29. In view of the above we are of the considered opinion that since there is no bar under the substantial provision of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, the Rules framed thereunder cannot create a bar for a voter to file complaint before Speaker/Chairman of the House seeking disqualification. Hence, the Disqualification Complaint Nos.3/2010 to 7/2010 filed by the five voters of five constituencies from which respective petitioners herein were elected, are maintainable. 30. Having held as above, we deem it proper to consider the submissions made on behalf of the three voters i.e., respondents 3, 5 and 7 who have retracted the complaints. Respondents 3, 5 and 7 in Writ Petition Nos.33998-34002/2010 have filed affidavits before this Court mentioning therein that they were fraudulently taken to the office of the Speaker and were made to sign certain documents, which they came to know later that such signed papers were misused for preparing the applications seeking disqualification of the MLAs of the respective constituencies. In other words, according to the aforementioned respondents, they have not consciously, voluntarily and knowingly signed and filed the complaints seeking disqualification. On the basis of such averments, it was argued by Sri S.S. Naganand that the proceedings arising out of such applications vitiate, inasmuch as, the Speaker has not acted fairly, but has acted with mala fide intention. The aforementioned contentions cannot be accepted. The respondents 3, 5 and 7 do not dispute that they have signed and filed the applications before the Speaker. However, according to these respondents, the contents made in such applications are not correct and not voluntarily made. As held by the Apex Court in Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh’s Case (cited supra), paragraph-6 of the Tenth Schedule does not contemplate moving of a formal petition by any person for assumption of jurisdiction of the Speaker of the House. The purpose of Rule-6 is only this much that the necessary facts on account of which a member of the House becomes disqualified for being a member of the House under Paragraph-2, may be brought to the notice of the Chairman. There is no lis between the person moving the petition and the member of the House who is alleged to have incurred disqualification. It is not an adversarial kind of litigation where he may be required to lead the evidence. There is no lis between the person moving the petition and the member of the House who is alleged to have incurred disqualification. It is not an adversarial kind of litigation where he may be required to lead the evidence. Even if the complainant withdraws the petition, it will make no difference as a duty is cast upon the Speaker to carry out the mandate of the constitutional provision viz., Tenth Schedule. Even otherwise, we are not satisfied with the explanation offered by respondents 3, 5 and 7 in their affidavits that they were taken to the office of the Speaker through mis-representation and were made to sign certain papers. Though they stated that certain other persons have taken them, the said statements have not been supported. Further, there is inherent contradiction in the statements, wherein at one breath, it is stated that they were taken to the House of Law Minister and the papers were prepared and in the other, they state that it was changed on the instruction of the Speaker which sounds highly improbable. If there was such intention, they could have got persons who are loyal to the party since all that was required was to secure a person from that area. The respondents 3, 5 and 7 should have been more careful and cautious in making such serious allegations against the Constitutional authority like the Speaker. Such grievance was not made by respondents 3, 5 and 7 earlier. The Speaker has filed an affidavit denying the allegations made against him. Even otherwise, the contents of the affidavits of Respondents 3, 5 and 7 are not supported by any other independent material, except the self serving statements. In view of the same, the contentions made on behalf of respondents 3, 5 and 7 are rejected. 31. POINT NO.2 – REGARDING RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE: As aforementioned, Rules are framed by the Speaker in exercise of jurisdiction vested in him under paragraph-8 of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. Paragraph-6(2) of the Tenth Schedule clarifies that all proceedings relating to disqualification on the ground of defection under paragraph-6(1) of Tenth Schedule shall be deemed to be the proceedings of the Legislature of the State, within the meaning of Article 212 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph-6(2) of the Tenth Schedule clarifies that all proceedings relating to disqualification on the ground of defection under paragraph-6(1) of Tenth Schedule shall be deemed to be the proceedings of the Legislature of the State, within the meaning of Article 212 of the Constitution of India. Article 212 mandates that the validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of the procedure. As aforementioned, the Apex Court in Kihota Hollohon’s Case (cited supra), has ruled that the order relating to disqualification can be questioned under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution under four circumstances one among them being non-compliance with Rules of Natural Justice. Rule 7 of the Rules deals with the procedure to be followed by the Speaker. Sub rule(3) of Rule 7 reveals that the Speaker shall cause copies of the petition and the annexures thereto, to be forwarded to the Member in relation to whom the complaint of defection has been made and such Member shall within seven days on receipt of copies or within such further period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause allow, forward his comments in writing thereon to the Speaker. Sub rule(3) further provides that after considering the comments, if any, in relation to the complaint received as above, the Speaker may either proceed to determine the question or refer the petition to the Committee for making preliminary enquiry if he is satisfied that it is necessary to do so. In the matter on hand, the Speaker has decided the petition himself. 32. During the course of arguments, the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners strongly expressed that the copies of the petitions and the documents annexed thereto were not served on the petitioners and consequently, the petitioners were unable to file their detailed statement of objections. While so submitting, they prayed for summoning the records from the Office of the Speaker. After hearing at length, in order to ward off any doubt, this Court passed the order directing the Speaker to furnish the records maintained by him relating to Disqualification Complaint Nos.2/2010 to 7/2010. While calling for the records, we were conscious of the legal position that the Speaker in such matters exercises jurisdiction as a Tribunal and the functions assigned to the Speaker in such matters are judicial functions. While calling for the records, we were conscious of the legal position that the Speaker in such matters exercises jurisdiction as a Tribunal and the functions assigned to the Speaker in such matters are judicial functions. Since we are exercising certiorari jurisdiction, and as we wanted to satisfy ourselves as to whether the Rules of natural justice is followed or not, particularly having regard to the rival contentions on the said issue, we have secured the records as it is open to do so in the facts and circumstances of each case. Accordingly, the records maintained by the Speaker were produced by the Advocate appearing for the Speaker in the sealed covers on 1.2.2011. Though a memo dated 1.2.2011 was filed on behalf of the Speaker depicting the production of record and mentioning that the review being limited, only in certain circumstances the record can be perused, we are of the opinion that appropriate conclusion can be arrived only on perusal of the records. We have therefore perused the original records maintained by the Speaker. 33. Speaker files are maintained by the Speaker in relation to each of the Disqualification Complaint Nos.2/2010 to 7/2010. 34. Disqualification Complaint No.2/2010 is filed by two members of Bharathiya Janata Party viz., Chief Whip and General Secretary of the said party. Same is dated 6.10.2010. The records maintained by the Speaker reveal that the said disqualification complaint was presented in the Office of the Speaker on 7.10.2010. The Speaker has ordered to issue notice on 8.10.2010, fixing the date of hearing on 10.10.2010. However, Sri K.J. Jagadish, learned advocate appeared voluntarily on behalf of the petitioners herein before the Speaker and filed vakalatnama on their behalf on 9.10.2010 and sought for time. The Speaker granted time with a direction to call the matter at 3.30 p.m. on 10.10.2010. On the very day, i.e., on 9.10.2010, the Speaker has mentioned in the proceedings sheet that notice be issued to the complainants and the copy of the disqualification complaints be served on the petitioners herein (respondents before the Speaker); as also the copy of the reply filed by the respondents therein, was ordered to be served on the complainants. On the very day, i.e., on 9.10.2010, the Speaker has mentioned in the proceedings sheet that notice be issued to the complainants and the copy of the disqualification complaints be served on the petitioners herein (respondents before the Speaker); as also the copy of the reply filed by the respondents therein, was ordered to be served on the complainants. On 10.10.2010 a vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the complainants and by consent of the petitioners as well as respondents, Complaint Nos.2/2010 to 7/2010 were clubbed together with a view to consider the common contentions and to pass a common order. The proceedings sheet does not depict that the learned advocate for the petitioners herein either sought for further time or has made any grievance regarding insufficient time but has proceeded with the matter. On that day, the arguments advanced on behalf of rival parties were heard and the matter was posted for orders. On the very day, i.e., on 10.10.2010 the impugned order came to be passed disqualifying the petitioners herein. On perusal of the records, we find that the Disqualification Complaint No.2/2010 is annexed with the copies of proceedings of BJP Legislature party meetings dated 23.6.2008, 27.7.2008, 16.10.2008, 25.11.2008, 16.1.2009, 25.2.2009, 25.3.2009, 21.5.2009, 4.1.2010, 16.6.2010, 4.7.2010. They show that the petitioners have attended Legislature Party meetings of BJP and have affixed their signatures on one or the other day. The Photostat copies of the newspaper reported dated 15.8.2010 and the copies of the whips issued by the Chief Whip which were served on the petitioners herein as well as copy of the list of the seating arrangement relating to 13th Assembly as allotted to the BJP Members are also annexed. The seats assigned to the petitioners by indicating their names are interspersed with seats assigned to the other BJP members. The file maintained by the Speaker contains the vakalatnama signed by each of the petitioners entrusting the brief to Sri K.J. Jagadish, Advocate, for appearing before the Speaker. The file also contains the written reply filed on behalf of the petitioners by Sri K.J. Jagadish, Advocate, dated 9.10.2010. The file maintained by the Speaker contains the vakalatnama signed by each of the petitioners entrusting the brief to Sri K.J. Jagadish, Advocate, for appearing before the Speaker. The file also contains the written reply filed on behalf of the petitioners by Sri K.J. Jagadish, Advocate, dated 9.10.2010. In the said reply, it is mentioned that none of the requirements as contemplated under Rule 7 of the Rules is complied with and that the copy of the disqualification complaint along with annexures be served on him and that seven days’ time may be given to him for filing statement of objections. 35. The files relating to Disqualification Complaint Nos.3 to 7/2010 are also perused. The proceedings sheet maintained by the Speaker in those complaints reveal that the said Complaints were presented by the voters of five constituencies on 9.10.2010 in person. The Speaker has ordered to issue notice to the respondents forthwith and the matter was ordered to be posted on 10.10.2010. In the proceedings sheet thereafter, it is noted that notice came to be served on the respondents therein i.e., the petitioners herein, on 9.10.2010. It is also evident that Sri K.J. Jagadish, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents before the Speaker (petitioners herein) has received the show cause notices dated 9.10.2010, copies of the complaints and documents by making the following endorsement: “Without prejudice received complaint, show cause notice and documents, subject to objection. 9/10/2010 at 9.20 p.m. Sd/- K.J. Jagadish Adv. for Respondents.” From the above, it is clear that the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners herein was served with all the applications and the documents annexed thereto on 9th October 2010. Hence, it cannot be said that neither the notices nor the Disqualification Complaints along with the documents were not served on the petitioners as contended by them. The said learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents therein, (i.e., the petitioners herein) has filed detailed statement of objections running to about 12 pages. Five separate copies of the statement of objections are found in the five separate files relating to Disqualification Complaint Nos.3/2010 to 7/2010. The proceedings sheet dated 9.10.2010 maintained in Complaint No.2/2010, as aforementioned reveals that all the applications were clubbed and were heard together and a common order was passed. Five separate copies of the statement of objections are found in the five separate files relating to Disqualification Complaint Nos.3/2010 to 7/2010. The proceedings sheet dated 9.10.2010 maintained in Complaint No.2/2010, as aforementioned reveals that all the applications were clubbed and were heard together and a common order was passed. Hence, it is clear that the statement of objections and the arguments were common to all the complaints. