JUDGMENT:- Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The suit property involved in the matter are two sheds with open land situated at Solapur. The property belongs to Shri Sidheshwar Devsthan Panch Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the said Trust"). The respondent Nos. 1 to 34 are the trustees of the said Trust. The Trust with the said trustees filed Regular Civil Suit No.195 of 1973 for eviction and possession and for recovery of rent against the respondent Nos.35 and 36. It was the contention of the plaintiff-Trust that the land along with two sheds was used for the purpose of holding the fodder market and the cultivators used to bring fodder on their bullock-carts for sale in that market. The plaintiff-Trust had entered into an agreement with Haji Hasansaheb and under that contract Haji Hasansaheb was allowed to conduct the fodder market and to collect charges of four annas from each bullock-cart coming to that market. He was also allowed to collect the pieces of fodder which would be left out as well as the cattle-dung. He was to pay certain amount to the said Trust annually for this purpose. He was also required to pay a nominal rent of Rs.2/- per month for each of the shed. The agreement had taken place some time in 1960 and under that agreement, he was conducting the market. The agreement was renewed in 1965 again. Haji Hasansaheb died on 14.5.1969 and he was survived by his two widows and a son and a daughter. After his death, his brother, defendant No.2 Abdul Sattar took over the responsibility of Haji Hasansaheb and gave in writing that he would be liable to pay arrears of rent due from Haji Hasansaheb and he also agreed to comply with and act as per the contract entered into between the plaintiffs and Haji Hasansaheb. In 1971, he again executed the document in favour of the plaintiffs admitting the liability to pay arrears of rent. According to the plaintiffs, defendant No.2 as well as other legal heirs of deceased Haji Hasansaheb had failed to pay the arrears of the amounts due, including the rent of the two sheds. Therefore, the plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Suit No.195 of 1973 on 22.2.1973 for the purpose of eviction and possession as well as for recovery of certain amounts. It may be noted that the four L.Rs. Therefore, the plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Suit No.195 of 1973 on 22.2.1973 for the purpose of eviction and possession as well as for recovery of certain amounts. It may be noted that the four L.Rs. of Haji Hasansaheb were shown as defendant Nos. 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D and even though Haji Hasansaheb had died long back, he was shown as defendant No, I. Pending the suit defendant No.2 also died and his LRs, being defendant Nos,2A and 2B were brought on record. 3. The LRs, of Haji Hasansaheb and defendant No.2 filed their written statements and they look several defences in respect of the arrears of amounts, They also contended that the suit in respect of the amount was barred by limitation, In 1998, the plaintiffs made an amendment to the plaint and impleaded defendant Nos.3 to 6, who are the present petitioners, contending that the original defendants had, pending the suit, wrongfully inducted the defendant Nos3 to 6 in the suit property, Defendant Nos3 to 6 filed the written statement denying that they were wrongfully and without permission of the plaintiffs inducted by the original defendants, According to them, they were inducted as tenants by the servants of the plaintiff-Trust, who used to collect rent According to them, the rent collectors changed from time to time and they used to collect rent from the defendant Nos. 3 to 6 regularly but never issued any receipt. According to them, in view of this, they were the legal tenants and were not trespassers or unauthorised subtenants. 4. Several issues were framed by the trial Court, The claim amount for a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the suit was found to be within limitation and the amount for the period beyond 3 years was found barred by limitation, It was held that original defendants had failed to pay the rent and the other charges as per the contract Accordingly, the suit came to be decreed for eviction as well as for payment of certain amount Against the said judgment and decree, the defendant Nos3 to 6 preferred Civil Appeal No. 90 of 2000. The decree was not challenged by the original defendant Nos. 1 and 2, The Appeal was also dismissed, The appellate Court held that defendant no,2 had unauthorisedly given the suit property in possession of the defendant Nos. The decree was not challenged by the original defendant Nos. 1 and 2, The Appeal was also dismissed, The appellate Court held that defendant no,2 had unauthorisedly given the suit property in possession of the defendant Nos. 3 to 6, Being aggrieved by dismissal of the Appeal, original defendant Nos.3 to 6 have preferred the present Revision Application. 5. Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for the revision-applicants vehemently argued that the applicants Le. defendant Nos. 3 to 6 are In possession of the suit premises since before 1.2.1973 and even if it is held that they were unauthorisedly inducted in the suit premises they are protected tenants and on determination of tenancy of the original tenants, these defendant Nos. 3 to 6 have become the tenants of the plaintiffs and they cannot be evicted unless a fresh ground for eviction is made out against them. In support of his contention, Mr. Apte placed reliance upon Anandram Chandanmal Munot and anr. Vs. Bansilal Chunilal Kabra (since deceased through LRs and Ors. (2000)1 SCC 10 : [2000(1) ALL MR 335 (S.C.)] wherein the legal position in respect of sub-tenants was considered at length and wherein Their Lordships also referred to several judgments including the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Indian Coffee Workers Co-op. Stores Ltd. Vs. Bachoobai Cowasjee Dhanjeeshaw, (1964)66 Boom.L.R. 338 as well as the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in