JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice R.Kantha Rao, J) This appeal is filed by the defendants in Original Suit No. 239 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kurnool. The first respondent filed the suit against the appellants to declare her and her husband as the owners of the plaint schedule property and to direct the appellants to deliver possession of the same. The suit was decreed by the trial Court granting ten weeks time to the appellants to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the first respondent. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties hereinafter will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants i.e., as they were originally arrayed in the plaint. 3. Briefly stated, the following are the averments of the plaint: One Draupathamma purchased the plaint schedule properties i.e., House and open space situated in Fort, Kurnool bearing H.Dr. No. Old 16/77, 16/81, New 16/97 and present door No. 67/97 in a Court auction held on 16.07.1962 in Original Suit No. 53 of 1959 in E.P. No. 65 of 1961 on the file of the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kurnool and sale certificate was issued in her favour. She took possession of the property through Court on 30.03.1963. Mutation was also effected in her name as the owner of the property and she was in possession of the property by paying property tax. Draupathamma died on 01.04.1979 leaving behind her son Bheema Rao as her sole surviving legal heir. After the death of Draupathamma, Bheema Rao became entitled to the property, he and his wife who is the plaintiff herein were in management of the property. 4. The plaint schedule premises consists of several independent residential houses. The property was leased out to tenants and some of them are defendants herein. Bheema Rao was unheard of for more than seven years and since then the plaintiff has been looking after the management of the property. The plaintiff with a view to construct apartments in the place wherein the plaint schedule houses are situate required the tenants to vacate the land. Some of the tenants vacated and the defendants also promised to vacate the houses by 31.12.1997. They also gave letters to the plaintiff during the year 1997 requesting time for vacating the schedule mentioned premises. The plaintiff with a view to construct apartments in the place wherein the plaint schedule houses are situate required the tenants to vacate the land. Some of the tenants vacated and the defendants also promised to vacate the houses by 31.12.1997. They also gave letters to the plaintiff during the year 1997 requesting time for vacating the schedule mentioned premises. The plaintiff granted six months time to vacate the premises but the defendants who took advantage of the absence of Bheema Rao and oldage of the plaintiff did not vacate the premises and they fabricated a will dated 14.02.1963 purported to have been executed by Draupathamma in their favour. Basing on the said will they filed Original Suit No. 398 of 1998 in the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool for bare injunction against a fictitious person Mohan Krishna. The suit summons were said to be served on the said Mohan Krishna. He was said to have entered appearance on or about 29.05.1998 but his vakalat was not filed into the Court. On the other hand the vakalat of one C.V. Krishna Mohan was filed. Subsequently the fictitious defendant did not contest the suit and a collusive decree was obtained without filing the death certificate of Draupathamma and without examining any of the attestors of the alleged will. According to the plaintiff, the decree having been obtained by playing fraud on the Court is null and void and is not binding on her. 5. Before the Court below the defendant No. 8 remained ex parte. The first defendant filed her written statement and the same is adopted by the defendants 2 to 7 and 9. 6. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, it is contended as follows: The plaintiff has to establish that late Draupathamma died on 01.04.1979 leaving behind her son Bheema Rao as the sole surviving legal heir. Draupathamma had no son by name Bheema Rao much less a daughter-in-law, the plaintiff herein. At no point of time the plaint schedule property was in possession and enjoyment of Bheema Rao or his wife Krishnavenamma, the plaintiff herein. By virtue of the will dated 14.02.1963 executed by late Draupathamma, the defendants became the owners of the plaint schedule property and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same in their own right. At no point of time the plaint schedule property was in possession and enjoyment of Bheema Rao or his wife Krishnavenamma, the plaintiff herein. By virtue of the will dated 14.02.1963 executed by late Draupathamma, the defendants became the owners of the plaint schedule property and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same in their own right. In the alternative, it is contended that the defendants have perfected their title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession. According to them, the plaintiff was set up by a highly influential political leader to file the suit. In fact one person by name Mohan Krishna along with his supporters tried to dispossess the defendant in the month of May, 1998. On that the defendant filed the Original Suit No. 398 of 1999 on the file of the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool against the said person for permanent injunction and obtained a decree against him. 7. It was further contended by the defendants that they were never tenants under the plaintiff at any point of time, they never agreed to vacate the premises. The defendants have been paying property tax to the municipality. They have put up electricity consumption meters and have been paying electricity consumption charges in their own name. On one occasion the said highly influential political leader obtained their signatures on blank white papers on the pretext of submitting a memorandum to the municipal authorities on their behalf for securing free municipal tap and drainage channel. Subsequently he fabricated some false documents by utilizing the said papers. All such documents are not genuine and binding on the defendants. Without admitting the right of the plaintiff, they contended that even if, the plaintiff has any semblance of right or title to the plaint schedule property, the suit of the plaintiff is barred by law of limitation, since she did not exercise any rights over the property for a period of twelve years preceding filing of the suit. 8. Basing on the rival contentions, the learned trial Court settled the following issues: 1. Whether the suit schedule property is in the management of Bheema Rao and his wife Krishnavenamma, the plaintiff after the death of Draupathamma as pleaded by the plaintiff? 