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2008 DIGILAW 726 (AP)

Nathi Venkaiah (died) per L. Rs Nathi Ramulu v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District

2008-09-04

P.S.NARAYANA

body2008
ORDER The revision petitioners filed the present C.R.P. under Section 91 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter in short referred to as 'the Act' for the purpose of convenience), challenging the order dated 31.3.2001, made in Appeal File NO.F2/934/99 on the file of the first respondent confirming the grant of ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the Act by the second respondent in favour' of unofficial respondents in proceedings No.B/315/LRE/75. 2. Sri L. Prabhakar Reddy, the learned counsel representing the revision petitioners would maintain that the ancestors of the revision petitioners late Nathi Chittaiah and others- late Sana Mallaiah and Yerrolla Laxmaiah were in joint possession and enjoyment of lands in Survey Nos. 94 and 95 at Kompally Village, Qutubullapur Mandai, Ranga Reddy District, prior to 1950. The learned counsel also would maintain that these families were in joint possession and enjoyment of these lands in the year 1954-55, 1955-56, 1957-58, 1958-59 and by virtue of the provisions of the Act, these parties would become protected tenants and at any rate in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act, Sections 34 and 37 in particular, these parties to be taken as deemed protected tenants. The learned counsel also while elaborating his submissions, had taken this court through Rules 3 and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Protected Tenants (Transfer of Ownership of Lands) Rules, 1973 (for short 'the Rules, 1973') and would maintain that inasmuch as before the preparation of the provisional list, no notice had been served on these parties and Rule 4 (2) of the said Rules had not been complied with. The counsel also would further maintain that no finding, in fact, had been recorded by the leaned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. The counsel also would further maintain that no finding, in fact, had been recorded by the leaned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 2 (r) of the Act and further had carefully taken this court through the language employed in Sections 34, 37 and 38 of the Act as well and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case, since the revision petitioners would fall under the expression "interested persons" when no notice was given and when the procedure contemplated by the Rules,1973 had not been followed, the whole proceedings are vitiated, and on the strength of such documents, if any, recording certain vague findings and without recording specific findings relating to the deemed protected tenancy in the light of Section 37 of the Act. definitely is bad in law. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel would maintain that when disturbance was caused, in fact, there was a cause of action and that was the reason why immediately the petitioners had initiated the necessary action and in the light of the explanation given by the petitioners, though question of limitation also was raised by the opposite party before the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, the learned Joint Collector had not rejected the said appeal on the ground of limitation but had gone into merits, relying on certain documents recorded findings and placing reliance on such documents, resulting in no procedure had been followed as contemplated by the Rules, 1973, also cannot be sustained. The counsel also pointed out specifically the object of the Act and would maintain that it is not as though the appellate authority is not in custody of the relevant documents and• when examining the relevant documents of the specified years by recording such findings dismissing the appeal cannot be sustained and hence it is a fit case for remand. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 3. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 3. Per contra, Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned senior counsel had taken this Court through Rules 20, 24 and 24-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Rules, 1950 (for short 'the Rules, 1950') and would maintain that in the light of the copy of the Final Tenancy Register for the year 1950-51, relied upon by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, the• said findings cannot be found fault with. The learned senior counsel also would maintain that the date of certificate is 03-06-1975 and the appeal was filed in the year 1999. The learned senior counsel also' pointed out to the grounds of appeal and the relief portion prayed for and would maintain that for the reasons best known, the revision petitioners had not challenged the certificate in controversy. The question of non-giving of opportunity or non-issuance of notice, these grounds cannot be permitted to be urged by the revision petitioners at this distance of time, after a long lapse of time about 24 years, since much water had flown in between. The learned senior counsel explained the series of events and would maintain that though appeal is hopelessly barred by limitation, the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, no doubt, referred to the same in the contentions advanced, but had not recorded any specific finding, but however, had gone into merits and may be the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, thought that disposing the matter on merits would be just and proper and hence without touching the question of limitation recorded reasons and ultimately dismissed the appeal. Hence, the learned senior counsel would maintain that this is not a fit case to be interfered with, especially while exercising revisional jurisdiction, even in the light of the language employed in Section 91 of the Act. The learned Senior counsel also would comment that though certain findings had not been recorded relating to the question of limitation by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, that ground also can be raised by the successful contesting respondents in the C.R.P. and on this ground alone, the C.R.P. is liable to be dismissed. The learned senior counsel also had drawn the attention of this court to the relevant provisions of the Act, apart from the Rules already specified supra. 