Judgment K.K.LAHOT, J. ( 1. ) This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 4.1.1993 by the First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, East Niwar, Khandwa in Civil Appeal No.24-A/84, by which the judgment and decree dated 4.4.1984 in Civil Suit No.48-A/1983 by First Additional Civil Judge to the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Khandwa, was affirmed. ( 2. ) This appeal was admitted on 15.9.1999 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. "Whether the plaintiff/appellants suit is based on title or it is a suit under Order 21 Rule 103 C.P.C. 2. Whether the suit is within limitation? 3. From which date the limitation started running for this suit i.e. whether from the date of deciding of objections under Section 47 C.P.C or from the date of decision of its appeal or from the date of decision of objections under Order 21 rule 99 C.P.C or from the date of decision of appeal from that order or from the date of decision of revision from that order or any other date? 4. Whether the objections under Section 47 CPC filed by the plaintiffs earlier is to be treated as objections under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC for purposes of counting limitation?" ( 3. ) (a) The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Court below erred in dismissing the suit of the appellants on the grounds of limitation. The objections preferred by the appellants under Order 21 Rule 99 C.P.C were decided by the trial Court on 16.10.1975. Thereafter an appeal was preferred by the appellants which was registered as Civil Appeal No.35/75 and it was dismissed on 10.1.1976. Against this order, the appellants preferred a civil revision before the High Court which was registered as C.R. No. 182/1976 and dismissed on 20th April, 1978.. Thereafter the present suit was filed under Order 21 rule 103 on 25.7.78 which was within a period of one year and under Article 98 of the Limitation Act, the suit was within the period of limitation. The Court below erred in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. Reliance was placed to a Single Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Gopal Lal vs. Ram Karan Singh: AIR 1974 Allahabad 44. The Court below erred in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. Reliance was placed to a Single Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Gopal Lal vs. Ram Karan Singh: AIR 1974 Allahabad 44. (b) Though the objections were preferred by appellants Umraobi and Sheikh Hamid on 2.1.1999, but these persons were not parties in the earlier litigation filed by Sheikh Farid and Mst. Hayatbi under Section 47 of the C.P.C. which was registered as MJC no.15/73 and was dismissed on 1.8.1973, so the objections filed by Umraobi and Sheikh Hamid were independent to the objections suit filed under Section 47 of the CPC, but the Court below erred in taking into consideration the aforesaid order, while deciding the present suit filed by the appellants. It was submitted that this appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Court below be set aside. (c) That, the Courts below had not considered the case of the appellants on merits and rejected it merely on the ground of limitation. Earlier also there was no adjudication on merits in respect of the title of the appellants who purchased the property from Manohar Lal Barole by a registered sale deed dated 8.1.1973. The appellants were having independent title, filed the suit to establish their title. As earlier there was no adjudication on merits, so in the present suit, the trial Court ought to have adjudicated the title. ( 4. ) Shri Sidharth Gulati, appearing for the respondents, opposed the contention and submitted that the appellants had purchased the property after judgment and decree on 13.3.1972 in Civil Suit No. 88-A/71 filed by the respondents, against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, appeal was preferred by Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid, as Civil Appeal No.40-A/72, which was dismissed on merits on 19.8.1972. After the decision of the eviction suit against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid, these persons purchased the property from Manoharlal Barole. Other two purchasers were son and mother of Sheikh Farid, who were also bound by the -judgment and decree passed in earlier suit, against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid under Section 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid, these persons purchased the property from Manoharlal Barole. Other two purchasers were son and mother of Sheikh Farid, who were also bound by the -judgment and decree passed in earlier suit, against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid under Section 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. That, even if the contention of the appellants is accepted that the civil suit was filed within a period of one year from 20th April, 1978 when Civil Revision No. 182/1976 was dismissed, then at that time, the Civil Procedure Code was amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977 and after dismissal of the objection under Order 21 rule 99 read with 103 C.P.C. a fresh suit was barred as held by the Division Bench in Dattatray vs. Mangal AIR 1983 MP 82 and submitted that this appeal is without merit and may be dismissed. ( 5. ) The appellant in reply to the contentions made by Shri Sidharth Gulatee submitted, that the appellants, bona fidely