Judgment :- S.P. TALUKDAR, J. (1.) GRIEVANCES of the petitioners may briefly be stated as follows:-The petitioner No. 1 is a Primary Teachers" Training Institute. The respondent No. 4 gave recognition to the said School provisionally for the academic year 2004-2005. It was subsequently renewed by such respondent No. 4 being the Secretary, West Bengal Board of primary Education up to the academic year 2005-2006. The Joint Secretary, Primary school Education Department issued a letter thereby intimating that all Primary Teachers" training Institute will have to approach the respondent No. 5, National Council for Teacher education for recognition. On July 13/14 of 2007 an order was issued granting recognition to petitioner No. 1 for conducting Primary Teachers" Training (Diploma Education) course of two years duration with an annual intake of 50 students subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions were duly complied with by the petitioners. Petitioner no. 2 approached the concerned authority informing it of the recognition and requesting for doing the needful. Respondent No. 3, by letter dated 24th August, 2007, expressed its inability to grant affiliation since a public interest litigation is still pending before the hon"ble High Court. The petitioner claimed that such public interest litigation and the interim order passed therein relates to non-recognized institution and has no manner of applicability to the facts of the present case. (2.) THE writ application being W. P. No. 21466 (W) of 2007 was filed. It was disposed of by the learned Single Bench of this Court by order dated 16th October, 2007 by way of directing the respondent No. 2 to consider the entire aspect of the matter as raised in the writ petition and take a decision in the matter in accordance with law. Direction was also given for calling the petitioner, if required and complete the entire exercise within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of the order. Accordingly, a meeting was held on 27th December, 2007 by respondent No. 3. An order was passed by such respondent No. 3 and it was communicated to the petitioners by the respondent No. 4 vide letter dated 12th February, 2008. The claim of the petitioners was rejected. (3.) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with such order, the writ petitioners approached this Court with the present application under Article 226 of the Constitution for redressal of the grievances. The claim of the petitioners was rejected. (3.) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with such order, the writ petitioners approached this Court with the present application under Article 226 of the Constitution for redressal of the grievances. (4.) IT is possibly necessary to mention that the public interest litigation, as referred to, is still pending before the learned Division Bench of this Court. But after hearing learned counsel for the petitioners, the respondent No. 4 as well as for respondent No. 5, it appears that the subject matter of controversy raised in the said public interest litigation, is distinctly different from that of the present case. Referring to the interim order passed in the said case, it was submitted by Mr. Behani on behalf of the writ petitioners that such interim order only related to non-recognized institutions. Mr. Behani submitted that since there is no dispute that the present petitioner No. 1 is a recognized institution, the said interim order does not seem to have any impact in the present case. (5.) AFTER hearing learned Counsel for the parties, it appears that the crux of the present controversy is whether the petitioner No. 1 institute deserves affiliation of the respondent no. 3 or not. It appears that in compliance with the order dated 16. 10. 2007 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in W. P. No. 21466 (W) of 2007, a meeting was held on 11th January, 2008. The concerned authority being the President of the West Bengal Board of Primary Education by an elaborate order dealt with the grievances of the writ petitioner, but finally expressed inability to grant affiliation to the petitioner in accordance with law. Mr. Behani referring to the said order submitted that the authority concerned was not justified in being unreasonably burdened with the pendency of the public interest litigation, since the subject matter of the said case being W. P. No. 4107 (W) of 2006 (Tulshi Rakshi and anr. Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) is entirely different. There is reference in the interim order and as admitted by learned Counsel for all the parties, the said interim order relates to unrecognized institutes. Mr. Behani is perfectly justified in mentioning that the petitioner No. 1 being a recognized institution is not covered by such interim order. Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) is entirely different. There is reference in the interim order and as admitted by learned Counsel for all the parties, the said interim order relates to unrecognized institutes. Mr. Behani is perfectly justified in mentioning that the petitioner No. 1 being a recognized institution is not covered by such interim order. (6.) VARIOUS provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 were referred to by Mr. Behani in support of his contention that it is for the said authority to give recognition and the affiliation is to inevitably follow. Section 2 (e) of the said Act defines "institution" as an institution which offers courses or training in teacher education. Section 2 (i) defines "recognized institution" as an institution recognized by the Council under section 14. Section 2 (l) of the Act is as follows:- "2 (l) "teacher education" means programmes of education, research or training of persons for equipping them to teach at pre-primary, primary, secondary and senior secondary stages in schools, and includes non-formal education, part-time education, adult education and correspondence education. " (7.) THE Council means the National Council for Teacher Education established under sub-section (1) of Section 3. Section 12 deals with the functions of the Council. Subsection (e) of Section 12 of the said Act authorizes the Council to lay down norms for any specified category of courses or trainings in teacher education, including the minimum eligibility criteria for admission thereof, and the method of selection of candidates, duration of the course, course contents and mode of curriculum. Subsection (g) of Section 12 empowers the Council to lay down standards in respect of examinations leading to teacher education qualifications, criteria for admission to such examinations and schemes of courses or training. (8.) SECTION 14 of the said Act relates to recognition of institutions offering course or training in teacher education. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act reads as follows:- "14. (8.) SECTION 14 of the said Act relates to recognition of institutions offering course or training in teacher education. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act reads as follows:- "14. (1) Every institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education on or after the appointed day, may, for grant of recognition under this Act, make an application to the Regional Committee concerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations: provided that an institution offering a course or training in teacher education immediately before the appointed day, shall be entitled to continue such course or training for a period of six months, if it has made an application for recognition within the said period and until the disposal of the application by the Regional Committee. " It appears that on receipt of an application by the Regional Committee from any institution under sub-section (1) and after obtaining from the institution concerned such other particulars as it may consider necessary, if it is satisfied that such institution had adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such other conditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a course or training in teacher education, as may be determined by regulations, it shall pass an order granting recognition to such institution, subject to such conditions as may be determined by regulations. If it is of the opinion that such institution does not fulfil the requirements laid down as above, it shall pass an order refusing recognition to such institution for reasons to be recorded in writing. (9.) SUB-SECTION (6) of Section 14 clearly lays down that every examining body shall, on receipt of the order under sub-section (4), grant affiliation to the institution, where recognition has been granted or cancel the affiliation of the institution, where recognition has been refused. Section 16 of the said Act clearly mentions that affiliating body to grant affiliation after recognition or permission by the Council. (10.) IN such backdrop, the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioner no. 1 institute being equipped with a legal and proper recognition by the Council does not deserve denial of affiliation. In fact, Mr. Behani went a step further while laying emphasis on the legal proposition that affiliation should automatically and inevitably follow recognition. (10.) IN such backdrop, the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioner no. 1 institute being equipped with a legal and proper recognition by the Council does not deserve denial of affiliation. In fact, Mr. Behani went a step further while laying emphasis on the legal proposition that affiliation should automatically and inevitably follow recognition. Section 2 (d) defines "examining body" as a University, agency or authority to which an institution is affiliated for conducting examinations in teacher education qualifications. So far the present case is concerned, such authority is none other than respondent No. 3. (11.) MRS. Gutgutia, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 5, in course of her submission virtually echoed the stand point of the petitioners. Mr. Panja, as learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 raised very intricate points of law while attempting to define the role of respondent No. 5 in the matter of granting recognition to petitioner No. 1. (12.) IT appears from the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties that this court in connection with the present writ application is called upon to decide as to whether the fate of the writ petitioner-institution is to be decided following the provisions of the national Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 or West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973. (13.) AS referred to earlier, the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 is to provide for the establishment of a National Council for Teacher Education with a view to achieving planned and co-ordinated development of the teacher education system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education system