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2008 DIGILAW 749 (GAU)

Gopendra Goswami v. Haradhan Das

2008-09-30

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2008
JUDGMENT Utpalendu Bikas Saha, J. 1. The appellants, the plaintiffs in the suit, have preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31-1-1998 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (Court No. 3), West Tripura, Agartala in Title Appeal No. 45 of 1996 whereby and whereunder, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal upholding the judgment and decree dated 2-5-1996 and 9-5-1996 respectively passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Agartala, West Tripura in T.S. 239 of 1983 wherein the suit was partly allowed and accordingly decreed. 2. Heard Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. Acherjee, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the respondents. 3. The following facts need to be noticed for proper understanding of the controversy between the parties. The appellants as plaintiffs filed the Title Suit No. 239 of 1983 In the Court of Munslff, which was subsequently designated as Civil Judge, Junior Division, Agartala, West Tripura, for declaration of title over the suit land of Schedule-A and also for declaration as Bargadar in the suit land of Schedule-B and for a decree of perpetual injunction on the plea that one Kshirode Ch. Sen and his brothers were the original owner of Jote No. 19 of Mouja-Malaynagar under Sadar Tahshil and the said Kshirode Ch. Sen sold out the suit land to one Kalipada Chakraborty who again sold out the same to Durgesh Ch. Das, the predecessor in interest of the defendants and from Durgesh Ch. Das, predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs, namely, Braja Gopal Goswami purchased the Schedule-A land measuring 5 kanies vide registered deed dated 3-7-1956. After purchase of the aforesaid land, the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs constructed dwelling house on the Schedule-A land and possessed the same by living therein which has been recorded in the present survey settlement vide Parcha No. 292 in the name of the plaintiffs. 4. After the death of the predecessor in Interest of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs continued to possess the said Schedule-A land by residing thereupon and by growing vegetables on the rest portion of the land. It is stated in the plaint that after the sale of the Schedule-A land, the predecessor in interest of the defendants left Agartala and permanently settled at Kulai Bazar, North Tripura. It is stated in the plaint that after the sale of the Schedule-A land, the predecessor in interest of the defendants left Agartala and permanently settled at Kulai Bazar, North Tripura. Before leaving Agartala, the said predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs as Bargadar In respect of the Schedule-B land measuring about 7.02 acres. 5. The predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs on being appointed as Bargadar of the Schedule-B land possessed the same and started cultivation thereupon. He also used to give the share of the crops of the Schedule-B land to the predecessor in interest of the defendants. 6. During the pendency of the suit, after filing the written statements by the defendants, the plaintiffs on 11-5-1994 amended the plaint withdrawing the plea of Bargadar claiming that the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs possessed the Schedule-B land continuously and by adverse possession, he perfected his title over the said land and after the death of the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs possessed the said suit land in continuation of the possession of their predecessor only adversely in hostile assertion of their jote rights and they have been continuing in such possession and valuable jote right accrued to the plaintiffs over the Schedule-B land. 7. The defendants by way of filing the written statements denied the fact of sale of Schedule-A land by their predecessors in interest in favour of the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, rather they claimed that they were in possession of the suit land. They also denied the plea of the plaintiffs that the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs was engaged by their predecessors in interest as Bargadar in respect of Schedule-B land. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed as many as six issues. The issues which are relevant for determination of the substantial questions of law in this appeal are reproduced hereunder:- (iii) Are the plaintiffs in possession of "B" Schedule land as Bargadar? (iv) Are the plaintiffs entitled to get any decree as prayed for? (v) To what other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to get? (vi) Whether any right, title and interest accrued in favour of the plaintiffs by virtue of adverse possession and whether the plaintiffs possessed the suit land adversely? 9. (iv) Are the plaintiffs entitled to get any decree as prayed for? (v) To what other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to get? (vi) Whether any right, title and interest accrued in favour of the plaintiffs by virtue of adverse possession and whether the plaintiffs possessed the suit land adversely? 9. The learned trial Court during the pendency of the suit appointed a Commissioner who filed his report on 31-5-1988 and the said report was accepted provisionally by the trial Court on 2-9-1989. 