JUDGMENT Hima Kohli, J.:- This order shall dispose of an application filed by the plaintiffs under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 1 Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short CPC) praying inter alia for impleadment of the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 as parties in the suit and for carrying out the consequential formal amendments pursuant thereto. 2. A brief background as to the nature of the dispute between the parties is necessary before proceeding to deal with the aforesaid application. 3. In the year 1997, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for permanent injunction restraining passing off, rendition of accounts, etc. Pleadings qua the aforesaid defendants were completed in the year 2002. In view of enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court to above Rs. 20 lacs, the suit was transferred to the District Judge, Delhi vide order dated 13.10.2003. Thereafter, by way of an amendment, the plaintiffs sought enhancement of the valuation of the relief for the purposes of the Court fee and pecuniary jurisdiction to Rs. 25 lacs. The said amendment was allowed and the suit was returned to this Court. The defendants entered appearance and took time to file the written statement to the amended plaint. In the meantime, an interim application filed by the plaintiffs seeking to restrain the defendants from using the trademarks or the service marks or trade names CFA, Chartered Financial Analysts, the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India, ICFA and ICFAI, or any other trademark identical/similar to the aforesaid trademarks and from passing off the defendants programmes as that of the plaintiffs, was allowed vide order dated 4.8.2006. An appeal against the aforesaid order is stated to be pending before a Division Bench of this Court, though there is no stay granted in the said proceedings. In the meantime, the plaintiffs have filed the present application seeking impleadment of the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 and for carrying out the consequential amendments thereto. 4. An appeal against the aforesaid order is stated to be pending before a Division Bench of this Court, though there is no stay granted in the said proceedings. In the meantime, the plaintiffs have filed the present application seeking impleadment of the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 and for carrying out the consequential amendments thereto. 4. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the need to seek impleadment of the proposed defendants arose on account of the fact that the said proposed defendants have been created, sponsored and controlled by the defendant No.1 to commit acts of passing off in relation to the plaintiffs valuable intellectual property right in the marks in question, which the proposed defendants are using as part of their trading style and as names of the impugned CFA programme being offered by them under the licence of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. He stated that the existence of the aforesaid proposed defendants came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs when the defendant No. 1 filed an application, being IA No. 1589/2005 asking for permission to place on record additional documents stated to be relevant to bring to the notice of the Court, certain subsequent developments after institution of the present suit. In the aforesaid application, the defendant No.1 referred to the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6, amongst other universities established under the relevant Statutes in the States of Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram and Uttarakhand under the name and style of ICFAI University which the defendant No.1 stated were sponsored by its institute. 5. Counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are under the financial and administrative control of the defendant No. 1 in respect to their day to day functioning and they claim all their rights in the impugned marks referred to hereinabove, through the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. He sought to draw the attention of this Court to para 26 of the order dated 4.8.2006 passed on the stay application of the plaintiffs wherein the Court observed as under: “26. A very interesting feature of the developments that take place subsequent to the withdrawal of the licence and during the pendency of the suit is the establishment of certain universities by certain State Legislatures. A very interesting feature of the developments that take place subsequent to the withdrawal of the licence and during the pendency of the suit is the establishment of certain universities by certain State Legislatures. The ICFAI University Act of 2003 of Uttaranchal in its Preamble says, 1/ An Act to establish and incorporate an University in the State, with emphasis on providing• high quality and industry relevant education in the areas of Applied Financial Management, General Management, Applied Science and Technology, sponsored by the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India (ICFA), Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.1/ Similar legislations are passed by the State of Sikkim and Tripura. The Act of Sikkim also acknowledges the role of Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India (ICFA), Hyderabad in sponsoring the legislation. Mr.Sudhir Chanda submits that it is not possible to injunct a Legislature from using any particular term in its legislation or to declare that the name of ICFAI University is not permissible in law. Nonetheless, it is true that all the universities have been created during the pendency of the suit. The defendants have been able to go ahead and sponsor the acts. This will not, however, create a right in them to violate the trademarks of the plaintiffs. Their right to use the trademarks came to end in 1997. If they have gone ahead to obtain legislative sanctions to their trademarks they have done so at their own peril. The rights of the plaintiffs cannot be defeated by the act of the defendants during the pendency of the suit. For the present the attention of the Court can be confined to the averments in the plaint and the right claimed by the plaintiffs against the defendants. It is for the plaintiffs to decide if and when the plaintiffs would seek redressal of their grievance against those legislations. The plaintiffs have been able to establish that they are entitled to an injunction. This right cannot be defeated by the defendants sponsoring Acts to convert their institutes into universities." 