and for matters connected therewith. This Act of Parliament received the assent of the President on the 29th December, 1993. (14.) THE West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 is an Act to make better provision for the development, expansion, management and control of primary education with a view to making it universal, free and compulsory. It was passed by the West Bengal Legislature and assent of the President was first published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary of the 20th September, 1974. Section 19 of the W. B. Primary Education Act, 1973 deals with the powers and functions of the Board. It was passed by the West Bengal Legislature and assent of the President was first published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary of the 20th September, 1974. Section 19 of the W. B. Primary Education Act, 1973 deals with the powers and functions of the Board. Clause- (ff) relates to grant or refuse recognition to primary Teachers" Training Institute, after considering the recommendation, if any, of the recognition Committee and to make regulations on all aspects connected with such recognition. (15.) THE aforesaid clause with its proviso has been added by the West Bengal Primary education (Amendment) Act, 2002 and was published in the Kolkata Gazette on 17. 07. 2002. Question has been raised as to whether such an amendment, which was brought in 2002 could override the N. C. T. E. Act, 1993, which received the assent of the president on 29th December, 1993. The fact remains that the W. B. P. E. Act, 1973 received the assent of the President on 20th September, 1974. (16.) AS it appears from the scope and object of the two Acts under reference, those are expected to operate in different fields. There should not be any antagonistic contradiction between the two. The W. B. P. E. Act, 1973 essentially relates to development, expansion, management and control of primary education and that too, with a view to making it universal, free and compulsory. (17.) THE N. C. T. E. Act aims at achieving planned and co-ordinated development of the teacher education system throughout the country. Article 246 of the Constitution relates to subject matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. The same is set out as follows:-"246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of states:- (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses-(2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-I in the Seventh schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "union List"). (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause-(3), Parliament, and, subject to clause- (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "concurrent List"). (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause-(3), Parliament, and, subject to clause- (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "concurrent List"). (3) Subject to clauses-(1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "state list"). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. " the Seventh Schedule, as referred to in Article 246, comprises three Lists i. e. List-I " Union List, List-II " State List and List-III " Concurrent List. Entry 65 of the Union List is as follows:-"65. Union agencies and institutions for " (a)professional, vocational or technical training, including the training of police officers; or (b)the promotion of special studies or research; or (c)scientific or technical assistance in the investigation or detection of crime. " entry 66 of the Union List relates to "co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. " entry 25 of the Concurrent List is as follows: "25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour. " Thus, the power to make law in the field of education of the Union Government and the State Government is also clear and distinct. It may be mentioned that Entry 25 of the concurrent List distinctly refers to Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of the Union List. By no stretch of imagination, "training of the teachers" can be brought within the purview of primary education. The teachers of the primary schools are already qualified and educated. But this by itself does not mean to suggest that there is no need for their further education. There is always scope for improvement. Besides, the Government may have its own priority as well as policy. The job of a primary school teacher is far too important. The teachers of the primary schools are already qualified and educated. But this by itself does not mean to suggest that there is no need for their further education. There is always scope for improvement. Besides, the Government may have its own priority as well as policy. The job of a primary school teacher is far too important. It is said that a teacher is a "man making man". Mrs. Gutgutia, appearing as learned Counsel for respondent No. 5, quite rightly mentioned about the importance of the role performed by such teachers. 19. She submitted that teachers are the nation builders and motivators of the future generation. Referring to the fact that our nation celebrates the birthday of our late President dr. S. Radha Krishnan i. e. 5th of September as Teachers day; she submitted that it is to show gratitude to the teachers. Referring to Article 41 of the Constitution, Mrs. Gutgutia submitted that education is light of life. Education is basic need of life along with bread, clothing, shelter and medicine. She quoted our Nobel Laureate, Dr. Amartya Sen, who said that "the strong and sound future of India cannot be envisaged in absence of efficient and scientific trained primary teachers and resultant education and trained learning to primary students". While quoting Swami Vivekananda who said that "every individual is a potential soul", Mrs. Gutgutia submitted that neglecting education is, in one stroke, compromising basic freedom of masses, denying them a political voice, better opportunities for employment, health and indeed, a life with dignity. 