JUDGMENT :- (Appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C., against the decree in AS No. 74 of 2004 dated 25-01-2005 on the file of the Court of I Additional District Judge, Vizianagaram. Preferred against the decree in OS No. 149 of 1995 dated 03-09-2004 on the file of the Court of junior Civil Judge, Gajapathinagaram.) This Court on 1.4.2005 made the following order: “Admit, in view of substantial question of law raised in ground No. 9(a) and 9(b) of the Memorandum of grounds of appeal. In S.A.M.P. no. 744 of 2005 interim stay had been granted.” 2. S.A.M.P. No. 1417 of 2008 is filed to vacate the interim stay granted by this Court. While the vacate application is coming up for hearing, the counsel on record Ms. Umadevi representing Sri G. Rama Gopal, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri K.K. Kanakaraju, learned counsel representing the respondent made a request for final disposal of the second appeal itself. Hence the second appeal itself was finally heard by this Court at the request of the counsel on record. 3. The substantial questions of law on the strength of which the second appeal had been admitted specified supra are as hereunder: “(a) Whether the judgment of the appellant Court is vitiated for non following of mandatory procedure contemplated under Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. (b) Whether the Courts below applied the statutory presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 inasmuch as the Deed of Adoption under Ex. B-1 is a registered document.” 4. Ms. Umadevi, learned counsel representing the appellant also had further pointed out to yet another substantial question of law formulated in ground No. 9(c) of the Memorandum of grounds of second appeal and would maintain that this substantial question of law also may have to be gone into while disposing of the second appeal. B-1 is a registered document.” 4. Ms. Umadevi, learned counsel representing the appellant also had further pointed out to yet another substantial question of law formulated in ground No. 9(c) of the Memorandum of grounds of second appeal and would maintain that this substantial question of law also may have to be gone into while disposing of the second appeal. The said substantial question of law reads as hereunder: “(C) Whether the issue with respect to the adoption in the previous suit i.e., O.S. No. 20 of 1992 will constitute as res judicata under Section 11 of C.P.C. in the present suit O.S. No. 149 of 1995.” The learned counsel for the appellant had taken this Court through the historical back ground of the litigation, the respective stands taken by the parties, the evidence available on record, the findings recorded by the court of first instance and also the findings recorded by the appellant court and would maintain that when there is a deed of adoption, the presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for the purpose of convenience) being available, such findings cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also made certain submissions relating to the decree made in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 and pointed out that in the light of the findings recorded in the prior suit the validity of the adoption cannot be re-agitated again in the present suit and hence the decrees made by the courts below and the findings recorded are vitiated. The learned counsel also would maintain that even in the plaint specific plea had not been taken questioning the validity of the adoption as such and in the light of the same the findings recorded by the courts below cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also pointed out to the recitals of Ex. B-1 and also further pointed out certain findings recorded in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 in Ex. A-2 and would maintain that in the facts and circumstance of the case the courts below totally erred in granting relief’s in favour of the plaintiff on the strength of Ex. A-1. The learned counsel also pointed out to Exs. B-2 B-3, B-4 and B-5 as well and had taken this Court through the evidence of D. Ws. 1,2 and 3 also P. Ws. A-1. The learned counsel also pointed out to Exs. B-2 B-3, B-4 and B-5 as well and had taken this Court through the evidence of D. Ws. 1,2 and 3 also P. Ws. 1,2,3 and 4 and further also had pointed out to Exs. A-2 to A-4 and Exs. X1 to X-3. The learned counsel also placed reliance on certain decision to substantiate her submissions. 5. Per contra, Sri K. Kanakaraju, learned counsel representing the respondent –plaintiff had pointed out to the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the concurrent findings recorded by both the trial court and the appellate court and would maintain that in the light of the admission made by the present appellant as P.W.1 in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 to the effect that the plaint schedule properly is the self-acquired property to Taddi Ramu, the appellant cannot put forth any right whatsoever in relation to such property. Ex. A-4 is the certified copy of deposition in the said suit, The said Taddi Ramu on 19.2.1994 executed a registered sale deed Ex. A-1 in favour of the respondent-plaintiff in relation to the plaint schedule property and the said Taddi Ramu died on 23.5.1995. The counsel also would maintain that to prove the said sale deed respondent- plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and