2. 8. Basing on the rival contentions, the learned trial Court settled the following issues: 1. Whether the suit schedule property is in the management of Bheema Rao and his wife Krishnavenamma, the plaintiff after the death of Draupathamma as pleaded by the plaintiff? 2. Whether the husband of the plaintiff Bheema Rao is the son of Draupathamma and that the said Bheema Rao is the sole legal heir of late Draupathamma? 3. Whether the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 398 of 1998 on the file of II Additional Junior Civil Judge's Court, Kurnool was obtained by playing fraud on the Court and it is not binding on the plaintiff? 4. Whether the will dated 14.02.1963 alleged to have been executed by late Draupathamma is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? 5. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 and 9 have perfected their title the plaint schedule property by adverse possession? 6. whether the suit is barred by limitation? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and for delivery of possession of the plaint schedule property as prayed for? 8. To what relief? 9. During the course of the trial in the Court below, P.Ws-1 to 2 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and Exs.A-1 to A-45 were marked. D.Ws-1 to 8 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-106 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 10. Upon considering the oral and documentary evidence forthcoming on either side, the learned trial Court decreed the suit as mentioned above. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: 11. The plaintiff proved that Bheema Rao is the son of late Draupathamma and there being no other legal representatives, he is the sole surviving legal heir of late Draupathamma. The defendants obtained the decree in Original Suit No. 398 of 1998 on the file of the Court II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool by playing fraud on the Court. Further the suit not being filed against her or her husband and being only for bare injunction, the decree and judgment in the suit are not binding on the plaintiff. The defendants failed to prove the will dated 14.02.1963 supposed to have been executed by Draupathamma and not even filed the said document into the Court and as such the question of truth, validity and binding nature of the said document does not arise. The defendants failed to prove the will dated 14.02.1963 supposed to have been executed by Draupathamma and not even filed the said document into the Court and as such the question of truth, validity and binding nature of the said document does not arise. After the death of Draupathamma, the plaintiff and her daughter have been looking after the affairs of the schedule mentioned properties. The defendants failed to prove that they perfected their title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession and the suit filed by the plaintiff is within time. The plaintiff without approaching the Rent Controller under Section 10(1) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 can approach a civil Court and recover possession of the premises from the tenants. Therefore, Bheema Rao being the sole surviving legal heir of the original owner Draupathamma and the plaintiff being the wife of Bheema Rao are entitled for declaration of their title to the plaint schedule property and to recover the vacant possession of the same from the defendants. 12. Sri E. Ayyapu Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants would submit that the defendants have been in possession of the schedule mentioned property in their own right. Neither the plaintiff nor Draupathamma never exercised their rights over the property and even if they have any semblance of right, the same has been extinguished by afflux of time. However, alternatively he would submit that even if the defendants are considered to be the tenants of the schedule mentioned property under Draupathamma, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit unless and until the Rent Controller issues a certificate to the effect that there existed a bona fide dispute in regard to title between the parties by virtue of Section 10 of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. 13. On the other hand Sri M. Subba Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff would stoutly contend that the contentions urged by the defendants are mutually inconsistent. He would submit that on one hand they pleaded that they became entitled to the schedule mentioned property by means of a will dated 14.02.1963 executed by Draupathamma the real owner and on the contrary they pleaded that they are the tenants under Draupathamma and the parties are governed by A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. He would submit that on one hand they pleaded that they became entitled to the schedule mentioned property by means of a will dated 14.02.1963 executed by Draupathamma the real owner and on the contrary they pleaded that they are the tenants under Draupathamma and the parties are governed by A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. Alternatively they further pleaded that they perfected their title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession. The pleas taken by the defendants according to the learned Counsel are untenable and the trial Court rightly rejected all the contentions urged by them. 14. Let us now examine whether any of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court call for interference in this appeal. 