4. The learned senior counsel also had drawn the attention of this court to the relevant provisions of the Act, apart from the Rules already specified supra. 4. Heard the counsel on record and perused the findings recorded by the appellate authority-learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. 5. The unsuccessful appellants in Appeal File NO.F2/934/1999 are the revision petitioners. It is the case of the revision petitioners that the father of the petitioners, namely, late Nathi Chittaiah along with late Sana MaJiaiah and Yerrolla Laxmaiah were joint tenants, cultivating land admeasuring AC.19.38 gts in Survey Nos.94 and 95 of Kompally Village, Qutubullapur Mandai, Ranga Reddy District, and these are the legal representatives of the protected tenants and entitled for joint tenancy rights along with respondents 3 to 16, the legal representatives of other joint protected tenants under the Act. It is also their case 17" that taking advantage of illiteracy of the petitioners' ancestor- Nathi Chittaiah, the other co-tenants and protected tenants i.e. Sana Mallaiah and Yerrolla Laxmaiah suppressing the material facts in collusion with the authorities, obtained Section 38-E certificate exclusively in their names from the second respondent, without issuing any notice to the revision petitioners or their ancestors, who are in possession of the land and who are interested persons. It is also their case that the revision petitioners 2 to 5' s grand father and revision petitioners 6 to 9' s father died in the year 1966 whose grave-yard still is in existence. The second respondent, without notice and without conducting any enquiry as required under the Act and also the Rules, 1973 and without preparing provisional list in Form NO.5 and without calling for objections,. issued certificates in Form NO.2. It is also their case that when the petitioners came to know about the said irregularities of the second respondent, immediately the revision petitioners filed statutory appeal under Section 90 of the said Act before the first respondent and obtained interim orders. It is also their case that the appellate authority first respondent without considering the relevant provisions and ignoring mandatory requirement to be complied under the Rules, 1973, dismissed the appeal confirming the orders of the second respondent i.e. the grant of ownership certificate. It is also their case that the appellate authority first respondent without considering the relevant provisions and ignoring mandatory requirement to be complied under the Rules, 1973, dismissed the appeal confirming the orders of the second respondent i.e. the grant of ownership certificate. Questioning the dismissal of appeal, revision petitioners filed W.P.No.13948 of 2001 before this court and the said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 8-6-2005 without going into the merits of the case on the ground of availability of the statutory remedy of revision under Section 91 of the Act giving liberty to the petitioners to file revision within four weeks from the date of the order under the said Act. Thus the present C.R.P. had been filed under Section 91 of the aforesaid Act raising several grounds. 6. Section 91 of the Act dealing with revisions reads as hereunder: "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, an application for revision shall lie to the High Court from any final order passed on appeal by the Collector or Board of Revenue on the following grounds:- (a) that the original or appellate authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) that the original or appellate authority failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) in following the procedure or passing the order, the original or appellate authority acted illegally or with material irregularity." 7. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy after tracing historical background of the litigation referred to the rival stands taken by the parties and also rival contentions advanced and also referred to the copy of the Final Tenancy Register for the year 1950-51, copy of Faisal Patti for the year 1975-76, copy of Pahani for the year 1975-76 and copy of Pahani for the years 1987 -88, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91, 1991-1992, 1992-93 and 1994-95 and after recording reasons ultimately came to the conclusion that the order challenged in the appeal does not suffer from any illegality and accordingly dismissed the appeal vacating the interim orders made by the said appellate authority. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District also had taken note of the specific stands taken by Respondents 7, 8, 9 and 11, but observed that though in a way they supported the stand taken by the revision petitioners, no supporting evidence in this regard had been placed. 8. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District also had taken note of the specific stands taken by Respondents 7, 8, 9 and 11, but observed that though in a way they supported the stand taken by the revision petitioners, no supporting evidence in this regard had been placed. 8. Section 2 (r) of the Act defines "protected", in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, "Protected" means a person who is deemed to be a protected tenant under the provisions of this Act. 9. Section 34 of the Act deals with protected tenants and the said provisions read as hereunder: Protected tenants: (1) A person shall, subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3), be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of land if he- (a) has held such land as a tenant continuously- (i) for a period of not less than six years, being a period wholly included in the Fasli years 1343 to 1352 (both years inclusive)-, or (ii) for a period of not less than s~ years immediately preceding the 151 day of January, 1948, or (iii) for a period of not less than six years commencing not earlier than the 15t day of the Fasli year 1353 (61h October,1943), and completed before the commencement of this Act." 10. Section 37 of the Act deals with persons not entitled under Section 34 deemed in certain circumstances to be protected tenants. 11. Elaborate submissions were made in the light of the language employed in these provisions and further strong reliance was also placed on Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1973. 12. Rule 3 of the Rules, 1973 dealing with the publication of notice reads as hereunder: "The Tribunal shall cause to be given wide publicity to he notification issued by the Government and published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette under subsection (1) of Section 38-E in each village situated in the area notified therein by:- (a) affixing copies of the notification in the village chavidi or any other conspicuous place in the village; and (b) beat of non-tom. 13. 13. Rule 4 of the Rules, 1973 dealing with enquiry reads as hereunder: "(1) As soon as may be after the issue of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 38-E, the Tribunal shall, after taking into consideration the tenancy records, if any, prepared and maintained under the Act and any other record of rights or revenue accounts if any, for the time being in force, and after holding or causing to be held summary enquiry in respect of the lands held by the protected tenants and their respective landholders, determine the extent of lands held or deemed to be held by the protected tenants the extent of land held by the landholders on the date notified under Section 38-E, and the extent which the protected tenant is entitled to purchase from the landholder and prepare a provisional list in From I showing the names of all protected tenants to whom the ownership is deemed to have been transferred under Section 38-E and the extent and description of land so transferred and vested in the protected tenants. (2) The provisional list prepared under sub-rule (1) together with a notice inviting objections thereto and fixing a date for hearing such objections (not being later than 15 days from the date of publication) shall be caused to be published by the Tribunal by affixing a copy thereof on the notice-board of the village chavidi or at any other conspicuous place in the village and by beat of tom-tom in the village. A copy of the list together with the notice shall also be communicated to the landholders and the protected tenants concerned at their usual place of residence, if any, in the village. (3) On the date fixed under sub rule (3), or on any subsequent date to which the enquiry maybe adjourned, the Tribunal shall after hearing objections, if any, received from any landholder, protected tenant or any other interested person, and making such further enquiry as may be necessary, declare the provisional list with or without modifications, as a final list and cause it to be published by affixing a copy thereof on the notice board of the village chavidi or at any other conspicuous place in the village and by beat of tom-tom in the village. 14. 14. Emphasis had been laid on Rule 4(2) of the Rules, 1973 specified supra in particular and submissions in elaboration had been made that the procedure had not been followed. 15. Further the learned counsel representing the revision petitioners had placed strong reliance in Janampally Narayana Reddy (deceased) by L.R. v. Chowlakayala Hanumanthacharlu' wherein the learned judge of this court while dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 91 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and also Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, observed as hereunder: "The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 91 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is analogous to that under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code but with this vital difference, namely, that whereas under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code the exercise of the powers of the High Court is discretionary, under Section 91 of the Tenancy Act the aggrieved party has a right of revision on any of the grounds specified in that section. Section 11 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act as amended by Amendment Act III of 1954 came into force on 4th February,1954. Section 13(1) makes it perfectly plain that the new section 11 is prospective in its operation and not retrospective. It