JUDGMENT REVA KHETRAPAL, J. 1. By this judgment it is proposed to resolve the divergence of opinion that has arisen on account of the views expressed by two learned judges of this Court in their respective judgments in Crl.M. (Main) No.2153/1996 O.P. Chirania and Anr. vs. The Director of Lotteris, Haryana and Ramrichhpal Gupta vs. M/s DCM Shri Ram Consolidated Limited reported in (1995) DLT 284. This Bench for the sake of brevity has limited the scope of its opinion to the question/issue referred to it. 2. The brief facts which have led to present reference are as follows. One Shri Gauri Shankar Mittal and the two petitioners, namely, Shri O.P. Chirania and Shri Binod Kumar Chirania, were the partners of M/s. Deep Mayank and Associates, the respondent No.3, having its branch offices in New Delhi and Patna and its Head Office at Calcutta. The firm was dealing in lottery business. In 1992, the State of Haryana was running seven weekly lotteries, namely, Jai Durga, Mahadev, Hari Om, Jai Vishnu, Shri Ganesh, Maha Laxmi and Mahabali. On June 29, 1992, the Govt. of Haryana, represented by the Director of Haryana State Lotteries, Chandigarh, entered into an agreement with M/s. Deep Mayank and Associates whereby the former constituted the latter as its main stockists of lottery tickets of the above said weekly lotteries w.e.f. July 1, 1993. As per one of the terms and conditions of the agreement, the firm was required to furnish a bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.3.71 crores and was also required to deposit a sum of Rs.3,78,000/- as payment on account of royalty, printing, publicity and administrative charges along with the amount of first prize in respect of 24 lakh lottery tickets of one draw per scheme. Before lifting the tickets the partnership firm issued fourteen cheques in favour of the Director of Haryana State Lotteries as per the following details:- S. No. Cheque No. Date Amount 1. 284134 18.08.1992 Rs.3,19,066/- 2. 284135 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 3. 284136 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-4. 284137 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. 284138 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-6. 284139 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 7. 284140 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-8. 284141 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 9. 284142 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 10. 284143 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 11. 284144 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-12. 284145 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 13. 284146 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-14. 284147 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- Total amount = Rs.52,34,106/- 3. 284134 18.08.1992 Rs.3,19,066/- 2. 284135 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 3. 284136 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-4. 284137 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. 284138 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-6. 284139 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 7. 284140 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-8. 284141 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 9. 284142 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 10. 284143 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 11. 284144 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-12. 284145 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 13. 284146 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-14. 284147 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- Total amount = Rs.52,34,106/- 3. These cheques were presented by the respondent to the Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi, in three lots on August 19, 1992, August 24, 1992 and August 25, 1992 for securing the credit of the amounts mentioned therein into the accounts of the Haryana Government. However, the cheques were returned by the concerned bank, i.e., Dena Bank, New Delhi, with the remarks “funds insufficient and not arranged for”. The five cheques presented on August 19, 1992 as per the following details were returned by separate memos of the bank dated August 20, 1992:- S. No. Cheque No. Date Amount 1. 284134 18.08.1992 Rs.3,19,066/- 2. 284135 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 3. 284136 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-4. 284137 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. 284138 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-4. By a notice dated August 25, 1992, the Sales Officer of the Haryana State Lotteries notified M/s. Deep Mayank and Associates of the factum of dishonour of the above said cheques. The firm was also required to deposit a sum of Rs.18,31,386/-with the Haryana State Lotteries. Besides, the firm was asked to ensure that the remaining cheques were honoured which had been deposited for clearance and collection on August 24, 1992 and August 25, 1992. Despite the above notice, the remaining cheques were also dishonoured and returned by the Dena Bank, New Delhi, with the remarks “funds insufficient and not arranged for” by its memos dated August 26, 1992 and August 29, 1992. Under memo dated August 26, 1992 , the following four cheques for a total value of Rs.15,12,320/- were returned:- S. No. Cheque No. Date Amount 1. 284139 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 2. 284140 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-3. 284141 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 4. 