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners herein were not afforded an opportunity to file their detailed statement of objections merely because the endorsement was made by the learned advocate on 9.10.2010 as noticed above. However, it is mentioned at the end of the statement of objections so filed that the same is an interim reply and is submitted without prejudice and by way of abundant caution. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the Speaker ought to have given opportunity to file detailed objections, inasmuch as, they were entitled to minimum of seven days’ notice to contest the matter. Such a submission is opposed by learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents herein by contending inter alia that the statement of objections filed on 9.10.2010 by the petitioners is a detailed one and the same answers each and every allegation made in the Disqualification Complaints. The relevant provisions of the Constitution as well as the Rules are adverted to in the statement of objections. Thus, according to the respondents herein, the statement of objections are, in fact, comprehensive and therefore, there was no justification on the part of the respondents therein to ask for further time. 36. The documents produced by the complainants along with the Disqualification Complaint No.2/2010, as aforementioned, are copies of the legislature party meetings of BJP, copies of the whips, copy of the seating arrangement made for the Assembly members of BJP and the news paper reports. Veracity of none of these documents nor the signatures appearing therein are denied by the petitioners herein with specific averment to that effect in the writ petitions. If really the petitioners had anything more to submit in relation to the documents produced by the complainants along with the Disqualification Complaints, they would have definitely stated so before the Speaker at the time of hearing or at least in the memorandum of writ petitions. If really the petitioners had anything more to submit in relation to the documents produced by the complainants along with the Disqualification Complaints, they would have definitely stated so before the Speaker at the time of hearing or at least in the memorandum of writ petitions. The correctness of the facts found in the said documents are also not disputed in the writ petitions except attempting to explain the circumstances under which the said documents have come into being. If it is so, no useful purpose would have been served in granting further time for filing the statement of objections by the Speaker. Even assuming that the Speaker had granted additional time for filing the statement of objections to the sow cause notices, nothing more could have been said by the petitioners and as such, no prejudice has been established. The petitioners have also not averred in the writ petitions that they wanted to produce any particular record in their favour which could have dispelled the inference drawn by the Speaker. They have merely stated in the writ petitions that sufficient opportunity was not granted to them and therefore, there is violation of principles of natural justice. However, it was argued on behalf of the petitioners that, had the Speaker afforded sufficient opportunity, the respondents before the Speaker would have produced certain newspaper reports wherein the Chief Minister and one other Minister are alleged to have made statements at an earlier point acknowledging that the respondents are independents. We are unable to accept the said contention. Firstly, since the said press reports are of a period much earlier to the date of the proceedings and if the petitioners really desired, they could have been part of the objections before the Speaker when the petitioners were in a position to submit such detailed objections with the help of the learned advocate. Secondly, the petitioners herein were not even diligent to appear in person before the Speaker in a matter of this nature and explain their stand if they had personal knowledge of all these aspects so as to put forth the same before the Speaker. Thirdly, the said press reports have been produced before this Court on 25.11.2010 along with the rejoiner long after the filing of the writ petitions on 11.10.2010. Thirdly, the said press reports have been produced before this Court on 25.11.2010 along with the rejoiner long after the filing of the writ petitions on 11.10.2010. This makes it clear that the petitioners herein would not have produced such press reports even if they had been granted the seven days’ time as sought for before the Speaker. If such is the conduct displayed by them, they cannot be heard to complain about prejudice being caused to them. 37. The petitioners admit that the notices were pasted on the doors of their respective rooms at the Legislator’s Home. Rule 7(3) provides that the member against whom the Disqualification Complaint is made shall within seven days of the receipt of the copy of the Disqualification Complaint along with the records, forward his comments in writing thereon to the Speaker. The words “within seven days” clearly mean that the comments should be forwarded by the concerned member to the Speaker within the maximum period of seven days and not that it should necessarily be the inner limit of seven days. The seven days prescribed under the Rules is the maximum period and not the minimum period as contended by the petitioners’ advocates. Considering that the complaint would be of defection and if it is shown to be true, a member cannot continue with the status for long and as such, an appropriate outer limit is fixed keeping in view the urgency with which it should be concluded. The Speaker may even allow further time if sufficient cause is shown. In the matter on hand, the Speaker having found that the statement of objections filed by the petitioners is exhaustive, has proceeded to hear the matter on merits. Both the parties were represented by their respective advocates and they had consented for clubbing the cases and the statement of objections filed indicates that it is addressed to the Speaker and not restricted with any particular case number and as such, is common to the cases filed by the BJP functionaries and the voters. It is brought to the notice of the Court during the course of arguments by learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents herein that the Speaker heard the arguments in detail for about three hours on each and every aspect of the matter and thereafter, the impugned order is passed. It is brought to the notice of the Court during the course of arguments by learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents herein that the Speaker heard the arguments in detail for about three hours on each and every aspect of the matter and thereafter, the impugned order is passed. Such submission is not controverted by the petitioners’ advocates before us. 38. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India, reported in 1994 Suppl.(2) SCC 641 that the Rules have been framed to regulate the procedure that is to be followed by the Speaker for exercising power conferred on him under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph-1 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Rules are therefore procedural in nature and any violation of the same would only amount to irregular procedure which is not subjected to judicial scrutiny in view of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph-6 to the Tenth Schedule of Constitution of India and as construed by the Apex Court in Kihoto Hollohon’s Case (cited supra), however subject to certain exceptions. As aforementioned, in the very judgment, the Apex Court has observed that the field of judicial review in respect of orders passed by the Speaker under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is confined to prejudice of constitutional mandates, mala fides or non-compliance with the Rules of natural justice and perversity. It is held that Principles of natural justice are important force in the modern administrative law. They have been defined to mean “fair play in action”. The order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions passed in violation of principles of natural justice is perversely ultra vires and therefore suffers from jurisdictional error. But while applying the principles of natural justice, it may be borne in mind that the rules of natural justice are not immutable, but flexible. They are not cast in a rigid mould and they cannot be put in a legal straight jacket. Thus, the question as to whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of facts and circumstances of a particular case. The facts in Ravi S. Naik’s Case (cited supra) reveal that the disqualified members were given only two days time for submitting the replies. Thus, the question as to whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of facts and circumstances of a particular case. The facts in Ravi S. Naik’s Case (cited supra) reveal that the disqualified members were given only two days time for submitting the replies. The replies were submitted to the Speaker within the said period. The replies so submitted were quite detailed. In the replies, the concerned MLAs. did not deny the crucial allegations made against them. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case, the Apex Court held that it cannot be said that insufficient time is given for submitting replies which has resulted in denial of adequate opportunity to the concerned MLAs. 39. In the matters on hand also, though the petitioners herein were granted two days time for filing statement of objections, they voluntarily filed their replies within a day i.e., on 9.10.2010. The replies filed by the petitioners are quite detailed. In the replies, the petitioners have alleged mala fides against the Speaker. Further, they have put forth their case in detail. However, the petitioners did not deny the contents and veracity of the documents produced along with the disqualification applications. They have also not stated anything in the replies that they wanted to produce any particular document in their support. In fact, the tenor of the contents in para-13 of the reply statement to the Speaker indicates that by the objection raised by them, they sought a decision from the Speaker to withdraw the show cause notice and dismiss the petition, failing which to grant at least seven days time. They did not even come forward to appear before the Speaker personally to contend that they would adduce any evidence on their behalf. Even the advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners did not submit so before the Speaker. As aforementioned, the petitioners have not stated anything even in the writ petitions denying the contents of the documents produced along with the Disqualification Complaints. On the other hand, the petitioners do not dispute the contents of the documents except contending that the said documents will not lead to any inference against them by seeking to explain the same. As aforementioned, the petitioners have not stated anything even in the writ petitions denying the contents of the documents produced along with the Disqualification Complaints. On the other hand, the petitioners do not dispute the contents of the documents except contending that the said documents will not lead to any inference against them by seeking to explain the same. Even if more time was to be granted to the petitioners, no useful purpose would have been served, inasmuch as, factual aspects borne out from the documents produced along with the Disqualification Complaints were not denied even in the writ petitions. On the other hand, it appears that the attempt was only to prolong it beyond 11.10.2010. In fact, while answering similar contentions in the case of Jagajit Singh vs. State of Haryana ( 2006 (11) SCC 1 ) wherein an interim reply was filed and thereafter the complainant had filed additional documents, the Apex Court rejected the contention. Thus, it cannot be said that non grant of further time for submitting the reply has resulted in denial of adequate opportunity to the petitioners to controvert the allegations contained in the Disqualification Complaints. As aforementioned, the petitioners voluntarily appeared through their learned Advocate before the Speaker on 9.10.2010 though the time granted to them was to appear on 10.10.2010. They filed their reply on the very day. They have consented for clubbing all the complaints. With consent, all the complaints were clubbed, heard and are decided together. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the petitioners were put to prejudice in any manner. Hence, it cannot be said that the rules of natural justice are not complied with in the matters on hand. 40. POINT NO.3: REGARDING VALIDITY OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER INCLUDING QUESTION OF MALA FIDES AND PERVERSITY: Even while considering these aspects of the matter, the entire matter will have to be examined keeping in mind the object with which Tenth Schedule is inserted in the Constitution by virtue of Fifty-Second Amendment and the manner of consideration should be in the direction of achieving the objects and not to defeat the intention with which Tenth Schedule is inserted. In that regard, a perusal of the impugned order would indicate that the Speaker while passing the impugned order has relied upon the following circumstances against the petitioners to infer that they have joined the BJP and incurred disqualification in terms of paragraph 2(2) of Tenth Schedule viz., (a) That the petitioners have joined Ministry formed by BJP, (b) That the petitioners have attended Legislature party meetings of BJP and signed the relevant registers, (c) That the petitioners have received the whip issued by the Chief Whip of BJP and have acted in accordance to the whip issued, (d) Petitioners have participated in the programme of the political party viz., BJP under its flag and symbol along with the leaders of the BJP. 41. Based on the above materials, since the Speaker has held that the petitioners have incurred disqualification and since the petitioners have alleged mala fides against the Speaker for acting at the behest of the Chief Minister, that aspect needs consideration at the outset. Having heard the learned advocates at length and having perused the entire materials on record, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned action of the Speaker is not actuated by mala fides as alleged by the petitioners. It is no doubt true that certain allegations are made against the Speaker both in the reply statement filed by the petitioners before the Speaker as well as in the writ petitions. Further, allegations are also made against the Chief Minister to the effect that he was instrumental for getting the impugned order passed at the hands of the Speaker in a hurried manner in order to see that these petitioners do not participate and vote against the Chief Minister in the Confidence Motion moved by the Chief Minister which was scheduled to be discussed in the Assembly on 11.10.2010. But, we find that such allegations stand unsubstantiated. If in law the petitioners have incurred disqualification and if the Speaker proceeds in that regard and if it is not against law, merely because the allegation is made that it is done to aid the Chief Minister in the Vote of Confidence at his behest, the mala fides cannot be assumed. But, we find that such allegations stand unsubstantiated. If in law the petitioners have incurred disqualification and if the Speaker proceeds in that regard and if it is not against law, merely because the allegation is made that it is done to aid the Chief Minister in the Vote of Confidence at his behest, the mala fides cannot be assumed. If the petitioners were to succeed on this allegation, they should not only establish that they had not incurred disqualification, but should also come out with specific details about the manner in which the Chief Minister prevailed upon the Speaker to pass a particular type of order by following a particular procedure. On the other hand, the petitioners have not disclosed the source of their information that the Chief Minister had influenced the Speaker for getting the order passed and also the details. Neither are any materials placed by the petitioners in support of their allegations from which such conclusion can be drawn. These allegations are not grounded on any factual knowledge, but has only been stated as “reasons to believe”. Even for their belief, the petitioners do not disclose any reasons on which they were founded except assuming so because the order is passed prior to the Vote of Confidence, which, in our view, cannot be the basis for the reasons stated aforesaid and for the reasons that would be discussed in the succeeding part of this order. It is no doubt true that in a case of this kind, it would be difficult for the petitioners to have personal knowledge in regard to an averment of mala fides, but then the details from where such knowledge is gathered is wanting. The petitioners ought to have disclosed their knowledge so that the other side gets a fair chance to verify it and to respondent to the same. In such a situation, the Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Purushtam Jog Naik ( AIR 1952 SC 317 ) has observed that as slip-shod verification of affidavits might lead to their rejection, they should be modeled on the lines of Order XIX Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and that where an averment is not based on personal knowledge, the source of information should be clearly deposed. In the absence of tangible materials, the only answer which the respondents against whom the allegations are made as to mala fides could be one of general denial. In the matter on hand, the Speaker, as well as, the Chief Minister have filed their affidavits denying the allegations. They have specifically denied the contention that the impugned order is passed at the behest of the Chief Minister. We must not overlook the well established legal position that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another ( AIR 1974 SC 555 ) wherein it is observed thus: “Para-92: Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up – these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach – but because otherwise functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this stand-point that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent.” Since the petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of establishing mala fides, the allegations of mala fides cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, we do not find that the impugned order is actuated by mala fides. 42. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the Speaker passed the impugned order is great haste as the discussion on Confidence Motion was fixed on 11.10.2010, and therefore, smacks of mala fides is a double edged one. It can also lead to the inference that it is because of that reason the petitioners were interested in prolonging the proceedings beyond 11.10.2010, but the Speaker wanted to decide before it, if the petitioners had incurred disqualification under Tenth Schedule, which, in fact, was towards upholding the law. As a matter of fact, the proceedings under Tenth Schedule will have to be decided as early as possible so as to avoid a defected member’s participation in the House. If the Speaker had not discharged his legal obligation, he would have been faulted on that ground. Hence, this Court cannot accept the allegations made only because of that reason. While concluding as above, we have also kept in view the observations of the Apex Court about the high tradition of the Speaker’s office and its role. The observations made in Kihoto Hollohon’s Case (cited supra), which reads as hereunder would also be apt for the aspects to be considered hereinafter as well: “Para-115:- The question is, whether the investiture of the determinative jurisdiction in the Speaker would by itself stand vitiated as denying the idea of an independent adjudicatory authority. The observations made in Kihoto Hollohon’s Case (cited supra), which reads as hereunder would also be apt for the aspects to be considered hereinafter as well: “Para-115:- The question is, whether the investiture of the determinative jurisdiction in the Speaker would by itself stand vitiated as denying the idea of an independent adjudicatory authority. We are afraid the criticism that the provision incurs the vice of unconstitutionality ignores the high status and importance of the office of the Speaker in a Parliamentary democracy. The office of the Speaker is held in the highest respect and esteem in Parliamentary traditions. The evolution of the institution of the Parliamentary democracy has its pivot the institution of the Speaker. ‘The Speaker holds a high important and ceremonial office. All questions of the well being of the House are matters of Speaker’s concern’. The Speaker is said to be the very embodiment of propriety and impartiality. He performs wide ranging functions including the performance of important functions of a judicial character. Para-116:- Mavalankar, who was himself a distinguished occupant of that high office says: ‘In parliamentary democracy the office of the Speaker is held in very high esteem and respect. There are many reasons for this. Some of them are purely historical and some are inherent in the concept of Parliamentary democracy and the powers and duties of the Speaker. Once a person is elected Speaker, he is expected to be above parties, above politics. In other words, he belongs to all the members or belongs to none. He holds the scales of justice evenly irrespective of party or person, though no one expects that he will do absolute justice in all matters; because as a human being he has his human drawbacks and shortcomings. However, everybody knows that he will intentionally do no injustice or show partiality. Such a person is naturally held in respect by all.’ Para-117: Pandit Nehru referring to the office of the Speaker said: ‘…. The Speaker represents the House. He represents the dignity of the House, the freedom of the House and because the House represents the nation, in a particular way, the Speaker becomes the symbol of the nation’s freedom and liberty. Therefore, it is right that that should be an honoured position, a free position and should be occupied always by men of outstanding ability and impartiality.” …. Therefore, it is right that that should be an honoured position, a free position and should be occupied always by men of outstanding ability and impartiality.” …. Para-118: It would, indeed, be unfair to the high traditions of that great office to say that the investiture in it of this jurisdiction would be vitiated for violation of a basic feature of democracy. It is inappropriate to express distrust in the high office of the Speaker, merely because some of the Speakers are alleged, or even found, to have discharged their functions not in keeping with the great traditions of that high office. The robes of the Speaker do change and elevate the man inside. Para-119: Accordingly, the contention that the vesting of adjudicatory functions in the Speakers/Chairmen would by itself vitiate the provision on the ground of likelihood of political bias is unsound and is rejected. The Speakers/Chairmen hold a pivotal position in the scheme of Parliamentary democracy and are guardians of the rights and privileges of the House. They are expected to and do take far-reaching decisions in the functioning of Parliamentary democracy. Vestiture of power to adjudicate questions under the Tenth Schedule in such constitutional functionaries should not be considered exceptionable.” (Emphasis supplied) 43. The undisputed facts in the instant case are that the petitioners were elected as independent members. After elections, they supported the Government formed by BJP which was the single largest party in the 13th Legislative Assembly. They, by their separate letters dated 26.5.2008 pledged their unconditional support to the BJP Legislature Party leader Sri B.S. Yeddyurappa to form the Government. They were sworn in as Ministers when the Government was formed by BJP. In this context, it was argued by Sri Satyapal Jain, appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents that the very fact that the petitioners were sworn in as Ministers in the Government formed by BJP itself would be sufficient to hold that the petitioners have joined a political party viz., BJP as it was not an outside support. The same is opposed by Sri P.P. Rao, and other Advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners by contending that the mere act of the petitioners joining the Council of Ministers would not be sufficient to incur disqualification as contained in paragraph 2(2) of Tenth Schedule as they have not joined the political party after they were elected. The same is opposed by Sri P.P. Rao, and other Advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners by contending that the mere act of the petitioners joining the Council of Ministers would not be sufficient to incur disqualification as contained in paragraph 2(2) of Tenth Schedule as they have not joined the political party after they were elected. According to the petitioners, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioners have joined any political party, much less, BJP. They are not enrolled as Members of BJP, their names are not found as BJP MLAs in the relevant registers maintained by the Speaker as required under Rules 3 and 4 of the Disqualification Rules and that the petitioners were only giving outside support. 