ORDER: The unsuccessful judgment-debtor in E.A.No.201 of 2005 in E.P.No.65 of 1995 in O.S.No.23 of 1989 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, is the present revision petitioner. The decree-holder is the respondent. 2. Respondent-decree-holder filed an application E.A.No.201 of 2005 aforesaid under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter in short referred to as 'the Code' for the purpose of convenience) to reduce the upset price. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, having formulated the point for consideration at para 5 after recording reasons and after referring to certain decisions, came to the conclusion that the application to be allowed reducing the sale price to Rs.35.00 lakhs from Rs.50.00 lakhs. Aggrieved by the same, the present civil revision petition had been preferred. 3. Sri V. Sudhakar Reddy, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner would maintain that the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, had totally erred in reducing the upset price ignoring the earlier order made by the Court dismissing the petitions filed by the respondent/decree-holder praying for reduction of upset price and confirming the value of Amin. The learned counsel also would maintain that the learned Judge also totally erred in ignoring the Sub-Registrar's valuation filed by the judgment-debtor earlier and it ought to have seen the valuation produced earlier accepted by the court. The learned counsel also further would maintain that the measurement shown in the valuation certificate filed by the decree-holder differed from the actual measurements of the E.P. schedule property as shown in the Sub-Registrar certificate produced by the judgment-debtor earlier. The learned counsel also pointed out certain arithmetical errors in the valuation certificate. The counsel also would maintain that the learned Judge is not right in relying upon the certificate issued by the Kavali Municipality in the year 1990 without considering the subsequent valuation certificate issued by the Sub-Registrar in the year 2003. The counsel also pointed out to the subsequent improvements made to the building. Thus, the learned counsel would maintain that the reduction of valuation suo motu from Rs.55.00 lakhs to Rs.50.00 lakhs even without a formal application and further reducing the same to Rs.35.00 lakhs definitely cannot be sustained. The counsel also pointed out to the subsequent improvements made to the building. Thus, the learned counsel would maintain that the reduction of valuation suo motu from Rs.55.00 lakhs to Rs.50.00 lakhs even without a formal application and further reducing the same to Rs.35.00 lakhs definitely cannot be sustained. The counsel also would maintain that the executing court also failed to take into consideration the order dated 07.7.2004 made in E.A.No.138 of 2003 ordering the test of the property and fixation of the value of E.P. schedule property at Rs.55.00 lakhs in pursuance of the said order. Further, the counsel also would maintain that the learned Judge ought to have seen that earlier it had reduced the upset price from Rs.50.00 lakhs to Rs.45.00 lakhs by its order dated 24.02.2003 made in E.A.No.16 of 2003 and further by order dated 07.7.2004 it had dismissed the E.A.No.67 of 2003 filed by the decree-holder praying for reduction of upset price and allowed E.A.No.138 of 2003 filed by the judgment- debtor under Section 47 of the Code to test the E.P. schedule property for estimating the probable and reasonable value by the Court Amin and accordingly the property was valued at Rs.55.00 lakhs. The counsel also pointed out that in the peculiar facts and circumstances while deciding this question at least the Sub-Registrar should have been examined and in the absence of any acceptable material, whatsoever, allowing the application and fixing the price in such an arbitrary fashion cannot be sustained, since the revision petitioner/judgment- debtor would be put to serious loss and prejudice would be caused if the sale to be further proceeded with in the light of the order which is challenged in the present civil revision petition. The learned counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the language employed in Order XXI Rule 72A and Order XXI Rule 66 of the Code and placed strong reliance on several decisions to substantiate his submissions that the Court has no such power to reduce and fix the upset price. 4. Per contra, Sri M. Venkata Narayana, learned counsel representing respondent had taken this court through the impugned order and would maintain that to say that under no circumstance the Court can reduce the upset price, cannot be a sustainable contention, especially in the light of the language employed in Order XXI Rule 72A of the Code. 4. Per contra, Sri M. Venkata Narayana, learned counsel representing respondent had taken this court through the impugned order and would maintain that to say that under no circumstance the Court can reduce the upset price, cannot be a sustainable contention, especially in the light of the language employed in Order XXI Rule 72A of the Code. The learned counsel also would maintain that it is no doubt true even in case of mortgage decrees the provisions of Order XXI Rule 66 of the Code may have to be followed, but however, the provisions of Order XXI Rule 72A of the Code also to be followed. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel would maintain that here is a case where the unfortunate respondent/decree-holder had been making serious attempts to realize his decretal amount. It is no doubt a decree obtained on the strength of a mortgage. The counsel also would point out that inasmuch as the decree-holder was unable to see that the property is sold in the court auction, the decree-holder himself made an application praying for permission to participate in the bid and accordingly under those circumstances since the decree-holder was not successful in seeing that his secured amount under the mortgage be realized, ultimately, being left with no other option this application had been moved. It is not as though the Court is powerless to fix the reserve price or upset price depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular given case especially in a case of this nature a decree obtained on the strength of a mortgage. The counsel also pointed out to the language employed in Order XXI Rule 72A of the Code and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case the order made by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, cannot be found fault in any way. The counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 5. Heard the counsel and perused the order impugned. 6. The counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 5. Heard the counsel and perused the order impugned. 6. The respondent herein, the decree-holder, Nellore Finance Corporation, represented by its Managing Director, filed an application E.A.No.201 of 2005 in E.P.No.65 of 1995 in O.S.No.23 of 1989 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kavali, stating that the Amin fixed the value at Rs.55.00 lakhs and no bidders came forward to participate in the auction and hence, valuation certificate issued by the Sub-Registrar was filed and it is stated that the certificate clearly reveals that the value of the property is Rs.35.00 lakhs and hence prayed for reduction of the sale price. 7. An elaborate counter had been filed by the revision petitioner/judgment- debtor as hereunder. The allegations of the petition are not true and correct. The value given by Amin was Rs.50.00 lakhs. The judgment-debtor had produced registration valuation of Government along with proof. The petitioner filed petition just before calling work even without waiting for bidders. Hence, the petition was not maintainable. As alleged by the petitioner the value of the E.P. schedule house was Rs.60,64,150/- and that it was higher than the market value. The petitioner filed E.P.No.252 of 2001 on 7.8.2001 under Order XXI Rule 72 of the Code praying permission to bid and purchase the property shown in the E.P. schedule and the same was allowed. The petitioner was trying to knock away the schedule property at throwaway price taking advantage of miserable position of the judgment-debtor. Since the income tax authorities raided the house of the respondent and attached all the properties, the respondent was not able to sell away his properties privately. The income tax arrears as on 15.11.1993 was Rs.22,98,736/-. The tax recovery officer passed an order on 05.01.1996 releasing the E.P. schedule property to the extent of Rs.7,82,358-75 ps. with further interest at the rate of 6% on Rs.4,50,000/- and the petitioner was entitled to appropriate the amount and the balance of amount had to be paid to the income tax authorities. The petitioner on the mortgage of E.P. schedule property gave a loan of Rs.4,50,000/- on 25.02.1987, whereas he gave the value of the property as Rs.75,000/- in the year 1995. The decree-holder filed E.A.No.272 of 2001 to fix the upset price on the ground that Amin's value was high. The petitioner on the mortgage of E.P. schedule property gave a loan of Rs.4,50,000/- on 25.02.1987, whereas he gave the value of the property as Rs.75,000/- in the year 1995. The decree-holder filed E.A.No.272 of 2001 to fix the upset price on the ground that Amin's value was high. The Court granted permission to the decree-holder to bid on the values stated by Amin holding that Amin value was correct. Subsequently, the decree- holder again filed E.A.No.16 of 2003 on 31.01.2003 to reduce the upset price to Rs.10.00 lakhs and the Court by an order dated 24.2.2003 reduced the value and fixed the upset price as Rs.45.00 lakhs. No appeal was filed against the said order. Again, the decree-holder filed petition in E.A.No.67 of 2003 to reduce the upset price. The judgment-debtor filed another petition in E.A.No.138 of 2003 to order test of property. The Amin valued the property to Rs.55.00 lakhs and the property was brought to sale on 13.6.2005 and the decree-holders brought the bidders from Nellore, who were their supporters. The Court, even without an application from the decree-holder, suo motu reduced the upset price to Rs.50.00 lakhs from Rs.55.00 lakhs and the sale was adjourned to 04.8.2005 without any application from 03.8.2005. On 04.8.2005 the Court directed the decree-holder to produce the valuation certificate and the matter was posted to 10.8.2005. On 10.8.2005 the decree-holder filed valuation certificate, which was not correct. There were arithmetical errors in the valuation certificate. 8. The learned Judge formulated the point for consideration as hereunder: "Whether the petitioner is entitled to reduce the sale price as prayed for? 9. The learned Judge referred to E.A.No.252 of 2001 filed under Order XXI Rule 72 of the Code and also referred to E.A.No.16 of 2003, E.A.No.67 of 2003 and further referred to AIR 2004 A.P. 465 and also referred to the evidence of P.W.1 and Ex.A-1, the valuation certificate issued by the Sub-Registrar and the evidence of R.W.1 and Exs.B-1 to B-4 as well and ultimately allowed the application reducing the sale price to Rs.35.00 lakhs from Rs.50.00 lakhs. Hence, the present civil revision petition. 10. The learned counsel representing the revision petitioner placed strong reliance on the decision in Gajadhar Prasad and others v. Babu Bhakta Ratan and others1 wherein the Apex Court at paras 13 and 15 observed as hereunder. Hence, the present civil revision petition. 