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2008 DIGILAW 740 (PAT)

Ganesh Yadav v. State Of Bihar

2008-05-29

MIHIR KUMAR JHA

body2008
Judgment Mihir Kumar Jha, J. 1. All these three writ applications having common question of fact and law have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. in the first writ application, C.W.J.C. No. 5646 of 2008, the petitioner Ganesh Yadav has assailed the order dated 8.3.2008 contained in letter no. 419, dated 8.3.2008 whereby and whereunder the Executive Engineer of Road Construction Department, Bhagalpur has cancelled the contract and the consequential agreement with the petitioner contained in Agreement No. 4{P)F2/2006-07 which was in respect of construction of 18.75 kms. of Jagdishpur-Sanhaula Road. The said work was allotted to the petitioner under a work order dated 27.3.2007 for a sum of Rs. 6,91,30.859/- fixing a dead line for completion of work in one year i.e. by 26.3.2008, which was also reiterated in the agreement no. 4(P)F2/2006-07, dated 30.3.2007. The Executive Engineer, however, had subsequently found that the progress of the aforesaid work undertaken by the petitioner was very slow and in fact only two per cent of the work has been executed by 27.12.2007 and accordingly the petitioner was given a show cause notice dated 27.2.2008 asking him to explan as to why the contract and the agreement in question be not rescinded and when the petitioner had filed its reply on 3.3.2008, the impugned order dated 8.3.2008 was passed whereby and whereunder the contract and the agreement in question was cancelled by the Executive Engineer in terms of the powers under clauses 2 and 3 of the agreement. The Executive Engineer in fact by the impugned order had not only cancelled the agreement but had also confiscated the amount of security and advance of the petitioner as well as had also issued a demand notice for further payment of Rs. 35,04,000/- by way of refund of the advance given to the petitioner on the head of machineries and apparatus. 3. In C.W.J.C. No. 5647 of 2008, the petitioner Ganesh Yadav is aggrieved by an order of the Executive Engineer contained in his letter no. 418 dated 8.3.2008 cancelling the work order and the agreement no. 2(P)F2/2006-07. The petitioner in this case was favoured with the work order dated 24.1.2007 for construction of 8 kms. of Tilkamanjhi-Champa Nagar Road, 3 kms. of Tilkamanjhi-Barari Road, 1.6 kms. of Tower-Tatarpur Road and 3 kms. of Womens College-Mirjanhaat Road for a total sum of Rs. 418 dated 8.3.2008 cancelling the work order and the agreement no. 2(P)F2/2006-07. The petitioner in this case was favoured with the work order dated 24.1.2007 for construction of 8 kms. of Tilkamanjhi-Champa Nagar Road, 3 kms. of Tilkamanjhi-Barari Road, 1.6 kms. of Tower-Tatarpur Road and 3 kms. of Womens College-Mirjanhaat Road for a total sum of Rs. 9,48,28,505/- requiring him to complete the aforementioned work by 21.3.2008 which was reiterated in the subsequent agreement no. 2(P)F2/2006-07. It, however, appears that the work of the petitioner had completed only 30 per cent of the aforesaid total work and as such after issuance of show cause notice to the petitioner dated 27.2.2008 and considering his show cause reply dated 4.3.2008, the impugned order came to be passed on 8.3.2008 by the Executive Engineer by invoking the powers under clauses 2 and 3 of the agreement who had not only cancelled the Agreement No. 2(P)F2/2006-07 but had also confiscated the amount of security and advance deposited by the petitioner while demanding a refund of the advance given to the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 35,54,667/- against the machineries and apparatus. 4. In the third case C.W.J.C. No. 5757 of 2008. the petitioner Arun Kumar Verma is aggrieved by an order contained in letter no. 449 dated 10.3.2008 cancelling his contract and the agreement no. 7(P)F2/2006-07. It appears that the petitioner was given a work order dated 22.1.2007 for construction of 18 kms. of Akbar Nagar-Sahkund Road for a sum of Rs. 5,46,38,808/- which was to be completed in one year i.e. by 21.1.2008 as was also confirmed and reiterated in the subsequent agreement no. 7(P)F2/2006-07 dated 7.7.2007. In this case also, the Executive Engineer on the basis of review of the work of the petitioner Arun Kumar Verma had found that he had completed only 7.5 per cent of the total work and as such after giving a show cause notice dated 27.2.2007 and considering the reply of the petitioner, dated 4.3.2008 had gone to pass the impugned order dated 8.2.2008 in terms of clauses 2 and 3 of the agreement by cancelling the agreement as also forfeiting the amount of security and advance deposited by the petitioner. 5. 5. In all these three cases, Counsel for the petitioners have basically submitted that all the three impugned orders passed by the Executive Engineer suffer from the inherent defect of being in violation of principle of natural justice inasmuch as they do not reflect any consideration to the show cause replies filed by the petitioners which have been rejected virtually by one word saying that they were unsatisfactory. It has also been submitted that as a matter of fact from the contents of the impugned order, it would be clear that they were passed under the dictation of the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department who had already directed the Executive Engineer in the meeting held on 25.2.2008 to cancel the contract and agreement of the petitioners and, therefore, the issuance of the show cause notice on 27.2.2008 and passing of the impugned order without even considering the replies