44. Before we proceed further to consider the validity or otherwise of the impugned order on all other aspects, it would be appropriate for us to take note of the decision of the Apex Court, inasmuch as, the facts of this case are almost similar to the facts in Jagjit Singh’s Case (cited supra). In the said matter also, independent members of Legislative Assembly were disqualified by the Speaker on the ground of defection ahead of the election which was scheduled for electing the Member to the Rajya Sabha from the Assembly. Similar contentions as are raised in this matter, were raised before the Apex Court. While considering the rival contentions urged by the parties, the Apex Court in the said matter, has observed thus:- “Para-28: We have no difficulty in accepting the contention that there is a fundamental difference between an independent elected member and the one who contests and wins on ticket given by a political party. This difference is recognized by various provisions of the Tenth Schedule. An independent elected member of a House incurs disqualification when he joins any political party after election as provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule. There is also no difficulty in accepting the proposition that giving of outside support by an independent elected member is not the same thing as joining any political party after election. To find out whether an independent member has extended only outside support or, in fact, has joined a political party, materials available and also the conduct of the member is to be examined by the Speaker. To find out whether an independent member has extended only outside support or, in fact, has joined a political party, materials available and also the conduct of the member is to be examined by the Speaker. It may be possible in a given situation for a Speaker to draw an inference that an independent member of the Assembly has joined a political party. No hard and fast rule can be laid down when the answer is dependent on the facts of each case. Para-29: It is also essential to bear in mind the objects for enacting the defection law also, namely, to curb the menace of defection. Despite defection a member cannot be permitted to get away with it without facing the consequences of such defection only because of mere technicalities. The substance and spirit of law is the guiding factor to decide whether an elected independent member has joined or not a political party after his election. It would not be a valid plea for a person who may have otherwise joined political party to contend that he has not filled up the requisite membership form necessary to join a political party or has not paid requisite fee for such membership. The completion of such formalities would be in consequential if facts otherwise show that the independent member has joined a political party. The facts of the four cases of independent elected members are required to be examined in the light of these principles. Para-37: The sufficiency of the time granted depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Having regard to the facts as noticed hereinbefore, we are unable to accept the contention that in the present case, the petitioners were not granted sufficient time to meet the case against them. Para-47: From the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the petitioners, it can be reasonably inferred that they were only interested in prolonging the proceedings beyond 28th June, 2004, the date fixed for Rajya Sabha elections. The argument that the Speaker passed the impugned order in haste as voting for Rajya Sabha elections was fixed for 28th June 2004, is a double edged one since the petitioners were interested in prolonging the proceedings beyond 28th June, 2004 and the Speaker wanted to decide before it, if the petitioners had incurred disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. The argument that the Speaker passed the impugned order in haste as voting for Rajya Sabha elections was fixed for 28th June 2004, is a double edged one since the petitioners were interested in prolonging the proceedings beyond 28th June, 2004 and the Speaker wanted to decide before it, if the petitioners had incurred disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. Para-50: It was also contended that paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule deserved to be strictly construed. The submission is that the word ‘join’ in Paragraph 2(2) deserves a strict interpretation in view of serious consequences of disqualification flowing therefrom on an order that may be made by the Speaker. Paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule reads as under: “2(2) An elected member of a House who has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after such election. Para-51: As noted earlier, the object of the defection law has to be borne in mind. The question to be considered is whether a member formally joining a political party is the requirement so as to earn disqualification or the factum of joining can be inferred from facts and conduct of a member, without a member formally joining a political party inasmuch as not filling form required to be filled by a member of the political party under the rules and regulations of that party or payment of any prescribed fee. The respondents pleaded for a liberal construction and submitted that inference from conduct was sufficient to establish that an independent member has joined a political party. These are two extreme views on the issue. Para-52: We are of the view that to determine whether an independent member has joined a political party the test is not whether he has fulfilled the formalities for joining a political party. The test is whether he has given up his independent character on which he was elected by the electorate. A mere expression of outside support would not lead to an implication of a member joining a political party. At the same time, non-fulfillment of formalities with a view to defeat the intent of paragraph 2(2) is also of non consequence. The test is whether he has given up his independent character on which he was elected by the electorate. A mere expression of outside support would not lead to an implication of a member joining a political party. At the same time, non-fulfillment of formalities with a view to defeat the intent of paragraph 2(2) is also of non consequence. The question of fact that a member has given up his independent character and joined for all intent and purposes, a political party though not formally so as to incur disqualification provided in paragraph 2(2) is to be determined on appreciation of the material on record.” (emphasis supplied) From the above observations, it is clear that substance and spirit of law is the guiding factor to decide whether an elected member has joined a political party after his elections. It would not be a valid plea for a person who may have otherwise joined a political party by his conduct, to contend that he has not filled up requisite membership form necessary to join a political party and has not paid requisite fee for such membership. The completion of such formalities would be inconsequential, if facts leading to the conduct otherwise show that the independent member has joined a political party or lost his independent status. In the very judgment, it is held that the conduct and behaviour of the elected candidate will have to be seen to infer as to whether such candidate has joined a political party or not. In the case on hand also, the petitioners have not become the members of the BJP expressly i.e., by filling up the form, etc. Hence, by conduct and behaviour of the petitioners whether it can be inferred that they have joined a political party is the issue to be determined. Since the petitioners have not expressly joined the party by paying membership fees and filling up the form, there is no question of their names being entered in the Register maintained by the Speaker under Rules 3 and 4 of the Disqualification Rules and as such, the change not being effected, cannot lead us to the conclusion. Since the petitioners have not expressly joined the party by paying membership fees and filling up the form, there is no question of their names being entered in the Register maintained by the Speaker under Rules 3 and 4 of the Disqualification Rules and as such, the change not being effected, cannot lead us to the conclusion. Therefore, it is not possible for us to accept the contentions of Sri P.P. Rao, that the names of the petitioners are not changed in the Register maintained by the Speaker as required under Rule 3(4) of the Rules by intimating the change if they had become members of BJP. For the very reason, the contention of Sri P.P. Rao, that the independent status of the petitioners is evident from the records of the Legislature, cannot be accepted. It is needless to observe that none of the political parties which is benefited either by express or implied defection by an independent member would inform the Speaker about the fact of joining the said political party, inasmuch as, such intimation to the Speaker would invite disqualification and consequently, such political party will lose the support of such independent member thereafter. So also, any independent member joining the political party will not inform the Speaker for effecting change under Rules 3(4) and 4 of the Disqualification Rules, for the very reason. In view of the non-intimation of the fact of joining the BJP by the Legislature party leader of BJP at an earlier point of time, for reasons best known to him, has resulted in a situation where the Speaker has to determine the said question as per the Constitutional mandate envisaged in the Tenth Schedule. Sri P.P. Rao submitted that the judgment in Ravi S. Naik’s Case (cited supra) is explained by the Apex Court in the subsequent judgment in the case of Mayawati vs. Markandeya Chand & Others reported in (1998) 7 SCC 517 ). In Mayawati’s Case the Apex Court did not finally decide the matter. Since two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court differed on certain points, the matter was referred to the Constitutional Bench for decision. Hence, it cannot be said that the Apex Court in Mayawati’s Case has explained the earlier judgment of Apex Court in Ravi S. Naik’s Case. 45. In Mayawati’s Case the Apex Court did not finally decide the matter. Since two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court differed on certain points, the matter was referred to the Constitutional Bench for decision. Hence, it cannot be said that the Apex Court in Mayawati’s Case has explained the earlier judgment of Apex Court in Ravi S. Naik’s Case. 45. As aforementioned, the Apex Court in Jagjit Singh’s Case (cited supra) has observed that there is no difficulty in accepting the proposition that giving outside support by an independent elected member is not the same as joining any political party after the election. The Apex Court has ruled that giving outside support by an independent MLA is permissible. Hence, it is to be determined whether the manner of support extended by the petitioners herein can be considered as outside support. The words “outside support” are not defined anywhere. We will have to infer the meaning of the words “outside support” as used in common parlance. The general perception of understanding the act of outside support means, supporting the Government from outside without being a part of the Government but adding to the number to have majority in the Assembly, meaning thereby if an elected representative joins the Ministry, he is not giving the outside support to the Government, but is a part of the Government. In such a situation, the question that would arise is as to whether the Government is by a heterogeneous body or a homogenous body. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the BJP has formed the Government in the State of Karnataka. Though Sri P.P. Rao, sought to contend that each independent member should be considered as a distinct political party having one member being part of the coalition, we are unable to accede to such contention. A political party can only be one as provide under Section 2(f) of Representation of People Act, 1951. Further, such mischief was sought to be remedied by omitting para-3 of the Tenth Schedule to ensure stability of the Government. We must also notice at this juncture that from the debate made in the Parliament which has been extracted above, it is evident that even though there was a view point expressed that the independent member should be excluded from the net of the Tenth Schedule, the same did not find favour with the lawmakers. We must also notice at this juncture that from the debate made in the Parliament which has been extracted above, it is evident that even though there was a view point expressed that the independent member should be excluded from the net of the Tenth Schedule, the same did not find favour with the lawmakers. As noticed, the petitioners have joined the Ministry unconditionally. They have not just supported the Government, but became an integral part of the same. Since the BJP which was the single largest political party, has formed the Government, it is but natural that the BJP manifesto as declared during the election campaign may have to be implemented by the Government. Practically, the policies and programmes of the BJP will be implemented by the Government. Hence, the petitioners being part of the Ministry are bound by the policies and programmes of BJP which would be implemented by the Government. These Ministers will have no independent say in the matter of policy decision, thereby they have lost their independent character as such. Thus, it cannot be said that after being part of the Ministry, they can still retain their independent character. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioners have given outside support to the Government. Thus, the petitioners having pledged their support due to lure of office unconditionally, the act of joining the Ministry to carry forward the policies and programmes of BJP is the same as joining the BJP and continuing further by the subsequent acts as well. 46. Independent member is the one, who is elected as a candidate, otherwise than set up by any political party. When such candidate went to the electorate, he must have told the voters that he will fight the election independently, since none of the political parties have catered to the needs of the constituency till that date. If it is so, the independent member should stick to what he had assured his electorate as he had fought independently and had secured verdict of the electorate to remain so. Therefore, he must continue as an independent member by desisting and resisting the lure of office by remaining loyal to his electorate. The moment he loses his independent character, he becomes subject to the Tenth Schedule because the very basis is the promise he had made to the electorate. Therefore, he must continue as an independent member by desisting and resisting the lure of office by remaining loyal to his electorate. The moment he loses his independent character, he becomes subject to the Tenth Schedule because the very basis is the promise he had made to the electorate. The electorate is the final authority which decided that he is a fit person to be elected because he is an independent. Therefore, the electorate would be confident that such elected independent member will remain as an independent member and would not join any political party later, since they had rejected all the political party later, since they had rejected all the political parties which were in the fray. Being not a member of any political party, the electorate would also be aware that he would not be a part of any Ministry formed by any political party, which may ultimately secure majority, but were rejected by them and therefore he would not be in a position to assume power by being a part of the Ministry is a foregone conclusion made by the voters of his constituency. Since the electorate of that particular constituency has rejected the political parties, it is incumbent upon the independent member so elected to retain his independent character by not joining any political party, much less, the Ministry formed by any political party. At best, he can lend outside support keeping in view the benefit that would bring to his constituency, so that, he would have sufficient elbow space to take his independent decisions without being bound by the ship or surrendering himself for fear of loosing ministerial berth. 47. Petitioners have produced the copies of their letter of support dated 26.5.2008 submitted to His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka, wherein they have categorically stated that they are extending their unconditional support to Sri B.S. Yeddyurappa, the leader of BJP Legislature party to form the Government. The letters are all identical. 47. Petitioners have produced the copies of their letter of support dated 26.5.2008 submitted to His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka, wherein they have categorically stated that they are extending their unconditional support to Sri B.S. Yeddyurappa, the leader of BJP Legislature party to form the Government. The letters are all identical. One of the letters reads as hereunder: “Kannadam” It is also relevant to note that in their reply filed to the show cause notice issued by the Speaker, at paragraph-9, they have stated that Sri B.S. Yeddyurappa, Chief Minister has forfeited the confidence of the people, and, therefore, in the interest of State and people of Karnataka and the BJP, they have withdrawn the support from the Government headed by Sri B.S. Yeddyurappa as Chief Minister and they are within their constitutional rights to do so in a parliamentary democracy. This indicates that they had the interest of the political party at heart and they only wanted a change of the leader which ought not to have been their concern. If they had believed themselves to be still independent all that they were required to do was to be away from the Ministry. 48. In this regard, the contention of Sri Ravivarma Kumar, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, also needs to be considered. He contended that in case the view of the Speaker that the conduct of joining the Ministry amounts to joining the political party is accepted, then, there would be far reaching consequences on the concept of coalition Government. Such apprehension cannot be accepted since in the instant case, it cannot be considered as a coalition Government. The coalition Government is different from the Government formed by a single political party. Coalition Government is the Government by a coalition of political parties formed when political parties unite to secure majority in the House over the other groups. In the coalition Government, all the political parties which form a coalition will retain their independent political character as a heterogeneous combination and they will stick to their own ideologies. One political party of a coalition Government will not impose its ideology on other parties. However, there would be common understanding or common minimum programme to run the Government. In the coalition Government, all the political parties which form a coalition will retain their independent political character as a heterogeneous combination and they will stick to their own ideologies. One political party of a coalition Government will not impose its ideology on other parties. However, there would be common understanding or common minimum programme to run the Government. No member of such political party which is a part of the coalition will be able to take independent decisions to either join or withdraw from the Ministry, but would be the collective decision without surrendering itself to the other political party which also results in the stability of such Government. Coalition Governments are formed in order to avoid repeated elections or elections at irregular intervals and basically they are formed in the interest of the State and not for individual benefit. But here is a case where the Government is formed by a single largest political party to which the independent members have supported unconditionally and have joined the Ministry. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the definition as found in Ramnath Iyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, wherein the words ‘coalition’ and the ‘coalition Government’ are explained as under:- “Coalition: Fusion into one whole; temporary combination between parties retaining distinctive principles. (In diplomacy), an alliance between States for combined action. Union of political parties to secure a majority in Parliament over other groups; usually takes, place in multi-party system in which no single party is able to command support of a working majority. (Constitutional and Parliamentary Term). Coalition Government: Government by a coalition of parties is formed when political parties unite to secure majority in Parliament over other groups or in times of war or other great national emergency when a majority party invites minority parties to form government in the interest of national unity; it tends to be unstable and weak as it lacks clear electoral mandate because it reflects diverse and partisan viewpoints; lacks cohesion of its membership; it has to necessarily accommodate minority view point for getting its Parliamentary support. (Constitutional and Parliamentary Term.)” 49. In theabove background, a perusal of the documents would indicate the intention of the petitioners when they joined the Ministry and conducted themselves thereafter. (Constitutional and Parliamentary Term.)” 49. In theabove background, a perusal of the documents would indicate the intention of the petitioners when they joined the Ministry and conducted themselves thereafter. The complainants have relied upon the documents relating to BJP Legislature party meeting dated 23.6.2008, 28.7.2008, 16.10.2008, 25.11.2008, 16.1.2009, 25.2.2009, 25.3.2009, 21.5.2009, 4.1.2010, 4.7.2010 and 17.6.2010, to contend that the petitioners herein have participated in Legislature party meetings of BJP and in evidence thereof they have signed the Register. A perusal of those documents reveal that the petitioners have attended Legislature party meetings of BJP and have signed in the Register. In the meetings from 23.6.2008, till the meeting dated 21.5.2009, the names of these petitioners were shown at the concluding portion of the list of Legislature party members of BJP. The petitioners were shown under a different heading viz., ‘Independent Co-members’. On the basis of such a noting, Sri P.P. Rao, contended that the petitioners have merely attended the meeting of BJP as they were the Ministers to discuss policy matters. It is contended that however, they retained their independent identity by signing the Register as independent co-members and the very fact that they are shown as independent co-members itself would go to show that they are not the members of BJP, but they independents and supporting the Government. However, in the meetings dated 4.1.2010 and 16.6.2010, such a distinction under the heading of ‘Independent Co-members’ is not made. The names of these petitioners though are shown in the concluding portion of the Register in the list of members of Legislature party, in the caption of the Register it is shown as BJP Legislature party. In the meeting dated 4.1.2010 and in the Legislature party meeting dated 16.6.2010, some Legislature party members/members of BJP have signed the Register after the signatures of the petitioners. If they were independent in letter and spirit, the question of showing them as co-members also would not arise. Such distinction is attempted to have been maintained because even the BJP had been benefited by their defection, but the same was to be concealed by retaining the documents in such manner. In the meetings held from 4.1.2010 onwards, no distinction is made in the Register of Legislature party meetings in respect of the petitioners by showing their names along with other Legislature party members of BJP. In the meetings held from 4.1.2010 onwards, no distinction is made in the Register of Legislature party meetings in respect of the petitioners by showing their names along with other Legislature party members of BJP. Paragraph-1(b) of Tenth Schedule defines “Legislature party” as under:- “Legislature party’, in relation to a member of a House belonging to any political party in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 or paragraph 4, means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the time being belonging to that political party in accordance with the said provisions.” From the above it is clear that the group consisting of all the members of the House for the time being belonging to that political party would form the Legislature party of such political party. A member of a Legislature party means a member of the House belonging to a particular political party. Since the petitioners have attended and signed the Register relating to BJP Legislature party meetings, it can be inferred that they have treated themselves as members of the House belonging to BJP as a continuing act after joining the Ministry. 50. The documents produced by the contesting respondents before the Speaker, which are relied on by the Speaker during the course of his order also includes the copies of the ‘whip’ issued by the Chief Whip of BJP and addressed to the petitioners. On 29.12.2009, Chief Whip of BJP, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, has issued ‘whip’ to the petitioners directing them to cast their vote in favour of the candidate belonging to the ruling party in the election to be held for the post of Speaker of the Assembly. In the very ‘whip’, it is stated that the petitioners are the Legislators from ruling party. Such whip is received by the petitioners by affixing their signatures on the whip without any objection. The whip issued to each of the petitioners at an undisputed point of time is identically worded. One such ‘whip’ issued to Sri Venkataramanappa, one of the petitioners, is extracted for the purpose of convenience which is as under: “Kannadam” (Emphasis supplied) It is not in dispute that the petitioners have acted in accordance with the direction issued by the Chief Whip. One such ‘whip’ issued to Sri Venkataramanappa, one of the petitioners, is extracted for the purpose of convenience which is as under: “Kannadam” (Emphasis supplied) It is not in dispute that the petitioners have acted in accordance with the direction issued by the Chief Whip. If really the petitioners were not the members of the Legislature party of BJP, they would not have received the ‘whip’ sent by the Chief Whip of that party. There is no reason as to why the petitioners should receive such a direction issued by the Chief Whip of BJP if they had retained their independent character and identity, more particularly, when they were described as the members of ruling party. It is relevant to note that the petitioners have not denied the contents of the documents, such as the Register relating to BJP Legislature party meetings and the ‘whip’ issued by the Chief Whip, even before us, but have only attempted to explain such documents. 51. One more circumstance relied on by the complainant for inferring that the petitioners have incurred disqualification is that they participated in the rallies conducted by the BJP under its banner and symbol. Certain newspaper reports are produced by the complainants before the Speaker to show that the petitioners have participated in the BJP rallies conducted at Mysore, wherein these petitioners have participated being on the dias along with the other National and State leaders of BJP. In this regard, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that those rallies were conducted by the Government and being the Ministers they were expected to participate and have participated. The said contention also fails, inasmuch as the photographs printed in the newspapers which have not been disputed clearly reveal that the function organized at Mysore was not the Government function, but it was a party function organized by BJP as depicted from the buntings and the banner in the background. The petitioners have also not denied that they have participated in such rallies at Mysore. The said photographs found in the news papers coupled with the other documents noticed above, would establish that they are part of the BJP. 52. Sri Ravivarma Kumar, appearing on behalf of the petitioners further contends that the power of the Speaker to disqualify should be exercised in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time. The said photographs found in the news papers coupled with the other documents noticed above, would establish that they are part of the BJP. 52. Sri Ravivarma Kumar, appearing on behalf of the petitioners further contends that the power of the Speaker to disqualify should be exercised in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time. It is contended that more than two years had elapsed from the date of alleged defection and as such, the power could not have been exercised at that stage. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mansaram vs. S.P. Pathak & Others, reported in 1984 (1) SCC 125 , wherein it is observed thus:- “Rent was accepted without question from the appellant by Basantrai Sharma till his death and thereafter. Could he be at this distance of time, thrown out on the ground that his initial entry was unauthorized. To slightly differently formulate the proposition, could the initial unauthorized entry, if there be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that he entered the premises in contravention of Clause 22(2)? Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But, when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in parry delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an unauthorized entry and that failure to vacate premises till nine years after retirement was not proper, yet it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which he has done. In such a situation, it would be open to him not to evict the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to Muralidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P. wherein one Ram Agyan Singh who came into possession of premises without an order of allotment in his favour as required by Section 7(2) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted to retain the premises by treating his occupation lawful and this Court declined to interfere with that order. No doubt it must be confessed that Section 7-A conferred power on the District Magistrate to take action against unauthorized occupation in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but there was a proviso to the section which enabled the District Magistrate not to evict a person found to be in unauthorized occupation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that there has been undue delay or otherwise it is inexpedient to do so. There is no such proviso to Clause 28 which confers power on the Collector to take necessary action for the purpose of securing compliance with the Rent Control Order. But, as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. However, one is readily available in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha. In that case Commissioner exercised suo motto revisional jurisdiction under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which did not prescribe any period of limitation for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Commissioner exercised revisional jurisdiction one year after the Collector made the order which was sought to be revised. The High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner. In the appeal by State of Gujarat. This Court declined to interfere holding inter alia that the revisional power in the absence of prescribed period of limitation must be exercised within a reasonable time and period of one year was held to be too late. The High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner. In the appeal by State of Gujarat. This Court declined to interfere holding inter alia that the revisional power in the absence of prescribed period of limitation must be exercised within a reasonable time and period of one year was held to be too late. This aspect must be present to the mind of House Allotment Officer before just rushing in on an unproved technical contravention brought to his notice contrived by the successor-in-interest of the deceased landlord, and evicting the appellant 22 years after his entry and 9 years after his retirement on the short ground that his entry in the year 1954 was in contravention of Clause 22 (2).” The aforesaid decision, was rendered in a case arising out of Rent Control Enactment. In the said matter, it is held by the Apex Court that even if no limitation is prescribed to initiate action, the exercise of power should be made within a reasonable time. However, in the case on hand, having regard to the object with which Tenth Schedule is inserted by virtue of Fifty-Second Amendment to the Constitution, we are clearly of the opinion that the paramount object would be to safeguard the interest of democratic principles. If the application seeking disqualification is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, the same would amount to perpetuating the illegality, which runs contrary to the object of the Tenth Schedule. There cannot be any dispute that whenever an authority is vested with the power, the same should be exercised reasonably and within a reasonable period and that would also depend on the nature of the controversy and the enactment under which it arises. As aforementioned, we are not deciding the inter se litigation between the two rival private parties. If a lis pertains to claiming any personal benefit in favour of the particular litigant, the aforesaid principle may be applicable. But in the matter on hand, the complaints seeking disqualification are made in accordance with the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, which is enacted to sub-serve the public interest. Since the complaints are made in the interest of public at large, the complainants cannot and would not get any personal benefit out of the controversy. But in the matter on hand, the complaints seeking disqualification are made in accordance with the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, which is enacted to sub-serve the public interest. Since the complaints are made in the interest of public at large, the complainants cannot and would not get any personal benefit out of the controversy. The authority can exercise jurisdiction by keeping in mind the object, so as to promote the interest of the public and good administration even if the complaint is delayed. The object is to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. In this context, it is relevant to note the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi & Another vs. The Speaker & Others, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1873 , which read thus:- “Para 27: None of these cases relate to the writ of quo warranto and in them the relief claimed was only for the personal benefit of the claimant. We are not persuaded to hold that on the basis of these decisions, some of which are referred by the High Court, the writ petitions in the present case could have been dismissed merely on the ground of laches of the petitioners. Para 29: In Halsbury’s Laws of England the statement of law is based primarily on the decision of the privy Council in The Lindsay Petroleum Company (1874 LR 5 PC 221) and those following it. We have already indicated the inapplicability of those decisions in the present case. At the same place one of the decisions referred to, in foot note 3 of para 926, is A.G. v. Proprietors of the Bradford Canal, (1866) LR 2 Equity Cases 71, for the proposition that ‘Laches are not imputable to the Crown or to the Attorney General suing on behalf of the public.’ In this decision distinction was drawn between the claim on behalf of the public and that by an individual plaintiff indicating that even though delay or laches may be attributable to an individual plaintiff, it may not be so to an action brought on behalf of the public. This is more so, when the grievance made is that a person continues to hold a public office without the authority of law. This is more so, when the grievance made is that a person continues to hold a public office without the authority of law. Para 33: In our opinion the exercise of discretion by the Court even where the application is delayed is to be governed by the objective of promoting public interest and good administration; and on that basis it cannot be said that discretion would not be exercised in favour of interference where it is necessary to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. Para 34: We may also advert to a related aspect. Learned counsel for the respondents were unable to dispute that any other member of the public, to whom the oblique motives and conduct alleged against the appellants in the present case, could not be attributed could file such a writ petition even now for the same relief, since the alleged usurpation of the office is continuing, and this disability on the ground of oblique motives and conduct would not attach to him. This being so, the relief claimed by the appellants in their writ petitions filed in the High Court being in the nature of a class action, without seeking any relief personal to them, should not have been dismissed merely on the ground of laches. The motive or conduct of the appellants, as alleged by the respondents, in such a situation can be relevant only for denying them the costs even if their claim succeeds, but it cannot be a justification to refuse to examine the merits of the question raised therein, since that is a matter of public concern and relates to the good governance of the State itself.” (emphasis supplied) 53. The argument that the elected person may be called as member of Assembly only on taking oath, cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, the elected candidate would be issued with the Certificate of Election by the Returning Officer immediately on his election as provided in Form No.22 under Rule 66 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. However, the member of the Legislative Assembly before taking his seat, make and subscribe before the Governor or some person appointed on his behalf, on oath or affirmation, as per Article 188 of the Constitution of India. However, the member of the Legislative Assembly before taking his seat, make and subscribe before the Governor or some person appointed on his behalf, on oath or affirmation, as per Article 188 of the Constitution of India. Merely because the oath is administered to him on a subsequent date, he cannot be treated as a non-elected representative or a non-member of the House. If such a narrow interpretation as contended by Sri Ravivarma Kumar is given, it will render the Tenth Schedule otiose, inasmuch as, every elected representative would switch over his loyalty after the election and before taking oath depending on the benefit that would accrue to him irrespective of earlier affiliation and would claim immunity, which cannot be permitted. Accordingly, the contention is noticed only to be rejected. 54. Thus, having noticed all aspects of the matter, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the Speaker is not in violation of constitutional mandate nor is there any infirmity based on mala fides or perversity. 55. Before parting, we deem it necessary to observe that even though on a general perception de¬hors the subject matter involved, it may appear that the proceedings were concluded by the Speaker at an undesirable place, what cannot be lost sight of is that the present proceedings is one under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The provisions introduced by the Fifty-Second Amendment is in effect the law of the elected representatives introduced by the elected representatives, which is for the regulation of the conduct of the elected representatives themselves. The most important aspect is that the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Bill was passed unanimously with all the 418 members present, voting in favour of the Bill. While considering such law, we should go strictly by the spirit and object, which is discernible from the debate made in the Parliament and the earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been referred to above. In that context, the fact that a limitation of time to show cause has been fixed for themselves by the Rules will show that the proceedings should be concluded expeditiously. In that context, the fact that a limitation of time to show cause has been fixed for themselves by the Rules will show that the proceedings should be concluded expeditiously. In fact, one of the learned Judges expressing His Lordship’s opinion in Mayawati’s case (cited supra) has observed as under: “Para-103: But I wish to add that it is absolutely necessary for every Speaker to fix a time schedule in the relevant rules for disposal of the proceedings for disqualification of MLAs. or MPs. In my opinion, all such proceedings shall be concluded and orders should be passed within a period of three weeks from the date on which the petitions are taken on file.” The above observations would indicate the desire that the entire proceedings under all circumstances should be completed in an outer limit of three weeks if not earlier, even in cases where there is necessity to record evidence. Therefore, such of the elected representatives who indulge in such conduct which leads to disqualification should also be diligent and cannot make out a grievance when the long arm of law catches up with them by holding the shield of procedure and technicalities. 