follows that the new Section 11 applies only to rents payable (by the cultivating tenant) after the 4th February,1954, and not prior there to. Therefore, in this case the rent in so far as it relates to the years 1952 and 1953, has to be determined with reference to the terms of the old Section 11, that is to say, the maximum rent payable by the tenant shall not exceed one-fourth of the crop of such land or of the value of such crop as determined in the prescribed manner. So far as the rent due for the year -1954, is concerned, the new section 11 is applicable (and the rent payable by the tenant shall be four times of the land revenue-dry). The Tribunals below were clearly in error in holding that the rent payable by the tenant is determinable on the basis of the agreement entered into between the petitioner's father and the landholder in 1946 and in computing it accordingly." 16. The Tribunals below were clearly in error in holding that the rent payable by the tenant is determinable on the basis of the agreement entered into between the petitioner's father and the landholder in 1946 and in computing it accordingly." 16. The learned counsel also had placed strong reliance on a decision of this court in Akula Pattaiah and others v. Harkala Mallaiah and others2 wherein the learned Judge at Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 observed as hereunder: "Protected tenant" is defined in Section 2 of the Act as " a person, who is deemed to be a protected tenant under the provisions of the Act" Section 34 of the Act which lays down the persons that can be treated as protected tenants, does not lay down that a purchaser from the owner of the land, would be treated as a protected tenant. 'Tenant' is defined in Section 2 (v) of the Act as "Asami Shikmi who holds land on lease and includes a person who is deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of the Act. Persons who are deemed to be tenants, defined in Section 5 of the Act, does not also state that a purchaser from the pattedar would be a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the purchaser of land from a land holder cannot be treated either as a tenant or a protected tenant, for him to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for a certificate under Section 38-E of the Act. As held in Venkateswara Rao's case (supra), a protected tenant only is entitled to ownership rights, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 38-E of the Act, and not anybody else. In view of the above position of law, the orders of both the Tribunals below granting the certificate under Section 38-E of the Act to 151 respondent who did not claim himself to be a protected tenant, is liable to be and hence is set-aside." 17. Further strong reliance also was placed on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Nerella Janiah v. Bairam Saiga3 whereunder the learned Division Bench observed as hereunder: "It is apparent from column 7 of the Tenancy Register that the petitioner was registered as the landholder or owner of the property. Column 13 only mentions Surayya, the father-in-law, as the person to whom rent is paid. Column 13 only mentions Surayya, the father-in-law, as the person to whom rent is paid. The entry under column 13 is not decisive in this matter having regard to the description of the petitioner as landholder or owner of the property and the statement of Surayya that he had gifted the land, 20 years before the dispute arose, to his daughter. If really the property belonged to Surayya and the petitioner had nothing to do with it, there is no purpose served by the petitioner urging his objection and Surayya abstaining from it. From the documentary evidence and the surrounding circumstances, the only reasonable inference is that the right to file objections inhered to the petitioner and, therefore, his petition could not be disallowed on that ground. The objection is, therefore, tenable and should be considered on its merits. This takes us to the point whether the respondent is one who would come within the ambit of Section 38-E of the Act. In order to appreciate the controversy in this case, it is useful to extract the terms of Section 38-E. "Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter or any law for the time being in force or any custom, usage, decree, contract or grant to the contrary, the Government may, by notification in the Jarida, declare in respect of any area and from such date as may be specified therein that ownership of all lands held by protected tenants which they are entitled to purchase from their landholders in such area under any provision of this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (7) of Section 38 of the Act, stand transferred to and vest in the protected tenants holding them and from such date the protected tenants shall be deemed to be the full owners of such lands. Indisputably, it is under this section that the Notification referred to above was issued. It is clear from the language of this section that the prerequisite to the applicability of this section is that the land should be held by a person describing himself as a protected tenant on the date of the notification. The question therefore is whether the respondent could be said to be a protected tenant holding lands at that time. The expression 'holding' has not been defined in the Act. The question therefore is whether the respondent could be said to be a protected tenant holding lands at that time. The expression 'holding' has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(z) of the Act recites that "Words