filed by the petitioners was a mere formality observed by the Executive Engineer under the commands of the top most functionary of the department i.e. the Principal Secretary. It was finally submitted in all the three cases that the reasons for cancellation of contract and agreement were also not germane inasmuch as the petitioners could not have been faulted for the slow pace of the work as the departmental authorities including the Executive Engineer had themselves failed to comply the conditions of the agreement. In this context, it was pointed out that not only the departmental authorities had failed to revise the estimated cost of the work which had increased by more than 100 per cent but even the obstruction being faced by them in construction of road such as removal of electrical poles, carriage of stone, stone-chips, earth, bricks etc. were not remedied by the concerned authorities despite repeated oral and written requests made by or on behalf of the petitioners. In nut shell, the petitioners in all these three cases had submitted that the impugned orders had been passed on non est and non-existent materials. 6. It further appears that during the pendency of these writ applications, the Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Bhagalpur after cancelling the work order and agreements of the petitioners, had also issued fresh advertisement (NIT) for completing the remaining part of work of the petitioners for which offers were invited on 2.4.2008 and the last date of submission of such tender was 26.4.2008. Accordingly, the petitioners had assailed the fresh NIT and tad also sought stay of award of contract in pursuance of the NIT by filing interlocutory applications. 7. In addition to it, the petitioners have also assailed the unilateral action of the authorities of the department including the Executive Engineer in faking measurement behind their back and in this context, they have also made their grievance that the authorities being biased had not even made correct measurement of the work in question to the extent they have been executed by the petitioners. 8. Mr. P.K. Verma, learned Additional Advocate General No. 11 appearing in all these three cases had contended that technicalities apart, this Court should reject the writ applications only on the ground that the petitioners had failed to adhere to the time limit given in the work orders and in fact if the petitioners had completed 2 per cent, 7.5 per cent and 30 per cent of work within the specified time limit of one year, it was not expected that they could ever complete the project. It was further emphasized by him that the petitioners were only interested in making a lame excuse only for the purposes of seeking extension of time and getting the amount of contract enhanced by delaying the project and by capitalizing on their own mistakes. It was finally submitted by him that construction of road being in paramount interest of the public at large, this Court should not exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India specially when the facts as with regard to the reasons of non-completing the project by the petitioners were disputed by the respondents. In this context, Mr. Verma, however, had emphasized that such complicated disputed questions of facts could not be decided by this Court in these three writ applications specially when the petitioners were also entitled to raise all these issues before the Arbitrator in terms of specific arbitration clause In all the three agreements envisaging resolution of all such disputes and differences amongst the parties by named Arbitrator in agreements i.e. Superintending Engineer of the Circle or the Engineer-in-Chief of the Road Construction Department. In this regard, reliance was also placed by him on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Indian Aluminium Company & Others V/s. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1975 SC 1967 and in the case of ABL international Ltd. and Another V/s. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others, 2004 3 SCC 553 . 9. In reply, Counsel for the petition-ers had submitted that relegating the petitioners to the remedy of arbitration under the clause of agreement would be a futile exercise inasmuch as from the impugned orders of all the three cases passed by the Executive Engineer, it was apparent that a decision for cancellation of contract and agreement of the petitioners had already been taken and conveyed by the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department in the meeting held on 25.2.2008 and oniy thereafter the formality of issuing show cause notice dated 27.2.2008 and passing of the consequential impugned orders dated 8.3.2008 and 10.3.2008 were observed by the Executive Engineer who in fact while acting under the dictation of the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department had even failed to examine any and every plea of the petitioners which were submitted by them in their exhaustive reply to the respective show cause notices, dated 27.2.2008. In this regard, Counsel for the petitioners had also submitted that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an arbitration remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and, therefore, when in the given facts the arbitration clause itself had been rendered futile by the conduct of the respondents, the writ petitioners could not have been shown doors of this Court as either the Engineer-in-Chief or the Superintending Engineer who were named Arbitrators under the three agreements being a subordinate authority to the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department were not expected to act as independently while deciding the huge monetary claims of the petitioners in the contracts worth Rs. 22 crores in all the three cases. 