JUDGMENT Aruna Suresh, J. 1. This petition has been filed by the Petitioner Shri R.N. Goel, Advocate under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) for quashing of criminal complaint dated 11.09.2006 filed by the respondent under Section 500 Indian Penal Code (IPC) for defamation read with Section 200 Cr.P.C. and for setting aside the summoning order dated 25.05.2007 in the said complaint passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari, Delhi. 2. Petitioner was appointed as a Senior Central Government counsel by the Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India on 17.02.2006 for conducting an arbitration case titled ERA Construction (India) Limited v. Union of India vide letter dated 17.02.2006 being letter F. No. 30(1) 2006 for contesting the arbitration case on behalf of the Union of India. On 22.03.2003 respondent Nirmal Goel, an engineer who was the Departmental Representative approached the Petitioner and asked him to complete the case within two or three hearings, although the claims of the contractor were for about rupees two and a half crores; to which the petitioner replied that since the claim was of a large amount, the proceedings could not be concluded in such a short time and it was for the arbitrator to decide the case. But since the respondent was adamant in his approach, the Petitioner wrote a letter on 24.03.2006 in his official capacity as Senior Government counsel to Shri V.K.Chugh the then Chief Engineer, by name under Speed Post with a view to safeguard the financial interest of the Government. In this letter the Chief Engineer, Mr.V.K.Chugh being the legal administrative authority over the respondent, was informed about the conduct of the respondent which appeared to be favouring the claimant contractor. This resulted into the complainant/respondent filing a complaint on 11.09.2006 under Section 500 IPC read with Section 200 Cr.P.C. with the allegations that the Petitioner had defamed him by writing the said letter to the Chief Engineer. After taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of pre-summoning evidence, the learned M.M. issued summons against the Petitioner vide order dated 25.05.2007. Aggrieved by the summoning order, the present petition has been filed. .3. After taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of pre-summoning evidence, the learned M.M. issued summons against the Petitioner vide order dated 25.05.2007. Aggrieved by the summoning order, the present petition has been filed. .3. Petitioner has challenged the maintainability of the complainant as well as the summoning order of the court on the following grounds: (i) The Petitioner was appointed as Senior Government Counsel and therefore he fell under the definition of a Public Servant as defined in Section 21 (6) and (12) of the IPC, as he was entitled to be remunerated and was paid his legal fee from the govt. exchequer. (ii) The respondent being the Executive Engineer, who was dealing with the said case before the Arbitrator was authorized as the Departmental Representative to assist and brief the Petitioner so that the case could be contested effectively. But Shri Nirmal Goel acted against and to the detriment of the interest of the Government of India by pressurizing him to complete the proceedings before the arbitrator within 2/3 hearings and the Petitioner wrote the impugned letter dated 24.03.2006 in his official capacity to Shri V.K. Chugh, the then Chief Engineer. .(iii) The Petitioner being a public servant is protected under Section 197 (1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. and therefore the complaint is hit by the provisions contained in Section 197 Cr.P.C. and is not maintainable as requisite and previous sanction of the Central Government has not been obtained by the respondent before filing the complaint and the court could not have taken the cognizance of any offence without any such permission. .(iv) Petitioner is also protected by the provisions of law and exceptions to Section 499 IPC, specifically 2nd, 8th and 9th Exceptions of the said Section and is also protected under the provisions of Section 81 of the IPC. .(v) Any communication made by the Petitioner against the respondent to the Chief Engineer in his official capacity cannot be considered as defamation punishable under Section 500 IPC and he has sought quashing of the complaint as well as summoning orders of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dated 25.05.2007. 4. This petition has been contested by the respondents. 5. Vide letter dated 17.02.2006 the Petitioner Mr. 4. This petition has been contested by the respondents. 5. Vide letter dated 17.02.2006 the Petitioner Mr. R.N. Goel, Senior Central Government Counsel was appointed by the Ministry of Law & Justice to represent Union of India in an arbitration matter of ERA Construction (India) Limited v. Union of India. Since respondent/complainant was the departmental nominee of the Union of India, he seems to have approached the Petitioner for pressurizing him to conclude the proceedings before the arbitrator in 2/3 hearings only. The Petitioner found the conduct of Mr. Nirmal Goel, the complainant unfair and felt that it was detrimental to the interest of the Union of India, he wrote a letter to Mr. V.K. Chugh, the then Chief Engineer on 24.03.2006 communicating him the objectionable conduct of the complainant. This letter has become the cause for the complainant to file the complaint filed by the complainant before the learned M.M. 6. Issues to be considered by this Court are if the Petitioner was a public servant and enjoyed the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore could not have been prosecuted by way of a private complaint by the respondent without permission of the appropriate authority. Section 21 of the IPC defines a "public servant". For the purposes of present petition Clause 6th and 12th of Section 21 are relevant which read as follows: 21. Public Servant - The words public servant denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following; namely Sixth- Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or mater has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or any any other competent public authority; Twelfth.