Judgment K.S.Garewal, J. 1. The petitioner-are Sarbhanand Chela Swami Nitya Nand and 5 others. The petitioners case is that Sarbhanand is the Mahant of Gadi Katas Raj Dham and owner of 28 bighas 18 biswas in Gobindpura. Petitioners 2 and 3 own 16 biswas in the said village, while petitioner 4 own 3 bighas 1-2/3 biswas. Petitioners 5 and 6 are also owners of land failing in Gobindpura. The land came within the municipal area of Yamuna Nagar and is connected with electricity, water, road etc. 2. Petitioners land adjoins temples of Vishnu Bhagwan, Shankar Ji. Santoshi Mata, Hanuman Jai and is being used for religious festivals for the past 20 years, langar is also a regular feature. People have great faith in the gaddi of Katas Raj Dham and visit the temple to make offerings. 3. The State of Haryana issued notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in 1969 intending to acquire land in Gobindpura. The acquisition was for the development of the area but no action was taken and the notification was allowed to lapse. 4. A second notification was issued under Section 4 on June 1, 1974 again for acquisition for development and utilization as residential/commercial area yet again no action was taken and the notification was allowed to lapse. 5. The present notification under Section 4 was issued on December 4, 1980. This the third time when the land was sought to be acquired. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on August 17, 1983 but the notification was not published in the locality, although an entry was made in the Patwaris roznamcha on December 5, 1980 to this effect. 6. The acquisition proceedings were challenged through the present petition filed in February, 1984. Proceedings were stayed on March 6, 1984. The petitioner was later admitted on April 25, 1986. 7. In the written statement filed by the Land Acquisition Collector on September 4, 1984, it was admitted that the petitioners were the owners of the land but petitioner I had sold some land from khasra 1038, 1039 and 1040 and the mutations had been entered in favour of the transferees. It was stated that the only interest of the petitioner was to make a lucrative business by selling plots. It was stated that the only interest of the petitioner was to make a lucrative business by selling plots. It was also submitted that no temple existed on the petitioners land but there was a temple on an adjoining plot. The temple land has been released from acquisition. Petitioner I had recently raised some superstructures on the land in dispute. 8. As regards the two notifications of 1969 and 1974, it was submitted that although no notification was issued in 1969 in respect of the land in dispute, a notification was issued in 1974 which was allowed to lapse as there was no immediate need to acquire the land. On December 4, 1980 a notification had been issued by but the land was not the same land which had earlier been covered under Section 4 in 1969 or 1974. The said notification had been published in the locality by beat of drum and entry in this regard also been made in the Patwaris roznamcha. The declaration under Section 6 was issued within the statutory period of 3 years on August 17, 1983 and the landowners were also issued notice under Section 9 and their claims were heard. The petitioners had not suffered any discrimination. 9. The petitioners placed on record an additional affidavit alongwith copies of proceedings dated July 24, 1986 (Annexure A/3), October 6, 1986 (Annexure P/4) and October 10, 1986 (Annexure A/5). They also relied upon four notifications, photographs and certain letters. 10. The petitioners argument is that after the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1984 a time limit had been provided for the pronouncement of the award, which limitation began from the date of Section 6 declaration. To consider this development, Chief Administrator, HUDA, presided over a meeting on July 24, 1986 of all departments concerned with land acquisition in Haryana. The participants included the Land Acquisition Collectors of Panchkula, Gurgaon and Faridabad. Thereafter, Chief Administrator, HUDA again met the concerned officers and directed that a list be prepared of all those notifications which had been lapsed in September 23, 1986 but the areas covered by orders by the courts should be specified. 11. Consequently, a list of such land was prepared indicating the area where notifications under Sections 4 and 6 had not been lapsed. This list is at Annexure A/5. The Government decided to re-acquire the same area. 11. Consequently, a list of such land was prepared indicating the area where notifications under Sections 4 and 6 had not been lapsed. This list is at Annexure A/5. The Government decided to re-acquire the same area. On April 5, 1990 a notification was issued under Section 4 to reacquire 17.89 acres in Gobindpura. This notification is Annexure A/6. Thereafter a declaration under Section 6 was issued on April 4, 1991 with regard to 3.31 acres. The award by the Collector in respect of 3.31 has already been announced. 12. Later on November 16, 2004, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act to acquire 2.71 acres in Gobindpura. This was followed by a declaration under Section 6 on October 21, 2005 to acquire 2.71 acres. Award in respect of this area has also been announced. The petitioners relied upon letters from the Additional Director, Urban Estates Department Haryana and Land Acquisition Collector, Panchkula, to support their contention that their land had not been acquired. Copies of these letters are Annexures A/12 to A/17. 13. The respondents response to the documents annexed with the additional affidavit was that after the issuance of declaration under Section 6 on August 17, 1983 the landowners filed 15 writ petitions before this Court in which stay of dispossession was granted. In the present case, order was passed on March 6, 1984 to stay further proceedings till further orders. Thereafter, Chief Administrator. HUDA and Urban Estate Department took a departmental decision in their meetings on July 24 and October 6, 1986 to allow proceedings in all old acquisition to lapse, total land for which the notification was allowed to lapse was 11.43 acres. The remaining area which was under stay of dispossession was kept under acquisition and was not allowed to lapse. This area was 39.3 acres. It was further pleaded that the Land Acquisition Act was amended on September 24, 1984 and Section 11-A was inserted which provided for two years limitation for pronouncement of the award, the period of two years was to be calculated from the date of declaration under Section 6. It was as a consequence of 1986 meeting that notification under Section 4 was re-issued on April 5, 1990 with the intention to acquire some of the areas in respect of which the notification had lapsed, 17.89 acres constituted such area. It was as a consequence of 1986 meeting that notification under Section 4 was re-issued on April 5, 1990 with the intention to acquire some of the areas in respect of which the notification had lapsed, 17.89 acres constituted such area. However, when declaration under Section 6 was issued it related to only 3.31 acres and remaining area was not declared for acquisition. This was due to a clerical mistake in which some area under litigation was included in 1990 notification and award was announced on March 15, 1993. The notification dated November 16, 2004 related to 2.74 acres. Award in respect of this area was announced on January 10, 2007. 