10. As the plaintiffs amended the plaint several times, the defendants were also allowed to file additional written statements and accordingly, they filed the written statements denying the claim of the plaintiffs over the Schedule-A land and the plea, inter alia, that the said land was originally recorded under Khatian No. 168 that re-numbered as 292 and the khatian was finally published on 5-6-1968. They also denied that the khatian bearing No. 1240/1 and 1240/2 were prepared in the name of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs showing him the true owner on jote right in the Schedule-A land and the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. 11. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties and careful consideration of the documents filed by them as well as deposition of the witnesses recorded and hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court decreed the suit partly declaring the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the Schedule-A land and restrained the defendants perpetually from disturbing the peaceful possession of the Schedule-A land by the plaintiffs, but dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs in respect of Schedule-B land vide its judgment and decree dated 2-5-1996 and 9-5-1996 respectively. 12. Having been aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala which was subsequently transferred to the Court of the Additional District Judge (Court No. 3) and registered as Title Appeal No. 45 of 1996 for the remaining relief which was not allowed by the Trial Court. The first Appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence found no error in the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 13. The first Appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence found no error in the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 13. Having been not satisfied with and aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree dated 31-1-1988 passed by the learned first appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 45 of 1996, whereby and whereunder the appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs-appellants Impugned the said judgment and decree of the appellate Court in the instant second appeal on the ground that the learned first appellate Court has not taken into consideration the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C. while decided the appeal and the learned Courts below have also failed to consider the amended plaint as it was wrongly held that the claim of the plaintiffs' possession would be available only after amendment was allowed in 1994 and not from 1956 and also assailed the said judgment and decree on the plea that the trial Court failed to consider the evidence on record in proper perspective along with other grounds. 14. This appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law: (a) Whether after allowing the amendment and receipt of cost of amendment by the other party, the amended portion of the plaint can be ignored to import a different fact or not? (b) Whether the learned First Appellate Court has failed to comply with the provision under Order XLI, Rule 31 of C.P.C.? 15. Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned senior Counsel in support of the case of the appellants submits that the respondents, defendants in the suit, did not file any additional written statements against the amendment of the plaint. Hence, the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court should have treated the said pleadings of the plaintiffs as admitted by the defendants respondents. He further contended that once amendment is allowed and incorporated in the plaint, then the pleadings in the amendment petition should be considered as if the same was in the original plaint. Hence, the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court should have treated the said pleadings of the plaintiffs as admitted by the defendants respondents. He further contended that once amendment is allowed and incorporated in the plaint, then the pleadings in the amendment petition should be considered as if the same was in the original plaint. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has made reliance in paragraph 10 of the decision of the Apex Court in Sampath Kumar vs. Ayyakannu reported in (2002) Supp 2 SCR 397, wherein the Apex Court held that once amendment is incorporated, it relates back to the date of the suit. He has also placed reliance in the case of Siddalingamma vs. Mamtha Shenoy reported in AIR 2001 SC 2896 . 16. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, when the trial Court allowed the plaintiffs appellants to withdraw their plea claiming as Bargadar and allowed the prayer for amendment relating to the plea of adverse possession over the B schedule land, both the Court below failed to consider the adverse possession over the B schedule land for which also the judgment and decree of the trial Court relating to B schedule land as well as the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court wherein the judgment of the trial Court was affirmed Is liable to be set aside. 17. He has also Submits that the first appellate Court has failed to comply with the provisions under Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C. 18. Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior Counsel would contend that the Trial Court as well as first appellate Court rightly rejected the plea of adverse possession of the plaintiffs appellants claiming 6ver the B Schedule land as according to their own statements, they were the Bargadar over the B Schedule land and only after filing of the written statement by the defendants respondents, they came to know that they are not the Bargadar for which they withdrew their claims as Bargadar and amended plaint claiming adverse possession over the B schedule land. Therefore it is the admitted position that the plea as to the adverse possession was claimed against the defendants respondents only in the year 1994 and not prior to that. And mere pleading of adverse possession would not entitle to the plaintiffs appellants to get declaration of title over the B schedule land on such plea of adverse possession. Therefore it is the admitted position that the plea as to the adverse possession was claimed against the defendants respondents only in the year 1994 and not prior to that. And mere pleading of adverse possession would not entitle to the plaintiffs appellants to get declaration of title over the B schedule land on such plea of adverse possession. 19. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove his possession is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. He also submits that mere ignoring of the title of the defendants respondents by the plaintiffs appellants will not be enough. That has to be animus possidendi. In the instant case, admittedly, the plaintiffs appellants claimed themselves as Bargadar of the defendants respondents in their initial plaint and after eleven years of filing of the suit, they came with a plea of adverse possession by way of amendment of their plaint, meaning thereby before taking the plea of adverse possession in the amended petition, they were admittedly the permissive possessor over the B-schedule land. In the instant case, the animus to hold land of B Schedule adversely to the title of the defendants respondents can be said to have started only when the plaintiffs appellants derived knowledge that their possession over the suit land had been alleged to be an act of encroachment on the defendants respondents' jote right extinguishing their title. The animus to hold the Schedule B land adversely to the title of the defendants respondents have started only after filing of the amendment as they changed the animus only after receiving the written statement of the defendants respondents wherein the defendants respondents denied the plea of the plaintiffs appellants as Bargadar over the B-Schedule land, not prior to that. In support of the aforesaid contention, Mr. Chakraborty has placed reliance in para-11 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deva (dead) through L.Rs. vs. Sajjan Kumar (dead) by L.Rs. reported in AIR 2003 SC 3907 . 20. He also contended that the plaintiffs appellants in their plaint no where stated as to against whom were their possession over the Schedule-B land adverse. Chakraborty has placed reliance in para-11 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deva (dead) through L.Rs. vs. Sajjan Kumar (dead) by L.Rs. reported in AIR 2003 SC 3907 . 20. He also contended that the plaintiffs appellants in their plaint no where stated as to against whom were their possession over the Schedule-B land adverse. In support of his submission, he referred Para-14 of the plaint wherein it is stated, inter alia, that the plaintiffs appellants since the time of their predecessor in interest acquired the title upon the lands in Schedule 'A' of the plaint by purchase and also upon the lands in Schedule 'B' of the plaint by adverse possession. But due to the activities of the defendants, a cloud has been casting upon the status of the plaintiffs in respect of the lands in schedule 'A' and 'B' below of the plaint for which a declaration by the learned Court is required that the plaintiffs are the owners in respect of the schedule 'A' lands which was purchased by their predecessor-in-interest. He finally submits that the plaintiffs appellants themselves are not aware about their real status regarding Schedule 'B' land. Therefore, the learned Trial Court as well as appellate Court rightly rejected the plea of the adverse possession. Whether the said adverse possession is against the defendants respondents or anybody else, according to him, once they admittedly claimed themselves as Bargadar in the initial plaint, they cannot change the said status on denial of their plea by the defendant respondents in their written statements. Once the plaintiffs appellants accepted the title of the defendants respondents in the suit, they cannot subsequently deny the same with the help of plea of adverse possession, he contended. Even if they can change the animus, then that animus would start only after raising the plea of adverse possession, not prior to that. 21. Mr. Chakraborty has further placed reliance in the case of S.M. Karim vs. Bibi Sakina reported in (1964) 6 SCR 780 which was subsequently followed in the case of Balkrishan vs. Satyaprakash reported in (2001) 2 SCC 498 : AIR 2001 SC 700 . He further submits that mere possession over the B-Schedule land cannot be treated as adverse possession unless the said possession is hostile to the title of the defendants respondents. 22. He further submits that mere possession over the B-Schedule land cannot be treated as adverse possession unless the said possession is hostile to the title of the defendants respondents. 22. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Dharmarajan vs. Valliammal reported in AIR 2008 SC 850 , Mr. Chakraborty further submits that in order to substantiate the plea of adverse possession, the possession has to be open and adverse to the owner of the property in question. But in the instant suit, the plaintiffs could not show this openness and adverse nature because the plaintiffs were not even certain and could not come at the time of filing the plaint as to against whom were their possession adverse. And thus they fail to prove the same, rather prior to the amendment of the plaint, they admitted themselves as Bargadar under the predecessor in interest of the defendants. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove their title over the B-Schedule land and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. He also submits that concurrent findings of the Court below should not be interfered with by the second appellate Court while exercising its power under Section 100, C.P.C. unless the important admitted piece of evidence had been overlooked by the Courts below while dismissed the suit as well as appeal. 23. In response to the contention of Mr. Chakraborty, Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that the first appellate Court ought to have held that when the trial Court allowed the amendment of the plaintiffs appellants that since 1956 they were possessing land adversely by withdrawing the plea of the plaintiffs appellants that they were the Bargadar of the defendants respondents, the learned Trial Court should have considered the possession of the plaintiffs appellants over the B-Schedule land since 1956 and held that the plaintiffs appellants acquired title over the B-Schedule land by way of adverse possession. But not doing so, the appellate Court also committed error, for which also, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court is liable to be set aside and the instant second appeal is to be allowed and decreed holding that the plaintiffs appellants are in continuous possession over the B-Schedule land adverse to the title of the defendants respondents. In support of his said contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava vs. Km. In support of his said contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava vs. Km. Jyoti Sahay reported in AIR 1983 SC 462 , which according to him, was mis-interpreted by the first appellate Court. 24. Before proceeding to scrutinize the detail submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, for the satisfaction of the Court, it is necessary to see the meaning of 'Bargadar' as stated in Section 2(bb) of Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. The said provision is quoted hereunder: 2.(bb) Bargadar means a person who under the system generally known as adhi, barga, bhag or any other term cultivates the land of any person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person; 25. It is clear from the aforesaid definition that Bargadar is not the title holder of the land, rather share holder of the crops being a cultivator. How much share a Bargadar will get from the produce of the land he cultivated depends upon the settlement between the Bargadar and the owner of the land and so long a person will remain as Bargadar, he cannot claim title of himself over the said Barga land, either he has to give up his Barga right or he has to purchase the said Barga land to become a title holder on the said land. On the same analogy, a title holder can also be a Bargadar if he wants to extinguish right and title over the land by selling the same to other persons and cultivate the said land either on Barga or bhag or in other terms of cultivation of the land of the person who purchased the said land. 26. Adverse possession is not defined, but the meaning is well settled by this time by way of judicial pronouncement. There are two kinds of adverse possession. Out of these two, in one, initial entry itself is as a trespasser; and in the second, the initial entry is permissive or non-hostile, but it becomes adverse or wrongful by change of animus by the possessor, who starts continuing in possession in his own right, disclaiming his subordinate status. There are two kinds of adverse possession. Out of these two, in one, initial entry itself is as a trespasser; and in the second, the initial entry is permissive or non-hostile, but it becomes adverse or wrongful by change of animus by the possessor, who starts continuing in possession in his own right, disclaiming his subordinate status. In these two kinds of adverse possession, the Court should take presumption in different manner at the time of evaluating the evidence and are strength or cogency of it in establishing the title by way of adverse possession. Unless this distinction is borne in mind, some times the ratio of the decisions is likely to be misunderstood as the possession of a person, of the property belonging to another, is prima facie presumed as adverse, unless the same is shown that it originated in a contract, permission or in fiduciary capacity or similar relationship. Possession of land some times may be legal, but not lawful. Legal possession is a state of being possessor in the eye of law. It may exist with or without rightful origin. Every owner of the property is prima facie entitled to its possession and also enjoyment of its fruits, at the same time, every one has the same right to whom has given the possession. In the instant case, admittedly, the plaintiffs at the time of filing of the suit up to amendment of the plaint incorporating the plea of adverse possession believed themselves and treated as Bargadar and they also did never deny either the title of the predecessor in interest of the defendants or the defendants at large. First time they deny the title of the defendants while filed the application for amendment of the plaint i.e. the change the animus. 