JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is filed by the defendant against the judgment and decree dated 7.8.1999 passed by District Judge, Guna, in Civil Suit No. 4A/99, whereby the trial Court decreed the suit for specific performance filed by the respondent No.1-plaintiff. 2. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 and Smt. Gajri Bai-defendant No.1 were co-owners of an area of7.692 hectares of Survey Number 857, situated at Tahsil and District Guna. They jointly purchased it vide registered sale deed 17.3.1964. On 1.3.1968, they executed a registered gift deed on the basis of agreement dated 27.9.1966 for an area of 7 Bigha to Shastri Mangilal Tripathi for running a Sanskrit Education Centre and possession was delivered to him. Thereafter, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 mutually partitioned the diverted area of Survey Number 857, i.e., 1.00 lac sq.ft. (1.254 hectares) and as per partition deed dated 30.4.1978 jointly, developed a colony in the name of Kashinath Bhargava Colony in respect of their share. In respect of rest of the area, i.e., 3.554 hectares of Survey Number 857/1, they jointly owned and possessed an area 1.777 hectares, i.e., half of the total area of 0.554 hectares. On 21.1.1983 (Ex. P-l), the defendant No.1 Smt. Gajri Bai entered into an agreement with the respondent No.1-plaintiff for sale of an area of l.777 hectares for a consideration of Rs.42,500/-; out of which, a sum of Rs.25,500/- was paid to the defendant No.1 and possession of the suit land was handed over to him. The defendant No.1 appended her thumb impression over the said agreement in presence of the attesting witnesses. Rest of the amount of Rs.17,000/- was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. The defendant No.1 instead of executing the sale deed, as per agreement dated 21.1.1983 asked for time. The plaintiff on the basis of assurance given by the defendant No.1 executed another agreement on 7.5.1985 (Ex. P-2). Rs.7,000/- was paid to the defendant No.1 and period for executing the sale deed was extended for a further period of two years with a condition that rest of the amount of Rs.10,000/- shall be paid at the time of execution of the registered sale deed. 3. According to the plaintiff, he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 3. According to the plaintiff, he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He was ready and willing to pay the remaining consideration and was also ready to get the sale deed executed. Defendant No.1 was avoiding to perform her part of the contract. On several occasions, oral requests were made by the plaintiff to defendant No.1, but the defendant No.1 did not pay any heed to it. Thereafter, a written notice was served by the plaintiff on 22.7.1987 to get the sale deed executed within 7 days from the date of receipt of notice on 25.7.1987. The defendant No.1 replied to it on 26.7.1987 and denied the contents of the agreement and averred that agreement dated 7.5.1985 (Ex. P-2) has come to an end. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 plaintiff filed a suit on 17.8.1987 for specific performance of contract on the ground that he was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 4. Defendant No.1-Smt. Gajri Bai filed her written statement on 17.11.1987 and denied the execution of the agreements dated 21.1.1983 and 7.5.1985. It is also averred that she never appended her thumb impression over the said agreements and the so-called agreements were forged and fabricated document. She also denied the receipt of consideration of Rs.25,500/- on 21.1.1983 and Rs.7,000/- on 7.5.1985. She also denied the possession of the plaintiff over the land in question. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit on 8.2.1990 of the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and also held that agreements dated 21.1.1983 and 7.5.1985 were executed by the defendant No.1 and she inspite of agreements failed to execute the sale deed and directed the defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed within a period of three months. 6. Defendant No. 1 challenged the said judgment and decree dated 8.2.1990 by filing First Appeal No. 28/91. In the first appeal, the defendant No.1 filed an application for amendment of pleadings on the ground that she belongs to weaker section of the society and the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 and to try the same. In the first appeal, the defendant No.1 filed an application for amendment of pleadings on the ground that she belongs to weaker section of the society and the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 and to try the same. In the amendment, it was also averred that the respondent No.1 plaintiffis a Meena by caste, which is an aboriginal tribe and agreement was executed without obtaining prior approval of the Collector as per the provisions of section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short the "Code"), therefore, the transfer without permission is bad in law and the suit is barred under section 9 of CPC as well as under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC. The said proposed amendment was allowed by this Court. This Court vide order dated 1.8.1991 passed in FA No. 28/91 remanded the matter to the trial Court. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 are relevant, which read as under: "4. In these circumstances, I do not think: if any other course is open to me except to remand the matter to the trial Court wherein the amendments prayed shall be carried out and then issue shall be struck as to maintainability of the suit keeping in view the provisions of section 14 of the Adhiniyam aforesaid, section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code as also of section 9 CPC and Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC. As such that direction contemplated is made subject to the conditions herein mentioned. In the course of retrial fresh issue or issues shall be struck but fresh evidence shall be received in respect of only the new issue or issues. If the same is or are decided in favour of the defendant, the plaint shall be returned to the plaintiff (herein respondent No.1) for approaching the SDO for determining his claim in terms of section 6 and 7 of the Adhiniyam aforesaid. However, if the contrary view is taken the decree passed shall stand affirmed and in that case it shall be open to the defendant-appellant to agitate his grievance in this Court by filing a fresh appeal, if so advised, to challenge on merits the claim out side the scope of the Adhiniyam. 5. In terms of the above direction, the appeal stands allowed. But no order is passed as to costs. 5. In terms of the above direction, the appeal stands allowed. But no order is passed as to costs. As retrial is ordered certificate shall issue from the Registry to the defendant-appellant for recovery of court fees filed in this appeal from Collector, Guna. 6. Let records go down at once along with the original (if traced), a copy only authenticated, of amendment application aforementioned filed by the defendant-appellant for needful to be done in the trial Court." 7. After remand, the plaint and written statement were amended and four fresh issues were framed and the burden to prove the said issues was placed on the defendant No.1. On 29.6.1993, the trial Court rejected the prayer of the defendant No.1 to summon and produce the witnesses. She challenged the said order by filing C.R. No.173/93. This Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties disposed of the revision application and gave the following directions, which read as under: "4. After hearing counsel, I am of the opinion that the petitioner on facts has made out a sufficient cause for allowing her to summon and examine the witnesses. The trial Court under Order 16 Rule 1(3) CPC, has not exercised the discretion judicially in the facts of the case, the petitioner being an old illiterate rustic lady, the petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity. As Shri Lahoti has stated that the petitioner will restrict the examination of the witnesses only on the new issues so framed after the order of remand, it will be proper in the interest of justice to allow all opportunity to produce the witnesses in the Court and to summon the village-Patwari with records, the said witness being a Government servant, cannot be produced by the petitioner, subject to the condition of payment of costs of Rs.100/-. The trial Court now shall fix a date for recording the evidence of the witnesses which shall be produced by the petitioner except the Patwari, who shall be summoned through Court." 8. The trial Court now shall fix a date for recording the evidence of the witnesses which shall be produced by the petitioner except the Patwari, who shall be summoned through Court." 8. Thereafter, the defendant No.1 filed an application for amendment to the effect that the respondent No.1 is a money lender and therefore the transaction in question would be hit by the provisions of section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharkon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (for shor "the Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976"). The trial Court rejected the said prayer of the defendant No.1. She challenged the said order by filing Civil Revision No. 848/94. This Court permitted the defendant No.1 to take additional plea by way of amendment and disposed of the Civil Revision on 13.10.1995. Paragraphs No.1 and 2 are relevant, which read as under: "This litigation is pending since 1987. There is some justification in permitting the present petitioner to take the plea which she wants to take now. The plea sought to be taken by the present petitioner is that the respondent No.1 is a money lender and therefore, the transaction in question would be hit by the provisions of section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargo Ke Krishi Dharko Ka Udhar Denewale Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambhandhi Kuchkro Se Paritran TathaMukti Adhiniyam, 1976. As noticed above, this plea would be necessary for the proper adjudication of the case. As such, the requisite permission is granted to the petitioner. The petitioner is permitted to take additional plea byway of amendment. The respondents would be at liberty to file their written statements." 