10. The learned counsel representing the revision petitioner placed strong reliance on the decision in Gajadhar Prasad and others v. Babu Bhakta Ratan and others1 wherein the Apex Court at paras 13 and 15 observed as hereunder. "It was submitted that the Court should not have put its own valuation on the property, as such a procedure was certain to prejudice the minds of prospective purchasers with regard to the value of the property to be auctioned. We find that there is some conflict of opinion in the High Courts on this question. Te Madras High Court, in S.K. Veeraswami Pillai v. Kalyanasundaram Mudaliar AIR 1927 Mad 1009 (1); Srinivasan v. Andhra Bank Ltd., AIR 1949 Mad 398; Yellappa Naidu v. G. Venugopal AIR 1958 Mad 423 and the Allahabad High Court, in Md. Said Khan v. Md. Abdus Sami Khan AIR 1932 All 664; Dwarka Dass v. Bhawani Prasad AIR 1960 All 510 have held that it is unnecessary for the Court to give its own estimate. The Calcutta High Court in Rajah Ramessur Prashad Narain Singh v. Rai Sham Kissen, (1904) 8 Cal WN 257; Saurendra Mohan Tagore v. Hurruk Chand (1908) 12 Cal WN 542; Bejoy Singh Dadhulia v. Ashutosh Gossain, AIR 1924 Cal 589; Lachira v. Rameshvar Singh AIR 1930 Cal 781; Pashupati Nath v. Bank of Behar, AIR 1932 Cal 141; New Birbhum Coal Co. Ltd. V. Surendra Nath Laik, AIR 1934 Cal 205 the Patna High Court in Raghunath Singh v. Nazari Sahu AIR 1917 Pat 381 and Mt. Golab Kuer v. Mt. Bibi Saira AIR 1919 Pat 372 and the Rangoon High Court in A.M.K.M. Firm v. Baishmaw, AIR 1937 Rang 137 have expressed opinions favouring giving of the Court's own estimate of the value of the property to be sold. But, a mere acceptance of the valuation given by the decree-holder has been held to be material irregularity in A.M.K.M. Firm v. Baishmaw (supra). The High Court of Bombay, in Charandas Vasanji v. Dossabhoy Maganlal AIR 1939 Bom 182; Premaraj Pannalal Shop v. Sadabai AIR 1935 Bom 331 has held that, although, it is not necessary for the execution court to value the property to be sold, yet, it may do so if it thinks fit. The High Court of Bombay, in Charandas Vasanji v. Dossabhoy Maganlal AIR 1939 Bom 182; Premaraj Pannalal Shop v. Sadabai AIR 1935 Bom 331 has held that, although, it is not necessary for the execution court to value the property to be sold, yet, it may do so if it thinks fit. In Sitabai Rambhau Marathe v. Gangadhar Dhanram AIR 1935 Bom 331 however, the Bombay High Court held that the Court is bound to hold an enquiry as to the value of the property and to state it in the sale proclamation. Although the Madras High Court had held that it is not necessary for the Court to give its own valuation, it expressed the opinion that it is desirable, where there is a wide divergence between the valuation of the decree-holder and of the judgment debtor, to have property valued through an Amin and to state it in the proclamation: The Calcutta view, in some of the cases mentioned above, was that, although the Court need not give its own valuation of the property in the sale proclamation, it would be justified in stating the valuation given by the parties. A review of the authorities as well as the amendments to Rule 66 (2) (e) make it abundantly clear that the Court, when stating the estimated value of the property to be sold, must not accept merely the ipse dixit of one side. It is certainly not necessary for it to state its own estimate. If this were required, it may, to be fair necessitate insertion of something like a summary of a judicially considered order, giving its grounds, in the sale proclamation which may confuse bidders. It may also be quite misleading if the Court's estimate is erroneous. Moreover, Rule 66 (2)(e) requires the Court to state only the facts it considers material for a purchaser to judge the value and nature of the property himself. Hence, the purchaser should be left to judge the value for himself. But, essential facts which have a bearing on the very material question of value of the property and which would assist the purchaser in forming his own opinion must be stated. That is, after all, the whole object of Order 21, Rule 66 (2)(e), Civil Procedure Code. The Court has only to decide what all these material particulars are in each case. That is, after all, the whole object of Order 21, Rule 66 (2)(e), Civil Procedure Code. The Court has only to decide what all these material particulars are in each case. We think that this is an obligation imposed by Rule 66 (2)(e). In discharging it, the Court should normally state the valuation given by both the decree-holder as well as the judgment debtor where they have both valued the property; and these do not appear fantastic. It may usefully state other material facts, such as the area of land, nature of rights in it, municipal assessment, actual rents realized, which could reasonably be expected to effect valuation. What could be reasonably and usefully stated succinctly in a sale proclamation has to be determined on the facts of each particular case. Inflexible rules are not desirable on such a question." 11. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Edara Pattabhi Srirama V. Thadikammal Veerabhadra Appala China Rajanna and others wherein the learned Division Bench at paras 10, 11 and 12 observed as hereunder. "We shall now turn to clause (f). This is a residuary provision. The provisions of clause (f) must be read in the light of the other clauses. The use of the words 'every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know' in clause (f) indicates that "every other thing" is not inclusive of the very value of the property. On a careful reading of this clause, we are of the view that the expression "every other thing" is not permissible of such wide interpretation so as to take in the very value of the property. The expression 'every other thing' means every other mater or information other than the matter or information specified in clause (e) which would provide a guide for the intending purchaser to assess the true nature and correct value of the property. If the framers of the Code intended the Court to give in the sale proclamation its own value in addition to the values stated by the decree-holder and judgment-debtor, clause (e) would have made a