JUDGMENT DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, C.J. — This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 2.11.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge in OJC No.8900 of 1998 by which the application for impleadment filed by the respondent No.1, Najma Alim has been allowed reversing the order passed by the learned District Judge in Civil Revision No.75 of 1996 and confirming the order of the trial Court dated 1.11.1996. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are as follows : The plaintiffs-appellants filed Suit No.54 of 1994 claiming themselves to be the owner of the suit property with a prayer for eviction of the tenant-sole defendant therefrom on various grounds. During the course of trial respondent No.1, Najma Alim, filed an application for impleadment under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called ‘CPC’) claiming herself to have acquired title by way of registered sale deed from the original owner of the said property and further alleging that the suit proceedings were collusive just to acquire title over the property. The said application was allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 1.11.1996 directing addition of the said applicant as defendant No.2 in the suit. The said order was reversed by the learned District Judge in Civil Revision No.75 of 1996 observing that the suit for eviction being a lis between the landlord and the tenant, a third person could not be a necessary party. The said revisional order was challenged in a writ peti¬tion and the learned Single Judge has reversed the same and con¬firmed the order of the trial Court by the aforesaid judgment and order dated 2.11.2004. Hence this appeal. 3. Mr. A.P. Bose, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that if the application is allowed the nature of the suit will be changed. More so, a third party cannot be a neces¬sary party in the suit for eviction of a tenant. 4. On the other hand, Shri B. Routray, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has contended that the suit itself is collusive as the plaintiffs-appellants want a declaration of tile in their favour and once such declaration is made it will cause prejudice to respondent No.1 who is the real owner as she has purchased the suit property by a registered sale deed from its original owner. He further submitted that respondent No.1 is neither stranger nor an outsider and therefore, the application for impleadment has rightly been allowed. The appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. We have considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Admittedly the suit is limited to the extent of eviction of tenant from the suit premises. More so, in case the respondent-applicant is allowed to be impleaded a simple suit for eviction will be converted into a most complicated suit for title. The issue involved herein is no mere res integra. This has been considered by the Courts time and again. 6. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the issue as to who is a necessary party and held that a person who is directly affected or against whom relief is sought is a necessary party and in case the matter is decided without impleading him the judgment and order shall not be binding on him having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Such a judgment or order cannot be effective one. 7. While considering the application for impleadment under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC, the Court must keep in mind that plaintiff is the sole architect of his plaint and he has a right to choose his own adversary against whom he seeks relief. Mere apprehension of any party that the plaintiff and defendant of the suit may collusively get their suit decided remains unfounded as whatever may be the judgment and order in a suit it cannot be binding on him as he was not a party in the suit. Such judgment or order shall have no legal effect so far as the person who is not a party in the case is concerned. Impleadment may be necessary to avoid multiplicity of the suit, but it cannot be the sole ground. Facts and circumstances of the case must show that unless a person is impleaded in the suit there is likelihood of further litigation in the same matter on the same issues. The plaintiff being the master of the suit cannot be compelled to file the same against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. The plaintiff being the master of the suit cannot be compelled to file the same against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. It is only in exceptional circumstances where the Court finds that addition of new party is absolutely necessary to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely the matter in controversy between the parties it will added him as a party. (Vide Banarsi Dass Durga Prashad v. Panna Lal Ram¬ Richhpal Oswal & Ors., AIR 1969 P & H 57; Arjan Singh & Ors., v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1975 P & H 184; Harbans Singh & Ors. v. E.R. Srinivasan & Anr., AIR 1979 Del. 171 ; and Mohd. Farooq v. District Judge, Allahabad & Ors., AIR 1993 All. 8 ). 