Mangbaram Chubarmal Vs. B. C. Patil, (1970)73 Bom.L.R. 140 and after reference to the several provisions including definition of "tenant" in Section 5(11) as well as the provisions of Sections 12, 13,14, 15and 15-A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and the observations of this Court in the above referred two authorities, Their Lordships held that if a sub-tenant was inducted even without permission of the landlord before 1.2.1973, he is protected against eviction and if the decree for eviction is passed, for any reason against the main tenant, from the time when the tenancy of the main tenant is determined, the sub-tenant, in view of the protection given to him by law, will become tenant of the landlord directly, The same view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in T. Raghavan Nair Vs, Brij Mohan P, Sethi & Ors. 2003(4) Bom.C.R. 606 : [2003(2) ALL MR 548]. Relying on these authorities, Mr. 2003(4) Bom.C.R. 606 : [2003(2) ALL MR 548]. Relying on these authorities, Mr. Apte vehemently contended that even if the defendant Nos.3 to 6 were not inducted with permission or consent of the landlord, still they are protected tenants because they are in possession since prior to 1.2.1973. 6. Mr. Godbole, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs fairly conceded that if it is proved that the defendant nos.3 to 6 were inducted and were in possession of the suit premises before 1.2.1973, in view of the legal position incorporated by the Supreme Court in Anandram Bansilal they will be protected and they cannot be evicted merely on the basis of determination of the tenancy of the original tenant. However, Mr. Godbole vehemently contended that the defendant Nos.3 to 6 had never claimed that they were in possession of the suit premises since prior to 1.2.1973 and that they are the protected tenants. He contended that the normal rule is that a tenant cannot induct a sub-tenant without permission or consent of the landlord. That being the normal rule, the exception is carved out by making amendment in the Rent Act. whereby a person even though inducted/without permission or consent of the landlord by the tenant gets protection provided he was inducted prior to 1.2.1973. According to him, when the defendants Nos.3 to 6 want to take benefit of that exception, onus lies on them to plead and prove that they were in possession of the suit premises since prior to 1.2.1973. In support of this contention, he relied upon Zenna Sorabji and others Vs. Mirabelle Hotel Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and others, AIR 1981 Born. 446. Thc learned Single Judge of this Court in Zenna Sorabji observed as follows in para 38A and para 39:- "38A .... .To my mind the onus of proof as regards issue no.16 was rightly put upon defendant No.3. This is so firstly because under the Bombay Rent Act prohibition against sub-tenancy is the rule whereas permission to sub-tenancy is only an exception carved out of the rule by sub-section (2) of Section 15 as also by the contract to the contrary referred to in subsection (1) of S. 15. Defendant No.3 is relying upon this exception and hence the circumstances which entitled him to avail of the exception must be proved by himself. Defendant No.3 is relying upon this exception and hence the circumstances which entitled him to avail of the exception must be proved by himself. This principle is analogous to the one contemplated by Section 105 of the Evidence Act." "39. Moreover. the provisions of Sec.l06 of the Evidence Act give use to the same position. After all, the exact date of the sub-tenancy was a fact which could be within the exclusive knowledge of defendant No.3 only. From the very nature of things that the plaintiff Trust could have no know ledge about the same, the onus of proving the date of the sub-tenancy must, therefore, lie upon defendant No.3 only. Similar conclusion could be arrived at also by relying upon S. 102 of the Evidence Act. We find that in the instant case the parties have come out with the pleadings. The plaintiffs have alleged subletting by one in favour of defendant No.3. Defendant No.3 had admitted subletting, but has contended that the subletting was done before 21-51959. Under the provisions of section 102 of the Evidence Act, we shall have to apply the test regarding the onus by assuming that no evidence was led by either side. In the instant case if neither defendant No.3 nor the plaintiffs led any evidence. defendant No.3's case that sub-tenancy took place before 21-5-1959, therefore. could be deemed to have gone unproved. Moreover. it is defendant No.3, who has been claiming a legal light regarding valid sub-tenancy in respect of the suit premises. That legal right can exist only if his sub-tenancy originated before 21-5-1959. It is, therefore, difficult to see as to how he could escape the onus of proving his legal right." 7. Mr. Godbole also placed reliance on Anwarali Ashrafali Vs. Abdul Aayyum s/ o. Abdul Khaliqui Fitwalla, 1986(1) Bom.C.R. 581 wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court had held that when a person claims to be in possession of premises prior to February 1973. to take benefit of protection given to the sub-tenants, onus lies on him to establish positively and decisively that he was in the premises prior to February, 1973. However, he vehemently contended that in the present case. defendant Nos.3 to 6 had never pleaded that they were inducted as sub-tenants in the suit premises by any of the tenants. to take benefit of protection given to the sub-tenants, onus lies on him to establish positively and decisively that he was in the premises prior to February, 1973. However, he vehemently contended that in the present case. defendant Nos.3 to 6 had never pleaded that they were inducted as sub-tenants in the suit premises by any of the tenants. In fact, defendant Nos.3 to 6 had pleaded that they were inducted by some servants of the plaintiff Trust and they were collecting rent from them and, therefore, they had become the legal tenants. It means as per their