15. While examining the rival contentions, it is to be noticed that the plaintiff filed Exs.A-9 toA-16 letters said to have been executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. It is clearly mentioned in all the letters that the defendants are in occupation of the houses in the schedule mentioned premises with the permission of the plaintiff and when the plaintiff demanded them to vacate they requested time till 31.12.1997 to vacate the said houses. It is also mentioned therein that each of the defendants demanded an amount of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff to vacate the house and undertook to vacate the houses before 31.12.1997. Most of the defendants who are examined as witnesses admitted their signatures on Exs.A-9 to A-16 letters but contended that their signatures were obtained on blank papers. Since the defendants admitted their signatures on the letters, the burden is on them to establish the circumstances under which their signatures were obtained. But the defendants did not adduce any evidence explaining the circumstances under which their signatures were obtained on blank papers or blank stamped papers. Thus from the letters and also from the alternative plea taken by the defendants, it is obvious that they have been continuing in possession of the plaint schedule property with the permission of Draupathamma and the plaintiff. Therefore, the question of their exercising hostile title against the plaintiff or her husband Bhema Rao does not arise at all. It is also pertinent to note that after executing Exs.A-9 to A-16 letters the defendants filed Original Suit No. 398 of 1998 against Mohan Krishna, a fictitious person naming him as defendant. 16. Therefore, the question of their exercising hostile title against the plaintiff or her husband Bhema Rao does not arise at all. It is also pertinent to note that after executing Exs.A-9 to A-16 letters the defendants filed Original Suit No. 398 of 1998 against Mohan Krishna, a fictitious person naming him as defendant. 16. As regards the issue whether Bheema Rao is the sole surviving legal heir of Draupathamma, P.W-1 stated in her deposition before the trial Court that Draupathamma and Hanumantha Rao had two sons viz., Bheema Rao and Venkoba Rao. Venkobarao died even prior to the marriage of P.W-1 with Bheema Rao. In Ex.A-2 sale certificate dated 24.08.1962, Ex.A-3 certified copy of the amin's report dated 30.03.1963, Ex.A-4 certified copy of the Village Munsif's report dated 30.03.1963 issued in favour of Draupathamma in E.P. No. 65 of 1961 in O.S. No. 53 of 1959 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kurnool, it is mentioned that Draupathamma is the wife of Hanumantha Rao. In Ex.A-1 certified copy of Secondary School leaving certificate of Bheema Rao, it is mentioned that Hanumantha Rao is the father of Bheema Rao. There is a declaration in the certificate regarding the date of birth of Bheema Rao. In the said certificate Draupathamma signed as parent. Thus, from the oral testimony of P.W-1 and Exs.A-1 to A4 documents, it is obvious that Bheema Rao is the sole surviving legal heir of late Draupathamma. Though the defendants made a formal denial of the said fact, they did not adduce any evidence to disprove the same. Therefore, the contention putforth by the defendants that the plaintiffs have to establish that Bheema Rao is the son of Draupathamma is only for the sake of contesting the case and as such the trial Court correctly answered the issue. 17. As regards the Original Suit No. 398 of 1998 on the file of the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, the decree and judgment passed therein and their binding efficacy, the defendants filed the suit for bare injunction against one Mohan Krishna resident of Srisailam Devastanam Choultry, Kurnool and they mentioned in the cause title that the father's name is not known. According to the plaintiff the said Mohan Krishna is a fictitious person and the suit is purposely filed to obtain a decree for permanent injunction showing the person not in existence as a defendant and that the defendants herein played fraud against the Court. From the pleadings in O.S. No. 398 of 1998, it appears that the defendant made appearance in the said case but vakalat was filed on behalf of one L.V. Krishna Mohan a stranger to the suit by one Sri N. Isaiah, Advocate,. In the said suit the defendant did not contest the case and remained ex parte. In the present suit the defendants did not take any steps to prove that the defendant Mohan Krishna is not a fictitious person and that vakalat was filed on his behalf only. They did not examine the advocate who filed the vakalat nor did they examine any other person to prove that the decree and judgment passed in O.S. No. 398 of 1998 are genuine. Further the plaintiff is not a party in Original Suit No. 398 of 1998. Thus, on one hand, the decree obtained in O.S. No. 398 of 1998 is fraudulent and is not binding on the plaintiff since she is not a party to the suit. 18. Insofar as the will dated 14.02.1963 said to have been executed by Draupathamma in favour of the defendants bequeathing the plaint schedule properties during her life time, the defendants based their claim in O.S. No. 398 of 1998 on the file of the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge on the said will. The alleged will was filed in the said suit and since the defendant therein did not contest the suit, it was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs granting the relief of permanent injunction. The plaintiff filed Ex.A-30 the certified copy of D.R. memo dated 22.06.2003 which indicates that the defendants after filing the will dated 14.02.1963 obtained the return of the same. But curiously in the instant case, though the defendants relied on the will dated 14.02.1963 supposed to have been executed by Draupathamma, did not file the said will into the Court. They also did not file the death certificate of the executant Draupathamma. But curiously in the instant case, though the defendants relied on the will dated 14.02.1963 supposed to have been executed by Draupathamma, did not file the said will into the Court. They also did not file the death certificate of the executant Draupathamma. The defendants are no way related to Draupathamma and the contention of the defendants that on being satisfied with the services rendered by the defendants Draupathamma bequeathed the valuable property in their favour is quite unconvincing and unbelievable. Further the evidence of the 9th defendant who was examined as D.W-7 indicates that he was not even born on the date of execution of the alleged will. Having regard to the conduct of the defendants in not producing the will and also in view of the fact that there was no convincing reason for Draupathamma to execute the disputed will, the trial Court rightly held that the execution of the will dated 14.02.1963 relied upon by the defendants is not proved. 