9. The trial Court after appreciating the pleadings of the parties and considering the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the execution of the agreements dated 21.1.1983 and 7.5.1985 were duly proved by the plaintiff and he was always ready and willing to execute his part of contract. It is also held that out of total amount of Rs.42,500/-, the defendant No.1 received Rs.25,500/- on 21.1.1983 and Rs.7,000/- on 7.5.1985, but failed to execute the sale deed in respect of the disputed area i.e. 1.777 hectares. 10. It is also held that out of total amount of Rs.42,500/-, the defendant No.1 received Rs.25,500/- on 21.1.1983 and Rs.7,000/- on 7.5.1985, but failed to execute the sale deed in respect of the disputed area i.e. 1.777 hectares. 10. In respect of possession, the trial Court has held that the defendant No.1 at the time of execution of agreement delivered possession of the area in question. The trial Court considered the objections raised by the defendant No.1 under the provisions of Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976. Section 2(c) of the Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 reads as under: "2 (c) 'holder of agricultural land' in the weaker sections of the people means a holder of land used for purposes of agriculture not exceeding eight hectares of un-irrigated land or four hectares of irrigated land within the State whether as a Bhumiswami or an occupancy tenant or a Government lessee either in anyone or all of the capacities together within the meaning of the Code." 11. As per the Explanation to section 2(c) of the Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976, one hectare of irrigated land shall be equal to two hectares of un-irrigated land vise-versa. 12. Defendant No.1 amended his written statement on 17.11.1992 and for the first time took a plea that she belongs to a weaker section of society, therefore, the suit is barred under the provisions of Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976. Under section 5 of the Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976, rules have been framed in the year 1978, which came into force on 12.5.1978. As per rule 1(2) of the Rules of 1978, the objection is to be filed within a period of 12 months from the date of the publication of 1978 Rules. No application for condonation of delay was also filed therefore it has been held by the trial Court that the objection was barred as per Ex. P-18 to Ex. P-22, EX.P-24 and Ex. P-25. When the Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 came into force, the plaintiff was having more than 100 acres of the land and therefore it cannot be said that she belongs to a weaker section of the Society and her contention that she was having less than 8 hectares of land is incorrect and contrary to the evidence on record. She was a holder of more than 25 to 30 hectares of irrigated and unirriaged land and therefore she does not belong to the weaker section of the Society. She was a holder of more than 25 to 30 hectares of irrigated and unirriaged land and therefore she does not belong to the weaker section of the Society. The trial Court has not committed any error of law in rejecting the objection of the defendant No.1. Learned counsel for the appellant rightly conceded her objections under the provisions of Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976. 13. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that defendant No.1-Smt. Gajri Bai was Meena by caste and she was declared as aboriginal tribe in District Guna. The agreement dated 21.1.1983 and 7.5.1985 were executed without obtaining permission from the Collector as required under section 165 of the MPLR Code and no transfer can be made without permission of the Collector. The defendant No.1 cannot transfer her land even though she was Bhumiswami, without permission of the Collector. The agreement executed on 21.1.1983 was in contravention of the provisions of section 165 (7)(b) of the MPLR Code. In support of the said contention, he drew my attention to the Single Bench decision of Gwalior Bench in the case of Vajeram v. Kaniram, 1992 RN 268, the apex Court's decision in the case of Keshabo and another v. State of M.P and others, 1996 RN 175 and the Division Bench decision of the M.P. High Court Principal Seat at Jabalpur in the case of Mulayam Singh and another v. Budhuwa Chamar and others, 2002 RN 250. 