JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—All the aforesaid appeals are connected and have been heard analogously, therefore, all are being decided by this common judgment having binding effect in all the appeals. 2. On 16th August, 1988 a gazette notification bearing No. 4913/11-5-88-72-L.A./88 was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act’) for acquiring the land situated in three villages, namely, Harsaon, Sadarpur and Dasna, Pargana Dasna, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad having total an area of 346-8793 acres. The said land was acquired for the purpose of construction and development of Sector-29, Govindpuram Awasiya Yojna of Ghaziabad Development Authority (hereinafter in short called as ‘G.D.A.’). Publication of such acquisition was made in two newspapers, namely, Dainik Pralayankar and Dainik Hint on 31st August, 1988 and 5th September, 1988 respectively. Local publication thereof was made on 1st October, 1988. Gazette notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 3rd October, 1988 vide Notification No. 5779/11-5-88-72-L.A./88. Publication was also made in two newspapers, namely, Dainik Hint and Dainik Jansatta on 19th November, 1988 and 21st November, 1988 respectively, whereas local publication in the villages was done on 9th December, 1988. Possession of the acquired land was taken by the State Government/G.D.A. on 14th December, 1988. 3. Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter called as ‘S.L.A.O.’) vide its common award dated 7th December, 1990 awarded compensation for the land of Village Harsaon at the rate of Rs.100/- per square yard; for the village Sadarpur at the rate of Rs. 63.77 per square yard; and for the village Dasna at the rate of Rs. 71.43 per square yard. In addition thereto, solatium @ 30%, additional compensation 12%, and interest from the date of taking possession upto the date of award @ 9% per annum for the first year and thereafter @ 15% per annum. 4. The claimants proceeded before the Court of reference under Section 18 of the Act. In such reference the claimants contended that after publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act no opportunity of hearing was given to the claimants as per Section 5-A of the Act. Pursuant to the notice under Section 9 (3) of the Act, claimants demanded rate of Rs. In such reference the claimants contended that after publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act no opportunity of hearing was given to the claimants as per Section 5-A of the Act. Pursuant to the notice under Section 9 (3) of the Act, claimants demanded rate of Rs. 750/- per square yard considering the location, utility and importance of the land since the village is very nearer to Ghaziabad city and is situated about two kilometres away from the office of G.D.A. All the facilities of a developed city like electricity, water supply, school and transportation, bus stand, health centre, etc. are available for last 30 years. Shastri Nagar Awasiya Colony of G.D.A., several institutions of Central Government like C.B.I. Training, Govt. Polytechnic College, Kante and other important institutions are in the village. Several plannings of Central Government like Central Finance Secretariat are going to be implemented nearer to this village. Police line is also situated there. G.D.A. is also selling land of this village at the rate of Rs. 1100/- per square yard. Therefore, the claimants demanded rate of Rs. 500/- per square yard, alongwith additional compensation @ 12% per annum from 18th August, 1988 till the handing over of possession, solatium @ 30% and interests, etc. 5. On the other hand, G.D.A. filed written statement and contended that compensation awarded by the S.L.A.O. is fair and adequate. Land holders have received the compensation without protest, therefore, the reference is not maintainable. Land holders have not filed any objection as such as per Sections 25 and 9 of the Act, therefore, reference is liable to be dismissed. The reference is barred by limitation. 6. Four set of references filed by the claimants, out of which one set was decided vide judgment dated 22nd December, 1999 in respect of village Harsaon and other three were decided vide judgments dated 31st May, 2000 in respect of the villages Sadarpur and Dasna. 7. In the leading L.A.R. No. 329 of 1992 (Chandra Bhan v. State of U.P.) (First Appeal No. 395 of 2000) the claimants produced five sale-deeds. The Court of reference, after taking into account the sale-deeds at Serial Nos. 16-Ka and 18-Ga as exemplars fixed compensation at the rate of Rs. 7. In the leading L.A.R. No. 329 of 1992 (Chandra Bhan v. State of U.P.) (First Appeal No. 395 of 2000) the claimants produced five sale-deeds. The Court of reference, after taking into account the sale-deeds at Serial Nos. 16-Ka and 18-Ga as exemplars fixed compensation at the rate of Rs. 163/- per square yard and other similar benefits thereon after making deduction of 30-45% from the amount arrived on the basis of the exemplar sale-deeds for the village Harsaon on 22nd December, 1999. Almost similar cases were set up by the claimants in all the references. The Court of reference on the basis of the judgment in the L.A.R. No. 329 of 1992 once again on 31st May, 2000 awarded uniform compensation @ Rs. 163/- per square yard with similar benefits to the claimants/land owners in respect of other villages i.e. Sadarpur and Dasna upon holding that the villages are adjacent to Village Harsaon and arising out of same notification. 8. Against the aforesaid judgments the G.D.A. has filed the first appeals for setting aside the judgments and awards, whereas, on the other hand, the claimants/land holders have filed the first appeals/cross objections for further enhancement of the awarded amount. According to G.D.A., awarding of compensation on square yard basis of a large tract of agricultural land is contrary to law laid down by the Supreme Court. Secondly, reliance of sale exemplars of very small area is legally erroneous. Moreover sale-exemplars were neither examined nor proved nor any finding to that extent is recorded. Claimants like plaintiffs under Section 18 of the Act failed to prove higher compensation. A Government Order dated 7th July, 1981 was wrongly relied upon. 9. In determining the compensation, by and large, the Court considers provisions under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act and various guidelines given by the different High Courts and the Supreme Court regarding the same. Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining compensation, wherein Section 24 deals with matters to be neglected in determining compensation. 10. In Nelson Fernandes and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and others, JT 2007 (8) SC 285, the Supreme Court held that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded, the LAO shall be guided by the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. 10. In Nelson Fernandes and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and others, JT 2007 (8) SC 285, the Supreme Court held that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded, the LAO shall be guided by the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. As per Section 22 (possibly Section 23 first clause) of the Act, the market value of the land has to be determined at the date of publication of notice under Section 4 of the Act. As per Section 24, the LAO shall also exclude any increase in the value of land likely to accrue from use to which it will be put once acquired. The market value of the land means the price of the land which a willing seller is reasonably expected to fetch in the open market from a willing purchaser. In other words, it is a price of the land in hypothetical market. 