and expressions used in this Act but not defined therein shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act', So, we have to see whether there is any definition of 'holding' in the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act.. That definition is contained in Section 2(6) of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. It says: '" to hold land' or to be a 'landholder' or 'holder' of land means to be lawfully in possession of land whether such possession is actual or not." By reason of Section 2(z) of the Act, this definition is incorporated into that Act. In view of this definition, the statutory benefit of Section 38-E could only accrue to a person who is lawfully in possession of the land. It is difficult to premise that the person who was dispossessed four years prior to the notification was lawfully in possession of the land. It is true that the respondent was a lessee of this land for a year, Le. 1950-51. As to how the petitioner got back the land is in dispute. According to him, the respondent surrendered the land himself in the year 1951, the lease having expired at the end of the concerned fasli, while it is the case of the respondent that he was evicted. That does not make much difference for the purpose of this enquiry. Granting that the version as presented by the respondent is the true one, that does not entitle him got the declaration envisaged in Section 38-E of the Act. If he was illegally evicted, he could have recourse to Section 32 of the Act which enacts: "A tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession." Therefore, if really he was aggrieved by the eviction, he could recover possession by invoking section 32 of the Act. The fact that, once upon a time, he was in possession of the land does not confer any right on him to obtain the declaration that is contemplated by Section 38-E of the Act." 18. The learned counsel had also placed strong reliance on a decision of this court in P.M. Narayana Swamy and others v. The Addl. R.D.G. (L.R.A.) and Tribunal under Section 38-E of the Tenancy Act and others" in Writ Petition No.4210 of 1976 dated 12-12-1977, wherein it was observed as hereunder: "The affixture of a copy of the provisional list on the notice Board of the village Chavodi or any other conspicuous place in the village, or by beat of tom-tom in the village is not deemed to be a sufficient notice by the rule-making authority itself, since it has taken care to provide such list should also be communicated to the land holders and the protected tenants individually at their usual place of residence. If the provisional list contains only the names of those tenants who, according to the Tribunal are entitled to be declared as owners, then the other protected tenants will have no opportunity or occasion for submitting their objections. The general publication of the provisional list in the village is not sufficient which is evident from the very fact that the Rule 4 (2) itself provides for individual communication of the said list to both the land holders and the protected tenants." 19. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners had also placed strong reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan Ali Khan (dead) by L.R and others' wherein the Apex Court observed as hereunder: "The benefit of S.38-E is given to person who hold the lands as protected tenants and who continue to hold the lands as protected tenants on 1-1-1973. The protected tenancy has to be enforced on 1-1-1973. Under S.38-E ownership rights are conferred only upon persons who continue to be protected tenants as on 1-1-1973. They form a special class. This class of persons is different from the category of protected tenants who fall under SS.34 and 37 respectively. S.37-A refers to persons who are holders of the land at the commencement of Amending Act of 1955 (12-3-1956). These persons were required to be tenants on 12-3-1956 and that they should continue to be tenants till 1-1-1973. This class of persons is different from the category of protected tenants who fall under SS.34 and 37 respectively. S.37-A refers to persons who are holders of the land at the commencement of Amending Act of 1955 (12-3-1956). These persons were required to be tenants on 12-3-1956 and that they should continue to be tenants till 1-1-1973. Only such category of persons are entitled to Ownership Certificate under S.38-E." 20. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in G. Venkat Ram Reddy and others v. Najeebunnisa and others3, where under the learned Division Bench observed as hereunder: "A bare reading of Section 34 suggests that a person holding land as tenant continuously for a period not less than six years between 1342 Fasli and 1352 Fasli (both years inclusive) or for a period of not less than six years immediately preceding the 151 day of January, 1948 or for a period of not less than six years commencing not earlier than the 151 day of the Fasli year 1353 F. and completed before the commencement of the said Act and that he had cultivated the lands personally during the said period would be deemed to be a protected tenant. When there is no person available to be a deemed protected.....tenant under Section 34 of the Act at the commencement of the Act, on the expiration of one year, any other person, who, at the commencement of the Act, held the land as tenant, subject to other conditions, would be deemed to be a protected tenant under Section 37 of the Tenancy Act which reads thus: Persons not entitled under Section 34 deemed in certain circumstances to be protected tenants (1) Every person who at the commencement of this Act holds are tenant any land in respect of which no person is deemed to be a protected tenant under Section 34, shall, on the expiration of one year from such commencement or, the final rejection of all claims by any other person to be deemed under Section 34 to be a protected tenant in respect of such land, whichever is later, be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of such land unless the landholder has before such expiration or final rejection as aforesaid made an application in the prescribed form. To the Tahsildar for a declaration that such person is not a protected tenant." 