284142 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- Subsequently vide memo dated August 29, 1992, the following five cheques for an amount of Rs.18,90,400/- were also returned to the respondent. S. No. Cheque No. Date Amount 1. 284143 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-2. 284144 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 3. 284145 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 4. 284146 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. 284147 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. 284140 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-3. 284141 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 4. 284142 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- Subsequently vide memo dated August 29, 1992, the following five cheques for an amount of Rs.18,90,400/- were also returned to the respondent. S. No. Cheque No. Date Amount 1. 284143 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/-2. 284144 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 3. 284145 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 4. 284146 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. 284147 18.08.1992 Rs.3,78,080/- 5. On receipt of the aforesaid memos by the Dena Bank, the respondent by its notices dated August 28, 1992 and September 4, 1992 intimated the firm about the cheques being dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds and on account of funds not arranged for. By the said notices the firm was asked to discharge their liability on account of the dishonoured cheques. 6. In reply to the notice dated August 25, 1992, the firm by its letter dated August 26, 1992 sought the cooperation of the respondent and requested that the cheques be presented again after four or five days. In reply to the other notice of the respondent dated August 28, 1992, the firm by its letter dated August 31, 1992 regretted the inconvenience and attributed the same to the financial difficulties being faced by it. The firm, however, admitted its liability to the extent of Rs.55,25,000/- towards the State of Haryana and undertook to make an initial payment of a sum of Rs.3,78,080/- and the remaining amount by way of daily instalments of Rs.50,000/- each. 7. On September 7, 1992 again a consolidated notice was sent by the respondent to the firm inviting its attention towards the dishonoured cheques and also requiring it to deposit an amount of Rs.52,34,106/-. It is material to mention that the firm deposited a sum of Rs.2 lakh each on August 29, 1992 and August 31, 1992 and from September 2, 1992 to September 13, 1992 paid a sum of Rs.50,000/- each day aggregating to Rs.10 lakh. After September 13, 1992, however, no payment whatsoever was made by the firm to the respondent. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.42,34,106/- remains due and outstanding in respect of the cheques which were dishonoured. 8. After September 13, 1992, however, no payment whatsoever was made by the firm to the respondent. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.42,34,106/- remains due and outstanding in respect of the cheques which were dishonoured. 8. Since the payment schedule was not adhered to by the firm in spite of its undertaking, the respondent gave another notice dated September 22, 1992 notifying the firm that the Government of Haryana had decided to take action under Clause 11 of the agreement as a consequence of which the tickets of all the weekly lottery schemes were to be sold at the risk and cost of the firm. The firm was also required to pay all the outstanding amounts and also such other amounts falling due in due course. 9. The aforesaid notice also did not have the desired effect and on November 4, 1992 the respondent sent a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 through registered post to the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, which appears to have been received in the Court on November 20, 1992. On May 6, 1995, the respondent filed an application before the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking extension of the period prescribed for filing the complaint under Section 142 of the Act. In the application it was, inter alia, submitted that September 22, 1992, when the final notice was given to the petitioner by the respondent, should be considered as the date on which the cause of action accrued to the respondent and if that is done then there is no delay in filing the complaint. It was also submitted that in case the consolidated notice dated September 7, 1992 is considered as the statutory notice and September 7, 1992 is regarded as the starting point for the purposes of limitation, the delay in filing the complaint would be ten days only from the date of dispatch of the complaint which ought to be condoned. 10. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated January 31, 1996 condoned the delay in filing the aforesaid complaint and directed the issuance of process against the firm as well as the partners thereof by passing the following order: “In the court of Shri V.K. Maheshwari Metropolitan Magistrate Patiala House Director of Lotteries Vs O.P. Chirania and Ors. Order: Present complaint is filed by Director of Lottery through Secy. Order: Present complaint is filed by Director of Lottery through Secy. To Govt. of Haryana Finance Deptt. V.S. Kundu, IAS Chandigarh on the allegations that respdt no.1 is a partnership firm and respdt no.2, 3 and 4 are its main partners. It is alleged that respdt no.1 was appointed main stockist to sale lottery of complainant. 2. It is further alleged that respdt no.1 through its partners issued 14 cheques to the complainant towards the payment of the price of lottery ticket total amounting Rs. About 52,34,106/-. 