27. To decide the appeal preferred by the appellants against the concurrent findings of the Court below, it is necessary to refer and reproduce the relevant portion of the decision of the Apex Court relied by the learned Counsel of the parties. In Siddalingamma AIR 2001 SC 2896 (supra), the Apex Court held, inter alia, that an application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 of the C.P.C. was moved and the deficiency in the pleadings stood removed by the amendment permitted by the trial Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction to do so. In Siddalingamma AIR 2001 SC 2896 (supra), the Apex Court held, inter alia, that an application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 of the C.P.C. was moved and the deficiency in the pleadings stood removed by the amendment permitted by the trial Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction to do so. The order permitting the amendment was not put in issue promptly. Even the High Court in its impugned order has not found fault with the order of the trial Court permitting the amendment nor has it expressed an opinion that leave granted by the trial Court for amendment in the eviction petition suffered from any error of jurisdiction or discretion. On the doctrine of relation back, which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons the Court excludes the applicability of the doctrine in a given case the petition for eviction as amended would be deemed to have been filed originally as such and the evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light of the averments made in the amended petition. Once an amendment has been unreservedly permitted to be incorporated in the pleadings, the correctness of the facts introduced by amendment cannot be doubted solely on the ground that they were not stated in the original petition. The Apex Court laid down the law relating to the effect of the amendment of the pleadings applying the doctrine of relation back which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons, the Court excludes applicability of the doctrine in a given case. The amendment would be deemed to have been filed originally with the plaint. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Siddalingamma (supra) as in that case appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respondent therein who was admittedly tenant on a monthly rent basis of the appellant and the appellant also by way of adducing evidence established sufficient pleadings in the amendment of the plaint to prove the genuineness of the requirement of the rented property for her own use. 28. In Sampath Kumar, (2002) Supp 2 SCR 397 (supra), the Apex Court held that in order to avoid multiplicity of the suit, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to permit the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession being sought for in the pending suit. 28. In Sampath Kumar, (2002) Supp 2 SCR 397 (supra), the Apex Court held that in order to avoid multiplicity of the suit, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to permit the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession being sought for in the pending suit. The plaintiff has alleged the cause of action for the reliefs now sought to be added as having arisen to him during the pendency of the suit. The merits of the averments sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be judged at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment. However, the defendant is right in submitting that if he has already perfected his title by way of adverse possession then the right so accrued should not be allowed to be defeated by permitting an amendment and seeking in new relief which would relate back to the date of the suit and thereby depriving the defendant of the advantage accrued to him by lapse of time, by excluding a period of about 11 years in calculating the period of prescriptive title claimed to have been earned by the defendant. The interest of the defendant can be protected by directing that so far as the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, now sought for, are concerned the prayer in that regard shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the application for amendment has been filed. 29. In that case the appellant plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1988 for Issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction alleging the plaintiff appellant's possession over the suit property which is an agricultural land. In the year 1999, but before the commencement of the trial, the plaintiff moved an application under Order 6, Rule 17 seeking an amendment in the plaint. The facts remain that in the year 1989 during the pendency of the suit, the defendant has forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff. On such averment the plaintiff sought for relief of declaration of title to the suit property and consequential relief of delivery of possession. The facts remain that in the year 1989 during the pendency of the suit, the defendant has forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff. On such averment the plaintiff sought for relief of declaration of title to the suit property and consequential relief of delivery of possession. The trial Court rejected the prayer for amendment with an observation that the appropriate course for the plaintiff was to bring a new suit and the said order has also been maintained by the High Court in the revision against which an appeal was preferred before the Apex Court and ultimately the Apex Court allowed the appeal by way of permitting the plaintiff to incorporate the plea sought to be raised by way of amendment in the original plaint foregoing the plea to the extent given up by him before the trial Court. 