10. 22 crores in all the three cases. 10. This Court had found substance in the aforementioned grievance of the petitioners inasmuch as from the contents of the three impugned orders, it is evident that the decision to cancel the agreement and rescind the work orders of the petitioners was not taken on the own volition of the Executive Engineer rather the same was on doited and dictated line in the form of an order already communicated to the said Executive Engineer in the meeting held on 25.2.2008 in course of review made by the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department. At this stage, if the contents of the impugned orders in all these three cases are read together with the arbitration clause, it would be evident that in pursuance of the decision of rescind the contract of the petitioners taken by the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department himself, no authority including the named Arbitrator either the Engineer-in-Chief or the concerned Superintending Engineer is expected to act as a fair and impartial Arbitrator. Such plea of apprehension of bias of the petitioners in fact is itseif reflected by a mere perusal of the arbitration clause which in the first two cases is governed by clause 25 of the agreement, which reads as follows: "Clause 25. Settlement of Disputes & Arbitration. Except where otherwise provided in the contract ail questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specification, design, drawing and instructions hereinabove before mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other question, claim, right matter or thing whatsoever in anyway arising out of or relating to contract, designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these? conditions or otherwise concerning the works of the execution of failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work or after the cancellation, termination, completion or abandonment thereof shall be dealt with as mentioned hereinafter. conditions or otherwise concerning the works of the execution of failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work or after the cancellation, termination, completion or abandonment thereof shall be dealt with as mentioned hereinafter. (i) If the contractor considered any work demanded of him to be outside the requirements of the contract, or dispute any drawings, record or decision given in writing by the Engineer-in-Chief on any matter in connection with or arising out of the contract or carrying out of the contract or carrying out of the work, to be unacceptable, he shall promptly within 7 days request the Superintending Engineer in writing for written instruction or decision. Thereupon, the Superintending Engineer shall give his written instructions or decision within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the contractors letter. If the Superintending Engineer fails to given his instructions or decision in writing within the aforesaid period or if the contractor is dissatisfied with the instructions or decision of the Superintending Engineer, the contractor may, within 15 days of the receipt of Superintending Engineers decision, appeal to the Chief Engineer who shall afford an opportunity to the contractor to be heard, if the latter so desires, and to offer evidence in support of his appeal. The Chief Engineer shall give his decision within 30 days of receipt of contractors appeal, if the contractor is dissatisfied with this decision, the contractor shall within a period of 30 days from receipt of the decision, given notice to the Chief Engineer for appointment of Arbitrator failing which the said decision shall be final binding and conclusive and not referable to adjudication by the Arbitrator. (ii) Except where the decision has become final, binding and conclusive in terms of sub-para (i) above disputes or difference shall be referred for adjudication through Arbitrator appointed by Engineer-in-Chief or the administrative head of the said P.W.D. If the Arbitrator so appointed is unable or unwilling to act or resign his appointment or vacates his office due to any reason what-soever another sole Arbitrator shall be appointed in the manner aforesaid. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor.It is a term of this contract that the party invoking arbitration shall give a list of disputes with amounts claimed in respect of each such dispute along-with the notice for appointment of Arbitrator and giving reference to the rejection by the Chief Engineer of the appeal. It is also a term of this contract that no person other than a person appointed by such Engineer-in-Chief or the administrative head of the department as aforesaid should act as Arbitrator and if for any reason that is not possible, the matter shall not be referred to Arbitrator at all. It is also a term of this contract that if the contractor does not make any demand for appointment of Arbitrator in respect of any claims in writing as aforesaid within 45 days of receiving the intimation from the Engineer-in-Chief that the final bill is ready for payment, the claim of the contractor shall be deemed to have been waived and absolutely barred and the Government shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the contract in respect" of these claims. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) or any statutory modifications or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. It is also a term of the contract that if any fees are payable to the Arbitrator these shall be paid equally by both the parties. It is also a term of the contract that the Arbitrator shall be deemed to have entered on the reference on the date he issues notice to both the parties calling them to submit their statement of claims and counter statement of claims. The venue of the arbitration shall be such place as may be fixed by the Arbitrator in his sole discretion. The fees, if any, of the Arbitrator shall, if required to be paid before the award is made and published, be paid half and half by each of the parties. The venue of the arbitration shall be such place as may be fixed by the Arbitrator in his sole discretion. The fees, if any, of the Arbitrator shall, if required to be paid before the award is made and published, be paid half and half by each of the parties. The cost of the reference land of the award (including the fees, if any, of the Arbitrator) shall be in the discretion of the Arbitrator who may direct to any by whom and in what manner such costs or any part thereof shall be paid and fix or settle the amount of costs to be so paid. All arbitration shall be held at PATNA and at no other place." 11. Similarly, in the third case (C.W.J.C. No. 5757 of 2008). it is clause 23 which governs the arbitration naming the Superintending Engineer of the circle to be the sole Arbitrator and his decision to be final, conclusive and binding on the parties. Clause 23 reads as follows: "Clause 23. In case any dispute or difference shall arise between the parties or either of there upon any question relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned or as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work, or as be the construction of any of the conditions or any clause or thing therein contained, or as to any question, claim, rights or liabilities of the parties, or any clause, or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of, or relating to the contract, designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders, or these conditions, or. otherwise concerning the work, or the execution, or failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work, or alter the completion or abandonment thereof, or as to the breach or this contract, then either party shall forthwith give to the other notice of such dispute or difference and such dispute or difference shall be referred to the Superintending Engineer of the circle and his decision thereon shall be final, conclusive and binding on all the parties." 12. Thus, if the objection of Mr. Thus, if the objection of Mr. Verma as with regard to maintainability of these three writ petitions on the ground of arbitration clause is taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that even after a decision had already been taken by the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department to rescind the contract and agreements of the petitioners, they should be now asked to invoke the arbitration clause whereby and whereunder either the Engineer-in-Chief or the Superintending Engineer of the same department would decide the dispute as with regard to the correctness of the order passed by the Executive Engineer cancelling the agreement and revoking the work order passed by the Executive Engineer in purported exercise of clauses 2 and 3 of the agreements. Thus, to that extent, the apprehension of bias of the petitioners as against the concerned Engineer-in-Chief or the Superintending Engineer and resultant objection in invoking arbitration clause under agreements by the petitioners seems to be perfectly correct and justified. 13. It was in this background that this Court had sought assistance of learned Advocate General to find out as to whether all the differences and disputes as being raised by the petitioners and repudiated by the concerned Executive Engineer so reflected in the impugned order itself could be decided by an Arbitrator above the rank of the Principal Secretary of the Road Construction Department and preferably by a retired High Court Judge. The learned Advocate General accordingly had personally appeared in these cases on 23.5.2008 and had sought a days adjournment to take instructions from the Government. On 26.5.2008, the learned Advocate Genera! on receiving instructions from the State Government had submitted before this Court that the State Government, after considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of these three cases and in the light of the facts recorded In the impugned orders, had taken a decision that the arbitration proceedings in all these three cases could be conducted by a retired High Court Judge and had also proposed the name of Hon ble Mr. Justice Rajendra Prasad, a retired Judge of this Court who if agreed and consented by the petitioners could act as an Arbitrator in all the three cases of the petitioners. 14. Justice Rajendra Prasad, a retired Judge of this Court who if agreed and consented by the petitioners could act as an Arbitrator in all the three cases of the petitioners. 14. Counsel for the petitioners in response to the aforementioned offer of the learned Advocate General to get the dispute decided through the arbitration have also concurred in the appointment of Hon ble Mr. Justice Rajendra Prasad, a retired Judge of this Court as the Arbitrator. 