6. It is for the plaintiffs to decide if and when the plaintiffs would seek redressal of their grievance against those legislations. The plaintiffs have been able to establish that they are entitled to an injunction. This right cannot be defeated by the defendants sponsoring Acts to convert their institutes into universities." 6. It was stated on behalf of the plaintiffs that in view of the aforesaid clear and categorical finding of the Court that merely because legislations have been passed by certain State Legislatures during the pendency of the present proceedings for creating the proposed defendants/universities in question subsequent to the withdrawal of licence granted by the plaintiffs to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, will not create a right in the said parties to violate the trademarks of the plaintiffs, the right of the plaintiffs cannot be defeated by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who have sponsored the aforesaid universities to convert their institutions into universities, and that the plaintiffs had no option but to file the present application for impleadment of the proposed defendartt Nos. 3 to 6. Reference was made to various documents filed by the plaintiffs along with the application and other documents filed by the proposed defendants to show that the defendant No.1 is sponsoring them and they are getting permissive user to adopt the plaintiffs trademark from the defendants on the record. 7. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs stressed that for the purposes of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties, it is necessary to add the proposed defendants in the suit. While attempting to establish the nexus between the defendant No.1 and the various universities sponsored by it, Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to draw the attention of this Court to a brochure published by the defendant No.1 for its various programmes containing a disclosure statement. He referred to names of private universities established through State Acts by the defendant No.1 as a sponsoring body, relevant sections in the statute pertaining to the definition clauses, objects of the university, funding of the university, constitution of the Board of Governors and the Board of Management, mode and manner of the dissolution of the university. He referred to names of private universities established through State Acts by the defendant No.1 as a sponsoring body, relevant sections in the statute pertaining to the definition clauses, objects of the university, funding of the university, constitution of the Board of Governors and the Board of Management, mode and manner of the dissolution of the university. The attention of the Court was also drawn to the website of the defendant No.1 to state that it features a link to the "ICFA University" which displays therein the names of the proposed defendants as universities sponsored by the defendant No. 1 under their respective legislations. 8. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the plaintiffs served a notice dated 14.5.2007 on each of the proposed defendants, drawing their attention to the interim injunction granted in the present proceedings on 4.8.2006 and calling upon them to cease and desist from using the impugned marks and amend their names and statutes so as to delete the impugned marks therefrom. However, as no response was received from any of the proposed defendants, the plaintiffs were compelled to file the present application seeking their impleadment. 9. It was urged by the Counsel for the plaintiff that by seeking to add the proposed defendants as parties in the present proceedings, the plaintiffs are not introducing a new case or pleading a new cause of action. He submitted that the proposed defendants are self-sustaining organizations sponsored by the defendant No.1 and that it was a strange co-incidence that they were sharing the same name as that of the defendant No.1 and had failed to reveal the source of adoption of the trademark of the plaintiffs. Thus all fingers pointed at defendant No. 1 who it was contended is engaging the plaintiffs in a proxy litigation by sponsoring such private Universities. 10. Counsel for the plaintiffs invoked the principles of dominus litus to urge that it is the prerogative of the plaintiffs to have their forum conveniens and implead the proposed defendants. He placed reliance on the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3, CPC to submit that the proposed defendants are liable to be joined in the present suit as they are getting permissive user of their impugned trademarks from the defendants on the record and as the relief sought by the plaintiffs arose out of the same act / transaction or series of acts / transactions. 11. 11. In support of the submission that the plaintiffs could not have filed the suit against the defendants on the record in a representative capacity for the reason that the proposed defendants, being juristic entities had not emerged at the time of the institution of the suit, Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Bush Boake Allen (India) Ltd. v. Red Club Products Corporation, reported as 1998 (2) All India Arb. Law Reporter 1. 