30. The case in hand that the Trial Court as well as the appellate Court has allowed the prayer for amendment of the plaintiff. The facts remain that the trial Court though allowed the prayer for amendment did not accept the plea of adverse possession either from the date of filing of the suit or from the year 1956 as alleged by the plaintiff, but accepted the said plea of the adverse possession from the date on which an application for amendment has been filed. According to this Court, the decisions of the Court below get support from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sampath Kumar (2002) Supp 2 SCR 397 (supra) wherein the Apex Court has stated, inter alia, that the interest of the defendant can be protected by directing that so far as the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, now sought for, are concerned the prayer in that regard shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the application for amendment has been filed. As the plaintiffs claimed that their predecessors in interest was the Bargadar of the predecessor in interest of the defendant from whom they inherited such right of the Bargadar and the said stand of the plaintiffs was changed by them only after the filing the petition for amendment wherein they incorporated the plea of adverse possession. Therefore, first time in the amendment, they expressed that they adversely possessed the B-schedule land. Therefore, first time in the amendment, they expressed that they adversely possessed the B-schedule land. Therefore, it can be easily said that the B-schedule land even if adversely possessed by the plaintiffs, that was only from the date of filing of the amendment not from the date of filing of the plaintiff as it is settled that to substantiate the plea of adverse possession, a possession has to be open and without any attempt at concealment and adverse to the owner of the property in question and that also within the specific knowledge of them. In the instant case, the possession was not adverse to the defendants till the filing of the amendment petition. 31. In Panchdeo Narain Srivastava, AIR 1983 SC 462 (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that a party may withdraw an admission by way of amendment and such amendment if allowed by the trial Court, the High Court in revision should not interfere with in such amendment. The Apex Court no where stated in the said decision that the trial Court ought to have decided the suit only relevant on the subsequent amendment ignoring the evidence before the trial Court which disproved the plea taken in the amendment. Therefore, according to this Court, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court did not commit any error by not accepting the plea of adverse possession. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the trial Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction and rejected the prayer for amendment. The plea of the plaintiffs before the first Appellate Court was that their plea of adverse possession was not accepted by the trial Court from 1956 since when the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs was allegedly possessing the land adversely or from the date of filing of the plaint. Therefore, law reports relied by Mr. Bhattacharjee does not in any way help the case of the plaintiffs. 32. For appreciating the case of defendants respondents, it is necessary to examine the law reports relied by Mr. Chakraborty, hence the same is taken up for consideration. Therefore, law reports relied by Mr. Bhattacharjee does not in any way help the case of the plaintiffs. 32. For appreciating the case of defendants respondents, it is necessary to examine the law reports relied by Mr. Chakraborty, hence the same is taken up for consideration. In S.M. Karim (1964) 6 SCR 780 (supra) wherein the Apex Court observed, inter alia, that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. The said observation of the Apex Court was followed in paragraph 7 of the case of Balkrishnan (2001) 1 SCR 480 (supra), which is also relied by Mr. Chakraborty. In the instant case, there is nothing available from the record when and in what manner the plaintiffs possessed the B-schedule land and against extinguishing whose real title. 33. In paras 11 to 13 of the case of Deva AIR 2003 SC 3907 (supra), the Apex Court discussed, inter alia, that the animus to hold the land adversely to the title of the true owner can be said to have started only when the defendant derived knowledge that his possession over the suit land had been alleged to be an act of encroachment on the plaintiffs survey number. The Apex Court also held that mere long possession of the defendant for a period of more than 12 years without intention to possess the suit land adversely to the title of the plaintiff and to the latter's knowledge cannot result in acquisition of title by the defendant to the encroached suit land. 34. In the instant case also, plaintiffs' own admission are that before filing the written statement, they were not aware that their predecessor in interest was not Bargadar, rather B-Schedule land was possessed by him adversely to the title of the predecessor in interest of the defendant true owner and thereafter they were possessing the same land adversely to the title of the present defendants. 35. From the aforesaid admission of the defendants, it is clear that first time they raised the plea of adverse possession in the amendment petition. 35. From the aforesaid admission of the defendants, it is clear that first time they raised the plea of adverse possession in the amendment petition. Therefore, animus to hold the B-Schedule land adversely to the title of the defendants true owner can be said to have been started only after filing of the amendment petition, not from the filing of the plaint i.e. not related back the date of the suit. Hence, the principle laid down in the case of Deva, AIR 2003 SC 3907 (supra) helps the contention raised by Mr. Chakraborty. 