specific mention of the same. That apart, as pointed out earlier, it is neither practicable nor possible for the court without an enquiry to give its own value of the property. That apart, as pointed out earlier, it is neither practicable nor possible for the court without an enquiry to give its own value of the property. In the circumstances, we are of the firm view that the expression 'every other thing' in clause (f) should not be construed to take the value of the property as determined by the executing Court. The very object and intendment of the furnishing of the particulars, i.e., the value of the property as stated by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor and every other thing which is material, is only to facilitate the intending purchasers in assessing the correct value and true nature of the property. If the very value of the property is given by the executing court, all the aforesaid material is really redundant. In order to arrive at the true nature and value of the property, the information and particulars specified in clauses (e) and (f) are required. The residuary clause (f), therefore, is intended to cover all mater and other than the market value of the property sought to be sold. Clause (f) is not susceptible of any interpretation other than he one indicated by us. This view of ours gains support from the decision of the Madras High Court in Srinivasan v. Andhra Bank, AIR 1949 Mad 398. We may also notice that it is not obligatory on the part of the executing Court to make a regular enquiry about the market value of the property and furnish the same in the sale proclamation. Reference in this regard may be made to Rule 199 of the Civil Rules of Practice, which would throw some light on this aspect of the same. Rule 199 provides for an application for leave to bid at the sale to be filed by any decree-holder who intends to take part in the court auction. Sub-rule (2) thereof enjoins the executing Court to fix the minimum price for which the decree-holder can bid provided leave is granted to him. The intendment of the aforesaid rule is to prevent the decree-holder from knocking away the property for a low price. There may be cases where third party bidders for reasons best known to them are not forthcoming. There is every danger in such cases of the property being purchased by the decree-holder himself for a low price. The intendment of the aforesaid rule is to prevent the decree-holder from knocking away the property for a low price. There may be cases where third party bidders for reasons best known to them are not forthcoming. There is every danger in such cases of the property being purchased by the decree-holder himself for a low price. The Court, in such cases, has a duty to protect the interests of the judgment-debtor. If the framers of the Code had intended that the executing Court shall fix the upset price after assessing the true market value of the property sought to be sold, clauses (e) and (f) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 66 of the Order 21 would have been differently and suitably worded. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that the executing Court is not bound to fix an upset price when there is a wide disparity between the values given by the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder for stating in the sale proclamation. However, we may state that the Court is not prevented in appropriate cases from indicating the approximate value of the property. In other words, there is no prohibition for the executing Court, if it thinks it just, proper and necessary, from including the market value of the property on the basis of the material available to it. (See AIR 1949 Mad 398). Where there is a very wide disparity in the values given by the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder, it is not only desirable but fair and proper for the executing Court to ascertain either through a Commissioner or an Amin the approximate value of the property and incorporate the same in the sale proclamation. (Vide AIR 1955 Mad 720). Such procedure would undoubtedly afford a safe guide for he intending purchasers to make up heir minds in estimating he true nature and value of the properties." 12. Reliance also was placed on the decision of this Court in M. Veeranjaneyulu V. M. Saraswathamma3 wherein the learned Judge of this Court while dealing with fixation of upset price in sale proceedings and the procedure to be followed in the light of Order XXI Rule 66 (e) (A.P.) held that it is desirable for courts to indicate nature of property along with surroundings etc. and also indicate rates quoted by judgment-debtor and decree-holder to prospective purchaser. and also indicate rates quoted by judgment-debtor and decree-holder to prospective purchaser. Court cannot estimate on is own particularly fixing price as estimated by decree-holder. 13. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision in P. Rami Reddy V. P. Sundara Rama Reddy and others4 wherein the learned Judge of this Court at paras 6 and 7 observed as hereunder. "A reading thereof would postulate that notwithstanding anything contained in R.72, a mortgagee-decree-holder of immovable property shall not bid for or purchase property sold in execution of a decree without obtaining the leave of he Court to bid for or purchase the property. The leave granted shall be subject to the condition that the reserve price shall be not less than the amount then due for principal, interest and costs in respect of the mortgage if the property is sold in one lot. If the leave is granted to the mortgagee- decree-holder to bid in the auction or purchase the hypotheca, the language couched in R.72-A(2) thereof manifests in mandatory language that the Court "then shall fix" a reserve price as regards the mortgagee and unless the Court otherwise directs, the reserve price "shall be not less than the amount due for principal, interest and costs in respect of the mortgage if the property is sold in one lot and if it is sold in more than one lot, not less than such sum as shall appear to the Court to be properly attributable to such lots in relation to the amount then due for principal, interest and costs on the mortgage. The contention of Sri Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant is that the language "unless the Court otherwise directs" would engraft within its ambit the discretion provided in R.72(1) and in exercise thereof the lower Court granted permission subject to the condition that the bid shall not be less than the upset price. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to consider what is the ambit and meaning of the words "unless the Court otherwise directs", in the context of R.72-A read as a whole. Undoubtedly, the words "unless the Court otherwise directs" would give a meaningful construction of discretion in the Courts while granting permission to the mortgagee-decree-holder to participate in the bid. But the exercise of the discretion and direction otherwise granted would be germane to the purpose sought to be achieved under R.72A. Undoubtedly, the words "unless the Court otherwise directs" would give a meaningful construction of discretion in the Courts while granting permission to the mortgagee-decree-holder to participate in the bid. But the exercise of the discretion and direction otherwise granted would be germane to the purpose sought to be achieved under R.72A. The question therefore is what is the purpose of R.72A. The language couched in R.72-A appears to emphasize the mandatory character of the duty case on the Court. The manner of exercise of the power under sub-rule (2) of R.72A makes manifest from the words "the Court shall fix the reserve price" for sale shall not be less than the amount due under the decree i.e., the principal amount, interest thereon and costs, if the land is sold in the one lot shall be conterminous with the extinguishment of the debt due. If it is sold in more than one lot, the reserve price shall be so apportioned consistent with the nature of the property, the extent thereof or quality and the amount sought to be recovered and shall be evenly distributed so as to apportion the debt and liquidation thereof. From the language thus manifested by the statute, it gives in unmistakable terms the legislative animation that it intended to relieve the mortgagor from all the liabilities incurred under the mortgage. It also seems to eradicate or at least aimed to nip in the bud the incurable tendency on the part of the decree-holder to take undue advantage of the court sale by purchasing the hypotheca at a lower price by procuring collusive bidders at a farce of sale and to knock off the property at a minimal price and then to take recourse to recover the residue of the decree debt by other process available under the Code. If the mortgagee-decree- holder opts to make avail of the statutory facility to bid in or purchase the hypotheca in such Court auction he shall abide by law i.e., he should be prepared to purchase the property in discharge of full quids viz., in full satisfaction of the entire outstanding debt due under the mortgage decree in execution. If the mortgagee-decree- holder opts to make avail of the statutory facility to bid in or purchase the hypotheca in such Court auction he shall abide by law i.e., he should be prepared to purchase the property in discharge of full quids viz., in full satisfaction of the entire outstanding debt due under the mortgage decree in execution. Considered from this perspective, the necessary conclusion is that it is the mandatory duty of the executing Court while granting leave to the mortgagee-decree-holder either under O. XXI R.72(1) or under O.21 R.72A, to comply with the fixation of the reserve price in conformity with the mandatory conditions stipulated under sub-rule (2) (a) or (b) of R.72A. That it is mandatory is made manifest when we read the opening language of R.72-A viz., "notwithstanding anything contained in R.72." The non-compliance thereof renders the grant of permission to the mortgagee-decree-holder fatal and per se illegal. The exercise of discretion under sub-rule (2) of R.72-A is in the nature of an exception and for the exercise thereof the legislature carved out large leeway to the Court by employing the language "the Court unless otherwise directs". It is obviously difficult for the legislature to foresee diverse situations or circumstances that may confront the Court invoking the rule. To meet such situation power is preserved in the Court. In a given case on its peculiar facts and circumstances, for relevant and germane reasons mentioned thereunder the Court may otherwise give directions. But such directions must always be to sub-serve the object of R.72-A but not in defeasance thereof. Lest while exercising the wide discretion the purpose and working of R.72-A would be rendered otiose and nugatory and could easily be frustrated or defeated. When permission to mortgagee is granted in conformity with R.72-A, then and then only the mortgagee could make avail of the statutory benefit of set off under R.84(2) of O.21. Otherwise the mortgagee on the sale being knocked down in his favour shall pay immediately 25% of the amount of purchase money as envisaged under R.84(1) and in default thereof the property shall forthwith be resold. A reading of the order of the Court below earlier would clearly show that the lower Court did not accord permission to the appellant in compliance of R.72-A (2) and thereby he is denuded the benefit of set off under R.84(2). A reading of the order of the Court below earlier would clearly show that the lower Court did not accord permission to the appellant in compliance of R.72-A (2) and thereby he is denuded the benefit of set off under R.84(2). Admittedly no deposit of 25% of the amount of purchase money was immediately deposited by the second respondent either by himself personally or on behalf of the appellant. As a fact, no deposit was made nor the property was resold forthwith. The non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of R.84(1) renders the sale per se illegal. Grouched from this perspective, I have no hesitation to conclude that the permission granted to the appellant is palpably illegal and the sale also became illegal and so the Court below has rightly set aside the sale warranting no interference in this appeal. The lower Court is directed to proceed with the execution as expeditiously as possible. In view of O. XXXIV, R.