claim, they were directly tenants of the plaintiff-Trust and not the sub-tenants claiming through the original defendants. Both the Courts below rejected the plea of the defendant Nos.3 to 6 that they were inducted as tenants by the plaintiffs through their servants. The Courts below noted that defendant Nos.3 to 6 only claimed that they were put in possession by the servants of the plaintiffs but they do not claim that they had entered into any contract with the plaintiffs or that the consent of the plaintiffs was taken fur that purpose. It is material to note that the written statement of the defendant Nos.3 to 6 nowhere pleaded as to the date or the period when they were inducted in the premises. Even though in the written statement they had pleaded that they had become the legal tenants, they had nowhere pleaded that they were protected because they were in possession since prior to 1.2.1973. It is material to note that even in the grounds of Appeal preferred by them and in the grounds taken in the present Revision Application, the defendant nos.3 to 6 had never claimed that they were in possession or were inducted in the suit premises on or before 1.2.1973. In view of absence of any pleading on this point, no issue was framed nor parties were called upon to lead evidence. The record reveals that on behalf of defendant Nos.3 to 6, their Advocate had suggested to P.W.2 Thobade Bhimshankar that defendant Nos.3 to 6 were inducted in 1971 and this was denied by the witness. The defendant Nos.3 to 6 did not produce any ora'!. or documentary evidence to prove that they were inducted or were in possession before 1.2.1973 From this it is clear that defendant Nos. The defendant Nos.3 to 6 did not produce any ora'!. or documentary evidence to prove that they were inducted or were in possession before 1.2.1973 From this it is clear that defendant Nos. 3 to 6 had never taken a plea nor they had given any evidence to show that they were in possession of the suit property on or before 1.2. 1973. They have also not taken this ground either in the Appeal or in the revision. For the first time, Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for the revision-applicants raised this plea during the arguments before this Court which is not permissible. Mr. Apte tried to take benefit of a sentence in para 4 of the evidence of P.W.I Shivshankar Dhmdore in support of his contention that the defendant Nos.3 to 6 were in possession prior to 1973. In the sentence it was stated that Haji Hasansaheb had not given possession of the shed to the plaintiffs and had sublet the propel1y to others i.e. defendant Nos.2 to 6. Haji Hasansaheb had died in 1969. Mr. Apte contended that in view of this. it must be held that defendant Nos. 2 to 6 were in possession since 1969 or before that. It is material to note that in the plaint, Haji Hasansaheb was shown as defendant No.1 while in fact he had died about four years prior to the filing of the suit. In fact, there was no need to show Haji Hasansaheb as defendant No.1. His L.Rs. should have been shown directly as defendant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4, but instead of that in the plaint, Haji Hasansaheb was shown as defendant No.1 and his L.Rs were shown as defendants Nos. 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D and his brother Abdul Sattar as defendant No.2. It is material to note that according to the plaintiffs, after the death of Haji Hasansaheb, defendant No.2 had entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs and had given in writing that he was liable for payment of arrears of rent and other charges and he had agreed to pay the same. According to the plaintiffs, the fodder market was working till May, 1972 and thereafter due to constitution of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, the fodder market on the land of the plaintiffs was closed and there after original defendants means the L.Rs. According to the plaintiffs, the fodder market was working till May, 1972 and thereafter due to constitution of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, the fodder market on the land of the plaintiffs was closed and there after original defendants means the L.Rs. of Haji Hasansaheb and his brother, defendant No.2 had no right to continue in possession of the same. Due to this, they were asked to vacate the premises, but as they failed to vacate the premises, the suit came to be filed. As the fodder market was working till May, 1972, Haji Hasaosaheb was never required to hand over possession to the plaintiffs because that agreement was in force when he died in 1969. In view of these circumstances, the question of induction of the defendants Nos. 3 to 6 by Haji Hasansaheb was completely ruled out. Therefore, it appears that because the name of Haji Hasansaheb was wrongly shown as defendant No.1, the question to the witness was also wrongly put and wrong sentence appears to have been recorded in the evidence of P.W.1. There is nothing to show that on the basis of this sentence, defendant Nos.3 to 6 had claimed to have been inducted as sub-tenants by Haji Hasansaheb, either before the trial Court or the appellate Court. In my considered opinion, in absence of any pleading on the part of defendant Nos. 3 to 6 that they were inducted and were in possession since prior to 1.2,1973 and in absence of any evidence to that effect, they have utterly failed to discharge that onus and. therefore, at this stage, for the first time, they cannot be allowed to contend that they are the protected sub-tenants and that they have become tenants on determination of the tenancy of the original defendants, 8. Once this contention raised by Mr. Aple, learned Counsel for the revision applicants is rejected, there is no substance in the Revision Application. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of facts. I find no error or irregularity in the judgments of the Courts below. Therefore, the Revision Application is liable to be dismissed. 9. For the reasons stated above, the Revision Application stands dismissed. Revision dismissed.