11. According to Sri A.K. Misra, learned Senior Counsel, and Sri Ashwani Kumar Misra, learned Counsel appearing for the G.D.A., at the time of determination of market rate of the land the S.L.A.O. found some of the sale-deeds to be proximate in time and situationing to the acquired land. He has taken the highest rate i.e. a sale-deed of 7th March, 1988 of Khasra No. 784 of 100 square yard land and relying upon the sale value of Rs. 10,000/- determined the compensation @ Rs. 100/- per square yard for the village Harsaon. Even such fixation by S.L.A.O. is exorbitant since he could not rely upon such smaller exemplar sale-deed on the basis of the settled law to determine the market value of 223 bighas of land. Therefore, any further enhancement by the Court of reference is uncalled for. According to Mr. Misra, even the date of publication of notification, as incorporated in the order of the Court of reference, is wrongful. The Gazette notification was made on 16th August, 1988 prior to execution of such sale-deeds. The claimants relied upon the following sale-deeds : Sl. Paper Date Vendor Vendee Khasra Area Rate Page No. No. No. (Per No. in Square Paper yard book of GDA 1. 10A 8.5.1989 Smt. Sarita Tahir Ali 696/1 186 sq. 170/- 55 Chauhan yds. 2. 11A 8.5.1989 Narendra Tahir Ali 694/1 84 sq. 170/- 58 Singh yds. 3. 13A 31.12.1987 Ratan Singh Bramh Dutt 693/2 581 sq. Paper Date Vendor Vendee Khasra Area Rate Page No. No. No. (Per No. in Square Paper yard book of GDA 1. 10A 8.5.1989 Smt. Sarita Tahir Ali 696/1 186 sq. 170/- 55 Chauhan yds. 2. 11A 8.5.1989 Narendra Tahir Ali 694/1 84 sq. 170/- 58 Singh yds. 3. 13A 31.12.1987 Ratan Singh Bramh Dutt 693/2 581 sq. 100/- 61 yds. 4. 16A 7.9.1988 Bramh Dutt Jai Prakash 693 150 sq. 160/- 64 Sharma yds. 5. 17A 4/26.11.88 Bramh Dutt Har Vilas 693 130 sq. 125/- 68 yds. 6. 18A 23.8.1988 Kisan Gopal Charan 298/1 57 sq. 298/- 73 (Claimant Singh yds. in LAR No. 328/92) 12. It is significant to note that at the time of going through the exemplar sale-deeds, as aforesaid, particularly which were relied upon by the Court of reference, we find that one of exemplar sale-deeds for the smaller plot of 57 square yards, price of which was fixed at the rate of Rs. 298/- per square yard as in the chart, was based on an unregistered document dated 23rd August, 1988 but the same was registered on 4th November, 1988 even after the local publication of notification on 1st October, 1988. Therefore, it can be safely construed that only to get advantage to make the nearer exemplar sale-deed, the document was manufactured by raising the price when, in effect, the registration was made after the notification. Similarly, the sale exemplar, which has been shown for an area of 150 square yards and rate fixed is Rs. 160/- per square yard, was executed on 11th July, 1988 just before Gazette notification on 16th August, 1988, but the registration was made on 7th September, 1988 after publication of notification to take the advantage of local publication on 1st October, 1988. Moreover, first sale-deed was executed by Kishan Gopal, one of the claimants himself, in favour of Charan Singh only for an area of 57 square yards (approximately .0117 acre) at the rate of Rs. 298/- per square yard. Both the exemplar sale-deeds are indeed small in comparison to vast tract of agricultural land acquired by the G.D.A. However, the Court of reference made an average of two sale-deeds and came to a figure of Rs. 229/- per square yard and arbitrarily deducted 30% towards development cost and accordingly fixed the market rate of Rs. 163/- per square yard. Both the exemplar sale-deeds are indeed small in comparison to vast tract of agricultural land acquired by the G.D.A. However, the Court of reference made an average of two sale-deeds and came to a figure of Rs. 229/- per square yard and arbitrarily deducted 30% towards development cost and accordingly fixed the market rate of Rs. 163/- per square yard. No evidence was led to justify the enhancement of compensation nor any evidence existed to prove that the determination made by the S.L.A.O. is inadequate in view of the facts and circumstances specially when about 500 bighas of undeveloped agricultural land is the subject matter of acquisition. A Division Bench of this High Court in a judgment dated 26th February, 2004 delivered in First Appeal No. 522 of 1993 as reported in (2004) 2 SAC 235, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Khushi Ram and others, held that the reliance upon Government Order in contravention of the statutory provisions under the Land Acquisition Act is illegal. Moreover, the Government order/instruction has already been withdrawn. 13. He further contended that the claimants have already accepted the compensation without any protest, therefore, they cannot challenge the award even thereafter. Moreover, leading case in all the matters is First Appeal No. 395 of 2000 between G.D.A. and one Sri Chandra Bhan and others. In such case the compensation was enhanced from Rs. 100/- per square yard to Rs. 163/- per square yard vide judgment dated 22nd December, 1999. The Court of reference has wrongly awarded uniform compensation in respect of all the three villages on the grounds that single notification was issued for all the villages and the villages are adjacent to each other. He further submitted that the claimants wanted to develop their case even at the stage of first appeal and filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure at this belated stage for consideration of subsequent event, which has no relevance. The calculation chart in respect of the matter of one Sri Ram Das was not an evidence on record before the Court below in Chandra Bhan’s case nor was relied upon. Land of Sri Ram Das was not part of any acquisition proceeding. The acquisition took place vide notification dated 16th August, 1988. G.D.A. took possession of land of Sri Ram Das on 14th December, 1988 without acquisition. Land of Sri Ram Das was not part of any acquisition proceeding. The acquisition took place vide notification dated 16th August, 1988. G.D.A. took possession of land of Sri Ram Das on 14th December, 1988 without acquisition. The sale-deed was thereafter executed by Sri Ram Das in favour of G.D.A. on 27th August, 1991 at the rate of Rs. 112/- per square yard. This was a distress transaction. So far as deduction is concerned, he contended that deduction is wrongful since the authority has left with only 40% of the total acquired land as the saleable area leaving aside 60% for the purpose of construction of roads, parks, sewer, etc. Therefore, the cost will be fixed on the basis of 40% land of the available saleable area. He further said that the acquisition proceeding under the judgments of a Division Bench of this Court presided over by one of us (Amitava Lala, J.) as reported in 2007 (8) ADJ 665 (DB), National Thermal Power Corporation, Vidyut Nagar, Ghaziabad v. State of U.P. and another and Jagdish Chandra and others v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, NOIDA and another, 2008 (1) ADJ 253 , did not relate to the acquisition of land for any residential colony. In those matters acquisition was made for thermal power plant or regional park. Therefore, this Court was not pleased to grant any deduction on account of development for residential purposes. Present case is factually distinguishable. 14. According to us, background of the acquisition proceedings of each case is distinguishable from other. However, we normally follow certain laying down principles of the Supreme Court and different High Courts to draw an appropriate conclusion. 15. In Union of India v. Zila Singh and others, 2003 (10) SCC 166 and Union of India and another v. Ram Phool and another, 2003 (10) SCC 167, two things we get i.e. (i) sale price in respect of a small area would not be the determinative factor for deciding the market value of a vast stretch of land and (ii) onus is upon the claimants to lead evidence for the determination of the market value. Once it is decided by the Court of competent jurisdiction then there is no residue of evidence on which the determination made by the High Court enhancing the compensation can be sustained. Once it is decided by the Court of competent jurisdiction then there is no residue of evidence on which the determination made by the High Court enhancing the compensation can be sustained. In K.S. Shivadevamma and others v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer and another, 1996 (2) SCC 62 again it was held that the sale-deed of a small piece of land never form the basis for determining the compensation for a large extent of land. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others, 1996 (3) SCC 124 , it has been held that it is settled law that the price prevailing as on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act is the price to which the owner or person who has an interest in the land is entitled to. It is equally settled law that when a large extent of land is acquired, it cannot be determined on square foot basis. Therefore, it should be determined only on the basis of yardage. No doubt in the instant case calculation is made on the basis of square yard. In the said judgment it is also held that by operation of Section 24 of the Act subsequent development is irrelevant for determination of compensation. In K. Posayya and others v. Special Tahsildar, AIR 1995 SC 1641 , it was held that the sale-deed brought into existence after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act cannot be taken as an exemplar sale-deed for the purpose of fixation of compensation. Again it was held that in case of acquisition of long tracts of lands for projects situated in several villages, stray sale-deed of small extent here and there would not form the basis to determine the compensation. The Court of reference should be circumspect, pragmatic and careful in analysing the evidence and arriving at just and fair market value of the lands under acquisition which could be fetched on the date of notification. The nature of the land, the crops raised and the nature of the income likely to be derived from the lands, the expenditure to be incurred for raising the crops and the net profits etc. The nature of the land, the crops raised and the nature of the income likely to be derived from the lands, the expenditure to be incurred for raising the crops and the net profits etc. would be the relevant factors in arriving at the net market value and if evidence is produced in that behalf on its basis applying the suitable 10 years multiplier, the market value need to be determined. The owner or claimants should not be put to loss by undervaluation. But, at the same time public exchequer should not be put to undue burden by excess valuation. It is the statutory duty of the Court to maintain the balance between the diverse interests. Claimants stand in the position of the plaintiffs and onus is on them to adduce necessary and relevant evidence in proof of the objection for higher compensation. From AIR 1995 SC 840 , Special Land Acquisition Officer and another etc. v. Sri Siddappa Omanna Tumari and others etc., we find that when there is no evidence produced by the claimants in the Civil Court on references got made by them which would show that they had produced evidence sufficient to discharge the burden of proof that the award made by the authority did not give adequate compensation for their acquired lands, the judgments and awards of the Civil Court are wholly unsustainable. In Jai Prakash and others etc. etc. v. Union of India, JT 1997 (4) SC 112, it was held that merely because in some neighbouring villages, valuation has been made at a higher rate, it cannot be said that the appellants must also be given same rate of compensation. In Kanwar Singh and others v. Union of India, 1998 (8) SCC 136 , it was held that the amount of compensation for the land acquired depends on the market value of land on the date immediately before the notification under Section 4 of the Act or when same land is acquired and offer of compensation is made through an award. Whether such an offer of compensation represents the market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, has to be determined on the basis of evidence produced before the Court. Whether such an offer of compensation represents the market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, has to be determined on the basis of evidence produced before the Court. The claimants have to prove and demonstrate that the compensation offered by the Collector is not adequate and the same does not reflect the true market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. This could only be done by the claimants by adducing evidence to the effect that on the relevant date, the market value of the land in question was such at which the vendor and the vendee (buyer and seller) were willing to sell or purchase the land. The consideration in terms of price received for land under bona fide transactions on the date or preceding the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act generally shows the market value of the acquired land and the market value of the acquired land to be assessed in terms of those transactions. Sale instances showing the price fetched for similar land with similar advantages under bona fide transaction of sale at or near about the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act is well recognized to be the appropriate evidence for determining the market value of the acquired land. It was further held by the Supreme Court that awarding of same rate of compensation regarding different villages is not tenable. The compensation awarded to the claimants of the adjoining village would not lead to the correct assessment of market value of the other land. In that particular case, as an example, the Court held that if the village ‘A’ adjoins village ‘B’, village ‘B’ adjoins village ‘C, village ‘C adjoins village ‘D’, so on and so forth and in that process, the entire Delhi would be covered. Generally, there would be different situation and potentiality of the land situated in two different villages unless it is proved that situation and potentiality of the land in two different villages are the same. Generally, there would be different situation and potentiality of the land situated in two different villages unless it is proved that situation and potentiality of the land in two different villages are the same. In Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru and others v. Jasti Rohini (Smt.) and another, 1995 (1) SCC 717 , it was held that the compensation must be determined by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser as on the date of the notification published under Section 4 (1) of the Act. The disinclination of the seller to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the vendee to purchase the land must, alike, be disregarded and neither of them must be considered as acting under compulsion. In determining the market value and fixation of compensation, the Court should be alive to the factors mentioned in Section 24 of the Act and keep them at the back of the mind and should not be influenced by the future or later development in the locality or neighbourhood and should not get influenced by the prevailing situation as on the date of the determination of the compensation. Its consideration should alone be confined to the market value prevailing as on the date of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. In M/s. Printers House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mst. Saiyadan (Deceased) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 1160 , it was held that while determining the market value of the acquired land when several sale-deeds or previous awards are produced in Court as evidence of comparable sales, Court has to necessarily examine every sale or award to find out as to what is the land which is the subject of sale or award and as to what is the price fetched by its sale or by the award made therefor. If the sale is found to be a