12. The present application was vehemently opposed by the Counsels for the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 who contended that the application filed by the plaintiffs suffers from a fundamental error inasmuch as it is filed on a flawed presumption that the defendant No.1 is the creator of the proposed defendants. It was submitted that the proposed defendants are universities which have been established under their respective statutes passed by the State Legislatures, that they are creatures of their respective statutes and not of defendant No.1 as contended by the plaintiffs and that the defendant No.1 is merely the sponsor of the proposed defendants. He submitted that simply because the funding of the proposed defendants comes from the defendant No.1 as the sponsoring body, no motives can be imputed/ attributed by the plaintiffs to the State Legislatures and that the proposed defendants did not on their own take any steps to adopt the mark ICFAI which mark was in fact bestowed on them by the statute. 13. Thus, it was contended on behalf of the proposed defendants that any attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to call upon them to amend the Statute as suggested in the proposed amendments by the plaintiffs, shall amount to calling upon the Legislature to amend the Statute, which is not permissible. 13. Thus, it was contended on behalf of the proposed defendants that any attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to call upon them to amend the Statute as suggested in the proposed amendments by the plaintiffs, shall amount to calling upon the Legislature to amend the Statute, which is not permissible. He sought to draw the attention of the Court to various provisions of the respective Acts under which the proposed defendants were established to urge that the concerned State Governments are involved a t every stage in the establishment and functioning of the proposed defendants and even if it is assumed that the proposed defendants were under the absolute control of the defendant No. I, it would not make a difference as their names have been conferred upon them under the respective statutes which cannot be changed unless the statutes are amended or struck off by the Court in the present proceedings, which is also not permissible. 14. It was further argued that while deciding the question of impleadment of parties, the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3 and Order 2 Rule 3, CPC are to be kept in mind and require to be satisfied along with the provision of Order 1 Rule 10, CPC. Counsel for the proposed defendants referred to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3 (a) CPC to state that in the present case, the right to relief in favour of the plaintiffs and against the proposed defendants did not arise out of the same act or transaction or the same series of acts or transactions, either jointly or severally. He submitted that the alleged misuse of the plaintiffs trademarks by the defendants on the record after the expiry of the licence granted by the plaintiffs to the defendant No. 1, was entirely a different cause of action as against the right of relief against the proposed defendants which would arise out of the passing of the respective statutes by the State Legislatures establishing the proposed defendants. Thus, he submitted that both the acts or transactions being entirely different in nature, could not be clubbed in the same suit. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Bank of Baroda v. Prakash Warehouse and Others, (1981) 51 Company Cases 609. (ii) Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, (1992) 2 SCC 524 . In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Bank of Baroda v. Prakash Warehouse and Others, (1981) 51 Company Cases 609. (ii) Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, (1992) 2 SCC 524 . (iii) Geeta Mohan v.Baldev Raj Hasija & Anr., 71 (1998) DLT 790. 15. While adverting to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3(b), CPC, Counsel for the proposed defendants categorically denied the fact that any common question of law or facts arise for consideration in the present case for which the proposed defendants are required to be added as the defendants in the suit. He submitted that the questions of law or fact arising against the proposed defendants would be entirely different as opposed to the questions of law and fact arising against the existing defendants in the suit. He also sought to draw a distinction between the defendants on the record and the proposed defendants and submitted that if the present application is allowed and the proposed defendants are impleaded in the present proceedings, this Court shall have to go into the issue as to whether mandatory injunction can be granted against a State Legislature directing it to amend the legislation to give relief to the plaintiffs as sought by the plaintiffs by way of the proposed amendments and whether the State Legislature establishing a private university and conferring a name on it can be held to have violated the trademark rights of the plaintiffs. As regards the questions of fact, it was contended that while the suit initially filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants on the record was on the basis of their claim that the licence agreement entered into with the defendant No.1 was terminated in January 1997, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that the proposed defendants were issued any such licence by the plaintiffs as they were independent statutory bodies governed, managed and controlled by their respective statutes and not by the defendants on the records as claimed by the plaintiffs. 16. While referring to the provisions of Order 2 Rule 3, CPC, Counsel for the proposed defendants submitted that only such of the parties can be added as defendants in a suit against whom same cause of action has arisen. 