JUDGMENT: S.D. Anand, J.:-Appellants (mother and son interse) were convicted by the learned Trial Judge on a charge of having murdered Mst. Nasreen (daughter-in-law and wife respectively of the appellants), by setting her afire, on 15.6.1996. 2. For recording that finding, the learned Trial Judge drew sustenance from the two dying declarations Ex.P10 and Ex.P14 the former having been made before Executive Magistrate who had been deputed for the purpose vide police request Ex.P5 and the latter being in the form of a statement made by Mst. Nasreen to ASI Des Raj, who went over to the Mission Hospital, Ferozepur Cantt., on receipt of MLR pertaining to the lady above indicated. To buttress that finding, reliance was also placed upon the statement of PW6 Veero, a real sister of the deceased lady who, having stayed for the night at the house of the appellants, had witnessed the impugned crime. 3. We find the finding to be thoroughly unsustainable. The reasons therefor are as under:- 4. The presence of PW 6 Veero at the relevant point of time is not proved on the file. If she had actually stayed over night at the house of the appellants and had witnessed the impugned crime at the hands of the appellants, there is no reason why Mst. Nasreen would not have made a mention of that fact in the course of the two dying declarations which she made before the Executive Magistrate and the police official respectively at different points of time. It cannot be expected that the deceased lady was not in the know of the presence of her sister Mst. Veero at the spot. It also cannot be argued with any justification that she had just omitted to mention her name. The omission of the name of PW6 Mst. Veero from the two dying declarations made by Mst. Nasreen leaves no manner of doubt in our mind that her introduction into the case is an after thought. 5. Though we are not unmindful of the fact that a certain amount of sanctity is attached to a dying declaration, we are equally conscious that the dying declaration must be free from the vice of confabulation and should be categorical in character on point of fixture of accountability of the culprit in order to be able to inspire the confidence of the Court. The two dying declarations made by Mst. The two dying declarations made by Mst. Nasreen in the present case do not come up to that level. In the course of both the dying declarations, she averred that she had been set afire by her mother-in-law i.e. Appellant Phamma; that her husband did not enquire from her about who had set her afire and that she also did not tell her husband i.e. Appellant Patras that it was latter’s mother who had committed the crime. Apart from the fact that it would appear fairly unnatural on her part to have refrained from telling her husband who exactly had set her afire, that version is completely falsified by the testimony of PW 6 Mst. Veero who averred that it was appellant Phamma who sprinkled kerosene upon her by taking it out from a stove and it was on the exhortation of her husband Patras that appellant Phamma set her afire. The exhortation attributed to appellant Patras, appeared for the first time in the testimony on oath of PW6 Mst. Veero. It requires particular notice that the attribution of that role to appellant Patras is not in accord with the two dying declarations which had been made by Mst. Nasreen. 6. It is in evidence that Mst. Phamma was separate in mess and residence from appellant Patras and latter’s wife Mst. Nasreen, though the former was residing in a house just opposite to that in which the latter were living. The two dying declarations would want the Court to believe that even after setting her afire, Mst. Phamma did not go over to her house and stayed over in the house of appellant Patras and Mst. Nasreen. This would not be in accord with a natural conduct on the part of a culprit who would like to get away from the scene of crime as early as possible. In the totality of the circumstances noticed in the preceding paras of this judgment, we are unable to uphold the finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge. The appeal shall stand allowed. The appellants shall stand acquitted of the charge. --------------------