genuine one or the award is an accepted one, and the sale or award pertains to land which was sold or acquired at about the time of publication of preliminary Notification under the Act in respect of the acquired land, the market-value of which has to be determined, the Court has to mark the location and the features (advantages and disadvantages) of the land covered by the sale or the award. This process involves the marking by Court of the size, shape, tenure, potentiality etc. of the land. Keeping in view the various factors marked or noticed respecting the land covered by the sale or award, as the case may be, presence or absence of such factors, degree of presence or degree of absence of such factors in the acquired land the market value of which has to be determined, should be seen. When so seen, if it is found that the land covered by the sale or award, as the case may be, is almost identical with the acquired land under consideration, the land under the sale or the market-value determined for the land in the award could be taken by the Court as the ‘price basis’ for determining the market-value of the acquired land under consideration. If there are more comparable sales or awards of the same type, no difficulty arises since the ‘price basis’ to be got from them would be common. But, difficulty arises when the comparable sales or awards are not of the same kind and when each of them furnish a different ‘price basis’. This difficulty cannot be overcome by averaging the prices fetched by all the comparable sales or awards for getting the ‘price basis’ on which the market-value of the acquired land could be determined. It is so for the obvious reason that such ‘price basis’ may very largely depending even on comparable sales or awards. Moreover, ‘price basis’ got by averaging comparable sales or awards which are not of the same kind, cannot be a correct reflection of the price which the willing seller would have got from the willing buyer, if the acquired land had been sold in the market. Therefore, when there are several comparable sales or awards pertaining to different lands, what is required of the Court is to choose that sale or award relating to a land which closely or nearly compares with the plot of land the market-value of which it has to determine, and to take the price of land of such sale or award as the basis for determining the market-value of the land under consideration. From JT 1995 (2) SC 91, Tarlochan Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others, we find that the Supreme Court said that Section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act expressly prohibits and puts an embargo on the Court in taking the factors mentioned in Section 24 as relevant in determining the market value. Under these circumstances, the future development and potential prospective use of the acquisition etc. are not relevant circumstances. Even the purpose of acquisition also is not relevant. In Kummari Veeraiah and others v. State of A.P., 1995 (4) SCC 136 , it has been held that in case it is found that the sale-deeds of smaller extent of land are genuine and the acquired land possessed of the same or similar special advantageous features, then reasonable price is required to be determined by giving suitable deduction depending upon the extent of land covered by the sale transaction and the acquired land. In respect of execution or registration of sale-deeds just few days prior to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act the Supreme Court held that it is common knowledge and experience that the proposal for acquisition takes long time for arriving at a decision. In the meantime, it would be an open card and known to everyone, in particular, to the owners of the land and persons in the neighbourhood. Therefore, it is not uncommon to have sale deeds executed and registered in the interregnum so as to boost the value of the acquired lands. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sahaswan, District Budaun through its Secretary v. Bipin Kumar and another, 2004 (2) SCC 283 , it was held that the market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be fixed on the basis of a basic valuation register maintained by the registering authority for collection of stamp duty. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Khushi Ram (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that it is well settled that the circle rate cannot be the basis for determining the market value under the Land Acquisition Act. The circle rate is meant only to collect stamp duty but it cannot be treated as the market rate for the purpose of the Act particularly when a vast stretch of land is acquired. Moreover, exemplar sale-deed of smaller land cannot be the appropriate exemplar. The circle rate is meant only to collect stamp duty but it cannot be treated as the market rate for the purpose of the Act particularly when a vast stretch of land is acquired. Moreover, exemplar sale-deed of smaller land cannot be the appropriate exemplar. Factually, therein 0.7 bighas of land was intended to compare with the acquired land of 88 bighas. In Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village (A.P.) v. Nookala Rajamallu and others, AIR 2004 SC 1031, it was held by the Supreme Court that principles of fixation of market value is dependable on the comparable sales, which take into account the following : (i) when sale is within a reasonable time of the date of notification under Section 4(1); (ii) it should be a bona fide transaction; (iii) it should be of the land acquired or of the land adjacent to the land acquired; and (iv) it should possess similar advantages. 16. In Allahabad Development Authority v. Ekhlaque Hussain and others, 2007 (3) ADJ 413 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court held that it is now settled position that potentiality of the future land acquisition is not relevant. Section 23 of the Act deals with matters to be considered in determining compensation and lays down that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under the Act, the Court shall take into consideration first, the market value of the land at the rate on the date of publication of notification under Section 4 (1). 17. Mr. Murlidhar, Mr. Ravi Kiran Jain and Mr. Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel, with the able assistance of Mr. Manish Goyal, Mr. Kamal Singh Yadav and Mr. Madan Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the claimants, time and again contended before this Court that the land area is falling within the national capital region as under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985. As per the Schedule of the Act the whole of District Ghaziabad comprising Tehsils Ghaziabad and Hapur are to be considered as part of national capital zone. The area is also under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. This place is within 15 Kms. from Delhi. Therefore, valuation of the land will be like the valuation of the land in Delhi. Meerut is far away place than the place in question but the price is higher than the same. The area is also under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. This place is within 15 Kms. from Delhi. Therefore, valuation of the land will be like the valuation of the land in Delhi. Meerut is far away place than the place in question but the price is higher than the same. It has been further contended that G.D.A. has illegally occupied land of Khasra Nos. 1800 and 1802 area 1632 square yards of Village Sadarpur belonging to one Sri Ram Das son of Sri Harpal Singh. The possession was taken on 14th December, 1988 alongwith other occupied land of three villages for the said Govindpuram Scheme of Ghaziabad. In order to compensate Sri Ram Das, the G.D.A. held a board meeting on 3rd September, 1990, in which rate of Rs. 250/- per square yard was decided to purchase the said land from said Sri Ram Das and also decided to give him a developed plot of equal area of Sri Ram Das on depositing the development charges by him. Sri Ram Das stated on oath as P.W.