20. Attention of the Court was invited to the decision in the case of Andhra Kesari educational Society Vs. Director of School Education and Ors. , as reported in AIR 1989 SC 183 , while submitting that a teacher is the engine of the educational system. He is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values. He needs to be endowed and energized with need potential to deliver enlightened service expected of him. His quality should be such as to inspire and motivate others. The Apex Court observed that "it is, therefore, needless to state that teachers should be subjected to rigorous training with rigid scrutiny of efficiency. It has greater relevance to the needs of the day. The ill-trained or sub-standard teachers would be detrimental to our educational system; if not a punishment on our children. The Apex Court observed that "it is, therefore, needless to state that teachers should be subjected to rigorous training with rigid scrutiny of efficiency. It has greater relevance to the needs of the day. The ill-trained or sub-standard teachers would be detrimental to our educational system; if not a punishment on our children. The Government and the University must, therefore, take care to see that inadequacy in the training of teachers is to compounded by any extraneous consideration. " 21. Mrs. Gutgutia, in course of her submission, referred to the decision of the Apex court in the case of ST Johns Teachers Training Institute (for women) Madurai and ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , as reported in AIR 1994 Sc 43 and the case of L muthu Kumar and Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , as reported in AIR 2000 SC 3084 . She submitted that training of teachers is the subject, which comes under "higher education". It is a job oriented training course, which is meant for adults, majors and launches the trainees in job after the successful completion of the course and is fully covered under entry 66 of List-I of 7th Schedule. She then submitted that even Presidents assent cannot help the State Legislature when the subject field is fully covered by the central Legislature. Mrs. Gutgutia, in this context, referred to the decision in the case of ITC Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. , as reporte4d in AIR 1985 SCC (Sup) 476 and TKVTSS medical Educational and Charitable Trust Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, as reported in AIR 1996 SC 2384 . It was submitted on behalf of such respondent No. 5 that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the Union and the State, both of them being competent to enact the same, the law of the Union should prevail over that of the State. It was contended that the important thing to consider with reference to Article 254 (2) of the constitution is whether the legislation is in respect of the same matter. (Ref:-Zaverbhai amaidas Vs. State of Bombay, as reported in AIR 1954 SC 752 ). The relevant observation of the Apex Court in the case of ITC Ltd. (Supra) is as follows:-"suppose there are two fields belonging to A and B. The area of As field is 500 X 200 meters. (Ref:-Zaverbhai amaidas Vs. State of Bombay, as reported in AIR 1954 SC 752 ). The relevant observation of the Apex Court in the case of ITC Ltd. (Supra) is as follows:-"suppose there are two fields belonging to A and B. The area of As field is 500 X 200 meters. There is another adjacent field belonging to B comprising 400 X 100 meters. As possession covers every nook and corner of the entire field leaving nothing vacant. It is manifest that B cannot encroach or entrench on the field of A conversely if A is in possession of the entire field leaving, however, a small portion (30 X 20) meters vacant B would be justified in encroaching on that particular part of the vacant land. This is how we have to construe the provisions of Central and State entries in List I and List II in accordance with the provisions of Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. " Mrs. Gutgutia further dealt with the meaning of "repugnancy". According to her, the statement of objects and reasons for enactment of the NCTE Act, 1993 and the non-obstante clause in Section 16 of the said Act clearly lays down the intention of the Central legislature in covering the entire field of "education" in the Country. She referred to the observation of B. N. Rau, J. in the context of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935: "it is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as and when one said "do" and the other "don"t". There is no true repugnancy, according this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. For reasons, which we shall set forth presently, we think that this is too narrow a test; there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say "don"t" but in different ways. For example, one law may say, "no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time" and another law may say, "no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time. For