3. It is further alleged in the complaint that all these cheques were presented to the concerned bank for encashment on 19/8/92, 24/8/92, 26/8/92 but all the cheques were returned inpaid on 20/8/92, 26/8/92 and 29/8/92 with the remarks “Not arranged for and insufficient funds”. Photostat copy of which are placed on judicial file. 4. Legal notice has been issued to the respdt on 25/8/92, 28/8/92 and 4/9/92 respectively. According to the complainant respdt gave the reply to the notices on 26/8/92, 31/8/92 but no reply of the notice dt 4/9/92 was received. It is alleged in the complaint that respdt requested for grant of time for making the payment which was granted by the complainant to the respdt. It is further alleged that respdt has made payment of about Rs.10 lacs. 5. It is also stated that respdt has paid Rs.10 (ten) lacs as instalment towards the payment of the disputed amount. It is alleged that respdt has paid this amount upto 13/9/92. 6. Another notice was issued on 22/9/92 to the complainant for making the payment but inspite of that respdt has not paid any amount hence the present complaint is instituted on 4/11/92. 7. An application is also moved for condonation of delay. 8. It is argued on behalf of complainant that complainant is a public servant as such benefit of provision of section 200(a) be granted to him. Prima facie complainant is a Govt. servant and he has filed this complaint in discharge of his official duty hence I allowed this request. 9. Ld. Counsel for complainant placed reliance on 59(1995) DLT 284 Ram Richhpal Gupta Vs. DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. with regard to condonation of the delay. Prima facie complainant is a Govt. servant and he has filed this complaint in discharge of his official duty hence I allowed this request. 9. Ld. Counsel for complainant placed reliance on 59(1995) DLT 284 Ram Richhpal Gupta Vs. DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. with regard to condonation of the delay. In a case U/s 138 of NI Act, our Honble High Court in this case observed as follows:- “In any event of the matter to argue that the provision of CrPC will not be applicable for condonation of delay is too far fetched. The trial under the Act takes place under the provision of CrPC. The argument raised by the ld. counsel for the petitioner that section 142 of the Act bars the application of CrPC is untenable in law. What has been specifically provided under section 142 of the Act in relation to Sub sections (a, b and c) deal with the provisions which have been specifically provided under the Act and anything contrary to such provisions under Cr.PC is excluded but that does not mean that the applicability of Cr.PC is excluded by virtue of provisions of Section 142 of the Act.” 10. After considering the various arguments and provisions of Cr.PC and N.I. Act referred before me coupled with the above cited authority I consider it proper in the interest of justice to condone the delay because heavy public funds are involved in this case. In my view cause of delay has also been sufficiently explained in the application moved for condonation which is supported by an affidavit. 11. After considering the allegations made in the complaint and the photostat copies of the documents which are from various banks at this stage I consider that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against all the four accods U/s 138 of NI Act. Process be issued against all the accd on filing of PF Copies etc. Summon be taken dasti if so desired.” 11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the criminal compliant filed by the respondent. Process be issued against all the accd on filing of PF Copies etc. Summon be taken dasti if so desired.” 11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the criminal compliant filed by the respondent. A learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 12.03.1998 directed the petitioner herein to file an affidavit specifying the date on which the demand notice dated 07.09.1992 was served on the petitioners and also directed the respondent to file a certificate from the postal authorities as to when the registered cover containing the demand notice was served on the petitioners. 12. The petitioners in compliance with the above order filed an affidavit dated 16th September, 1999 to the effect that the notice dated 07.09.1992 was served on 11.09.1992 and that the complaint was hopelessly time barred. It was also stated therein that the consolidated demand notice dated 07.09.1992 cannot be considered as a notice since the respondent had issued three notices dated 25.08.1992, 28.08.1992 and 04.09.1992. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said affidavit read as under:- “3. At the outset I am instructed to state that the consolidated demand notice dated 7.9.1992 does not fulfill the requirement of Clause (b) of the proviso of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and cannot be reckoned for determining the date on which the cause of action accorded to the respondent for filing the complaint. It is submitted that the even according to the submissions made by the respondent to the effect that the notice under the Act was issued on 25.8.1992, 28.8.1992 and 4th September, 1992. The Act contemplates only issuance of one notice in the event of dishonour of cheques. It is further submitted that the consolidated notice dated 7.9.1992 cannot be deemed to be a notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for considering the period of limitation within which the complaint could be filed before appropriate court. 