contested the matter in appeal and revision after dismissal of the objections under Order 21 Rule 99 C.P.C. on 16.10.75 and the period be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was submitted by Shri Choubey that he has now moved an application in the High Court in this case under Section 14 of the Limitation Act S.A.No.6864/2008 on 19.6.2008 for exclusion of the time spent in the aforesaid proceedings. If the aforesaid application is allowed, the suit filed by the appellant can be treated as within the limitation. ( 6. ) To appreciate the aforesaid contentions, factual position in the present case may be looked into. (a) The suit property is a residential house situated at Mohalla Khadakpur Ward No.16, in the township of Khandwa. This house belonged to Sheikh Babu, who was father of respondents Sheikh Mazar and Mst. Jebunisha. After the death of Sheikh Babu, respondents succeeded the property. In the aforesaid house, the appellants Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid were residing as tenants. (b) Sheikh Mazar and Mst. Jaibunnisa filed a suit for eviction, based on landlord tenant relationship, against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid, which was registered as Civil Suit No.88-A/71 in the Court of First Civil Judge Class-2, Khandwa and was decreed on 13.3.1972. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid were residing as tenants. (b) Sheikh Mazar and Mst. Jaibunnisa filed a suit for eviction, based on landlord tenant relationship, against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid, which was registered as Civil Suit No.88-A/71 in the Court of First Civil Judge Class-2, Khandwa and was decreed on 13.3.1972. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid preferred a Civil Appeal No. 40-A/72 which was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Khandwa judgment and decree dated 5.12.1972. These judgment and decree were not challenged further by the defendants and had attained finality. (c) After the aforesaid judgment and decree, the plaintiffs of present case namely,Sheikh Hameed, Umraobi, Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid purchased the suit house from Manoharlal Barole by registered sale deed dated 8.1.1973. The aforesaid Manoharlal Barole sold the aforesaid property on the strength of a registered will dated 17.4.1961, allegedly bequeathed by Sheikh Babu and after the death of Sheikh Babu on the basis of the will, he claimed property as an owner. (d) After the purchase of property, Sheikh Farid and Mst. Hayatbi filed an application under Section 47 of the C.P.C. before the Civil Judge Class I, Khandwa which was registered as MJC No.51/73. These objections were dismissed by the aforesaid Court on 1.8.1973 against which an appeal M.A.No.24/73 was preferred by Sheikh Farid and Mst. Hayatbi, but it was dismissed by the order dated 30th June 1975. Against this order, no further appeal or revision was preferred by Sheikh Farid and Mst. Hayatbi and this order has also attained finality. (e) After dismissal of the objections by the appellate Court on 30.6.1975 in Misc.Appeal No.24/73, on 4.7.1975 Umraobi and Sheikh Hamid filed an application under Order 21 Rules 99, 100 and 101 CPC against Sheikh Mazar and Zebunnisa. This objection was dismissed by the trial Court on 16.10.1975. These persons preferred a Civil Appeal No.35/75 which was also dismissed on 10.1.1976. A civil Revision no. 182/76 was preferred before this Court which was dismissed by the order dated 20th April, 78. This Court while dismissing the revision held thus: "5. From a narration of the relevant facts, it is obvious that the present petitioners who are close relations of the judgment-debtors have obviously been set up to repeat the objections which have earlier been rejected after due enquiry. This Court while dismissing the revision held thus: "5. From a narration of the relevant facts, it is obvious that the present petitioners who are close relations of the judgment-debtors have obviously been set up to repeat the objections which have earlier been rejected after due enquiry. In M.J.C.No.51/73, to which the petitioners were also parties, the very same objection was taken by the judgment- debtors for themselves and also for the petitioners because joint title as purchasers was claimed in the judgment-debtors along with the petitioners. After rejection of that objection by the executing Court, the appeal against that order was also dismissed and that order has become final. This fact alone clearly shows that a fresh set of objections filed by the petitioners repeating the very same objections, to say the least, is an abuse of the process of Court. 