15. This Court upon taking into consideration the aforementioned developments as also considering the fact that a large number of disputed question have to be gone into in the first instance to find out as to whether the petitioners had violated the terms of the agreement or the departmental authorities including the Executive Engineer had caused such breach of agreements leading to non-completion of work in all the three contracts of the petitioners holds it appropriate that the entire dispute and differences between the parties to the agreements as sought to be raised in these three writ petitions should be decided as per the terms of the agreement through the mode of arbitration. 16. The refusal of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in a case where the parties are bound by an earlier agreement providing for arbitration by now is a well settled law. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. V/s. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., 1996 6 SCC 22 wherein the Apex Court had held as follows-: "Further, the contract in question contains a clause providing inter alia for settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration. The Arbitrators can decide both questions of fact as well as questions of law. When the contract itself provides for a mode of settlement of disputes arising from the contract, there is no reason why the parties should not follow and adopt that remedy and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The existence of an effective alternative remedyin this case, provided in the contract itselfis a good ground for the court to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226." 17. The existence of an effective alternative remedyin this case, provided in the contract itselfis a good ground for the court to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226." 17. The same view in fact has been reiterated by the Apex Court even in the case of ABL International Ltd. (supra) where it had been held as follows: "It is well known that if the parties to a dispute had agreed to settle their dispute by arbitration and if there is an agreement in that regard, the courts will not permit recourse to any other remedy without invoking the remedy by way of arbitration, unless of course both the parties to the dispute agree on another mode of dispute resolution." 18. In view of the fact that in the present case also, the petitioners are bound by the clauses of their agreements, this Court would hold that the writ applications enforcing a term of contract or assailing any decision taken under the terms of the contract to be not maintainable and the only option for them is to take recourse to the remedy of arbitration as provided in the agreements. 19. Counsel for the petitioners have, however, prayed that this Court should at least pass an interim order in terms of the fresh NIT dated 2.4.2008 in favour of any person so that in the event of reference being answered in their favour by the learned Arbitrator, the petitioners couid be directed to continue and complete the remaining work under their agreements. 20. Such prayer of interim relief of staying the award of contract of construction of road in terms of the NIT dated 2.4.2008 is seriously however objected by the learned Advocate General who has submitted that the apprehension of the petitioners in this regard of being made loser of the work during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings is misconceived because if the learned Arbitrator comes to a conclusion that the contract and the agreement of petitioners were rescinded illegally and without any justification, he would also award compensation to the petitioners for the loss sustained by them on account of non-completion of their work arising out of the order of cancellation of the agreements passed by the concerned Executive Engineer of the Road Construction Department, Bhagalpur. 21. 21. In the opinion of this Court, once it has been held that the parties may resolve all their disputes and differences through the arbitration proceedings in terms of Clauses 25 and 23 of the respective agreements and consequently these writ petitions are not being decided on merits by this Court, any interim order by this Court to stay the award of contract under the fresh NIT would be both in excess of its power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as against the public interest. 22. It should also not however be forgotten that an interim relief can only be granted in the aid of and as an ancillary to the main and principal relief which can be granted by the Court at the time of final disposal of the petition. If, however, the High Court refuses to entertain the petition or holds that the petition is not maintainable or is of the opinion that the petitioner should approach an appropriate forum in respect of the reliefs claimed in the petition, the court cannot grant or continue interim relief. The Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa V/s. Madan Gopal, AIR 1952 SC 12 considered somewhat a similar situation as with regard to a writ petition filed in the Orissa High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against cancellation of mining leases by the Government and restraining the Government from interfering with the position of the petitioners had deprecated the order of the Orissa High Court which had directed the petitioners to approach the Civil Court by filing suits and yet had passed an interim order restraining the Government from disturbing the position of the petitioners for a period of three months to enable the petitioners to obtain appropriate relief from the Civil Court. Hon ble the Chief Justice Mr. Kania (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Supreme Court in that context had held as follows: "The language of the Article shows that the issuing of writs or directions by the court is founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights) has been