-2 in L.A.R. No. 261 of 1992 with regard to such unauthorised occupation by G.D.A. and confirmed the fact that in order to save the said rate from becoming an exemplar the G.D.A. purchased the land at the rate of Rs. 112/- per square yard only through a sale-deed dated 27th August, 1991 and allotted him a plot of 550 square yards at the rate of Rs. 397/- per square yard in Nehru Nagar Colony. Said Sri Ram Das also stated that sale-deed was executed by him under force and influence of G.D.A. The issue of Sri Ram Das has been discussed in the judgement and order dated 31st May, 2000 passed in L.A.R. No. 261 of 1992 (Harpal Singh v. State). In L.A.R. No. 329 of 1992 (Chandra Bhan and others v. State of U.P.), from which the leading First Appeal No. 395 of 2000 arose, appropriate sale-deed was executed on 23rd August, 1988, but G.D.A. has wrongly mentioned its date as 4th November, 1988 instead of 23rd August, 1988. In L.A.R. No. 329 of 1992 (Chandra Bhan and others v. State of U.P.), from which the leading First Appeal No. 395 of 2000 arose, appropriate sale-deed was executed on 23rd August, 1988, but G.D.A. has wrongly mentioned its date as 4th November, 1988 instead of 23rd August, 1988. One of the seller of the sale-deed Sri Suresh Kumar stated on oath as P.W.-4 in L.A.R. No. 261 of 1992 (Harpal Singh v. State of U.P.) that he has received the whole consideration of sale in cash and after the sale, purchaser has built his own building on the land so sold. He further stated that much before the said sale-deed, the lands for Central Government and Police Line were acquired and it is wrong to say that at an inflated rate sale-deed has been executed falsely. Thus, rate, which has been fixed on 23rd August, 1988, is fully genuine and the sale-deed was executed much before 5th October, 1988 i.e. the date of notification, which as per the law is the last date of publication in the locality. Learned Counsel for the claimants contended that from the above evidence, it is proved that before notification the rate was fixed at Rs. 305/- per square meter. Sri Ram Das was allotted a developed land on depositing the development charges. The actual benefit was given to said Sri Ram Das. Upon evaluating the market value of the land comes to Rs. 652.22 per square yards. These evidences are very important and required to be taken on record for consideration by the High Court to decide the true market value of the land. 18. From AIR 1997 SC 2664 , Meharban and others etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and others) we find that it is settled legal position that the Court, while determining the compensation must sit in the arm chair of a willing and prudent vendee and put a question whether the market value sought to be determined would be capable to fetch the price that hypothetic he should determine just and adequate compensation for the land acquired. It is duty of the Court to take all the relevant factors into account before determination of the compensation. It is duty of the Court to take all the relevant factors into account before determination of the compensation. Applying the above acid test, in view of the paucity of evidence, instead of remitting the matter to the reference Court and prolonging the agony of the claimants the appropriate course would be to base the award of the Court of reference in respect of the notification, in which the compensation was determined and which has become final. That would form the foundation and base to determine the compensation treating that area as a block. The belting in this case is not reasonable for the entire lands are situated in well defined and developed blocks. From AIR 1992 SC 2298 , Bhagwathula Samanna and others v. Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Visakhapatnam Municipality, we further find that in awarding compensation in acquisition proceedings, the Court has necessarily to determine the market value of the land as on the date of the relevant notification. It is useful to consider the value paid for similar land at the material time under genuine transactions. The market value envisages the price which a willing purchaser may pay under bona fide transfer to a willing seller. The land value can differ depending upon the extent and nature of the land sold. A fully developed small plot in an important locality may fetch a higher value than a larger area in an undeveloped condition and situated in a remote locality. By comparing the price shown in the transactions all variables have to be taken into consideration. The transaction in regard to smaller property, therefore, cannot be taken as a real basis for fixing the compensation for larger tracts of property. In fixing the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property, generally a deduction is given taking into consideration the expenses required for development of the larger tract to make smaller plots within that area in order to compare with the small plots dealt with under the sale transaction. In Land Acquisition Officer Revenue Divisional Officer Nalgonda (A.P.) v. Morisetty Satyanarayana and others, JT 2001 (10) SC 200, it was held that it is true to say that normally fixing the market price of the land under acquisition, when the sale instances are for small piece of land then appropriate reduction is required to be made. In Land Acquisition Officer Revenue Divisional Officer Nalgonda (A.P.) v. Morisetty Satyanarayana and others, JT 2001 (10) SC 200, it was held that it is true to say that normally fixing the market price of the land under acquisition, when the sale instances are for small piece of land then appropriate reduction is required to be made. In that case, the acquired land is out of the same survey number. Various sale-deeds produced which reflect the increase in price of the portions of land of the same survey number. Other evidence on record indicates increase in the market price of land in the village during the relevant years. Therefore, considering the increasing trend of the market price and the fact that small pieces of land owned by different persons are acquired, it was decided not a fit case for reducing the amount on the ground that relevant sale-deed is for a small piece of land. In Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acqn., Vishakapatnam v. Smt. A. Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666 , it was held that price paid in sale or purchase of the land acquired within a reasonable time from the date of the acquisition of the land in question would be the best piece of evidence. In Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust, Bhopal, AIR 1989 SC 1222 , it has been held that the acquired land possessed some important features being located within the Corporation area and its potentiality for being developed as a residential area. There was no sufficient direct evidence of market price. The fact that applications were made for diversion and for sanction of a lay-out plan went to show that the owner was interested in developing the land and in selling it by dividing it into plots. Considering the different sale-deeds produced it was held that willing vendor had agreed to sell land after development and the development charge was to be paid by the willing purchaser. In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another, AIR 1988 SC 1652 , it has been held as under : “4. Considering the different sale-deeds produced it was held that willing vendor had agreed to sell land after development and the development charge was to be paid by the willing purchaser. In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another, AIR 1988 SC 1652 , it has been held as under : “4. The following factors must be etched on the mental screen : (1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. (2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the Reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate Court. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. (5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of Notifications under Ss. 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. (7) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land). (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations : (i) proximity from time angle; (ii) proximity from situation angle. (11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. (13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors. (14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors : Plus factors 1. smallness of size. 2. proximity to a road. 3. frontage on a road. 4. nearness to developed area. 5. regular shape. 6. level vis-a-vis land under acquisition. 7. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors : Plus factors 1. smallness of size. 2. proximity to a road. 3. frontage on a road. 4. nearness to developed area. 5. regular shape. 6. level vis-a-vis land under acquisition. 7. special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage. Minus factors 1. largeness of area. 2. situation in the interior at a distance from the road. 3. narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth. 4. lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up. 5. remoteness from developed locality. 6. some special disadvantageous factor which would deter a purchaser. (15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10000 sq. yds. or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx. between 20% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. (16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself. (17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.” 19. In P. Ram Reddy etc. (16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself. (17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.” 19. In P. Ram Reddy etc. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad etc., JT 1995 (1) SC 593, the Supreme Court held that the market value of the land must relate to the last of the dates of publication of notification or giving of public notice of substance of such notification according to Section 4 (1) of the Act. Learned Counsel appearing for the claimants also relied upon various judgments of this Court in Jagdish Chandra (supra), National Thermal Power Corporation, Vidyut Nagar, Ghaziabad (supra) and National Thermal Power Corporation v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (7) ADJ 595 (DB), in which the Court discouraged the question of necessary deductions. 20. From the latest view of the Supreme Court as in Gafar and others v. Moradabad Development Authority and another, 2007 (7) SCC 614 , we find that it is true that there is no absolute prohibition in taking note of the rates fixed for sale of smaller plots and making it the basis for fixation of compensation for larger extents. But normally, when larger extents are involved in an acquisition, it will be more prudent to rely on sale deeds of larger extents and not to base the assessment of the compensation on values fetched at sales of small extents. However, the claim for enhancement was allowed by the Court of reference, in that case, in spite of the finding that the evidence of the witnesses adduced on behalf of the claimants was unreliable. The two sale deeds relied on by the claimant in support of the claim for enhancement were also not comparable or reliable in the light of the evidence of the claimant himself. But what is relevant is to notice that at least a set of claimants similarly situated whose lands were covered by the same notification were content to receive Rs. 100/- per square meter towards compensation. No attempt was made to show by the claimants that they received those amounts not under their free will but under coercion or in view of any other circumstance, which compelled them to receive compensation at that rate. 100/- per square meter towards compensation. No attempt was made to show by the claimants that they received those amounts not under their free will but under coercion or in view of any other circumstance, which compelled them to receive compensation at that rate. Normal inference would be that they received the amounts since they found it proper compensation for their lands. Surely, that fact will furnish some evidentiary value regarding the market value of the lands in the locality. It must be remembered that some of the sale-deeds at the approximate point of time relating to agricultural lands. The awarding officer had taken note of a sale-deed, which was at a time proximate to the date of notifications in these cases and it related to a piece of land, though a small extent, which was not distant from the acquired lands, to borrow the language of the awarding officer. The High Court said that the awarding officer himself had been generous in his award. An element of guesswork is inherent in most cases in determining the market value of the acquired land. If the judgment of the High Court revealed that it had taken into consideration the relevant factors prescribed under the Act, in appeal under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, assessment of market value thus made should not be disturbed by the Supreme Court. 21. According to us, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a legislation for the purpose of acquisition of land required for public purpose. In the process an amount of compensation is being paid to the land owners, who are loosing their lands. At the time of determination of compensation normally a Court or an authority sees balancing factor by way of guesswork so that neither the land loosers nor the public exchequer feel sufferer. From the objects and reasons of the Act one aspect is very clear that the need of the land for the public purpose will have prevailing effect over the private purpose. But deduction of compensation is controlled by the equitable principle. On the variable circumstances the Courts prescribe deduction of certain sum from the payable consideration normally when the land is acquired for the specific public purpose i.e. land is underdeveloped and necessitated for commercial or residential purpose. There is no straitjacket formula. But deduction of compensation is controlled by the equitable principle. On the variable circumstances the Courts prescribe deduction of certain sum from the payable consideration normally when the land is acquired for the specific public purpose i.e. land is underdeveloped and necessitated for commercial or residential purpose. There is no straitjacket formula. This idea has been developed when the Court found that the small piece of land gets higher price than the large tract of land, therefore, if such price is given in respect of large tract, the public exchequer may be affected because entire area cannot be utilized for such purpose. A substantial area has to be utilized for road, sewerage, other amenities and facilities. If a deduction is made from such common area, a comparable price of small piece of land may come out. In Bhagwathula Samanna (supra) it was held that the transaction in regard to smaller property cannot, therefore, be taken as a real basis for fixing the compensation for larger tracts of property. In fixing the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property, generally a deduction is given taking into consideration the expenses required for development of the larger tract to make smaller plots within that area in order to compare with the small plots dealt with under the sale transaction. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted. 23. However, our anxiety lies somewhere else. If a State or its machinery deducts an amount from the amount of compensation to be paid to the land owners who are loosing their lands for the aforesaid purpose and at the same time collects development charges from the ultimate purchaser/s, whether State is doubly benefited or not. It will be unjust enrichment or not. That apart, for example, when a developer purchases a land, he fixes a separate price for the seller keeping in the back of mind Floor Area Ratio (FAR) but after construction when he sales to the purchaser, he collects price of the common area in the name of development charges to make additional profit. That apart, for example, when a developer purchases a land, he fixes a separate price for the seller keeping in the back of mind Floor Area Ratio (FAR) but after construction when he sales to the purchaser, he collects price of the common area in the name of development charges to make additional profit. Can a State or its machinery do so? Previously lands were being acquired for actual public purpose. But now-a-days in many occasions we find there is one superficial public purpose and the other is hidden public purpose. Unless veil is lifted, nothing can be seen. Of late, a practice has been developed to pursue or convince a State or its machinery to acquire land and deposit the price through State for two effective reasons i.e. to get a land free from encumbrances and also at a reasonable price. Therefore, who is the beneficiary, his financial position and intention has to be seen before deduction otherwise the public purpose will be frustrated. Hence, apart from largeness or not, commercial or residential purpose or not, developed area or not, now-a-days specially two other aspects are required to be seen i.e. whether both deduction from the payable compensation to the land loosers and development charges from the ultimate purchasers can be made and whether public exchequer will actually suffer or private exchequer will actually suffer, and in case private exchequer will actually suffer, whether there should be any deduction or not. According to us, neither of the aforesaid observations is uncalled for nor alien to the context. Therefore, we cannot deviate from our stand as in Jagdish Chandra (supra) and National Thermal Power Corporation, Vidyut Nagar, Ghaziabad (supra). However, in this case such ratio cannot be seemed to be applicable. In this case no deduction is made by the S.L.A.O. and the claimants accepted the compensation without protest. The Court of reference raised the price without appropriate basis and deducted making the claimants beneficial. Therefore, the award of the Court of reference as a whole is not sustainable. Hence, if the order in its entirety goes, the question of deduction cannot sustain independently. 24. Secondly, in this case, single notification was issued for three villages and compensation was fixed by the S.L.A.O. on three different rates. Concerned S.L.A.O. has fixed Rs. 100/- for one village on the basis of 66 comparable sale deeds, Rs. Hence, if the order in its entirety goes, the question of deduction cannot sustain independently. 24. Secondly, in this case, single notification was issued for three villages and compensation was fixed by the S.L.A.O. on three different rates. Concerned S.L.A.O. has fixed Rs. 100/- for one village on the basis of 66 comparable sale deeds, Rs. 63.77 paise for another village on the basis of 48 comparable sale deeds and Rs. 71.43 paise for other village on the basis of 105 comparable sale deeds. In determining the market value of the land, the price paid in sale or purchase of the land acquired within a reasonable time from the date of the acquisition of the land in question would be the best piece of evidence. According to us, one notification or several notifications cannot be the guiding factor for fixation of uniform rate of compensation for three different villages. Uniform rate is dependable on the various factors like location, shape, size, potentiality or tenure. In M/s. Printers House Pvt. Ltd. (supra) it was held that where there is evidence of sales or awards of land(s), which could be compared with the acquired land(s), the Court, as a matter of course, adopts the ‘Comparable Sales Method of Valuation of Land in preference to other recognised methods of valuation of lands, such as ‘Capitalisation of Net Income Method’ or ‘Expert Opinion Method’ for determining the market value of the acquired land(s). If ‘Comparable Sales Method of Valuation of Land’ is adopted for determining the market-value of an acquired plot of land, it generally holds good for determination of the market-value of several acquired plots of land if acquisition of all such plots of land is made pursuant to the same preliminary notification. But, if any of the factors, such as, location, shape, size, potentiality or tenure of one plot of acquired land widely differs from the other plot(s) of acquired land(s), then the market-value of each plot of land acquired has to be determined independently of the other(s) even if all of them had been acquired pursuant to the same preliminary notification. Therefore, it implies that if the notifications are different but the lands are uniform in nature, uniform price can be made. But if the lands are dissimilar but brought under single notification, there cannot be any embargo to fix different rates. Therefore, it implies that if the notifications are different but the lands are uniform in nature, uniform price can be made. But if the lands are dissimilar but brought under single notification, there cannot be any embargo to fix different rates. S.L.A.O. has correctly drawn the inference which the claimants have accepted without protest but the Court of reference failed to appreciate such part and came to a wrong conclusion. 25. Thirdly, even independently foundation of the judgment of the Court of reference is baseless. S.L.A.O. fixed compensation of Rs. 100/- per square yard in respect of village Harsaon. The Court of reference relying upon two sale-deeds of small pieces of lands of such village, although executed and/or registered after notification, enhanced compensation and after making deduction arrived at a uniform rate for all the three villages. The basis is that all the villages are adjacent to each other, acquisition is made by single notification and future developments and/or potentialities are available. We repeat and say that the Supreme Court in Kummari Veeraiah (supra) held that it is common knowledge and experience that the proposal for acquisition takes long time for arriving at a decision. In the meantime, it would be an open card and known to everyone, in particular, to the owners of the land and persons in the neighbourhood. Therefore, it is not uncommon to have sale deeds executed and registered in the interregnum so as to boost the value of the acquired lands. Even in the High Court, the claimants wanted to adduce further evidence by way of application under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure mainly on the basis of the transaction of one Sri Ram Das and G.D.A. saying that such evidence was existing in the record before the Court of reference but was not in the possession of the claimant/s. We are of the view that such transaction between Sri Ram Das and G.D.A. cannot be considered to be sale exemplar because the same did not derive from any acquisition proceeding but from a distress sale. Moreover, an exception cannot be the rule. It is unbelievable that a governmental authority made overpayment in cash like a private party. Moreover the evidence of Sri Ram Das cannot be said to be evidence of non-interested person. Moreover, an exception cannot be the rule. It is unbelievable that a governmental authority made overpayment in cash like a private party. Moreover the evidence of Sri Ram Das cannot be said to be evidence of non-interested person. That apart, when evidence was already available before the Court of reference, there is no scope of adducing further evidence before the High Court. Even assuming Rs. 112/- per square yard is treated to be the compensation to be given to Sri Ram Das, how it will help the cause of the claimants to support their entitlement of Rs. 163/- per square yard as per the Court of reference or more than the same, is unknown to this Court. Thus, the original cause and the application both seem to be meritless. 