16. While referring to the provisions of Order 2 Rule 3, CPC, Counsel for the proposed defendants submitted that only such of the parties can be added as defendants in a suit against whom same cause of action has arisen. He denied that the cause of action in the present case was common to the defendants on the record and the proposed defendants as he submitted that the cause of action against the proposed defendants would arise on their being established under the Acts or State Legislatures which is not the case in respect of the existing defendants on the record. He thus submitted that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the test laid down under Order 2 Rule 3, CPC. 17. As regards the provision of Order 1 Rule 10, CPC, it was canvassed on behalf of the proposed defendants that the plaintiffs had failed to place on record any material to establish that the proposed defendants were either necessary or proper parties in the present proceedings or that their presence was necessary to enable this Court to effectually and completely adjudicate the issues involved in the suit. It was submitted that the reliefs prayed for against the defendants on the record could easily be granted even in the absence of the proposed defendants, for the reason that the genesis of the dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants on the record came into existence prior to the very creation of the proposed defendants. He reiterated that there was no unity of cause of action and nor did the plaintiffs make out a case, either jointly or severally against the defendants on the record and the proposed defendants. He also urged that impleadment application was highly belated and liable to be rejected as the same was filed by the plaintiffs after a delay of three years of the establishment of the proposed defendants. 18. It was urged by the Counsel for the defendants that while examining the present application, this Court cannot overlook the fact that if the amendments as proposed by the plaintiffs are allowed, then this Court a shall be compelled to decide a controversy raised by the plaintiffs by which directions were sought to the proposed defendants to take necessary steps to amend the statutes under which they were established, which as per the settled position of law, the Court;; cannot direct. In support of his submissions, Counsel for the proposed defendants relied on the following judgments: (i) Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 886 . (ii) Bank of Baroda v. Prakash Warehouse and Ors. (supra). (iii) Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. (supra). (iv) Geeta Mohan v. Baldev Raj Hasija & Ors. (supra). (v) M/s. Virtus Dordrecst B. V. & Ors. v. Vikram Bhargav & Ors., 105 (2003) DLT 394=2003 (V) AD (Delhi) 321. (vi) Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal & Ors., IV (2005) SLT 70=II (2005) CLT 143 (SC)= AIR 2005 SC 2813 . (vii) Suresh Seth v. Commr. Indore Municipal Corp. & Ors., VIII (2005) SLT 182= (2005) 13 SCC 287 . 19. The present application was also opposed on behalf of the proposed defendants on the ground that the amendments sought for by the plaintiffs if allowed, would alter the very nature of the suit, enlarge its scope and bring in fresh cause of action which in not permissible. It was strenuously urged that the proposed amendments are not necessary as the dispute between the parties to the suit can be completely and effectually resolved without the addition of the proposed defendants and even if it is assumed that after leading of evidence, the suit ought to be decreed, then also there is no relief that cannot be granted against the defendants on the record in the absence of the proposed defendants. Counsel for the proposed defendants relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.K. Narayana Pillaiv. Parameshwaran Pillai & Anr., reported as X (1999) SLT 451=1 (2000) CLT 92 (SC)= (2000) 1 SCC 712 , to contend that amendment of pleadings is not a matter of right, but a matter of judicial discretion. 20. In response to the argument of the Counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect that the plaintiffs are dominus litus in a suit, it was submitted that the concept of dominus litus is not an absolute concept, but is limited by judicial discretion exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case. 20. In response to the argument of the Counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect that the plaintiffs are dominus litus in a suit, it was submitted that the concept of dominus litus is not an absolute concept, but is limited by judicial discretion exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case. As regards the order dated 4.8.2006 passed on the stay application filed by the plaintiffs, Counsel for the proposed defendants urged that the order was being wrongly interpreted by the plaintiffs and that while passing the orders the learned Single Judge had clarified that it was for the plaintiffs to decide if and when the plaintiffs could seek redressal of their grievance against those various legislations. He submitted that the said observations were being twisted out of contest by the plaintiffs to be read against the• proposed defendants. 21. In rejoinder, Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the Trade Marks Act was a central legislation enacted under List I of the Constitution of India under Schedule 49, and that the said Act binds the Government and therefore no State Government can take any steps which destroys the Act or overrides the same. He sought to refer to the legislations under which the proposed defendants were created to urge that when compared with each other, all the statutes were virtually identical and the hand of the defendant No.1 was apparent from the manner in which the legislations were drafted. 