infringed. It can also issue writs or give similar directions for any other purpose. It can also issue writs or give similar directions for any other purpose. The concluding words of Article 226 have to be read in the context of what precedes the same. Therefore, the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the court under this Article... ....This is not a case where the court before finally disposing of a petition under Article 226 gave directions in the nature of interim relief for the purpose of maintaining the status quo. The question which we have to determine is whether directions in the nature of interim relief only could be granted under Article 226 when the court expressly stated that it refrained from determining the rights of the parties on which a writ of mandamus or directions of a like nature could be issued. In our opinion Article 226 cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief as the only and final relief on the application as the High Court has purported to do. The directions have been given here only to circumvent the provisions of Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, and in our opinion that is net within the scope of Article 226. An interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. If the Court was of opinion that there was no other convenient or adequate remedy open to the petitioners, it might have proceeded to investigate the case on its merits and come to a decision as to whether the petitioners succeeded in establishing that there was an infringement of any of their legal rights which entitled them to a writ of mandamus or any other directions of like nature; and pending such determination it might have made a suitable interim order for maintaining the status quo ante. But when the Court declined to decide on the rights of the parties and expressly held that they should be investigated more properly in a civil suit, it could not, for the purpose of facilitating the institution of such suit, issue directions in the nature of temporary injunctions, under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, the language of Article 226 does not permit such an action." 23. In our opinion, the language of Article 226 does not permit such an action." 23. Apart from the limitations imposed by this Court in passing of an interim order, in a case like the present one, this Court is also of the considered view that such an interim order would also be against the public interest. The construction of road within a specified time frame for the people in general should not be stopped only because all the dispute and differences between the contractor-petitioners and the officials-respondents is being sought to be resolved in an arbitration proceedings at the instance of the petitioners. It is not very difficult for this Court to assume that in case the learned Arbitrator comes to a conclusion that all the three impugned orders passed by the Executive Engineer of the Road Construction Department, Bhagalpur were passed on non est and non-existing grounds and the allegation made against the petitioners in not completing the work within the specified time was unjustified and illegal, the petitioners could be suitably compensated for damages and loss sustained by them on account of cancellation of their work orders. 24. Accordingly, the prayer for interim relief of staying the award of contract in terms of the fresh NIT, dated 2.4.2008 for the work in question being done earlier by the petitioners is hereby rejected. 25. As the parties have agreed to now get their disputes and differences resolved through the arbitration proceedings, this Court would direct the parties to appear before the learned Arbitrator on next Sunday i.e. 1st June, 2008. The learned Arbitrator thereafter will not only fix his remuneration either by way of consolidated amount or day to day basis as he chooses but will also set out scheduled programme for conducting and concluding the arbitration proceedings in a fixed time frame by directing the petitioners to file their claim within a week and its rejoinder by the Executive Engineer of the Road Construction Department, Bhagalpur by way of counter claim and written statement thereto within a period of further one week. In view of the fact that both the parties have a huge financial stake, this Court would expect the learned Arbitrator to conclude the arbitration proceedings expeditiously in terms of the agreements including its arbitration clause preferably within a period of two months of filing of the claim by the petitioners. In view of the fact that both the parties have a huge financial stake, this Court would expect the learned Arbitrator to conclude the arbitration proceedings expeditiously in terms of the agreements including its arbitration clause preferably within a period of two months of filing of the claim by the petitioners. As the arbitration clause itself provides for conducting the arbitration proceedings in terms of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it would be open for the learned Arbitrator to pass an arbitral award including an interim award in terms of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act in the aforementioned period. It is also made clear that the Executive Engineer of the Road Construction Department, Bhagalpur will promptly submit all the records as required by the learned Arbitrator so as to ensure that the arbitration proceedings is not stretched and prolonged unnecessarily and is concluded within the aforementioned time limit. 26. With the aforementioned observations and directions, all these three writ applications are disposed of.