example, one law may say, "no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time" and another law may say, "no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time. "here, it is obviously possible to obey both laws, by obeying the more stringent of the two, namely, the second one; yet it is equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other, though not actually disobeyed, is nullified". (Ref: g. P. Stewart Vs. B. K. Roy Chaudhary, AIR 1939 Calcutta 628). " she explained that repugnancy between two statutes may be ascertained on the basis of the following principles:-1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions. 2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature and 3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field. Learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. (Ref:- State of Orissa Vs. M. A. Tulloch and Co. as reported in (1964) 4 SCR 461 ). It was further submitted by Mrs. Gutgutia that the fact that the State Act received the assent of the President, would hardly make any difference because Sub-Article (2) of article 254 of the Constitution entitles the Parliament to add to, amend, vary or repeal the state Act. She contended that in exercise of this power, Parliament would repeal the State act expressly or by implications. It was then submitted that standards of Higher Education depend on the standards of Primary Education. She added that the Union Government has power to legislate in the field of Primary Education as well. According to her, Navodaya vidyalaya, Sarva Shikhsha Abhiyan and National Literacy Mission are such programmes run by and funded by Central Government in the field of Primary Education. Relying upon the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. She added that the Union Government has power to legislate in the field of Primary Education as well. According to her, Navodaya vidyalaya, Sarva Shikhsha Abhiyan and National Literacy Mission are such programmes run by and funded by Central Government in the field of Primary Education. Relying upon the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sant dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalay, as reported in 2006 (3) SCALE 675 , it was submitted that the decision taken by the National Council for Teacher Education is to be implemented by all authorities in the light of the provisions of the said Act and the law declared by the Honble Apex Court. Mr. Behani, as learned Counsel for the writ petitioner, referred to the copies of various correspondences issued and orders passed from time to time in connection with the recognition and affiliation of the petitioner institute. He categorically submitted that there had been a public interest litigation being W. P. No. 4107 (W) of 2006. The learned division Bench of this Court passed an interim order in connection with the said case, thereby restraining the non-recognized Primary Teachers" Training Institutes from admitting any further student for primary teachers" training course till the disposal of the writ petition. Mr. Behani then mentioned that since the petitioner institute is a recognized one, it does not fall within the said category and as such, the learned Division Bench did not pass any order of restraint nor does the said order apply to the case of the petitioner institute. 22. Mr. Behani thereafter referred to the order dated 16th October, 2007 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in W. P. No. 21466 (W) of 2007. By the said order dated 16th October, 2007, the learned Single Bench of this Court observed that unless and until there is a specific order of restraint/injunction operating between the parties, there cannot be any embargo and/or fetter upon the concerned authorities to grant necessary affiliation. The learned Court disposed of the application with the following direction:- "however, this entire aspect of the matter needs to be brought before the notice of the concerned respondent authorities and for this purpose, the contention of the writ petitioner as raised in the writ petition, may be duly considered by the said respondent authorities. The learned Court disposed of the application with the following direction:- "however, this entire aspect of the matter needs to be brought before the notice of the concerned respondent authorities and for this purpose, the contention of the writ petitioner as raised in the writ petition, may be duly considered by the said respondent authorities. If there is specific order of restraint/injunction operating against the respondent authorities from granting affiliation to the writ petitioner, it will be open to the concerned respondent authority, being the respondent No. 2 to consider the same and take a decision in the matter in accordance with law. If required, the said respondent No. 2 shall be at liberty to call the writ petitioners for a hearing. The entire exercise shall, however, be completed by the respondent No. 2 within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order. " In compliance with the direction given by the learned Single Bench of this Court in 23. W. P. No. 21466 (W) of 2007, the concerned authority being the President, West Bengal board of Primary Education took up the matter. As reflected from the said order, personal hearing was taken on 27th December, 2007 and the petitioner institute was represented by learned Counsel. It was brought to the notice of the said authority that the West Bengal board of Primary Education granted provisional