1. New India Assurance Company Limited has filed this appeal questioning Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Jammus award of August 26, 2005, awarding an amount of Rs. 4,10,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum to the parents of Master Kewal Krishan, who had died in a motor vehicular accident because of injuries received by him in the accident when he had been hit by rashly and negligently driven water tanker bearing registration No. JKP-2905, when he had been coming home after purchasing note books from Talab Tillo, Jammu. 2. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company, Mr. Baldev Singh, submits that the Tribunal had awarded excessive amount by way of compensation to the parents of the deceased when no evidence had been led by them indicating about the exceptional brilliance of the deceased, warranting higher amount of compensation. Learned counsel referred to various judgments in which compensation to the parents for the death of their children in the age group of 15 years had been awarded at a lesser amount than one which had been awarded in the present case. 3. Mr. K.S. Chib, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, submitted that the Tribunals award was passed on the basis of a judgment of Honble Supreme Court of India and in that view of the matter no interference therewith was warranted. 4. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment of Honble Supreme Court of India, which had been referred by the Tribunal in its award. 5. Learned Tribunal appears to have erred in treating paragraph no. 11 of Honble Supreme Courts judgment in case titled Lata Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar, 2001 ACJ 1735, as the law laid down for determining compensation payable to the parents of the deceased minors. A careful reading of this paragraph, however, indicates that no such law of general application had been laid down by Honble Supreme Court of India as such and the amount of compensation had been awarded in view of the fact that parents of the children were reasonably well placed officers of TATA Iron and Steel Company and in that view of the matter an increase in the compensation had been accepted by the Honble Supreme Court of India, in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. For facility of reference paragraph no.
For facility of reference paragraph no. 11 of the judgment supra is reproduced hereunder for facility of reference:- "11. So far as the award of compensation in case of children are concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud, has divided them into two groups, first group between the age of group of 5 to 10 years and the second group between the age group of 10 to 15 years. In case of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years, a uniform sum of Rs.50,000/-has been held to be payable by way of compensation, to which the conventional figure of Rs. 25,000/- has been added and as such to the heirs of the 14 children, a consolidated sum of Rs.75,000/- each, has been awarded. So far as the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years, there are 10 such children, who died on the fateful day and having found their contribution to the family at Rs.12,000/-per annum, 11 multiplier has been applied, particularly, depending upon the age of the father and then the conventional compensation of Rs. 25,000/- has been added to each case and consequently, the heirs of each of the deceased above 10 years of age, have been granted compensation to the tune of Rs. l,57,000/- each. In case of the death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the childs lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rail Co. v. Jenkins, 1913 AC 1, and Lord Atkinson said thus :, " .......................... all that is necessary that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues.
This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rail Co. v. Jenkins, 1913 AC 1, and Lord Atkinson said thus :, " .......................... all that is necessary that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact- there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but 1 wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that the deceased earned money in the past, and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can I think be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them." At the same time, it must be held that a mere speculative possibility of benefit is not sufficient. Question whether there exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always a mixed question of fact and law. There are several decided cases on this point, providing the guidelines for determination of compensation in such cases but we do not think it necessary for us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits, which the parents expected. In case of a bright and healthy boy, his performances in the school, it would be easier authority to arrive at the compensation amount which may be different from another sickly, unhealthy rickety child and bad student, but as has been stated earlier, not an iota of material was produced before Shri Chandrachud to enable him to arrive at just compensation in such cases and, therefore, he has determined the same on an approximation. Mr. Nariman, appearing for the TISCO on his own, submitted that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his views also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money could compensate the parents.
Mr. Nariman, appearing for the TISCO on his own, submitted that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his views also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which these children were brought, their parents being reasonably well placed officials of the Tula Iron and Steel Company, and on considering the submission of Mr, Nariman, we would direct that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs. 1.5 lakhs, to which the conventional figure of Rs. 50,000/- should be added and thus the total amount in each case would be Rs. 2.00 lakhs. So far as the children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of TISCO. The TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can get one of his child employed in the company. Having regard to these facts in their case, the contribution of Rs. 12,000/- per annum appear to us to be on the lower side and in our considered opinion, the contribution should be Rs. 24,000/- and instead of 11 multiplier, the appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the compensation, so calculated the aforesaid basis should be worked out to Rs. 3.60 lakhs, to which an additional sum of Rs. 50,000/- has to be added, thus making the total amount payable at Rs. 4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased children." 6. The judgment referred to by the learned Tribunal does not lay down any such law as such of universal application in terms whereof, for the death of every child in the age group of 15 years a compensation of Rs. 4.10 lacs would be awardable to the parents of the deceased minors. 7. The finding of the Tribunal on issue no.2 cannot thus be justified. 8. During the course of consideration of this appeal it was brought to my notice that in almost similar case like the present one, Honble Supreme Court of India had allowed an amount of. Rs.
4.10 lacs would be awardable to the parents of the deceased minors. 7. The finding of the Tribunal on issue no.2 cannot thus be justified. 8. During the course of consideration of this appeal it was brought to my notice that in almost similar case like the present one, Honble Supreme Court of India had allowed an amount of. Rs. 2,25,000/- as compensation for the death of a minor aged 13 years in case titled Manju Devi and anr v. Musafir Paswan and anr, reported as 2005 ACJ, 99, where Honble Supreme Court of India had observed as under :- "As set out in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for a boy of 13 years of age, a multiplier of 15 would have to be applied. As per the Second Schedule, he being a non-earning person, a sum of Rs. 15,000 must be taken as the income. Thus the compensation comes to Rs. 2,25,000." 9. In view of the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court of India (Supra), I am of the view that keeping in view the age of the minor and the age of the parents an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum would be just compensation to the parents of the deceased minor in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 10. Award of the Tribunal is accordingly modified to be an award for an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. 11. This appeal is accordingly allowed on the above modification. 12. The amount deposited by the appellant-Instance Company shall be released in favour of the claimants in accordance with the award, if not already received, on their proper identification. The remaining amount, alongwith interest accrued there on, shall be released in favour of the appellant-company by a payees account cheque.