36. The contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee, inter alia, that the first appellate Court ought to have held that when the trial Court allowed amendment of the plaint that the plaintiffs are in possession of the B-Schedule land adversely by withdrawing the plea of plaintiffs that they were the Bargadar of the defendants, the learned trial Court should have considered the possession of the plaintiffs over the B-schedule land since 1956 and held that the plaintiffs acquired title over the B-schedule land by way of adverse possession cannot be considered as a question of law. Consideration of possession is a matter of appreciation of evidence, it cannot be treated as a question of law, far to a substantial question of law. 37. Further original claim as Bargadar by the plaintiffs in their suit and subsequent plea of adverse possession amending their plaint petition are incompatible and the said plea being changed the nature and character of the suit, as the said point was not taken up before the trial Court, this Court is not expressing any opinion regarding acceptance of amendment petition, but the Court cannot shut its eyes from the fact that the plea of adverse possession was first time taken after eleven years of the filing of the suit and for the first time, the defendants came to know that the plaintiffs who were their permissive possessor claiming adverse possession over the B-Schedule land against them extinguishing their title as a true owner. Hence, the defendants' title over the said land could not get extinguished unless the plaintiffs had prescribed title remaining in adverse possession for continuous period of 25 years as required by provisions of Limitation Act. 38. Hence, the defendants' title over the said land could not get extinguished unless the plaintiffs had prescribed title remaining in adverse possession for continuous period of 25 years as required by provisions of Limitation Act. 38. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court is opinion that the trial Court as well as appellate Court did not commit any wrong either by ignoring or by not accepting the plea of adverse possession. Mere taking a plea in the plaint for adverse possession is not enough, that has to be proved by the party who raised the plea, in the instant case, which is absent and even not a whisper that from which date and against whom the adverse possession is claimed. 39. On going through the question formulated at the time of admission of the appeal, inter alia, whether after allowing the amendment and receipt of cost of amendment by the other party, the amended portion of the plaint can be ignored to import a different fact or not, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sampat Kumar, (2002) Supp 2 SCR 397 (supra), the aforesaid formulated question cannot be considered as a substantial question of law. 40. Question remains for decision is whether the first appellate Court has failed to comply the provisions under Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C. For better appreciation, the Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C. is reproduced hereunder: 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment. The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state. (a) The points for determination. (b) The decision thereon. (c) The reasons for the decision. (d) Where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. 41. (a) The points for determination. (b) The decision thereon. (c) The reasons for the decision. (d) Where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. 41. The object of Rule 31 of Order 41 is to afford the parties opportunity of knowing and understanding the ground of decision to enable to exercise the right of second appeal and to enable the High Court in Second Appeal to judge whether the lower appellate Court properly appreciated and decided the case and when the first appellate Court agreed with the views of the trial Court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. The whole evidence of the record need not be reviewed. It is enough if the evidence discussed is reasonably adequate for a proper decision of the case. It is also not must for a Court to refer each and every document or piece of evidence on record while recording the finding. A substantial compliance with Rule is enough. What is substantial compliance depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 42. In the instant case, after going to the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the further opinion that first appellate Court though not strictly complied with the requirement of provisions of Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C., but substantially complied with. Hence, it cannot be said that impugned judgment is bad for non-compliance of the aforesaid provisions of the C.P.C. 43. While dismissing the suit as well as the appeal, the second appellate Court normally should not interfere with such decision of the Courts below unless substantial questions are involved. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can be easily said that the learned trial Court as well as appellate Court had not overlooked any important admitted piece of evidence while allowed the suit relating to A Schedule of the land and dismissed the same in respect of B Schedule land. Hence the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court does not call for interference. Hence the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court does not call for interference. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observation, the instant appeal fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.