8. In Jaikaran Singh v. Sita Ram Agarwalla & Ors., AIR 1974 Pat. 364 , the Patna High Court examined a case where the landlord filed a suit for eviction of tenant, the tenant pleaded that the title of the property has subsequently vested with a third party. Therefore, the third party was a necessary party to the suit. The Court rejected the contention observing that the said person who claims title can file a separate suit for decla¬ration of his title, but he cannot be arrayed as a party in a eviction suit. 9. In M/s. Jayashree Chemicals Ltd. v. K. Venkataratnam & Ors., AIR 1975 Ori. 86 , the Court held that it is not permissible that by moving an application under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC the nature of the suit can be changed. Therefore, in case of a plain and simple eviction suit if another person files an applica¬tion claiming to have title over the suit property, it would amount to converting the simple suit for eviction into a suit for declaration of title. The said course would amount to substitute a new suit in place of old one. 10. In Chamiar Kunchelan v. Kandan Damodaran, AIR 1960 Ker. 284, the suit was filed for recovery of arrears of rent. Another person filed an application for impleadment on the ground that he was in possession of half of the suit property as owner. The question arose as to whether the applicant was the owner or trespasser. 10. In Chamiar Kunchelan v. Kandan Damodaran, AIR 1960 Ker. 284, the suit was filed for recovery of arrears of rent. Another person filed an application for impleadment on the ground that he was in possession of half of the suit property as owner. The question arose as to whether the applicant was the owner or trespasser. The Court held that the suit had been filed for arrears of rent and it cannot be converted into a complicated title suit by addition of parties and to adjudicate upon title of the parties. 11. In Pravat Kumar Misra v. Prafulla Chandra Misra & Anr., AIR 1977 Ori. 183 , a suit for eviction of tenant was filed and a person made an application claiming title over the suit property and thus applied for impleadment. This Court rejected the application on the ground that in the suit no relief has been claimed against the applicant nor his rights were to be deter¬mined therein and the judgment and order passed in the suit cannot adversely affect him as he was not the party in the suit. Therefore, he was not a necessary party. 12. In Firm of Mahadeva Rice and Oil Mills & Ors. v. Chennimalai Goundar, AIR 1968 Mad. 287 , the Court held that unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the applicant is one for whose presence the question in the suit cannot be com¬pletely and effectively adjudicated upon, the question of his addition does not arise. Merely because impleadment would avoid multiplicity of suits and it would be convenient for purpose of trial application cannot be allowed as there are not relevant considerations. The Court has to restrict the case only for determining the real controversy between the parties and when it is found that the third party is necessary only then he may be impleaded. 13. In Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co.(P) Ltd. v. District Committee, Dhanbad & Ors., AIR 1962 Pat. 357 , the Court held that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a party against his wishes and in spite of his protest to follow litigation against such a person against his choice. Merely because a person is indirectly interested in the suit property, he cannot become a necessary party. 357 , the Court held that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a party against his wishes and in spite of his protest to follow litigation against such a person against his choice. Merely because a person is indirectly interested in the suit property, he cannot become a necessary party. The Court must keep two principles in mind while consider¬ing such a question, i.e., (1) when the applicant ought to have joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not so joined, or (2) when without his presence the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. The plaintiff is a dominus litis of his case. He cannot be forced to add a party against his wishes or a person against whom he had not claim for relief. Therefore, the Court must invariably take into account the wishes of the plaintiff before adding a third person as a defendant to his suit claiming no relief against such third person. A person may be having inter¬est in the property, but the plaintiff does not claim any relief. So he cannot be permitted to add it and the Court must keep in mind the issue as to whether there is anything in the suit which cannot be determined on account of his absence in the party array or whether there will be prejudice by his not being added. Person seeking impleadment should have a direct interest in the suit property. A third party cannot be allowed to enforce himself on the plaintiff to get his title decided when no such question arises between the parties to the litigation. 14. However, there cannot be any absolute bar to implead a person against the plaintiff’s consent in a fit and proper case where the applicant is found to be a necessary party. (Vide Naba Kumar Hazra & Anr. v. Radhashyam Mahish & Ors., AIR 1931 PC 229; and Banarsi Dass Durga Prashad v. Panna Lal Ram Richhpal Oswal & Ors., AIR 1969 Punj. 57). 15. In J.J. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., v. Mr M.R. Murali & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 1061 , the Supreme Court held as under : “Both the sets of applications raise such controversies as are beyond the scope of these proceedings. This is a simple land-lord-tenant suit. The relationship of Municipal Corporation, with the respondents and their mutual rights and obligations are not germane to the present proceedings. This is a simple land-lord-tenant suit. The relationship of Municipal Corporation, with the respondents and their mutual rights and obligations are not germane to the present proceedings. Similarly, the question of title between Hemlata Mohan and the respondents cannot be decided in these proceedings. The impleadment of any of the applicants would change the complexion of litigation and raise such contro¬versies as are beyond the scope of this litigation. The presence of either of the applicants is neither necessary for the decision of the question involved in these proceedings nor their presence is necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in these proceedings. They are neither necessary nor proper parties. Any decision in these proceedings would govern and bind the parties herein. Each of the two applicants is free to establish its own claims and title whatever it may be in any independent proceedings before a compe¬tent forum...” (Emphasis added). 