26. Lastly, a determination of compensation cannot be baseless determination. If we try to find out the base, obviously it will relate back to the original offer made by the Collector. Although it is an offer of the S.L.A.O. but it is to be seen by the Court of reference whether such offer is accepted by the claimants or not. As soon as the offer is accepted, such offer cannot be termed as an offer at all but a contract. Therefore, a further question arises when contract is concluded by acceptance of consideration, whether the same can be reopened independently or not unless it is established beyond doubt that the conclusion reached by the S.L.A.O. out of fraud or coercion or undue influence. This is not such case. Here, the offer made by the S.L.A.O. has been accepted by the claimants without protest. Admission is the best evidence. Section 18 of the Act starts with the wordings any person interested who has not accepted the award may proceed before the Court. Again Second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act says that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18. Section 20 of the Act says that notice will be served by the Court upon the persons interested except such of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of compensation so awarded. Therefore, the statute is clear and categorical to that extent. Section 20 of the Act says that notice will be served by the Court upon the persons interested except such of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of compensation so awarded. Therefore, the statute is clear and categorical to that extent. Ashwani Kumar Dhingra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 974 , speaks as follows : “It is clear from the provisions of S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act that the person interested, in order to enable him to seek the remedy of reference can do so only if he does not accept the award. In order to show that the person concerned had not accepted the award the claimants accept the compensation only under protest because once the compensation awarded in pursuance of the award is accepted without protest the person concerned may lose his right to a reference for various matters mentioned in S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. Again in Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai and others, AIR 1997 SC 2642 , the Supreme Court held that it is now settled position in law that the claimants, who receive the compensation under protest and who make application under Section 18(1), alone are entitled to seek reference. Therefore, it is implied that who has received the compensation without protest cannot be held entitled to raise any objection before the Court of reference. One cannot take two advantages when the law is explicit that reference cannot be maintainable when the claimant/s received the compensation without protest. There is a maxim known as qui approbat non reprobat, meaning thereby one who approbates cannot reprobate. It is a fundamental principle of general application that if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him. This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is not firmly embodied in English Common Law. According to it, a party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the same instrument or transaction. This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is not firmly embodied in English Common Law. According to it, a party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the same instrument or transaction. Although a person cannot be debarred from enforcing his fundamental rights on the ground of estoppel or waiver, the aforesaid principle which prohibits a party to a transaction from approbating a part of its conditions and reprobating the rest, is different from the doctrine of estoppel or waiver. A plaintiff is not permitted to ‘approbate and reprobate’. It is used to express the principle embodied in doctrine of election—namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument. The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction. So the maxim that a person cannot ‘approbate and reprobate’ is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a species of estoppel, it applied only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel) which is a rule in equity. By that rule, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. No inconsistent stand can be taken in the Court of law. 28. Hence, in totality we are of the view that the judgments/awards of the Court of reference, impugned in the present appeals, are not sustainable and liable to be set aside and accordingly are set aside. No inconsistent stand can be taken in the Court of law. 28. Hence, in totality we are of the view that the judgments/awards of the Court of reference, impugned in the present appeals, are not sustainable and liable to be set aside and accordingly are set aside. As a result whereof, the appeals of the GDA succeed and are allowed. The appeals and the cross-objections filed by the claimants fail and are, therefore, dismissed alongwith the application/s. 29. However, no order is passed as to costs in favour of either of the parties. 30. Out of the aforesaid appeals, 28 appeals are shown as defective for various reasons. Out of such 28 appeals, defects of 12 appeals are already cured as per the departmental note and regular numbers have been given with the defective numbers. Substitution applications pending in F.A. Nos. (78)/2000 & (79)/2000 [290/2008 & 289/2008 respectively] are allowed upon condoning the delay in filing the same. So far as the remaining 16 appeals are concerned, in First Appeal Nos. (252) of 2000, (251) of 2000, (256) of 2000 and (275) of 2001 deficiency of Court fees has already been made good leaving aside the delay in preferring the appeals and in First Appeal No. (960) of 2000 the only defect is delay in filing the appeal. Since no objection was raised by the other side with regard to the delay and since we have passed the order on merit, the delay in filing such appeals is formally treated to be condoned and application/s for condonation of delay is/are treated to be allowed without imposing any cost. So far as First Appeal No. (67) of 2000 is concerned, although deficiency of Court fees has been made good but delay in filing the Court fees has not been condoned. However, the same is condoned since we have passed an order on merit. Hence, all the aforesaid appeals are treated to be regular and dismissed without imposing any cost and the decision in merit will have binding effect in such appeals. 31. So far as First Appeal No. (74) of 2000 is concerned, deficiency of Court fees is available. So far as First Appeal Nos. Hence, all the aforesaid appeals are treated to be regular and dismissed without imposing any cost and the decision in merit will have binding effect in such appeals. 31. So far as First Appeal No. (74) of 2000 is concerned, deficiency of Court fees is available. So far as First Appeal Nos. (253) of 2000, (250) of 2000, (254) of 2000, (255) of 2000, (293) of 2000, (700) of 2000, (927) of 2000, (929) of 2000 and (151) of 2002 are concerned, such appeals are barred not only by limitation but also non-payment of requisite Court fees. Steps have not been taken either for condoning the delay or for payment of requisite Court fees. Therefore, although we have passed order on merit but so far as these appeals are concerned, these are liable to be treated as dismissed for non-prosecution and are accordingly treated to be dismissed for non-prosecution alongwith the connected applications, if any, without cost. 32. Let the lower Court’s records of the present appeals be returned as early as possible. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————