recognition in favour of the institute for the academic Sessions 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. The said authority being the president of the West Bengal Board of Primary Education in the impugned order referred to the promulgation of the West Bengal Primary Education (Amendment) Act, 2002. According to her, such Amendment Act, 2002 conferred power upon the West Bengal board of Primary Education to institute Primary Teachers" Training Examination as well as to grant or to refuse recognition to Primary Teachers" Training Institutes. It is further reflected that in connection with the public interest litigation, as mentioned earlier, the Board raised the point that as per Amendment Act, 2002, the Board has been according recognition to Primary Teachers" Training Course, withdrawing or refusing such recognition, prescribing the curriculum, the syllabi and the course of studies of PTTIs, conducting examination for the students of PTTIs and awarding certificates to successful candidates. Mr. Mr. Panja, on behalf of the respondent authority, submitted that admittedly an Act of legislature with the assent of the President is a valid piece of enactment and the NCTE Act, 1993 must yield to the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 in relation to matters concerning Primary Education and the Primary Teachers" Training Courses. It appears that the Board took the stand that "the consequence of granting affiliation would be the acceptance of the provisions of the NCTE Act ignoring the provisions of the Amendment act, 2002 in absence of any declaration by the Honble Court at Calcutta. " 24. Referring to the decision in the case of Jaya Gokul Educational Trust Vs. Commissioner and Secretary to Government Higher Education Deptt. Thiruvananthapuram and Anr., ass reported in AIR 2000 SC 1614 , it was submitted by mr. Behani that there is no power vested in the State under any State law to grant approval and even if it was so vested, it would have been void on the ground of repugnancy. The apex Court in the factual backdrop of the said case held that there was no statutory requirement for obtaining the approval of the State Government and even if there was one, it would have been repugnant to the All India Council for Technical Education Act. Only the "views" of the State Government be obtained before granting affiliation and this would not amount to obtaining approval. 25. In order to ascertain as to whether a legislation has impinged on the field of other legislatures, in fact or in substance, or is incidental, keeping in view the true nature of the enactment, the Courts have evolved the doctrine of "pith and substance" for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in one list or the other. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. State of Assam and Anr. , as reported in (2004) 2 SCC 553 , for applying the principle of "pith and substance" regard is to be had (i) to the enactment as a whole, (ii) to its main objects, and (iii) to the scope and effect of its provisions. Where the question for determination is whether a particular law relates to a particular subject mentioned in one list or the other, the Courts look into the substance of the enactment. Where the question for determination is whether a particular law relates to a particular subject mentioned in one list or the other, the Courts look into the substance of the enactment. If the substance of enactment falls within the Union List then the incidental encroachment by the enactment on the State List would not make it invalid. The Apex Court in the said case observed that when the question is as to whether a provincial legislation is repugnant to the laws enacted by Parliament the onus to show its repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant would be on the party attacking its validity. There ought to be a presumption in favour of its validity and every effort should be made to reconcile them and construe both so as to avoid they being repugnant to each other. "repugnancy has to be there in fact and not based on a mere possibility. If the two enactments operate in different fields without encroaching upon each other then there would be no repugnancy. " 26. The Apex Court in the case of Basic Education Board, U. P. Vs. Upendra Rai and ors. , as reported in (2008) 3 SCC 432 , held that policy decision cannot be interfered by court unless it violates constitutional or statutory provisions. In the factual backdrop of the case under reference, the Apex Court pointed out that ordinary educational institutions which impart education to students are not required to seek recognition under the National council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 as the Act is applicable to teachers" training institutions. Article 254 has the application where the two Acts operate in two different fields. Similar view was taken earlier in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sant dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and Ors. , as reported in (2006) 9 SCC 1 . It cannot be denied that the power to legislate is engrafted under Article 246 of the constitution and the various entries for the three lists of the Seventh Schedule are the fields of legislation. The different entries are all of enabling character and are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and the State legislatures. They neither impose any restrictions on the legislative powers nor prescribe any duty for exercise of the legislative power in any particular manner. In the case of union of India and Ors. The different entries are all of enabling character and are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and the State legislatures. They neither impose any restrictions on the legislative powers nor prescribe any duty for exercise of the legislative power in any particular manner. In the case of union of India and Ors. Vs. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers" College, as reported in (2002) 8 SCC 228 , it was held that "it is the cardinal principle of construction that the language of the entries should be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable and while interpreting an entry of any list it would not be reasonable to import any limitation therein. This rule, however, would not enable the legislature to make a law relating to a matter which has no rational connection with the subject-matter of an entry. The Court sometimes is duty-bound to guard against extending the meaning of the words beyond their reasonable connotation in its anxiety to preserve the power of the legislature. " it was further observed that "ncte is an expert body created under the provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 and Parliament has imposed upon such expert body the duty to maintain the standards of education, particularly, in relation to teacher education. Education is the backbone of every democracy and any deterioration in the standard of teaching in the B. Ed Course would ultimately produce sub-standard prospective teachers. Therefore, the conclusion of an expert body should not be lightly tinkered with by a Court of law without giving due weightage to the conclusion arrived at by such expert body"". "27. Mr. Behani referred to the Division Bench judgment in the case of Shimla education Society and Trust Vs. State of H. P. and Anr. , as reported in AIR 2008 himachal Pradesh 4, in support of his contention that once the field is occupied under entry No. 66 of List 1 of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India under which i. e. the national Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 has been framed, the State Government could not frame the policy repugnant to the Central Act. It may be relevant to reproduce the observation of the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. Vs. It may be relevant to reproduce the observation of the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. Vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Ors., as reported in (1995) 4 SCC 104 in order to appreciate issues raised in the present application. Entry 66 of the Union List relates to co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. Such co-ordination is not mere evaluation. It means harmonization with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to certain design, scheme or plan of development. 28. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can very well be pointed out that the conflict as raised at the time of hearing of the present application is apparently non-antagonistic in nature. West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973, in view of its object, as reflected in the preamble, had little scope to encroach into the territory of Entry-66 in the union List. The amendment in this regard brought in the year, 2002, no doubt, gives scope for unnecessary controversy. It attempts to ignore the existence of the National Council for teacher Education Act, 1993. It apparently refuses to accept that teaching of the teachers or training of the teachers is not an easy job nor under any circumstance it can be brought within the purview of primary education. The fact that it had the assent of the President by itself does not change the legal complexion, since Entry-25 of the Concurrent List relates to education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64 and 65 of the Union List. Having regard to the structure of our constitution, which is more unitary than federal, with centripetal forces stronger than the centrifugal ones, it is no wonder that there is one entry being entry No. 97 in the Union List. It relates to "any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists." Considering all such facts and circumstances, I find it difficult, if not impossible, to brush aside the grievances, as ventilated by Mr. Behani on behalf of the petitioner. The impugned order passed by the President of West Bengal Board of Primary Education, thus, seems to suffer from inherent impropriety. Behani on behalf of the petitioner. The impugned order passed by the President of West Bengal Board of Primary Education, thus, seems to suffer from inherent impropriety. The relevant aspects do not appear to have been properly dealt with by the said authority. For the reasons, as indicated earlier, such order cannot be sustained and be accordingly quashed. 29. In the result, the application being W. P. No. 3536 (W) of 2008 be allowed and the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 are hereby directed to cancel the impugned order being Annexure" p-18" to the writ application. The respondent No. 3 is hereby directed to consider the entire matter afresh in the light of the observation made in this judgment and take appropriate action and issue necessary order of affiliation of the petitioner No. 1 in accordance with the rules. There is no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of the judgment be supplied to the parties, if applied for, as expeditiously as possible.