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is still open to the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount in terms thereof and get the debt discharged. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Since none are appearing for the respondent, there is no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed." 14. Reliance also was placed on the decision in R. Srinivasan and others v. The Andhra Bank Ltd., having its Head office at Masulipatnam. 15. Order XXI Rule 72A dealing with mortgagee not to bid at sale without the leave of the Court reads as hereunder: "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 72, a mortgagee of immovable property shall not bid for or purchase property sold in execution of a decree on the mortgage unless the Court grants him leave to bid for or purchase the property. (2) If leave to bid is granted to such mortgagee, then the Court shall fix a reserve price as regards the mortgagee, and unless the Court otherwise directs, the reserve price shall be,- (a) not less than the amount then due for principal, interest and costs in respect of the mortgage if the property is sold in one lot; and (b) in the case of any property sold in lots, not less than such sum as shall appear to the Court to be properly attributable to each lot in relation to the amount then due for principal, interest and costs on the mortgage. (3) In other respects, the provisions of sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 72 shall apply in relation to purchase by the decree-holder under that rule." 16. It is pertinent to note that sub-section (2) of Order XXI Rule 72A specifies certain further conditions. Order XXI Rule 72A principally specifies that 'in other respects, the provisions of sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 72 shall apply in relation to purchase by the decree-holder under that rule.' 17. Order XXI Rule 72 of the Code deals with decree-holder not to bid for or buy property without permission. Order XXI Rule 72(2) and (3) read as hereunder. "(2) Where decree-holder purchases, amount of decree may be taken as payment.--- Where a decree-holder purchases with such permission, the purchase- money and the amount due on the decree may, subject to the provisions of section 73, be set off against one another, and the Court executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in part accordingly. (3) Where a decree-holder purchases, by himself or through another person, without such permission, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the judgment-debtor or any other person whose interests are affected by the sale, by order set aside the sale; and the costs of such application and order, and any deficiency of price which may happen on the re- sale and all expenses attending it, shall be paid by the decree-holder." 18. In Mrs. Achamma Cyriac v. The Kerala Financial Corporation and others6 while dealing with Order XXI Rules 64 and 72 of the Code and fixation of reserved price less than the decretal amount due to mortgagee, decree-holder it was held that the sale is nullity. 19. In Mrs. Achamma Cyriac v. The Kerala Financial Corporation and others6 while dealing with Order XXI Rules 64 and 72 of the Code and fixation of reserved price less than the decretal amount due to mortgagee, decree-holder it was held that the sale is nullity. 19. Reliance also was placed on the decision in A.C. Nagaraju v. N. Sreenivasa Reddy where the learned Judge of this Court while dealing with setting aside the execution of sale on the ground of irregularity while dealing with an application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code held that the decree against respondent had become final and sale proceedings initiated- respondent was not present at the time of sale and he was not aware of value of property as entered in sale proclamation before sale took place, sale notice was published in English which language respondent did not know, the respondent produced valuation certificate issued by sub-registrar showing valuation of property much more than indicated in sale proclamation- order setting aside sale on the ground that valuation of property furnished in the sale proceedings was far less than actual value, not to be interfered with. 20. Sri M. Venkata Narayana, learned counsel representing the respondent- decree-holder placed strong reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Anto Nitto v. South Indian Bank Ltd.,8 wherein while dealing with Order XXI Rule 72A(2) of the Code observed at para 21 as hereunder. "Before parting with the consideration of Antony's case (supra), we would like to refer to one important aspect having a bearing on the question of a party's right to waive the strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of law like Rule 72A (2). In this connection we would refer to the avowed legislative purpose intended to be achieved by the incorporation of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 72A. Justice K. Ramaswamy (as His Lordship then was) had pithily put it in the following words in P. Rami Reddy v. P. Sundara Rama Reddy, AIR 1986 AP 29 (at page 31): "...... From the language thus manifested by the statute, it gives in unmistakable terms the legislative animation that it intended to