21. To the Tahsildar for a declaration that such person is not a protected tenant." 21. The learned senior counsel Sri K.Ramakrishna Reddy had drawn the attention of this court to the language employed in Section 91 of the Act and made certain submissions relating to limitation imposed on this Court in interfering with such orders while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Further strong reliance was placed on Rule 20 of the Rules, 1950 and the said Rule dealing with Presumption of Correctness of Entries in the Records of Tenancies and Registers of Mutations reads as hereunder: "Every entry in the Provisional Record of Tenancies shall be presumed, to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is duly substituted there for". 22. Reliance was also placed on Rule 24 of the aforesaid Rules and the said Rule deals with Final Record of Tenancies, which reads as hereunder: (1) For every village an abstract of tenancy shall be prepared in Form NO.5 appended herewith based on the Provisional Record of Tenancies relating thereto and such an abstract of tenancies shall with effect from 10th June, 1951, be deemed to be the final record of tenancies if the said 'village subject to the final orders on application if any, filed under Sections 5, 35 and 37 of the said Act relating to any land therein. (2) The final record of tenancies of a village shall be amended by the Tahsildar in accordance with the final orders passed on applications filed under Sections 5, 35 and 37 of the said Act. (3) If on a representation made to him, the Tahsildar is of opinion that any entry in the final record of Tenancies of a village is not correct or the name of any person which should have been entered in the said records has not been so entered, the Tahsildar may at any time before 10-6-1952 amend the said record suitably under his signature." 23. Reliance also was placed on Rule 24~A of the Rules, 1950 and same reads as hereunder: 24-A (i) A Taluq Commission consisting of the Tahsildar of a Tahsil as Chairman and two other non-official members nominated by the Government for such period as they may deem fit not exceeding one year, shall examine the final records of all the villages within the jurisdiction of the said Tahsildar. 24. 24. Emphasis had been laid on the second proviso of Rule 24- A (1) of the Rules, 1950 which specifies "provided further than no representation in respect of wrong entry in or omission from the final record of tenancies shall be entertained after the 31-01-1955". 25. In the light of these provisions and submission in elaboration had been made and further strong emphasis had been laid on the fact that after the issuance of ownership certificate after long lapse of 24 years, the appeal had been preferred and this ground of limitation though had been just referred to in the contentions and though the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District had not rejected appeal on the said ground also can be considered and even on that ground also, the C.R.P. is liable to be dismissed. 26. The principal question which may have to be decided in the present C.R.P. is whether in the light of the findings recorded by the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District and in the light of the grounds raised by the revision petitioners and the submissions advanced by the counsel representing the revision petitioners, whether the matter to be remanded for the purpose of recording appropriate findings or whether the C.R.P. to be dismissed. 27. The principal question which had been argued in elaboration before the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District- the appellate authority is that whether the ancestor of the appellants- Natti Chittaiah was the protected tenant over the lands in question in Survey Nos.94 and 95 at Kompally Village, Qutubullapur Mandai, Ranga Reddy District. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District had referred to the under noted documents: (1) Xerox copy of Certificate of Ownership U/s.38-E of Tenancy Act,1950, (Form-II), issued in favour of Sanna Lachaiah. (2) Xerox copy of Certificate of Ownership U/s.38E of Tenancy Act, 1950, (Form-II), issued in favour of Yerrolla Laxmaiah s/o.Pochaiah. (3) Xerox copy of Certificate of Ownership U/s. 38-E of Tenancy Act, 1950, (Form-II), issued in favour of Yerrolla Narsimha. (4) Xerox copy of Certificate of Ownership U/s.38-E of Tenancy Act, 1950, (Form-II) issued in favour of Sanna Mallesha s/o.veeraiah (5) Copy of Pahanies for the. years 1955-58 relating to Survey Nos.94 and 95 of Kompally Village. (6) Copy of Pahani for the year 1966-67 relating to Survey Nos.94 and 95 of Kompally Village. 28. (4) Xerox copy of Certificate of Ownership U/s.38-E of Tenancy Act, 1950, (Form-II) issued in favour of Sanna Mallesha s/o.veeraiah (5) Copy of Pahanies for the. years 1955-58 relating to Survey Nos.94 and 95 of Kompally Village. (6) Copy of Pahani for the year 1966-67 relating to Survey Nos.94 and 95 of Kompally Village. 