4. Assuming without admitting that demand notice dated 7.9.1992 can be considered to be notice under Section 138 of the Act. I state that the said notice was received by me on 11.9.1992 and if the period of within one month of the expiry of 15 days from the receipt of the demand notice, then the complaint ought to have been filed before 25.10.1992. I state that the said notice was received by me on 11.9.1992 and if the period of within one month of the expiry of 15 days from the receipt of the demand notice, then the complaint ought to have been filed before 25.10.1992. In the instant case though the complaint was sent by respondent by post on 4.11.1992, the relevant date for the period of computing limitation period can be only 25.11.1992 when the Learned Magistrate issued notice to the complainant/respondent. In any event of the matter the complaint is hopelessly time barred and the Act being special statute and also in view of the non obstante Clause in Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and limitation imposed by the Act, the delay in filing the complaint cannot be condoned.” 13. The respondent in response to the aforesaid affidavit could not file any proof of service of notice dated 07.09.1992 in view of the fact that the Post and Telegraph Department was unable to furnish the information since the same was not available with it. The related record, which was to be preserved for two years, had been weeded out. 14. A impass” having been reached, on 30.10.2007 a learned Single Judge of this Court after hearing the parties passed the following order:- “Present: Mr.G.Umapathy wit Mr.Aleo G. Rozario for the petitioner Mr.Arvind Nayar for the respondent Crl.M.C.No.2153/1996 and Crl.M.No.3529/1999 1. With consent of parties matter is directed to be placed before Honble the Chief Justice on the administrative side for constitution of a larger Bench in view of the order dated 12.3.1998 passed by Honble Mr.Justice Anil Dev Singh. 2. I note that vide said order, His Lordship had indicated prima facie reasons as to why His Lordship disagreed with the view expressed by Honble Mr. Justice Vijender Jain in the decision reported as Ram Richhpal Gupta Vs. DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. 59 (1995) DLT 284. 3 The issue involved was whether in view of Section 142 of the N.I.Act, 1881 as it existed prior to the amendment incorporated in the year 2003, could the Metropolitan Magistrate invoke Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to condone delay in filing complaint under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act. 4. 3 The issue involved was whether in view of Section 142 of the N.I.Act, 1881 as it existed prior to the amendment incorporated in the year 2003, could the Metropolitan Magistrate invoke Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to condone delay in filing complaint under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act. 4. I note that the matter has remained pending in this court for nearly 9 years after order dated 12.3.1998 was passed on account of the fact that a question of fact also arose for consideration, namely, what was the date when notice of demand dated 7.9.1992 was served upon the petitioners. 5. Effect of said fact was that it was impacting limitation. 6. Unfortunately, the hope expressed in the order that notwithstanding said question of fact required evidence to be led, on remand matter would be delayed and it would be advisable to require the parties to file affidavits in this court for resolution of the dispute on fact has remained but a dream for the reason resolution of the dispute on fact requires participation from the Post and Telegraph Department, the agency through which notice of demand was communicated by the complainant to the accused persons. 7. Requisite information is not forthcoming on record from the P and T Department as per information made available by learned counsel for the complainant. 8. In my opinion, if on law it is held that learned Metropolitan Magistrate would have the power to condone the delay in filing the complaint, question of fact need not be decided.” 15. This is how the matter has come to be placed before us. We have pondered over the submissions made at the Bar and gone through the precedents. Apparently, it is not possible to resolve the matter from the factual angle as the determination of the date as to when the notice of demand was served on the petitioners has not been feasible on account of the weeding out of the old records the postal authorities. The petitioners assert on affidavit the service of demand notice dated 07.09.1992 upon them on 11.09.1992. The respondent is unable to furnish proof of rebuttal. The petitioners assert on affidavit the service of demand notice dated 07.09.1992 upon them on 11.09.1992. The respondent is unable to furnish proof of rebuttal. The whole matter now hinges upon the legal question: Can Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 5 of the Limitation Act be invoked to condone the delay on the part of the respondents in filing the complaint” 16. First a look at the legal provisions. Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was inserted by the Banking Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (66 of 1988) w.e.f. 01.04.1989. This chapter deals with penalties in case of dishonour of cheques for insufficient funds in the accounts of the bank. Section 138 of the Act provides that the cheque should be one, which is issued in the discharge of the whole or part of a debt or other liability while Section 142 deals with the cognizance of offences under Section 138 of theAct. The said sections read as follows: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.” Whereany cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless” (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.” For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 142. Cognizance of offences.” Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)” (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause-of-action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138; (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.” 17. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid sections yields the following result. The mere dishonour of a cheque is not an offence. An offence is committed and cause of action under Section 138 read with Section 142 arises when in spite of the demand notice by the payee issued within fifteen days of the receipt of the intimation to him from the bank regarding dishonour of such cheque, on account of the reason of insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer, payment is not made by the drawer to the payee within the period stipulated in Section 138(c), that is, within a period of fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice by the drawer. From the expiry of these fifteen days the complaint is to be made within one month. From the expiry of these fifteen days the complaint is to be made within one month. In other words, Section 138 of the Act provides an opportunity to the drawer of a dishonoured cheque to pay within fifteen days of the receipt of a written notice sent by or on behalf of the drawee/payee informing him that the cheque has been dishonoured. If payment is still not made by the drawer to the payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice, he commits an offence giving rise to a cause of action to the payee to file a complaint before the court of a Metropolitan Magistrate within thirty days thereafter. It may be emphasised, even at the cost of repetition, that the period of one month laid down in clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act for filing the complaint is required to be calculated with reference to the cause of action which arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. Chapter XVII of the Code thus prescribes a special procedure for the institution of complaints under the said Chapter and is in that sense a complete Code in itself. 18. A view has been expressed by the learned Single Judge (Honble Mr. Justice Anil Dev Singh as His Lordship then was) in this case that the words “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure” give overriding effect to the provisions of Section 142(b) of the Act, and such period cannot be extended under Section 473 of the Code as Section 142 of the Act prevails over Section 473 of the Code, which permits the Court to take cognizance of an offence even after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on facts and in the circumstances of the case that delay has been duly explained or that is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. The learned Single Judge in expressing the aforesaid view referred to and relied upon the view taken by the Kerala High Court in Kunhi Mohammed vs. M.K. Khadiya and Another, 1996 (2) Vol.29 All India Banking Law Judgments 44 and the view expressed by the Orissa High Court in Janardhan Mohapatra vs. Saroj Kumar Choudhury, 1993 Crl. L.J. 1751. The learned Single Judge in expressing the aforesaid view referred to and relied upon the view taken by the Kerala High Court in Kunhi Mohammed vs. M.K. Khadiya and Another, 1996 (2) Vol.29 All India Banking Law Judgments 44 and the view expressed by the Orissa High Court in Janardhan Mohapatra vs. Saroj Kumar Choudhury, 1993 Crl. L.J. 1751. However, as noticed above, he deemed it expedient to refer the matter to a larger Bench in view of the contrary view expressed by another learned Single Judge (Honble Mr. Justice Vijender Jain, as His Lordship then was) in Ram Richhpal (supra). 19. As regards the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the view expressed by the learned Single Judge [relying upon the view expressed in Kunhi Mohammed (supra) and differing from the view taken in this regard in Janardhan Mohapatra] was that a complaint by no stretch of imagination can be included within the meaning of the words “appeal” and “application” in Section 5. Thus, the period fixed for filing a complaint under Section 142 of the Act can neither be extended under Section 473 Cr.P.C. nor delay can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 20. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. The Honble Supreme Court in a series of decisions, viz., Sadanandan Bhadran vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 514 ; SIL Import, USA vs. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore, (1999) 4 SCC 567 ; Prem Chand Vijay Kumar vs. Yashpal Singh and Another, (2005) 4 SCC 417 and Krishna Exports and Others vs. Raju Das, (2006) 1 SCC (Crl.) 350 has unequivocally laid down that the interdict of Section 142(b) is absolute and admits of no exceptions. It cannot be rendered otiose by interpreting it any other manner. 21. In Sadanandan Bhadran (supra), the Supreme Court held that the legislative intent was clear that the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint could not be rendered nugatory once the payee had chosen to take pre-emptory action by issuance of notice to the drawer. The law in that case was stated as follows:- (SCC p.518-519, para 6”8) “6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action” means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. The law in that case was stated as follows:- (SCC p.518-519, para 6”8) “6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action” means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act: (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. If were were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term “cause of action”, certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises “ and can arise “ only once. 7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action, there are other formidable impediments which negate the concept of successive causes of action. 