56. It is needless to observe that democracy is the basic feature of the Constitution. It is by now well settled that a right to elect though is fundamental to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right, but, is a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. Outside of statute, there is no right to be elected. The election conducted at regular, prescribed intervals is essential to the democratic system envisaged in the Constitution. So is the need to protect and sustain the purity of the electoral process right from the date of commencement of election process till the completion of the term of the House. The elected members are duty bound to adhere strictly to the democratic norms without making themselves subject to the wrath of the Tenth Schedule. The mandate of the electorate is supreme and the same has to be respected for the entire term of the House. The election promises and pledges held out to the electorate at the time of election have to be maintained. Any deviation of the same would amount to betrayal of the electorate who has reposed confidence in the elected member. The mandate of the electorate is supreme and the same has to be respected for the entire term of the House. The election promises and pledges held out to the electorate at the time of election have to be maintained. Any deviation of the same would amount to betrayal of the electorate who has reposed confidence in the elected member. We hope and trust that the elected members of the House would realize the avowed object of the Tenth Schedule in order to prevent unholy atmosphere in the House and also in the society. The elected members shall strengthen the fabric of Indian Parliamentary Democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections. For all the aforestated reasons, we see no merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. Accordingly, all these writ petitions being devoid of merit, stand dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs. ORDER N. Kumar, J: The petitioners have challenged in this writ petition the order passed by the second respondent - The State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities in the State of Karnataka, directing them to with hold the recruitment process for the post of Secondary School Teachers for the year 2007-08. 2. The 4th petitioner-Selection Authority, Belgaum, Department of Public Instructions, Government of Karnataka, called for applications for appointment of Special Teachers in Government High Schools/Government Composite Pre-University Colleges (High School Division), in Belgaum Division in the year 2007-08. Annexure-A, dated 01.09.2007 is the notification issued. According to the petitioners, the said notification was issued on the basis of the Government Order dated 20.06.1995, regarding reservations as per Annexure-B. It was also based on the notification as per Annexure-C regarding horizontal reservations. The Government of Karnataka has also issued certain guidelines regarding reservations to be followed by the Selection Committee as per Annexure-D. Applications have been received for appointment of Special Teachers in Belgaum Division. The said applications are processed on the basis of the aforesaid Government Orders and Government Circulars. A provisional list came to be published on 08.03.2008. However, before the publication of the provisional list, the Government has passed one' more order as per Annexure-E dated 04.01.2008 making alterations in the roster. 3. Belgaum Division comprises of 8 education districts. As the notification Annexurc-B was issued on 01.09.2007 prior to 04.01.2008, the Government Order modifying the rosters as per Annexure-E is not applicable to the present recruitment. However, before the publication of the provisional list, the Government has passed one' more order as per Annexure-E dated 04.01.2008 making alterations in the roster. 3. Belgaum Division comprises of 8 education districts. As the notification Annexurc-B was issued on 01.09.2007 prior to 04.01.2008, the Government Order modifying the rosters as per Annexure-E is not applicable to the present recruitment. Therefore, complaining of not following the said roster, the first respondent filed a complaint before the second respondent. The second respondent without issuing any notice to the petitioner, has passed the impugned order dated 26.03.2008 directing them to with-hold recruitment process for the post of Secondary School Special Teachers for the year 2007-08 till the matter of implementation of reservations of persons with disabilities is implemented in letter and spirit, as per Annexure-F. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners are before this Court. 4. Mter service of notice, the first respondent has filed detailed statement of objections. He contends that Rule 9(1)(A) of the General Recruitment Rules, as amended on 03.08.2005, makes it clear that 5% of the class 'c' and 'D' posts are to be reserved for persons with disability. Therefore, the appointing authority and the State Government are under a statutory obligation to reserve 5% of the posts for the disabled persons. The State is expected to have a constitutional vision. It must give effect to the constitutional mandate.- The Selecting Authority is the Joint Director of Public Instructions in the Division, who is also the Selection Authority required to conduct combined competitive examination. The number of candidates to be included in the list shall be equal to the number of vacancies for each of the categories of posts as notified against each of the educational districts in the notification published at the time of recruitment. The competitive examinations is held by the Selecting Authority and the selection takes place at Divisional Level. The selection should have been made on the basis of State level. The Division wise and District wise selection is illegal and contrary to law. Therefore, it was contended that the selection made by the petitioners is illegal and therefore the second respondent was justified in passing the impugned order. Therefore, he seeks for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. This Court by interim order dated 30.07.2008, stayed the impugned order for a period of three months. Therefore, it was contended that the selection made by the petitioners is illegal and therefore the second respondent was justified in passing the impugned order. Therefore, he seeks for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. This Court by interim order dated 30.07.2008, stayed the impugned order for a period of three months. By virtue of the stay order, the petitioners have proceeded to publish the final list of candidates. It is made clear in the final list published that "selection is subject to the final decision in this case". 6. Learned Government Advocate assailing the impugned order' contends that, the Notification was issued for recruitment on Division basis. The appointment is, made on District Basis. There are totally 8 districts in the Belgaum Division. The appointments are made on the basis of roster which were prevailing on the date of the Notification. According to the said Notification Point No. 19 is reserved for a physically disabled person. As the 1st respondent hails from Chikkodi, there were only 28 posts in this District, 50% of seats are reserved for open category candidates. In the remaining 50%, only 14 seats have to be filled up and therefore as the point reserved for physically disabled is at 19, the 1st respondent could not be accommodated. Same is the position in respect of other 8 districts which falls within Belgaum Division. 7. Per contra, 1st respondent who is appearing in person submitted that, the recruitment is made on the basis of Division whereas, the appointment is made on the basis of District. The applicability of the roster at the time of appointment on the basis of District, is illegal. If out of 183 posts which are filled up on division basis, if the roster is followed, 9 posts should have been earmarked for persons with physical disability. It is by wrong interpretation of the Government Orders, the petitioner has been denied appointment. 8. In the light of the rival contentions, the point that "arise for consideration is, whether the recruitment made by the petitioners is in accordance with law? 9. Disability has drawn the attention of the world wide community. Economic development is central to considerations of personal independence, self-edification and self-esteem. The provision for employment, entrepreneur opportunities and social security benefits would go a long way in making a person self-reliant. 9. Disability has drawn the attention of the world wide community. Economic development is central to considerations of personal independence, self-edification and self-esteem. The provision for employment, entrepreneur opportunities and social security benefits would go a long way in making a person self-reliant. The job insecurity or joblessness more often results in lot of foreboding even among the non-disabled employees and this is more so among the persons with disabilities. The persons with disabilities hates to avail benefits in the name of charity, alms, pity or sympathy. They want the society and Government to recognize their talent, ability and their basic right to work at par with other human beings. The concept of integration of persons with disabilities into mainstream of society is the principle underlining the law dealing with disabled persons. 10. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific Region, convened a meeting at Beijing, in December, 1992 to launch the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons, 1993-2002. In that meeting the proclamation on the Full Participation and Equality of people with disabilities in Asia and Pacific Region was adopted. India being a signatory to the above said proclamation, it was obligatory to enact suitable legislation. 11. The Constitution of India though does not specifically prescribe discrimination on the ground of disability' but contains non-discriminatory provisions, which guarantee equality and equal opportunities for all citizens. The Act is a principal legislation in India, which for the first time recognised the need to integrate persons with disabilities with the mainstream of society by some normative action. The State has a very important role to play through its legislations, policies and rules to provide employment to persons with disabilities. Viewed from the real context, it is not limited to mere pursuit of gainful occupation, but a fundamental question of human rights, social justice and economic independence. 12. Accordingly, the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, for short, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' was passed. The primary object of this Act was to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities. Yet another object was to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalisation of opportunities for persons with disabilities. 13. Yet another object was to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalisation of opportunities for persons with disabilities. 13. Chapter VI of the Act deals with Employment. An obligation is cast under Section 32 of the Act on the appropriate Government to identify posts in the establishments, which can be reserved for the persons with disability and periodical renewal of the list of posts identified, is to be done. Section 33 of the Act deals with reservation of posts. Every appropriate Government shall appoint in every establishment such percentage of vacancies not less than three percent for persons or class of persons with disability. Section 36 provides where in any recruitment year any vacancy under Section 33, cannot be filled up due to non-availability of a suitable person with disability or, for any sufficient reason, such vacancy shall be carried forward in the succeeding recruitment year. Ari obligation is cast on the employer to maintain records in relation to the persons with disability employed in the establishment under Section 37 of the Act. Section 38 provides schemes for ensuring employment of persons with disabilities. In fact, Section 41 provides for incentives to employers both in public and private sectors to ensure that at least five per cent of their work force is composed of persons with disabilities. The appropriate Governments shall be notification make schemes to provide aids and appliances to persons with disabilities. 14. The State took a policy decision to have reservation with a view to fulfil its constitutional objective as also its commitment to international community. A disabled is a disabled. They constitute a special class. The State in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution may make two types of reservations. Vertical and Horizontal. Social reservations in favour of SC, ST and OBC under Articles 16(4) are "vertical reservations". Special reservations in favour of physically handicapped, women etc., under Article 16(1) and 15(3) are "horizontal reservations". Horizontal reservations cut across the vertical reservations. Now the Government has provided 5% reservation to disabled persons in its services. 15. The legislative mandate and the constitutional obligation has to be kept in mind while giving effect to law. The law enforcing agencies are duty-bound to follow the law, and it is not open to them to allow their bias to defeat the lawful rights of the disabled persons. 