22. In response to the argument of the Counsel for the proposed defendants that the Court in the present proceedings cannot issue any mandate to the State legislations, Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that in the present case, the Court would ultimately have to decide whether the defendants have infringed the trademark of the plaintiffs or not and while :deciding the same, the Court is not required to go into the issue of compliance of the final judgment, which shall lie in separate proceedings. Much emphasis was laid on the fact that the very name of the enactments under which the proposed defendants were created amounts to infringement of the trademark of the plaintiffs and as the proposed defendants who came to be created during the pendency of the present proceedings, were using the same trademark and same programmes devised by the plaintiffs, they were liable to be impleaded in the present proceedings to ensure that they did not indulge in infringing the civil rights of the plaintiffs through the medium of their sponsor/defendant No.1. He submitted that for the purposes of evaluating an amendment application, the Court must exercise its judicial discretion and test the bona fides of the parties. He further submitted that if the statutory veil is lifted, it is manifest that the defendants on the record and the proposed defendants have a common identity and thus the plaintiffs are entitled to seek their impleadment in the present proceedings. 23. Counsel for the plaintiffs lastly submitted that the impleadment of the proposed amendments is necessary to avoid multiplicity of litigation. He denied that there was any delay on the part of the plaintiffs in filing the application and stated that the existence of the proposed defendants was brought to the notice of the Court by the existing defendants who filed certain documents on the record on 24.2.2005, and the present application for impleadment and amendment was filed in August, 2007 which was well within a reasonable time. He stated that there was nothing so sacrosanct about the name of the proposed defendants that the same could not be changed by way of an administrative act. 24. Counsel for the defendants sought to respond to the argument raised on behalf of the plaintiffs as to the Trademarks Act being a Central legislation as against the enactment of State legislations by stating that there was no clash between the two legislations and that the said legislations are not contrary to the Trademarks Act. 25. Before dealing with the case in hand, a birds eye view of the scope and purview of the provision of Order 6 Rule 17, CPC is necessary. 25. Before dealing with the case in hand, a birds eye view of the scope and purview of the provision of Order 6 Rule 17, CPC is necessary. A perusal of the provision of Order 6 Rule 17, CPC make it manifest that the Court is conferred with the power to allow alterations and amendments of the pleadings if the Court is of the view that such amendments may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties at any stage of the proceedings. Proviso to Order 6 Rule 17, CPC stipulates that no application for amendment shall be allowed after trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, a party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In the present case, proviso to Rule 17, CPC has no application as trial of the suit has not yet commenced. In fact the suit is still at the stage of framing of issues as admission/ denial of documents has taken place. 26. It is trite that the Court should be liberal in granting a prayer for amendment of the pleadings, unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side or on the ground that the prayer made in the amendment application is mala fide. One of the basis for rejecting an amendment of the pleadings is that the amendment shall result in changing the subject matter of the suit by substituting one cause of action for another and the other is that the relief sought by way of amendment is time-barred. 27. The object of the aforesaid provision is that the Courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the controversy between the parties provided, it does not cause any injustice or prejudice to the other side. It is also settled law that while considering whether an application for amendment should be allowed or disallowed, the Court should not go into the correctness or the falsity of the case in the amendment, nor should it record a finding on the merits of the amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendment [Refer Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal & Ors. v. K.K.Modi & Ors., III (2006) SLT 67=II (2006) CLT 62 (SC)= AIR 2006 SC 1647 ]. 28. v. K.K.Modi & Ors., III (2006) SLT 67=II (2006) CLT 62 (SC)= AIR 2006 SC 1647 ]. 28. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parames Waran Pillai, reported as I (2000) CLT 92 (SC)=X (1999) SLT 451= (2000) 1 SCC 712 , the Courts while deciding prayers for amendment should not adopt a hyper technical approach and amendments should be allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. In the case of Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Others, reported as I (2001) SLT 668= AIR 2001 SC 699 , the Supreme Court observed that even if the amendments sought would change the nature of the suit originally filed, the same could not be a reason for refusing the application for amendment and that the dominant purpose of Order VI Rule 17, CPC was to minimize the litigation and that the plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case. 29. Thus it can be seen that the power to allow amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interest of justice, guided by various precedence. Though, amendments to pleadings cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances, however, while deciding such an application, the Courts ordinarily do not adopt a hypertechnical approach. In Saif-ul-Islam Companyv. Roshan Lal Arora and Anr., 102 (2003) DL T 692, it was held that all amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action. A proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to other side which cannot be compensated by costs. It was held that no amendment should be allowed which amounts to or results in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. 