the digging for purposes of winning mica can go on, the lessee would be deprived of collecting feldspar or quarts which he may come across while he is carrying on mining operations for wining mica. That would lead to an unreasonable result which would not in any way subserve the object of the Act. There was an existing lease where mining operation was being carried on and what was due by incorporation of a new term was that while mining operations were being carried on some other minerals were available, he was giving right to collect those. The new lease only permitted utilization or collection of the said other minerals. 17. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC (111 ) (vide SCC p.130, para 59) Apex Court observed-...It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the presidential value of a decision. 18. The Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8 SCC 579 held that a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment Apex Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584, paras 9-12). 9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. In the same judgment Apex Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584, paras 9-12). 9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor' as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read I the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (AC at p.761) 1951 AC 737 Lord Mac Dermott observed (All ERp. 14C-D). The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the Ipsissima verba of Wiles, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,... 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. 1972 All ER 294 (HL) (All ER p.297 g-h) Lord Reid said, 'Lord Atkin's speech... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.' Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) (1971) 2 All ER 1267observed: (All ER p. 127d). One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russel, LJ. as if it were an Act of Parliament; And, in Herington v. British Railways Board Lord Morris (1972) 1 All ER 749(HL (E)) said: (All ER p. 761C). There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. 19. The fact of the case in Jitendra Kumar Senapati's case (supra) which is incidentally a case from this High Court, is diametrically different from the present case inasmuch as there is no written agreement or undertaking of the present writ Petitioners that they will abandon or/waive the right for payment of interest under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and such being the situation, keeping in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, this Court is of considered view that the decision of the Apex Court in Jitendra Kumar Senapati's case (supra) will not help the Respondents in 'the present writ petition. 20. Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned CGSC appearing for the Respondents in order to bolster up the case of the Respondents had referred to the decision of the Apex Court in SBI v. Ram Chandra and Ors. 1 SCC 73 wherein the Apex Court held that relief claimed but no granted should be deemed to be rejected. This Court also fully endorses the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chandra Dubey's case (supra). 1 SCC 73 wherein the Apex Court held that relief claimed but no granted should be deemed to be rejected. This Court also fully endorses the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chandra Dubey's case (supra). But the case in the instant writ petition is that the rejection of the claim for payment of interest on the compensation under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act by this Court in the judgment and order dated 10.12.1998 in CR No. 1422 of 1992, in the given case of the present case, is in contravention of statutory requirement for payment of interest contemplated in proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and, therefore, the principles of estoppel or res judicata do not apply because a statutory direction or prohibition cannot be overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. 21. The law confers upon a man no right or benefit which he does not desire, whoever waives, abandons or disclaim a right will lose it. Reference: Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 5 . In case of abandonment of right there cannot be fresh writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India on the ground of res judicata. As discussed above, in the present case there is absolutely no abandonment of right of the present writ Petitioners to claim for payment of interest on the compensation under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 22. For the foregoing discussions, the second core question 'whether the writ Petitioners have waived their right to claim interest on the said amount of compensation amounting to Rs. 2,01,795 under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the period from 1.8.1991 to 31.8.2000' is also decided in favour of the Petitioners. 23. As the two core questions formulated for deciding the present writ petition have been decided in favour of the writ Petitioners, this Court has no alternative except to allow the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the Respondents are directed to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent per centum per annum on the said compensation amount of Rs. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the Respondents are directed to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent per centum per annum on the said compensation amount of Rs. 2,01,795 for the period from 1.8.1991 to 31.8.2000 under proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act within a period of 5 (five) months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Parties are to bear their own costs. Petition allowed