15. The legislative mandate and the constitutional obligation has to be kept in mind while giving effect to law. The law enforcing agencies are duty-bound to follow the law, and it is not open to them to allow their bias to defeat the lawful rights of the disabled persons. The disabled persons too are equal citizens of the country and have as much share in its resources as any other citizen. The denial of their rights would not only be unjust and unfair to them and their families, but would create larger and grater problems for the society at large. What the law permits to them is no charity or largess but their right as equal citizens of the country. It is those laws which give preference to these persons who need the protection of the society and the State, speaks about the standard of a civilized State in the comity of nations. 16. The Apex Court in the case of Mahesh Gupta and Others Vs. Yashwant Kumar Ahirwar and Others reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5683, dealing with reservation of disabled persoris has held as under. "The State in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution may make two types of reservations-vertical and horizontal. Article 16(4) provides for vertical reservations; whereas Clause(1) of Article 16 provides for horizontal reservation. The State adopted a policy decision for filling up the reserved posts for handicapped persons. Such a reservation falling within Clause (1) of Article 16 of the Constitution has nothing to do with the object and purport sought to be achieved by reason of Clause (4) thereof. Disability has drawn the attention of the worldwide community. India is a signatory to various International Treaties and Conventions. The State, therefore, took a policy decision to have horizontal reservation with a view to fulfil its constitutional object as also its commitment to the international community. A disabled is a disabled. The question of making any further reservation on the basis of caste, creed or religion ordinarily may not arise. They constitute a special class. xxx xxx Handicapped candidates have not been further classified as belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and general category candidates." 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass and Another Vs. The question of making any further reservation on the basis of caste, creed or religion ordinarily may not arise. They constitute a special class. xxx xxx Handicapped candidates have not been further classified as belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and general category candidates." 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass and Another Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 534, has following things to say: "We understand that the concerned Officers were acting in what they believed to be the best interests of the Board. Still under the old mind-set it would appear to them just not right that Board should spend good money on someone who was no longer of any use. But they were quite wrong, seen from any angle. From the narrow point of view the officers were duty bound to follow the law and it was not open to them to allow their bias to defeat the lawful rights of the disabled employee. From the larger point of view the officers failed to realise that the disabled too are equal citizens of the country and have as much share in its resources as any other citizen. The denial of their rights would not only be unjust and unfair to them and their families but would create larger and graver problems for the society at large. What the law permits to them is no charity or largess but their right as equal citizens of the country." 18. Annexure-A is the notification dated 1.9.2007 by which applications were called for in the Belgaum Division for direct recruitment of teachers. It catergorically states that there are 8 education Districts in Belgaum Division and for recruiting eligible candidates for the posts mentioned therein by way of direct recruitment the notification is issued. It is also mentioned that the recruitment would be done in the light of the Karnataka Education Department Services (Department of Public Instruction) (Recruitment) Rules, 1967 and the amendments carried to the same on 21..5.1988, 24.6.2003 and 17.6.2006 and also in accordance with the reservation which is prevailing. Thus, candidates who are selected are appointed District wise (selection is Division wise, appointment is District wise.) The said fact that the selection is Division wise and appointment is District wise is reiterated in more than one place in the said notification. Annexure-B is the roaster providing for reservations. Thus, candidates who are selected are appointed District wise (selection is Division wise, appointment is District wise.) The said fact that the selection is Division wise and appointment is District wise is reiterated in more than one place in the said notification. Annexure-B is the roaster providing for reservations. Annexure-C is the horizontal reservation showing the reservations to persons who are eligible for reservation under Article 16(1) read with Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India. Annexure-D categorically states that 5% reservation is made in case of physically handicapped and in the roaster at Annexure-A they are to be filled at points 19, 39, 59, 79 and 99. . Annexure-E is a Government Order dated 4.1.2008 revising the horizontal reservation dated 22.11.2002 providing for reservation to disabled at point No.4 instead of point No. 19. Now, the question is whether the selection authority has kept in mind the Act, the Rules, the notification, the roasters and Government Orders in selecting and appointing the persons. 19. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the notification was issued Division wise in respect of all the four divisions in the State of Karnataka. The total number of posts to be filled up under the four notifications is 686, 5% of 686 would come to 34 posts. Therefore, in respect of 34 posts persons with physically disabled should have been selected and appointed. Out of the 686 posts 202 posts falls within Gulbarga Division; 196 posts in Mysore Division; 200 posts in Belgaum Division and 78 posts in Bangalore Division. Out of the 202 posts in Gulbarga Division, where 10 candidates belonging to physically handicapped category should have been selected, only 2 posts are filled up under the said category. In Mysore Division also they should have filed up 10 posts whereas only 1 post is filled up. In Belgaum Division and in Bangalore Division net even a single post is filled up by physically handicapped person. Thus, in all as against 34 posts only 3 posts are filled up by the physically handicapped persons. 20. The reason given is though recruitment was done on Division basis, appointments are made on District basis. The number of posts to be filled up in respect of each District was only19, 28, 24, 22,22, 23,23. Thus, in all as against 34 posts only 3 posts are filled up by the physically handicapped persons. 20. The reason given is though recruitment was done on Division basis, appointments are made on District basis. The number of posts to be filled up in respect of each District was only19, 28, 24, 22,22, 23,23. Either under the reserved category or under the general category the points fixed for physically disabled was 19 and, therefore, in none of the Districts there were posts to fill up these category of persons. In Belgaum Division though 183 posts had to be filled up, not one person belonging to the physically handicapped was able to get employment. The second respondent in this case hails from Chikodi, where the total number of posts to be filled up was 28 out of which 14 is reserved and 14 candidates in the general category and in both the categories the point fixed was 19 and.) therefore, he could not be accommodated. In fact the Government was conscious of this anomaly in the roaster which they have prepared. Therefore,. on 4.1.2008 as per Annexure-E they have modified the roaster. Now the point fixed for physically disabled is at point No.4 in both the categories. However, the said roaster is not applied to the present recruitment on the ground that the roaster came into force subsequent to the notification and it is only prospective. 21. Therefore, the authorities by such interpretation, have successfully nullified a parliamentary mandate and a constitutional obligation. Any rules, circulars, Government Orders, issued should be to implement this mandate of law and give effect to the constitutional obligation. If any such rule, regulation, order, is made which is contrary to the constitutional provisions or the statutory provisions it would have not effect and it cannot be enforced in a Court of law and it has to be ignored. 22. In the instant case, the notification categorically states recruitment by Division wise. Therefore, even by adapting the existing roster at point No. 19,5% among 183 candidates i.e., 9 candidates belonging to physically disabled category should have been recruited and appointed. It is after recruiting 183 persons, appointments could have been done District wise. It is at the stage of recruitment the roaster is to be operated and not at the time of appointment. It is after recruiting 183 persons, appointments could have been done District wise. It is at the stage of recruitment the roaster is to be operated and not at the time of appointment. Thus, by operating the roaster at the time of appointment, which is contrary to the terms of the notification itself, authorities have disobeyed the mandate of law. It only shows the mind set of the bureaucracy which is expected to implement the law. When the Legislature with laudable object passed the law, thus meeting not only the constitutional obligation, but also the international obligation, the benefit of law given to the persons to whom it was meant is denied by such obstructive tactics adopted by the bureaucracy. It is this approach which is found fault with by the Commissioner who is the authority, who is expected to see that this legislative mandate is properly implemented in the State. He was only performing his statutory obligation. It is when the executive misinterprets the law and negates the rule of law, thus depriving the benefit of the law, it becomes a solemn duty of this Court to strike out the said executive act and direct them to give effect to the legislative mandate. Therefore, the action of the first respondent-Commissioner is strictly in accordance with law and cannot be found fault with. 23. Now the question is what is the order to be passed to implement the mandate of law. 24. The Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities after noticing that the recruitment conducted by the State is illegal in-so-far as it violated the State policy and the Government Order granting 5% reservation to the' persons with disabilities, directed the State to withhold the recruitment process till the illegality pointed out is set right. However, under the cover of the interim order granted by this Court on 30.7.2008 for a period of three months, the State has proceeded to publish the final list of candidates. In the said final list published, it is made clear that "selection is subject to the final decision of this case". Therefore, all those persons who are recruited and appointed is subject to the decision of the Court. In the said final list published, it is made clear that "selection is subject to the final decision of this case". Therefore, all those persons who are recruited and appointed is subject to the decision of the Court. When the petitioner is unable to show any illegality in the impugned order, consequently the petition is unable to show any illegality in the impugned order, consequently the petition is to be dismissed on merits, the interim order granted cannot stand independently of the final order. It is settled legal position that an interim order is granted in aid of the main relief. When the party is not entitled to the main relief, consequently any benefit accrued or granted in pursuance of the interim order has no legal effect. At the same time the total number of persons recruited and appointed in so far as Belgaum Division is concerned is 183. It is only 9 posts out of 183 posts should be reserved for physically handicapped persons. Therefore, in-so-far as recruitment and appointment of teachers for 174 posts is concerned, there cannot be any challenge. The challenge could be only in respect of 9 posts provided there are 9 eligible candidates. Therefore it is not necessary to hold that in view of the dismissal of the Writ Petition, all the appointments made are illegal. Only appointment of 9 posts could be illegal, if there are nine eligible physically handicapped applicants. In those circumstances, the justice of the case would be met, by either directing the State to remove 9 persons from the aforesaid list and accommodate persons with physical disability who are otherwise eligible in the said list or create 9 additional posts and accommodate these physically handicapped candidates. Hence, I pass the following order:- (a) Writ Petition is dismissed. (b) Appointment of 9 persons according to the final list published in the event of there being 9 eligible physically handicapped persons who had applied against the notification, is hereby set aside. (c) It is open to the State to identify 9 candidates whose names should be removed from the final list and appoint the first respondent and others who are eligible to be appointed under the reserved category of physically handicapped persons or In the alternative create 9 additional posts and appoint the first respondent and others who are eligible under the reserved category of physically handicapped to the said post. (d) It is made clear that if there are no 9 applicants under the reserved category of handicapped persons, the number of posts to be so filled up could be proportionately reduced. (e) The petitioner is directed to pay the cost Rs. 5,000/- to the first respondent.