19. On one hand, the defendants have been contesting the suit that they became entitled to the schedule mentioned property by virtue of the will executed by Draupathamma. On the other hand, their contention is that they are the tenants under Draupathamma and that they also perfected their title to the schedule mentioned property by adverse possession. Thus, the pleas set up by the defendants are contradictory to each other and they do not have any specific stand in regard to their defence. On failure by the defendants in proving execution of the will dated 14.02.1963 set up by them, they cannot acquire any rights under the will. 20. Now the questions remained to be considered are: a. Whether the defendants perfected their title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession? b. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation? c. Whether the plaintiff cannot seek the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, without first approaching the Rent Controller for a decision as to whether there existed a bona fide dispute relating to landlord and tenant? 21. (a). Since the defendants based their title on the will dated 14.02.1963 said to have been executed by Draupathamma, they cannot alternatively plead that they have perfected their title to the property by adverse possession. 21. (a). Since the defendants based their title on the will dated 14.02.1963 said to have been executed by Draupathamma, they cannot alternatively plead that they have perfected their title to the property by adverse possession. Nowhere in the pleadings and evidence of the defendants, it appears that they had set up adverse title in themselves and exercised the said right or title continuously and peacefully for over a statutory period. According to the plaintiff, the defendants and some other persons are the tenants under Draupathamma. Originally and subsequent to the death of said Draupathamma when plaintiff required them to vacate the premises for a bona fide requirement, they promised to vacate the same but failed to keep their promise. When once it is held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any rights in the property under the will dated 14.02.1963 set up by them it must be held that they are in permissive possession of the property. Mere long possession without assertion of hostile title does not amount to adverse possession and by means of such possession, however, long it may be, a person cannot acquire title to the property. In the instant case, it may be noticed that in the first instance the defendants filed O.S. No. 398 of 1998 on the file of the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge claiming title to the property under the will dated 14.02.1963 said to have been executed by Draupathamma and obtained the decree basing on the said will. Therefore, their case was never that they acquired adverse title to the property against Draupathamma at any point of time. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the burden lies on the defendants to prove affirmatively that they asserted hostile title by remaining in possession either by express or implied denial for the period prescribed under the statute. The animus of the person claiming adverse title must be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case. When a possession could be referred to a lawful title, it can never be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title, will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another title. Adverse possession connotes actual and exclusive possession. When a possession could be referred to a lawful title, it can never be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title, will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another title. Adverse possession connotes actual and exclusive possession. The animus of the person holding the property must be hostile to the rightful owner of the property and the possessor of the property must hold the same as if he himself is the owner. In the instant case, the defendants have no specific theory as to the definite quality of their possession. If their claim that they became entitled to the property under the will dated 14.02.1963 executed by Draupathamma were to be true, their possession can never be adverse. Similarly even if they are in actual and exclusive possession of the property, possession cannot be said to be adverse so long as they claim to be tenants under Draupathamma or plaintiff. The reason being as tenants, their possession is only permissive. Thus, the defendants miserably failed to establish that they perfected their title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession. 22. (b). The plaintiff based her suit on title. According to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, it is not for the plaintiff to prove that she was in possession of the property within twelve years from the date of the suit. The burden is on the defendants to show that they perfected their title by adverse possession. Thus, it is enough on the part of the plaintiff to establish her title and in the instant case, admittedly Draupathamma is the original owner of the property and the plaintiff's husband who was unheard of for a period of more than seven years is the sole surviving legal heir of Draupathamma. Further even the defendants did not deny the title of the plaintiff. The plaintiff came to know about the defendants setting up title in themselves only in the year 1998 when they filed Original Suit No. 398 of 1998 against a fictitious defendant and obtained a decree. Till such time the plaintiff was under the impression that the defendants were the tenants and they would vacate the premises. The knowledge of the plaintiff about the assertion of the hostile title by the defendants is not traceable prior to 1998. Till such time the plaintiff was under the impression that the defendants were the tenants and they would vacate the premises. The knowledge of the plaintiff about the assertion of the hostile title by the defendants is not traceable prior to 1998. The present suit is filed by the plaintiff in the year 2003. Therefore the suit filed by the plaintiff is well within limitation. The defendants can only succeed on their proving adverse title to the schedule mentioned property. 