14. The respondents argue that the. area which was allowed to lapse on the basis of the meeting held in 1986, had been re-acquired under different awards but the area which did not lapse was the area which was covered under litigation. Therefore, this area still continued to be under acquisition but he proceedings had been stayed. The petitioners cases fell in the latter category. The area belonging to the petitioners was not covered under the lapsed notification or the acquisition proceedings which had come to an end. The area still remained under acquisition but the proceedings could not be completed because of the stay operating against the respondents. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Beml Employees House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. The appellant in the said case was a Cooperative Society which had moved the Government for acquisition of land for construction of residential houses for its members. The Government decided to acquire large tracts of land including the land of one G. Ramaiah Reddy (Reddy). The notification under Section 4 was issued on March 26, 1990. Reddy filed objections on the ground that he had constructed a house and also sunk a bore well on the land proposed to be acquired. The Land Acquisition Collector recommended dropping of acquisition proceedings in respect of Reddys land. These objections were over-ruled but later when the declaration under Section 6 was published, it was found that some other land had been released from acquisition but not the land belonging to Reddy. When the action of the government was challenged in the writ petition, the main ground was that Reddy has been discriminated. These objections were over-ruled but later when the declaration under Section 6 was published, it was found that some other land had been released from acquisition but not the land belonging to Reddy. When the action of the government was challenged in the writ petition, the main ground was that Reddy has been discriminated. There was no plausible reason for such discriminatory action against him. Reddy had urged before the Court that where proceedings had been dropped against similarly situated person there was no ground to acquire his land and discriminate him for continuing with the acquisition. This contention was upheld by the single Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court. In the Supreme Court, the challenge against the judgments of the High Court was made and the proceedings were quashed altogether. "Once it is held that the action was discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, then the High Court was justified in quashing the whole proceedings, including the notification under Section 4(1), as prayed for by the fifth respondent" 16. On behalf of the State, reference was made to State of Haryana and Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka and Ors., and P. Narayanappa and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2006)7 Supreme Court Cases 578. 17. The argument submitted by the respondents is that the acquisition proceedings against the petitioners did not lapse therefore, their case stood on a different footing altogether. The proceedings had been kept in abeyance in view of the interim orders of this Court. It was only in those acquisition cases in which there was no stay operating that proceedings had lapsed. 18. The respondents relied heavily on the interim orders to contend that stay of proceedings granted in the present case would amount to keeping the proceedings alive, therefore, when the stay was vacated or the petition decided, the proceedings would commence and the period during which the proceedings had been stayed would be excluded for the purpose of determining the limitation for pronouncement of the award. 19. The respondents are not coming forth with any plausible material to demonstrate that the petitioners case, dehors the stay of proceedings, was different from the cases where lands were released but reacquired in 1990 or 2004. 19. The respondents are not coming forth with any plausible material to demonstrate that the petitioners case, dehors the stay of proceedings, was different from the cases where lands were released but reacquired in 1990 or 2004. What was so special in those cases that the proceedings were allowed to lapse except the difference that there was stay of proceedings in one case and no stay in other case. Proceedings against all similarly placed parties lapsed due to operation of law, as the award had not been pronounced within the stipulated period. The result was that the land was re-acquired in 1990 and the some was re-acquired as late as in 2004. The petitioners cases related to acquisition of 1980. The respondents should have been gracious enough to quash these proceedings as well and if necessary re-acquire the land but they took shelter of the provisions of the amended Section 11-A to exclude the period under which the proceedings were stayed from the limitation provided. 20. The stand taken by the respondents is not only discriminatory but is altogether irrational. Acquisition proceedings lapsed in one case because of operation of law but can these proceedings be deemed to continue in other cases where stay had been granted? One would think not. The Chief Administrator. HUDA, should have been astute enough to seek vacation of stay and early hearing in these cases in 1986. When the notifications were declared as lapsed in respect of the other cases. The selective administrative action of 1986 disclosed gross discrimination against parties whose cases were pending. 21. The only reasonable conclusion in these cases is that acquisition proceedings on the basis of notification dated December 4, 1980 cannot be permitted to continue. Similarly placed lands were acquired in 1990 and 2004. The respondents should have of their own accord withdrawn the notification and re-acquired the land, under the notifications which were issued subsequently. The petitioners whose lands are covered by the notification of 1980 are those who had challenged the acquisition proceedings before amendment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1984. It is not fair to penalize these parties for having approached the court of law to seek relief. 22. Consequently, it is held that acquisition proceedings against the petitioners on the basis of notification under Section 4 dated December 4, 1980 are null and void. All the proceedings are quashed. It is not fair to penalize these parties for having approached the court of law to seek relief. 22. Consequently, it is held that acquisition proceedings against the petitioners on the basis of notification under Section 4 dated December 4, 1980 are null and void. All the proceedings are quashed. The respondents shall be at liberty to re-acquire the land by taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act after re-notifying the land. 23. The petition is allowed in the above terms. The parties shall bear their own costs.