relieve the mortgagor from all the liabilities incurred under the mortgage. From the language thus manifested by the statute, it gives in unmistakable terms the legislative animation that it intended to relieve the mortgagor from all the liabilities incurred under the mortgage. It also seems to eradicate or at least aimed to nip in the bud the incurable tendency on the part of the decree-holder to take undue advantage of the Court sale by purchasing the hypotheca at a lower price by procuring collusive bidders at a force of sale and to nock off the property at a minimal price and then to take recourse to recover the residue of the decree debt by other process available under the Code....." We are in full agreement with the above observations. It is clear that of the above two purposes one at least cannot be treated as something intended to benefit the judgment-debtor alone. While the one is exclusively to safeguard the interest of the judgment-debtors, the other is intended to serve a public purpose also, namely to nip in the bud itself an incurable and pernicious tendency on the part of the decree-holder to take undue advantage of the court sale and to practice fraud even in Court proceedings. We may also refer in this connection to the observations of Subba Rao, J. in Dhirendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 1300 , where the learned Judge was dealing with the right of a party to waive strict compliance with certain provisions of law (at page 1305): "......a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interests, but in the interests of the party that waives it......" In the light of the above principle regulating the right of a party to waive compliance with mandatory provisions of law had it been necessary for us to take a final decision in the matter, we would have held that compliance with the requirements of Rule 72A(2) cannot be waived by the judgment-debtor since it is not a provision incorporated solely for his benefit. It is a provision intended to remove a social evil. It is a provision intended to remove a social evil. However, we find that it is not necessary for us to pronounce finally upon the above point in this case as we have already held as a finding of fact that the judgment-debtor in this case has not waived his rights in that behalf." It is pertinent to note that AIR 1986 AP 29 had been referred to by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. 21. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of Madras High Court in Dr. A.U. Natarajan and another V. Indian Bank, Madras9 wherein the learned Division Bench of the Madras High Court at paras 14, 20, 21, 22 and 23 observed as hereunder. "We have already pointed out the difference in meaning between the words 'value' and 'upset price' or 'reserve price'. What the proviso in question lays down is that in a proclamation of sale the estimate of the value of the property as given by either or both the parties, should necessarily find a place. But, no duty was cast on the court to enter into the sale proclamation its own estimate of the value of the property. The reason for the Legislature having worded the proviso in the manner done is not far off to see. The court making an estimate of the value of the property and entering it in the proclamation of sale would become necessary only when an upset price has to be fixed for the property. Since the Legislature has now made it obligatory that the estimate of the value of the property as given by either or both the parties, should necessarily find a place in the proclamation of sale, the need for the Court to fix an upset price may not arise in all cases. The procedure indicated by P.N. Ramaswami, J. in Yellappa Naidu v. Venugopal Naidu (1957) 70 Mad LW 815: ( AIR 1958 Mad 423 ) can be resorted to i.e., the sale will have to commence at the higher price given by the judgment-debtor and, in the absence of bidders, the price will have to be progressively brought down till it reaches the figure given by the decree-holder and again raised up, depending upon the availability of bidders. If, in spite of such a procedure, the sale does not take place for want of bidders, then it is open to the court, on the application of the decree-holder, to fix an upset price for the property at a rate as near as the property would be worth in the estimation of the court. If, even then, the sale does not take place, the decree-holder can move the executing court to reduce the upset price. It will be open to the executing court to reduce the upset price or not, depending upon the circumstances of the case, and, if a reduction is to be made, to decide the extent to which the upset price should be reduced. It is only for these reasons, the legislature should have enacted the proviso in two parts, the first part relating to the discretionary power of the court to give its own estimate of the value of the property in the sale proclamation and the second part relating to the obligation of the court to include in the sale proclamation the estimate, if any, given by either of both the parties. The first part of the proviso is in the negative and the second part, in the affirmative. The significance of the manner of drafting cannot be missed. The affirmative is used to give a mandate and the negative is used only to emphasize that the court is not under a duty to enter its own estimate in the proclamation of sale. If it is the intention of the legislature that the court should, in no circumstances, give its own estimate of the value of the property, then the wording of the first part of the proviso would have been entirely different. The legislature would have clearly mentioned that the court was precluded from making its own estimate of the value of the property and that the proclamation shall not include the estimate, if any, made by the court. In some cases, the court may feel called upon, in the interests of justice, to enter in