14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 drew my attention to the order passed by the SDO on 28.12.1987 (Ex. P-48) and submitted that Meena of the Guna District is not an aboriginal tribe. The defendant earlier raised similar question before the SDO, who after examining the matter rejected the objection vide order dated 28.12.1987, which is on record as Ex. PA8. He further submitted that against the said order, she filed an appeal before the Collector. The learned Collector, Guna, examined the matter in detail and found that Meena of Gun a District does not belong to aboriginal tribe and dismissed the appeal vide order dated 1.2.1989 (Ex- P-46). He lastly submitted that similar question was raised by the respondent No.1 earlier also in S.A. No. 314/95. The learned Collector, Guna, examined the matter in detail and found that Meena of Gun a District does not belong to aboriginal tribe and dismissed the appeal vide order dated 1.2.1989 (Ex- P-46). He lastly submitted that similar question was raised by the respondent No.1 earlier also in S.A. No. 314/95. This Court while deciding the said second appeal considered the orders dated 28.7.1987 and 1.2.1985 and upheld the order passed by the Collector by holding that Smt. Gajri Bai does not belong to aboriginal tribe. Against the said order passed in second appeal on 9.12.1998 Ex. P-50, no appeal was filed by the respondent No.1, who was appellant in. the said appeal and therefore the said order attained the finality. In the alternative, he drew my attention to the statement of Smt. Gajri Bai (DW1), who in her statement very specifically admitted that she executed as many as more than 100 sale deeds in respect of other land, but she never sought any permission from the Collector Guna under the provisions of the Code nor she ever raised an objection that she is aboriginal tribe belonging to Meena Caste and no sale deed can be executed without obtaining permission from the Collector. She now has raised such an objection just to avoid a decree for specific performance of contract. 15. On perusal of the written statement filed by Smt. Gajri Bai, I found that she in Para 1 of the written statement raised the objection of aboriginal tribe by stating that she is an illiterate old woman, who belongs to Meena Adiwasi Mahila. The objection raised by the defendant No.1 reads as under: ^^oknh ,oa izfrokfn;ksa us la;qDr [kkrs dz; djus ds i’pkr~ oknh us izfrokfn;k tks fd vf’kf{kr] o`) o vk[kksa ls de fn[kkbZ nsus okyh ehuk vkfnoklh efgyk gSA** 16. Defendant No.1 filed an application before the SDO, Guna, under . section 170B of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, in respect of an area of Survey Number 855 by stating that she is an illiterate lady and Pandit Kashinath Bhargava, who is respondent No.1 in this case, fraudulently got executed the agreement in respect of half of her share. She is Adiwasi Mahila and the sale deed executed be declared as void. She is Adiwasi Mahila and the sale deed executed be declared as void. SDO examined the said question and held that from the notification issued by the State Government under section 165 of the Code, Meena caste of Gun a District has not been shown there as belonging to aboriginal tribe. The relevant para of Ex. P-48 reads as under: ^^pwafd Hkw&jktLo lafgrk dh /kkjk 165 esa of.kZr vuqlwph ftlesa vkfnokfl;ksa dh tkfr ds uke fn, gSa esa ehuk tkfr dks xquk ftys esa vkfnoklh ugha ekuk x;k gS blfy, bl vuqlwph esa ehuk vkfnoklh xquk ftys ds fy, vafdr ugha gSA blfy, vkosfndk dks ehuk gksus ds ukrs vkfnoklh ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS bl dkj.k izdj.k ;ksX; u gksus ls fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA** 17. In an appeal, the learned Collector Guna after examining the question as to whether the defendant No.1 belongs to aboriginal tribe or not, dismissed the appeal. The finding given in Para 3 of order dated 9.2.1989 reads as under: ^^3- eSus mHk;i{k ds fo}ku vfHkHkk”kdksa ds rdZ Jo.k fd;s lkFk gh v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dh izdj.k if=dk dk HkyhHkkafr v/;;u fd;kA vihykaV ds fo}ku vfHkHkk”kd us vius rdksZa esa crk;k fd vkosfndk ehuk tkfr dh gksdj vkfnoklh efgyk gS blfy, mldk izdj.k 170 ¼[k½ ds varxZr izpyu ;ksX; Fkk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us /kkjk dk iw.kZ :is.k v/;;u fd, cxSj vkns’k fn;k gS fjLik- ds fo}ku vfHkHkk”kd us viuh cgl esa crk;k fd /kkjk 165 esa of.kZr vuqlwph esa tks tkfr;ka n’kkZbZ xbZ gSa mlesa ehuk tkfr vkfnoklh tkfr esa ugh gS] Hkhy fHkykyk esa lfEefyr cjSyk] iSjkfy;k] ehuk tkfr vkfnoklh gSaA xquk ftys ds ehuk vkfnoklh ugha ekus