- Every person- (a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government; 7. Thus it is clear that Petitioner who was appointed as Senior Government Counsel by the Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India for conducting the arbitration case for and on behalf of Union of India was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 Clause 12 (a) of the IPC. For performance of public duty for and on behalf of the Government, he was getting remuneration by way of his fees from the Government of India. For performance of public duty for and on behalf of the Government, he was getting remuneration by way of his fees from the Government of India. Explanation 2 of Section 21 of the IPC makes it clear that wherever the words public servant occur, they shall be understood for every person who is in actual possession of the situation as a public servant, irrespective of any legal defect which may be there in his right to hold that situation. Hence, the Petitioner having been appointed by the Govt. of India as its Senior Government Counsel was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC on the date when he wrote letter dated 24.03.2006 addressed to Mr. V.K.Chugh, the then Chief Engineer, complaining about the conduct of the respondent, which according to the respondent was defamatory in nature. 8. Second Exception and Third Exception to Section 499 IPC which defines defamation have also become relevant in context of the present proceedings. For the sake of brevity, the relevant provisions are reproduced as below: 499. Defamation - Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person. Second Exception. - Public conduct of public servants. - It is not defamation to express in a good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Third Exception. - Conduct of any person touching any public question. - It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. 9. The conduct of the Petitioner in writing the impugned letter is also protected by Eighth Exception to Section 499 IPC. This exception provides that an accusation preferred in good faith against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation, does not constitute defamation. 9. The conduct of the Petitioner in writing the impugned letter is also protected by Eighth Exception to Section 499 IPC. This exception provides that an accusation preferred in good faith against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation, does not constitute defamation. In this case, since Petitioner being a public servant wrote the impugned letter to the then Chief Engineer, who had lawful authority over Mr. Nirmal Goel containing certain accusations against Mr. Nirmal Goel, it cannot be said that his letter was defamatory in nature. Illustration of Eighth Exception makes this proposition of law very clear. Eighth Exception with its illustration read as follows: Eight Exception - Accusation preferred in good faith to authorized person. -- It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Illustration If A in good faith accuse Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Zs master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, and child, to Zs father - A is within this exception. 10. The letter dated 24.03.2006 indicating the conduct of the complainant Nirmal Goel an engineer and departmental representative of the Government, written by the petitioner was in the capacity of a public servant in discharge of his public functions. In this letter Petitioner also expressed in good faith his opinion with regard to the conduct of Mr. Nirmal Goel which was against the interest of the Government and hence he could not be said to have defamed the respondent as alleged by writing this letter to the Chief Engineer. Impugned letter was not even publically circulated and the action so taken by the Petitioner in writing the impugned letter and the contents contained therein, even if presumed as defamatory, fall under Second and Third Exceptions to Section 499 IPC. 11. In M.K. Karunanidhi v. Union of India and Anr. Impugned letter was not even publically circulated and the action so taken by the Petitioner in writing the impugned letter and the contents contained therein, even if presumed as defamatory, fall under Second and Third Exceptions to Section 499 IPC. 11. In M.K. Karunanidhi v. Union of India and Anr. 1979CriLJ773 while interpreting Section 21(12) of the IPC, it was observed: ...We, however, agree that so far as the first part of Clause (12) (a) is concerned, namely in the service of the Government undoubtedly signifies a relationship of master and servant where the employer employs the employee on the basis of a salary or remuneration. But we are of the opinion that so far as the second limb in the pay of the Government is concerned that appears to be of a much wider amplitude so as to include within its ambit even public servant who may not be a regular employee receiving salary from his master- It was further observed: A careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word pay in the various dictionaries and the texts referred to above would clearly reveal that the expression in the pay of connotes that a person is getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount of money. This by itself however does not lead to the inference that a relationship of master and servant must necessarily exist in all cases where a person is paid salary. 