30. In Time Warner Entertainment Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Das and Ors., 102 (2003) DLT 794, it was held that amendments necessary for determination of real questions in controversy should be allowed as such amendments which are necessary for determination of controversies will not cause any prejudice to the defendants. 30. In Time Warner Entertainment Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Das and Ors., 102 (2003) DLT 794, it was held that amendments necessary for determination of real questions in controversy should be allowed as such amendments which are necessary for determination of controversies will not cause any prejudice to the defendants. It was further held that mere delay and laches in making an application for amendment is not a ground for refusal of amendment. In Sushil Kumar Gupta v. Anil Kumar Gupta, 143 (2007) DLT 587=1998 (5) AD (Delhi) 708, it was held that amendment necessitated because of subsequent events should be allowed as no serious injustice or irreparable loss shall be caused to the other side as the amendment applications are to avoid multiplicity of litigation. In Vikram Singh Mehta and Anr. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 89 (2001) DL T 196, a Division Bench of this Court held that introduction of subsequent events resulting in different approach or set of ideas claiming same relief should be permitted in order to shorten the litigation and the discretion exercised by a Judge to allow amendment in order to incorporate subsequent events cannot be termed arbitrary, perverse or irregular. 31. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that the amendment sought by the plaintiffs by seeking to implead the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 as co-defendants and thereupon carry out consequential amendments in the plaint are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. When the suit was originally filed, the plaintiffs were claiming the J reliefs against the defendants on record based on their claim that the defendants were infringing the trademark of the plaintiff by running their institute under the name CFA, Chartered Financial Analyst, the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts (ICFA) and ICFAI and/or any other mark which may be identical or deceptively similar to the marks of the plaintiff and passing off the marks and programmes that of the plaintiffs business even after the licence granted to them by the plaintiff had expired. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the defendants filed an additional affidavit stating inter alia that certain States had passed enactments for creation of universities bearing the acronym ICFAI and thus the defendants could not be injuncted from using such an acronym. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the defendants filed an additional affidavit stating inter alia that certain States had passed enactments for creation of universities bearing the acronym ICFAI and thus the defendants could not be injuncted from using such an acronym. It is in the aforesaid background that the plaintiffs filed the present application seeking impleadment of the aforesaid universities as proposed defendants in the present proceedings. The plaintiffs cannot be prevented from seeking the amendments in question as the same are based on the occurrence of subsequent events which were brought to the notice of the plaintiffs by the existing defendants themselves. 32. The real controversy test, which is held to be the cardinal test for exercise of discretion to allow or disallow an amendment is whether such an amendment as prayed for is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. The main plank of defence taken by the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 to resist their impleadment is that they are universities which have been established under their respective Statutes passed by the State Legislatures and that as they are creatures of their respective Statutes and not of defendant No.1, who is merely their sponsor, it cannot be said that the proposed defendants took any steps to adopt the impugned trademark, the same having been bestowed on them by the Statues. The said defence is one on merits. The proposed defendants shall have ample opportunity to take the said defence and/ or any other defence as may be available to them at the time of filing their written statement. The plea taken on behalf of the proposed defendants that it is not permissible for this Court to strike off the Statute by which the proposed defendants have been conferred their name and that any such relief if ultimately granted in favour of the plaintiffs will amount to directing an amendment to the Statute, which is not permissible, is also one which cannot be considered by this Court for the purpose of deciding an application for amendment for the reason that barring the plea of limitation, inordinate and unexplained delay and lack of bona fides, the admissibility or otherwise of the pleas taken on merits in the amendment application and/ or consequences thereof are not to be examined by the Courts at this stage. The stage for that will arrive later, only after the application is disposed of. What would be the ultimate relief that may be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against which of the defendants shall also be decided at a much later stage. The consequence of the proposed amendment cannot be a subject matter of consideration at this stage. 