the proclamation of sale its own estimate of the value of the property. Take, for example, a case where the judgment-debtor, for some reason has not given his value of the property and only the decree-holder has given his value and that value is grossly low. Take, for example, a case where the judgment-debtor, for some reason has not given his value of the property and only the decree-holder has given his value and that value is grossly low. The proclamation of sale would then contain only the value as given by the decree-holder, and if the property is brought for sale, the bidding at the auction can start only at the rate given by the decree-holder and the property may be knocked off at the value given by the decree-holder or for a slightly higher amount. The result will be that the property may get sold for a very low price and the judgment-debtor would be the loser in the bargain. To avoid such a situation, the court can certainly exercise its discretionary power under the first limb of the proviso and give its own estimate of the value of the property in the sale proclamation. When property is sold in court auction, the court does not merely act as an auctioneer, but has also a duty to protect the interests of the judgment-debtor as well as the decree-holder. It is with reference to this peculiar role, Rule 199 (2) of the Civil Rules of Practice has been framed. The said rule is in the following terms--- "Upset price:- In cases in which the court may consider that the applicant (decree-holder) should not be allowed to bid for less than a sum to be fixed, it shall be competent to the court to give leave to bid at the sale only on condition that the applicant's (decree-holder's) bid shall not be less than the amount so fixed by the court, which amount shall, as far as practicable, be determined with reference to the probable market value of the property, or of the lot or lots into which the property is divided for sale." When the decree- holder seeks leave of the court to bid at the auction, the court may deem it necessary to fix the upset price of the property with reference to the probable market value of the property or the lots into which it may be divided for sale. It would be strange logic to say that the court should step into safeguard the interests of the judgment-debtor only in those cases where decree-holder seeks leave of court to bid at the auction and at other times, the court need not concern itself with fixing an upset price for the property. If such a narrow view is taken, then the decree-holder can defeat the object underlying the rule by putting up a benamidar as the purchaser. Even as in the case of a judgment- debtor, the court has also to safeguard the rights of the decree-holder by seeing to it that the execution proceedings do not become abortive for want of bidders for purchasing the property at the highly boosted up rate given by the judgment-debtor. We are therefore of opinion that the court's power to fix an upset price for the property, which includes within it a right to reduce the upset price whenever necessary has not only been available to the court all through, but such a right is a irremovable one, and the said right has not been impinged in the least by the second proviso introduced by Act 104 of 1976. Of course, as pointed out in Susila v. Saraswathi Ammal, AIR 1970 Mad 357 , when the court fixes the upset price, the court is not determining the rights of any of the parties before it, and the fixation of the upset price is only for facilitating the conduct of the sale and, at the same time, safeguarding the interests of the judgment-debtor by fixing a reserve price. Notwithstanding the fixation of the upset price and notwithstanding the fact that a bidder has offered an amount higher than the upset price, it will still be open to the judgment-debtor to approach the executing court and adduce proof that the property has been sold for a low price on account of some material irregularity or fraud in the publication or conduct of the sale and have the sale set aside." 22. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in D.S. Chohan and another V. State Bank of Patiala10 wherein the Apex Court while dealing with Order XXI Rule 72A(2) of the Code held that while granting permission to mortgagee, decree-holder, to make bid in the auction must give direction regarding fixing reserve price and sale effected in violation of this mandatory requirement liable to be set aside. 23. It is needless to say that this procedure ordained or contemplated by Order XXI Rule 72A of the Code is mandatory. It is no doubt true that at the same time Order XXI Rule 66 may have to be followed. In the case of mortgage decrees both the provisions of Order XXI Rule 72A, Order XXI Rule 66 of the Code may have to be harmoniously construed. However, on over all facts and circumstances, inasmuch it is brought to the notice of the court that varying certificates had been produced and from time to time the valuation is being changed. It may be true that the decree-holder may not be able to realize the amount at all, but however at the same time the interest of the judgment-debtor also equally to be protected. The object underlying is to see that the property sold in the court auction not to be sold away for unreasonable price. 24. Keeping this object in view, in the light of the observations made above, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Judge to hear both the parties again on the aspect of valuation and pass appropriate orders in this regard in the light of the decisions referred to supra. 25. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. At this juncture Sri M. Venkata Narayana states that the matter is being prolonged by the revision petitioner- judgment-debtor by adopting all methods. Let the learned Judge give opportunity to both the parties and decide the matter in accordance with law at the earliest point of time.