12. Thus it is clear that whenever a public servant is assigned any duty by his master may be under a statute or by an executive order, it would assume the character of public duty provided the duty assigned is not illegal or against public policy. 13. The next issue to be considered by this Court is whether after coming to the conclusion that the Petitioner was discharging his public duties being a public servant when he wrote letter dated 24.03.2006, whether the complaint filed by the respondent without seeking permission under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is maintainable or not. 14. 13. The next issue to be considered by this Court is whether after coming to the conclusion that the Petitioner was discharging his public duties being a public servant when he wrote letter dated 24.03.2006, whether the complaint filed by the respondent without seeking permission under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is maintainable or not. 14. Section 197 is an embargo on the court to take cognizance of an offence allegedly committed by a public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty except with the previous sanction of the government and in the case of a person who was employed at the time of commission of an alleged offence in connection with the affairs of the Union, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The scope of Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been widened by extending protection even to those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duties that is in the colour of office held by such public servant. Section 197 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants. (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- .(a) In the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; .(b) In the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government 15. In State of Orissa and Ors. In State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew 2004CriLJ2011 while interpreting Section 197 Cr.P.C. the supreme Court observed: It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determined its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. 16. It was also observed that the Law Commission in its 41st Report in paragraph 15.123 while dealing with Section 197 Cr.P.C. (unamended) observed that protection under the Section is needed much after retirement of the public servant as before retirement. The protection granted by the section would be rendered futile if it was open to a private person having a grievance to wait until the public servant seizes to hold his official position and then to lodge a complaint. The purpose of granting protection to a public servant under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is in the public interest to ensure that the official acts do not lead to needless or vexatious prosecution. It should be left to the government to determine from that point of view the question of the expediency of prosecuting any public servant. 17. The purpose of granting protection to a public servant under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is in the public interest to ensure that the official acts do not lead to needless or vexatious prosecution. It should be left to the government to determine from that point of view the question of the expediency of prosecuting any public servant. 17. The facts and circumstances of this case clearly indicate that Petitioner had to write the impugned letter to the Chief Engineer when he felt that he was being unnecessarily pressurized by the respondent/ complainant to expedite the hearing before the arbitrator which was detrimental to the interest of the Government. The Petitioner therefore discharged his official duties by informing the conduct of the respondent to his controlling authority, the Chief Engineer. The act of the Petitioner is, therefore, protected as done in the exercise of its official duties or purported to be done in exercise of his official duties. Therefore, he is entitled to protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and no complaint could have been lodged against him without the previous sanction of the Central Government. If once it is established that the act or omission was done by the Petitioner while discharging his duties, the scope of its being official has to be constituted so as to define the objectives of Section 197 Cr.P.C. in favour of the public servant, otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without a sanction shall stand frustrated. 18. Hence, the complaint bearing No. 431 of 2001 dated 13.09.2006 filed under Section 500 IPC read with Section 200 Cr.P.C. as filed by the respondent complainant is hit by the provisions of law and could not have been entertained by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. Similarly, the order of the Magistrate dated 25.05.2007 whereby he proceeded to summon the Petitioner for the said offence also suffers from same infirmity. 19. Hence, petition is accordingly allowed. The complaint case No. 431/2001 and the order dated 25.05.2007 and other proceedings conducted therein by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in the said complaint are hereby quashed. 20. Attested copy of the order be sent to the trial court. Trial court record be sent back immediately. Petition allowed