23. (c). One of the important contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants is that the subject matter of the dispute is situate in Municipal Corporation of Kurnool. The parties are governed by the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession unless the Rent Controller issues a certificate to the effect that the denial of title of landlord by the tenant is bona fide as laid down in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Rent Control Act. In the opinion of the learned Senior Counsel, the landlord shall not be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court without any such finding recorded by the Rent Controller. 24. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section (10) of the Rent Control Act does not take away the jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle the dispute in regard to the question of title between the landlord and tenant and therefore the issue of settling the present dispute is well within the competence of the civil Court. 25. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on J.J. Lal (P) Ltd Vs. M.R. Murali1 wherein interpreting the provisions of Section 10(2)(7) and 10(1) second proviso of T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 which are analogous to the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 vis--vis the jurisdiction of civil Court, the Supreme Court held as follows: "If the Controller does not find the denial or claim to be not bona fide he shall deny the landlord's claim for eviction by making an order rejecting the application. Such finding and rejection of landlord's application would not debar the landlord from approaching the Civil Court for establishing his title. By having regard to second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act, the bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Court stands lifted and the landlord becomes entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court enabling such Civil Court to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds on which the Controller could have directed eviction under Sections 10, 14 or 16, notwithstanding the opinion formed by the Civil Court whether the denial of title by the tenant had entailed forfeiture of the lease and notwithstanding the finding of the Civil Court that the claim of permanent tenancy was unfounded. This is how any conflict of jurisdiction between Civil Court and Controller can be avoided by construing Section 10 (2) ( (vii) and Section 10 (1) second proviso homogeneously and as part of one scheme. The legislative intent appears to be that denial of title can be decided by the Controller for the limited purpose of finding out whether a ground of eviction is made out but the questions, of the title should be left to be determined by the Civil Court. Once a question of title has arisen between a landlord and a tenant and such dispute is bona fide, the doors of Civil Court are let open to the landlord and therein adjudication, on grounds of eviction otherwise within the domain of Controller, is also permitted so as to avoid multiplicity of suits and proceedings. All the disputes between landlord and tenant would be settled in one forum and the need for prosecuting two separate proceedings before two fora would be eliminated." 26. In the decision referred above, the Supreme Court upholding the jurisdiction of civil Court to decide the dispute relating title between landlord and the tenant reconciled the powers of Rent Controller with that of the civil Court's jurisdiction to avoid hardship to the parties. Ultimately, the Supreme Court arrived at the finding that to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide the dispute relating to title between the landlord and tenant cannot be taken away. Ultimately, the Supreme Court arrived at the finding that to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide the dispute relating to title between the landlord and tenant cannot be taken away. As such in the instant case, it is no longer open for the defendants to contend that without approaching the Rent Controller the plaintiff cannot directly approach the civil Court for reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of schedule mentioned property. Furthermore, the defendants have not specifically admitted to be the tenants under Draupathamma or the plaintiff herein. They took altogether different and inconsistent pleas. In O.S. No. 398 of 1998 they claimed title to the plaint schedule property under a will dated 14.02.1963 supposed to have been executed by Draupathamma in their favour. Alternatively they pleaded that they remained in possession of the plaint schedule property continuously for more than a statutory period and thereby acquired adverse title to the plaint schedule property. In view of the wholly inconsistent pleas taken by the defendants, the civil Court alone can adjudicate upon the contentious issues and it is not possible for the Rent Controller having limited jurisdiction to decide the said questions. Therefore, in the instant case, it is not open for the defendants to contend that without a finding recorded by a Rent Controller to the effect that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is bona fide the plaintiff cannot directly approach the civil Court for the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the schedule mentioned property. RESULT: 26. For the foregoing reasons, we absolutely see no valid grounds to interfere with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court. There is no merit in the appeal and consequently the same is dismissed with costs.