6. It is not necessary in the present case to decide whether the appeal filed in the Court below against rejection of the objection by the executing Court was maintainable or not because I have no hesitation in holding that on merits the petitioners objection was rightly dismissed. It is not necessary to discuss this matter any further." (f) After dismissal of Civil Revision on 20.4.1978, Sheikh Hamid, Umraobi, Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid filed the present suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Sheikh Majhar and Smt. Zebunnisa. Before proceeding further it would be appropriate if the relationship is stated. The family tree of the appellants is as under: These persons claimed the property on the basis of sale deed executed in their favour by Manoharlal Barole, who claimed the property from Sheikh Babu, on the basis of registered will dated 17.4.1961. (g) In the suit, the respondents filed written statement and raised preliminary objection of res judicata, limitation, lis pendence and nonjoinder of parties. The trial Court framed preliminary issues, heard the, parties and found that the suit was barred by limitation. So far as other three issues were concerned, the trial Court found that no necessity was there to decide the aforesaid issues. The trial Court found that the objections preferred by the plaintiffs were dismissed on 16.10.1975. The trial Court framed preliminary issues, heard the, parties and found that the suit was barred by limitation. So far as other three issues were concerned, the trial Court found that no necessity was there to decide the aforesaid issues. The trial Court found that the objections preferred by the plaintiffs were dismissed on 16.10.1975. The civil suit was filed on 25.7.1978, while under Article 98 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a limitation of one year was provided from the date of rejection of the objections, so the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit. (h) Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appellants preferred an appeal, bearing no.24-A/84, but the appellate Court after considering the entire facts of the case, by judgment and decree dated 4.1.1993, dismissed the appeal. These orders are under challenge in this appeal. ( 7. ) To appreciate the contentions made by the parties, it would be pertinent to mention here that at the time when Civil Suit No.88-A/71 was filed and the objections under Order 21 Rules 99 and 100 C.P.C. were preferred, the provisions of C.P.C. which were existed prior to 1.2.77 were applicable. For ready reference, the provisions of Order 21 rule 98, 99 and 103 in the C.PC prior to 1.2.77 in the statute book may be referred, which were thus: 98. "Resistance or obstruction by judgment- debtor :- Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may be extend to thirty days. 99. Resistance or obstruction by bona fide claimant.- Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by any person (other than the judgment-debtor) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application. Resistance or obstruction by bona fide claimant.- Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by any person (other than the judgment-debtor) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application. 103 Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite.- Nothing in Rules 99 and 101 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person." Earlier Section 47 of the C.P.C, before the amendment of 1.2.1977, may be referred which was thus. 47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decrees.- (1) AH questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) The Court may, subject to- any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional court- fees. (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, sub question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court." ( 8. ) In this case, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff/appellant Sheikh Fareed and Mst. Hayatbi preferred objections under Section 47 of C.P.C. on 18.6.1973, which application was registered as MJC No.51/73 .These objections were dismissed by the trial Court on 1.8.1973 and appeal M.A.No.24/73 was also dismissed on 30th June, 1975. The aforesaid objections were based on the same facts which were agitated in the present suit. Hayatbi preferred objections under Section 47 of C.P.C. on 18.6.1973, which application was registered as MJC No.51/73 .These objections were dismissed by the trial Court on 1.8.1973 and appeal M.A.No.24/73 was also dismissed on 30th June, 1975. The aforesaid objections were based on the same facts which were agitated in the present suit. The decision on objections under Section 47 of C.P.C prior to 1.2.77 was having force of the decree, as the definition of the Decree prior to the amendment was- as under 2(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 47 or Section 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order; or (b) any order or dismissal for default. Explanation- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;" ( 9. ) An adjudication or determination of any question under Section 47 of C.P.C, determining of rights of the parties, was a decree between parties. The aforesaid order has attained finality and is having effect of res judicata between the parties. So the suit filed by Sheikh Farid and Mst. Hayatbi was barred under Section 11 of the C.P.C. and they were not entitled to file a fresh suit for adjudication of the questions which were already decided in MJC No.51/1973 under Section 47 of C.P.C. ( 10. ) Now objections filed by Mst. Umraobi and Shiekh Hameed may be seen. These persons preferred objections under Order 21 rules 99, 100 and 101 C.P.C.The aforesaid objections were dismissed by the trial Court on 16.10.1975 and after dismissal of the aforesaid objections, these persons ought to have filed a suit as required under Order 21 Rule 103 C.P.C. and limitation of one year was provided under Article 98 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but in place of filing a suit, Sheikh Hamid and Mst. Umraobi preferred an appeal which was numbered as Appeal No. 35/75, but it was dismissed on 10.1.1976. Thereafter a Civil Revision No. 182/76 was preferred which was heard and decided by this Court on 20th April, 1978. In the meantime, the C.P.C. was amended by Act No. 104 on 1976 with effect from 1.2.77. The Order 21 rule 103 C.P;C, was amended and a new rule was substituted in the CPC which reads thus: "103. Orders to be treated as decrees.- Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made therein shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to any appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree." ( 11. ) The aforesaid rule specifically provides that order deciding an application under Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order 21 shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree, meaning thereby that and order under Order 21 rules 98 and 100 CPC has been given effect to as of decree and no fresh suit was maintainable. ( 12. ) This question came up for hearing before the Division Bench of this Court in Dattatray Vs. Mangal AIR 1983 MP 82 in which the Division Bench considering the effect of amendment in Order 21 Rule 103 C.P.C. held that if an order was passed by an Executing Court, after 1st Feb. 1977 viz. enforcement date of Amendment Act 104 of 1976 disposing of an application under Order 21 rule 97 C.P.C. which was pending on that date, the order was appealable under the provisions of Amended code of Civil Procedure and the aggrieved party has no right to file a suit under the provisions of the code as it stood before its amendment. If the application was decided after commencement of the Amendment Act, there was no accrual of any right of suit under the old Rule 103, and no such right is preserved by the provisions of Section 97(2) of the Amendment Act, 1976 or under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 97(3) of the Amendment Act, 1976, therefore, has full operation and the application. Under Rule 97, pending application at the commencement of the Amendment Act, has to be disposed of in accordance with the Code as amended. Section 97(3) of the Amendment Act, 1976, therefore, has full operation and the application. Under Rule 97, pending application at the commencement of the Amendment Act, has to be disposed of in accordance with the Code as amended. In view of the settled law by the Division Bench, the decision on an application, which was decided finally by Revisional Court on 20th April, 78, a civil suit was not maintainable, under Rule 103 of Order 21 which stood prior to 1.2.1977. In these circumstances, if the contentions of the appellants are accepted that cause of action arose on 20th April, 1978 when the Revision No. 182/76 was decided, then in the light of the aforesaid judgment of Division Bench in Dattatatray, no suit was maintainable. ( 13. ) Now another contention may be examined. The appellants submitted that the objection was decided on 16.10.1975. Thereafter the matter remained pending in appeal and civil revision and the aforesaid time can be excluded in filing present suit, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid contention has no force. No such prayer was made before the trial Court.An appropriate forum for filing such an application was the trial Court and the appellants ought to have made such a prayer before the trial Court. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Appellate Court also affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dismissing the suit on the question of limitation. In these circumstances, after a period of nearabout 33 years, from the decision of the application under Order 21 rule 99, 100 C.P.C. on 16.10.75, this prayer or application cannot be allowed. This would cause serious prejudice to the respondents, who are litigating since 1972, when their Civil Suit No.88-A/71 was decided, directing a decree of eviction against Mst. Hayatbi and Sheikh Farid. Apart from this, the appellants preferred a Civil Appeal and thereafter Civil Revision, which were dismissed on merits vide orders dated 10.1.1976 and dated 20th April, 1978. The aforesaid matter decided finally after 1.2.1977 and as held by the Division Bench in Dattatray such civil suit is barred. In view of decision of Dattatray such prayer cannot be allowed. In these circumstances, the application of the appellant, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, cannot be allowed. ( 14. ) Now, the last contention of appellant may be examined. In view of decision of Dattatray such prayer cannot be allowed. In these circumstances, the application of the appellant, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, cannot be allowed. ( 14. ) Now, the last contention of appellant may be examined. The appellants purchased jointly property by registered sale deed dated 1.8.1973 knowing it well that a judgment and decree was passed against them on 17.3.1972. The relationship of the appellant is very closed and all were residing in the same house. The appellants with the open eyes purchased the house in respect of which a decree of eviction was already passed. A decree against Mst. HayatBi and Sheikh Hamid was executable even against Sheikh Fareed and Mst Umrao Bi, in view of the specific provision under Section 23 of the M.P. Accommodation Act, 1961. To defeat the judgment and decree, if the appellants had purchased the property, they were not entitled to protect their possession or to get any benefit of the aforesaid sale deed. In the result, this appeal is found without merit and is dismissed with cost. Counsel fee Rs.2,000/- Appeal dismissed.