7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action, there are other formidable impediments which negate the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque, there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour, the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage, it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again. 8. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept of successive causes of action is that it will make the period of limitation under clause (c) of Section 142 otiose, for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the drawer, can circumvent the above limitative clause by filing a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of statutes, the court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part should have effect, the above conclusion cannot be drawn for that will make the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory.” 22. In SIL IMPORT, USA (supra), the Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Sadanandan Bhadrans case held as under:- (SCC p.574, para 24) “24. The upshot of the discussion is, on the date when the notice sent by fax reached the drawer of the cheque the period of 15 days (within which he has to make the payment) has started running and on the expiry of that period the offence is completed unless the amount has been paid in the meanwhile. The upshot of the discussion is, on the date when the notice sent by fax reached the drawer of the cheque the period of 15 days (within which he has to make the payment) has started running and on the expiry of that period the offence is completed unless the amount has been paid in the meanwhile. If no complaint was filed within one month therefrom the payee would stand forbidden from launching a prosectuion thereafter, due to the clear interdict contained in Section 142 of the Act.” 23. Approving of the law laid down in Sadanandan Bhadran and SIL IMPORT, USA (supra), the Supreme Court in Prem Chand Vijay Kumars case highlighted that the date of the receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque was the starting point of limitation and that once the period of limitation began to run, it could not be stopped for any reason:- (SCC p.423, para-12) “12. As noted in Sadanandan Bhadran case once a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act is “received” by the drawer of the cheque, the payee or holder of the cheque forfeits his right to again present the cheque as cause of action has accrued when there was failure to pay the amount within the prescribed period and the period of limitation starts to run which cannot be stopped on any account.” 24. A look now at Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as under:- “473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.” Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.” 25. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the aforesaid Section is couched in a language that gives it the characteristic of a non-obstante clause. Thus, the said Section acts an empowering provision that empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence even after the period of limitation. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the aforesaid Section is couched in a language that gives it the characteristic of a non-obstante clause. Thus, the said Section acts an empowering provision that empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence even after the period of limitation. However, Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 imposes a specific bar with respect to the power of the Courts to take cognizance of any offence under the said Act unless the complaint is made within the period specified in Clause (b) of the said Section. This bar is to operate notwithstanding anything that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) may contain. The Negotiable Instruments Act was enacted in the year 1881 (26 of 1881), but Section 142 was introduced by an amendment by Act 66 of 1988 (w.e.f. 01.04.1989). Thus, the clear intention of the legislature was to exclude the power granted to the Courts through Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. from operation in cases related to Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Even otherwise, it is an established principle of law that the provisions of a special law or enactment would have overriding effect over the provisions of a general law. The exclusion of the operation of the Code of Criminal Procedure is specifically postulated by the opening words of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. To negate those words would, in our considered opinion, render otiose the period of limitation specifically provided in the said Section. 26. Aseven Bench judgment of Honble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, 1981 Supp. SCC 87, in the context of interpretation of the words of a statute adumbrated as follows:- (Suppl. SCC, p.377, para 199) “But there is one principle on which there is complete unanimity of all the courts in the world and this is that where the words or the language used in a statute are clear and cloudless, plain, simple and explicit unclouded and unobscured, intelligible and pointed so as to admit of no ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty or equivocation, there is absolutely no room for deriving support from external aids. In such cases, the statute should be interpreted on the face of the language itself without adding, subtracting or omitting words therefrom.” 