16. In Vijay Lata Sharma v. Rajpal & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 762 , the Supreme Court considered the case where the proceeding for release of the premises under the provisions of Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 were pending and a person filed an application for impleadment on the ground of acquiring title on the basis of a will left by the owner before his death. The Court held that as the release of building had nothing to do with ownership of the suit premises, such a person was neither necessary nor a proper party and application for release would be decided without his presence. More so, the issue of title cannot be decided by the Prescribed Authority in those proceedings. 17. In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2813 , during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of con¬tract for sale, a third party claimed independent title and possession over the contracted property, and filed an application for impleadment. The Apex Court held that such an application would enlarge the scope of the suit for specific performance of contract to the suit for title and possession. As the nature of the suit itself would change, the impleadment was not required. The Apex Court held that such an application would enlarge the scope of the suit for specific performance of contract to the suit for title and possession. As the nature of the suit itself would change, the impleadment was not required. To decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the third party to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be converted into a regular title suit. In case the nature and char¬acter of the suit is converted by impleadment, the application has to be rejected. The Court further held as under :- “... This addition, if allowed would lead to a complicated litigation by which trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of (applicants) in respect of the contracted property...... (Plaintiff) is dominus litus and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the lis between the appellant and respondent Nos.2 and 3 shall only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide whether the respondent Nos.1 and 4 to 11 have acquired any title and possession of the contracted property as that would not be ger¬mane for decision in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, that is to say in a suit for specific perform¬ance of the contract for sale the controversy to be decided raised by the appellant against respondent Nos.2 and 3 can only be adjudicated upon, and in such a list the Court cannot decide the question of title and possession of the respondent Nos.1 and 4 to 11 relating to the contracted property.” (Emphasis added). 18. 18. While deciding the said case, a heavy reliance has been placed by the Supreme Court upon its earlier judgment in Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha, AIR 1996 SC 2755 wherein it was held that the scope of the suit cannot be enlarged by addition of a party and suit for specific performance cannot be converted into a suit for title and possession. 19. In Sumtibai & Ors., v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partner¬ship Firm, AIR 2007 SC 3166 , the Apex Court held that if a party can show fair semblance of title and interest, he is entitled to make an application for impleadment. 20. Thus, an application for impleadment can be allowed in case the person is found to be a necessary party. His impleadment is found to be absolutely necessary to enable the Court to adju¬dicate the issues effectively and completely. Person sought to be impleaded must have direct interest in the suit property. Avoid¬ance of multiplicity of litigation cannot be a sole criterion for deciding the application. Generally a party cannot be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff, who is the master of his suit and he is not seeking any relief against such a party. 21. In view of the above, as the impleadment of the appli¬cant itself would change the nature of the suit and it will be converted from a suit for eviction to the suit of title, we are of the view that such a course is not permissible as the said relief cannot be claimed even by amending the plaint by a plain¬tiff. More so, in case the applicant is not impleaded he would not be bound by the decision passed by the Civil Court in the eviction suit and the case of the applicant would not be preju¬diced. 22. In view of the above, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 2.11.2004 and restore the judgment and order of the learned District Judge. Needless to say that any observation made herein would not cause any prejudice or create a right in favour of either of the parties. The applicant-respondent No.1 is at liber¬ty to agitate the issue for declaration of her title in an independ¬ent suit proceeding and the order to be passed in the eviction suit shall not be binding on her. No costs. The applicant-respondent No.1 is at liber¬ty to agitate the issue for declaration of her title in an independ¬ent suit proceeding and the order to be passed in the eviction suit shall not be binding on her. No costs. B.N. MAHAPATRA, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.