33. Insofar as the plea of the proposed defendants that the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3 and Order 2 Rule 2, CPC ought to be kept in mind and are required to be satisfied along with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10, CPC is concerned, it is not for the Court at this stage to examine in-depth, as to whether the proposed defendants are liable to be joined by the plaintiffs in the present suit on the basis of the defence taken on their behalf that the cause of action against them is entirely different and independent or that the questions of law or fact arising against them are entirely different as opposed to those against the existing defendants. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that the aforesaid pleas shall be available to the proposed defendants at the time of taking their defence in their written statements. It shall also be open to them to have issues framed in this context when the matter is taken to trial or for that matter, even have preliminary issues framed and decided in that regard. 34. As to what would constitute cause of action as mentioned in Order 2 Rule 2, CPC, one must keep in mind that cause of action is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a Tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing; the fact situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another (refer Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 791 ; Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, VI (2000) SLT 628=III (2000) CCR 164 (SC)= (2000) 7 SCC 640 ; Rajasthan High Court Advocates Assn. v. Union of India, I (2001) SLT 138= (2001) 2 SCC 294 ; Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., VII (2001) SLT 612=AIR2002 SC 126; and Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India, 131 (2006) DLT 557 (SC)=V (2006) SLT 655= (2006) 6 SCC 207 . In the present case, the amendments sought to be incorporated shall not result in substitution of the cause of action, but addition thereto based on subsequent events. 35. There is merit in the plea of the Counsel for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are dominus litis in the suit• and are well entitled to seek impleadment of such parties as they may consider necessary for enforcing their claim. There is no dispute with the proposition that the plaintiff is the master of, or having dominion over the case. He has a right to have his forum conveniens, in approaching the Court where part of the cause of action arises. He is the person who has carriage and control of an action. In ordinary circumstances, the choice of impleading the defendants rests with the plaintiffs, unless opposed to public policy or an abuse of process of law. In the present litigation, the request of the plaintiffs for impleading the proposed defendants as co-defendants cannot be rejected on either of the above grounds. 36. The plea of the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 that the amendment application is barred by delay and laches is also misconceived. The present application seeking their impleadment was filed within a reasonable time from the date of the knowledge of their existence. The events sought to be brought on record by way of impleading the proposed defendants have also occurred during the pendency of the present proceedings. The plaintiffs do not seek to set up a new case or a new cause of action but only enlarge the canvas of their suit by impleading the proposed defendants on the basis of subsequent facts and circumstances. It cannot be denied that impleadment of the proposed defendants will prevent multiplicity of litigation, nor shall it cause any serious injustice or irreparable loss to the proposed defendants. Conversely, refusal to grant the relief for impleadment and amendment as sought by the plaintiffs, will result in prolonged litigation between the parties. Thus, the cardinal ‘real controversy test for exercise of discretion has to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiffs. Conversely, refusal to grant the relief for impleadment and amendment as sought by the plaintiffs, will result in prolonged litigation between the parties. Thus, the cardinal ‘real controversy test for exercise of discretion has to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiffs. 37. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the present case and in the light of the judicial pronouncements as discussed hereinabove, it is held that the application filed by the plaintiffs for amendment is liable to be allowed. The presence of the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 before the Court is necessary for effectually and completely adjudicating upon and settling all the questions involved in the suit. The objections raised by the proposed defendants as to the maintainability of the suit against them shall be available to them at the time of filing their written statement. Hence no irreparable loss or injury is likely to be caused to the defendants. In any case, suit is at the pre-trial stage as issues have yet to be framed. The defendants shall be at liberty to have the issues framed on the basis of law and facts including those with regard to the maintainability of the suit qua them. 38. Accordingly, the application of the plaintiffs is allowed. The plaintiffs are permitted to implead the proposed defendant Nos. 3 to 6 as parties in the suit and carry out the consequential formal amendments pursuant thereto. The proposed amended plaint along with the amended memo of parties, enclosed with the application is taken on record. 39. It is made clear that while disposing of this application, this Court has not expressed any opinion on the respective pleas/ objections raised by both the parties on merits, which shall be examined at the appropriate stage. 40. The application is disposed of. Application disposed of.