27. In such cases, the statute should be interpreted on the face of the language itself without adding, subtracting or omitting words therefrom.” 27. Thus interpreted, in our considered opinion, neither Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor Section 5 of the Limitation Act can come to the rescue of the respondents. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act brooks no delay. If the respondent has chosen slumber over his rights, bestowed upon it by this special legislation, it must have recourse to the general law of the land for recovering any outstandings due to it from the petitioners. The position post 2002 might be different in view of the amendment, but the legislative intent in interpreting Section 142 of the Act anterior to the amendment cannot be gleaned therefrom. 28. A recent decision of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Anil Kumar Goel vs. Kishan Chand Kaura 2008 Crl.L.J 1386 fortifies the aforesaid view taken by us. But first a look at Section 142 in its reincarnated form after the insertion of the proviso by Act 55 of 2002. Section 142 now reads as follows: “142. Cognizance of offence.” Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) - (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause-of-action arises under clause (c ) of the proviso to section 138: [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.] (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.” 29. It is apposite at this juncture to refer to Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act of 2002, which, inter alia, provides as under:-“OBJECTS AND REASONS OF AMENDING ACT OF 2002 Keeping in view the recommendations of the Standing committee on Finance and other representations, it has been decided to bring out, inter alia, the following amendments in the Negotiable Instruments, Act, 1881, namely:- (iii) to provide discretion to the Court to waive the period of one month, which has been prescribed for taking cognizance of the case under the Act; (Para 4)” 30. The Honble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Goels case (supra), while considering the effect of the 2002 amendment ruled against its retrospectivity in the following manner: “6. Before the amendment, the proviso, as quoted above, was not there. Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. This apart, in the course of business transactions it is not uncommon for a cheque being returned due to insufficient funds or similar such reasons and being presented again by the payee after sometime, on his own volition or at the request of the drawer, in expectation that it would be encashed. The primary interest of the payee is to get his money and not prosecution of the drawer, recourse to which, normally, is taken out of compulsion and not choice. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right and not a cause of action “ accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. 7. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in short the General Clauses Act) also throws considerable light on the controversy. Section 5 reads as follows: “5. 7. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in short the General Clauses Act) also throws considerable light on the controversy. Section 5 reads as follows: “5. Coming into operation of enactments - (1) Where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent,- (a) In the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of the Constitution of the Governor “ General and (b) In the case of an Act of Parliament of the President. (c ) Unless the contrary is expressed a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement.” 8. All laws that affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous, effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court has to decide whether, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, retrospective effect should be given to it or not. (See: M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh etc. etc. v. Central Government and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 87 ). 9. There is nothing in the amendment made to Section 142(b) by the Act 55 of 2002 that the same was intended to operate retrospectively. In fact that was not even the stand of the respondent. Obviously, when the complaint was filed on 28.11.1998, the respondent could not have foreseen that in future any amendment providing for extending the period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown would be enacted. 10. That being so the High Courts view is clearly unacceptable. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The proceeding pursuant to respondents complaint i.e. Complaint No.120 of 1998 in the Court of JMIC, Chandigarh, is quashed.” 31. 10. That being so the High Courts view is clearly unacceptable. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The proceeding pursuant to respondents complaint i.e. Complaint No.120 of 1998 in the Court of JMIC, Chandigarh, is quashed.” 31. In view of the above position of law and keeping in view the provisions of Section 142 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment, we have not the least bit of hesitation in concurring with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 12th March, 1998 in the instant case and in holding that the view expressed in Ramrichhpal Gupta to the contrary is clearly unsustainable. 32. The reference is answered accordingly. The matter be now posted before the appropriate Criminal Bench subject to the orders of Honble the Chief Justice for hearing arguments on the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.