x, gSa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dh izdj.k if=dk ds voyksdu ls ik;k tkrk gS fd vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh us mHk; i{k dh lquokbZ ds mijkar vkns’k ikfjr fd;k gSA /kkjk 165 dh vuqlwph ds dz- 3 esa tks ehuk tkfr n’kkZbZ xbZ gS og Hkhy fHkykyk dh lfEefyr tkfr okyh vkfnoklh tkfr gS] xquk ftys dh ehuk tkfr dks vkfnoklh tkfr ugha ekuh gS blfy, vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh us tks vkns’k ikfjr fd;k gS] /kkjk dh lgh foospuk djds gh fd;k gS] blfy, mlesa fdlh izdkj ds la’kks/ku dh vko’;drk izrhr ugha gksrh gSA QyLo:Ik izLrqr vihy vLohdkj dj v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dk vkns’k fLFkj j[kk tkrk gSA** 18. In Second Appeal No. 314/95, the defendant No.1 raised the said question, which was considered by this Court and while dismissing the objection made the following observation in Paragraphs No.9 to 12, which reads as under: "9. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously challenged the findings returned against the appellant asserting that the gift-deed relied upon by the plaintiff is liable to be discarded as the defendant-appellant was entitled to the protection envisaged under the provisions of the M.P. Land Revenue Code on account of her being an Adiwasi. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, produced the certified copy of the order dated 9.2.1989 passed by the Collector, Guna, disposing of the appeal of Smt. Gajribai where under it has been held that she was not entitled to the benefits envisaged under section 170(kha) of the Code as she could not be deemed to be an Adiwasi Mahila and no permission of the Collector was required before effecting the transfer of the land in question. 11. The State is represented in this appeal and the learned Government Advocate has also stated that there is no notification which could entitle the defendant-appellant for the benefit available to an Adiwasi. 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has not been able to demonstrate and produce any notification issued by the State Government where under the persons falling in the category of the appellant should be taken to be entitled to the protection extended to Adiwasis." 19. Thus, the question whether defendant No.1-Smt. Gajri Bai belongs to aboriginal tribe on account of her being an Adiwasi was considered by this Court in respect of the land, which is adjoining to the suit land. This Court very categorically gave a finding that appellant-defendant No.1 did not belong to aboriginal tribe and was not required to seek permission as required under section 165 of MPLR Code. 20. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and the discretion exercised by the trial Court in granting the decree for specific performance the learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out as to how the trial Court has faulted on acts or committed any error of law in the discretion exercised for grant of a decree of specific performance. I have gone through the evidence and findings recorded by the trial Court, the plea taken by the defendant No.1 that she was an aboriginal tribe is found to be false and as such no fault can be found with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. 21. In the present appeal also, on perusal of the record of the case, I find that except the words that she was a Mahila Adiwasi, there is no other evidence on record. No notification nor any document has been filed by her before the trial Court when the matter was remanded nor she mentioned the number of notification and date by which she was declared by the State Government as aboriginal tribe. In absence of any notification, the trial Court has not committed any error in holding that she does not belong to aboriginal tribe. Apart from that, earlier she raised a similar objection before the trial Court in respect of the gift deed executed by her in favour of respondent No.1-Pandit Kashinath Bhargava in respect of the land which is adjoining to the disputed land. The issue was examined in detail by the SDO as well as by the Collector Guna and they both after examining the issue very categocially gave a finding that Meena Adiwasi of Guna District does not belong to aboriginal tribe as per the notification issued by the State Government from time to time. The said finding of the Collector was upheld by this Court in the year 1998. Civil suit was decided by the trial Court on 7.8.1998. Before this Court also she had not filed any notification or document to prove that she belongs to aboriginal tribe and finding of the Collector is perverse. It is a well settled principle of law that when parties have gone into trial knowing fully well the issue involved, inadequate pleading, if any, may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment. 22. This appeal thus has no merit and is dismissed with costs.