28. The appellate authority- learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District also had taken note of the fact that though for certain other lands the revision petitioners obtained Section 38-E tenancy certificate, the same had been suppressed. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District also recorded when the name of Natti Chittaiah does not find a place at all in the Final Tenancy Register, at this distance of time the legal representatives cannot claim any right whatsoever for the purpose of recording their names. In this context, the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, referred to the copy of Final Tenancy Register for the year 1950-51, copy of Faisal Patti for the year 1975-76, Copy of Pahani for the year 1975-76 and copy of Pahani for the years 1987-88, 1988-89,1989-90,1990-91,1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95. The learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District also observed that the lower court file bearing NO.315/75 had been summoned and a perusal of the copy of Tenancy Register prepared in the year 1950-51 reveals that the name of Sana Mallaiah had been recorded as Protected Tenant against Survey Nos.27, 28,29,30,31,32,16,17,94,95 and 161 of Kompally Village. But however, the Survey Nos.94 and 95 alone are the subject suit lands. It is also observed that it is seen from the said file that a provisional list as well as a final list of Protected Tenants to whom ownership of land is transferred under Section 38-E of the Act is available and either in the said provisional list or the final list of protected tenants to whom ownership of land is to be transferred under Section 38-E of the Act, the name of the Nathi Chittaiah does not find place through whom the appellants are claiming the Tenancy Rights. It is needless to say that the appellants are the present revision petitioners. It is needless to say that the appellants are the present revision petitioners. It is no doubt true that it appears that respondents 7, 8, 9 and 11, may be for' certain reasons had supported the stand or the version of the revision petitioners and that aspect had been taken into consideration, but it was recorded that no supporting documentary evidence had been placed in this regard. The main contention on which strong emphasis had been laid by the counsel representing revision petitioners Sri L.Prabhakar Reddy is non-following of procedure as contemplated under Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules,1973. It is pertinent to note that after long lapse of time of 24 years after the issuance of certificate when the same had been challenged by way of appeal, no doubt stated that they came to know only when certain unlawful acts had been resorted to, in the light of the series of events this aspect of non-compliance .of Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1973 cannot be gone into and the said contentions cannot be permitted to be advanced by the revision petitioners. Here is a case where the present legal representatives of deceased Nathi Chittaiah are challenging the certificate in question after long lapse of time about 24 years. Even if such action is initiated beyond the period of limitation, if the same had been done within a reasonable period may be the other merits and demerits may also have gone into, in elaborate. It is not as though this objection has not taken before the appellate authority-learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. In the contentions, the same had been recorded, but however, the appellate authority- learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District; instead of rejecting the appeal at the threshold on that ground, had gone further recorded reasons and came to the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed the same. No doubt, Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned senior counsel representing the contesting respondents had pointed out to the relevant Paras in the appeal' before the Joint Collector-Ranga Reddy District and specifically pointed out to the relevant portion and would maintain that the certificate had been left unchallenged. No doubt, this argument is too technical argument in the light of the nature of the grounds which has been raised in the appeal. 29. No doubt, this argument is too technical argument in the light of the nature of the grounds which has been raised in the appeal. 29. Be that as it may, when the revision petitioners had chosen to challenge the certificate of ownership after a long lapse of 24 years, such parties cannot be permitted to raise this specific aspect of non-following of the procedure as contemplated by Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules 1973. Even otherwise, it is not as though the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District had not taken into consideration the contentions of the respective parties, in fact, had gone into the merits and demerits principally relied on the Final Tenancy Register for the year 195051. Further specifically recorded a finding that neither provisional list nor the final list of protected tenants had shown the name of Nuthi Chittaiah and accordingly came to the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit. Hence, viewed from in any angle, this court is thoroughly satisfied that the impugned order does not warrant any interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 30. The C.R.P. accordingly shall stand dismissed. Let the parties bear their own costs.