attester was examined as P.W.2. The learned counsel also had drawn attention of this Court to Section 13 of the Act. Further, the learned counsel also had drawn attention of this Court of Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Act as well and in all fairness the counsel would contend that presumption my be available under Section 16 of the Act. But, however, even in the light of the evidence available on record inasmuch as the adoption had not been duly proved, even otherwise the said adoption being invalid being in contravention of the provisions of the Act, the said concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below normally not be disturbed in a second appeal. The learned counsel also relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 6. The substantial question of law on the strength of which the second appeal had been admitted and the further substantial question of law, which had been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant also had been specified above. The learned counsel also relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 6. The substantial question of law on the strength of which the second appeal had been admitted and the further substantial question of law, which had been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant also had been specified above. For the purpose of convenience, the parties hereinafter would be referred to as shown in O.S. No. 149 of 1995 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Gajapathinagaram. 7. The suit was filed for declaration that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and for recovery of possession and to set aside the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 and for costs. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the trial court having recorded the evidence of P.W. s.1 to 4, D. Ws. 1 to 3 and having marked Exs. A-1 to A-4 Exs. X-1 to X-3 and Exs. B-1 to B-5 and came to the conclusion that the decree in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 cannot be set aside. But, however, the other relief’s had been granted. It appears initially the suit was disposed of. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant carried the matter in appeal in A.S. No. 88 of 1998 and the learned District Judge, Vizianagaram made an order of remand and even after the order of remand had been made, again the suit was decreed partly as specified above granting the declaration and recovery of possession. Though the relief, to set aside the decree in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 had been negatived, the unsuccessful defendant being aggrieved of the said decree and judgment carried the matter by way of appeal in A.S. No. 74 of 2005 on the file of the I Additional district Judge, Vizianagaram and the appellate court at Para 9 formulated the following point for consideration-whether there are any valid grounds to allow the appeal, recorded reasons commencing from paras 10 to 15 and ultimately dismissed the appeal with costs confirming the decree and judgment of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Gajapathinagaram in O.S. No. 149 of 1995, dated 3.9.2004. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal had been preferred. 8. It is no doubt true that the point for consideration formulated by the appellate court is not happily worded. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal had been preferred. 8. It is no doubt true that the point for consideration formulated by the appellate court is not happily worded. But, however, this Court had thoroughly scrutinized the findings recorded by the appellate court as paras 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 and this Court is satisfied all the aspect had been dealt with and appropriate findings had been recorded. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gorrella Durga Vara Prasada Rao v. Indukuri Ram Raju 2002(2) ALT 589 (D.B) wherein the learned Division Bench observed that even would framing specific point for determination, the appellate court in its judgment dealing with all grounds taken in memorandum of appeal and giving decision on those grounds with reasons amounts in sufficient compliance with Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. The other substantial question of law, which had been pointed out supra while making submissions by Ms. Umadevi, is ground No. 9(c), which had been already referred to above. In O.S. No. 20 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif, Gajapathinagaram, the first plaintiff is transposed as 4th defendant as per the orders dated 26.9.1994 in I.A. No. 23 of 1994. The suit is for permanent injunction. Thus issues, which had been settled in the said suit, are as hereunder: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed by him? 2. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? Ex. B-3, dated 19.2.1994, in the said suit is the registered sale deed executed by D-4. Ex. A-1 is the registered adoption deed dated 9.10.1986. Exs. A-1, A-2, B-1 and B-2 also had been marked and the evidence of P.W. s.1 and 2 and D.W.1 is available on record. However, the aforesaid suit was decreed granting permanent injunction restraining defendants 1 and 3 and their men from ever interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of he plaint schedule land until the rights of the plaintiff and the first defendant in pursuance of Ex. B-3 are decided. It is needless to say that the present suit had been instituted on the strength of the said Ex. B-3 sale deed. B-3 are decided. It is needless to say that the present suit had been instituted on the strength of the said Ex. B-3 sale deed. It is pertinent to note that the said suit is for permanent injunction and specifically liberty was given to the present plaintiff to agitate his rights on the strength of the sale deed. 9. In Madhavi Amma Bhawani V. Kunjikjuty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai AIR 2000 SC 201 the Apex Court at para 7 observed as under: “Within the said parameter now we proceed to examine the question raised in this appeal. The principle of res Judicata as enshrined in Section 11, is evolved from the maxim “memo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa”. This principle enunciates that no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause. This principle gradually developed further by bringing within its compass more such litigations. Thus with the passage of time this principle gradually expanded. This shows that sphere of res judicata as enshrined in Section 11, C.P.C. is not exhaustive, it is ever growing. One such example of its growth is exhibited by the incorporation of Explanation VIII in Section 11 by means of Amending Act in 1976. The submissions made are broadly under two heads. Firstly under the broad and general principle of res judicata in view of Explanation VIII and secondly, whether in a proceeding for the grant of Succession Certificate, any adjudication or issue decided therein would operate as res judicata to a suit proceeding. In order to apply the general principle of res judicata Court must first find, whether an issue in a subsequent suit was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit or proceeding, was it between the same parties, and was it decided by such Court. Thus there should be an issue raised and decided, not merely any finding on any incidental question for reaching such a decision. So if no such issue is raised and if on any other issue, if incidentally any finding is recorded it would not come within the periphery of the principle of res judicate.” 10. Thus there should be an issue raised and decided, not merely any finding on any incidental question for reaching such a decision. So if no such issue is raised and if on any other issue, if incidentally any finding is recorded it would not come within the periphery of the principle of res judicate.” 10. In the light of the same and also in the light of the evidence recorded in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 and on the strength of the issues settled inasmuch as specific opportunity and liberty had been given to the present plaintiff to agitate his right on the strength of the sale deed, it cannot be said that the plea of adoption had been finally decided in the prior suit and hence the said question cannot be reagitated in the present suit and the stand taken that this would operate as res Judicata in the light of Section 11 of C.P.C in the present suit cannot be accepted. The other substantial question of law, which had been argued in elaboration, is in relation to the validity of the adoption in the light of the availability of the registered deed of adoption Ex. B-1 and in the light of statutory presumption available under Section 16 of the Act. 11. Before taking up further discussion on this question, it is appropriate to have a glance at the respective pleadings of the parties. It was averred in the plaint that the father or the plaintiff and father of the defendants and one Taddi Ramu are brother and they had no any ancestral property. The said three brothers divided long back. The defendant is the cousin of the plaintiff. The said Taddi Ramu used to do business and acquired some movable and immovable properties of his own including the plaint schedule. During his life time, the said Ramu who is the junior paternal uncle of both the plaintiff and defendant purchased the suit schedule property from Sagirau Venkata Satyanarayana Rau and others by means of a registered sale deed dated 11.7.1979 and used to enjoy the said land. While so, the defendant and the said Taddi Ramu colluded together with the active support of Taddi Chinnamnaidu @ Chinnayya and brought a suit O.S. No. 20 of 1992 on the file of District Munsif, Gajapathinagaram against the plaintiff, his brother and father. While so, the defendant and the said Taddi Ramu colluded together with the active support of Taddi Chinnamnaidu @ Chinnayya and brought a suit O.S. No. 20 of 1992 on the file of District Munsif, Gajapathinagaram against the plaintiff, his brother and father. Prior to filing of the above suit, the plaintiff, his brother and father used to cultivate and enjoy the suit schedule property. But, the court was pleased to restrain the plaintiff herein, his brother and father from entering into the suit schedule land by its order in I.A.NO.188 of 1992. While so, to put an end to the litigation, the said Taddi Ramu and the plaintiff herein came to an agreement as per the advice of elders and accordingly the said Taddi Ramu agreed to sell away the suit schedule land to the plaintiff and the plaintiff agreed to purchase the suit schedule land for Rs. 26,000/- Accordingly on 19.2.1994 the said Taddi Ramu sold away the said property for Rs. 26,000/- to the plaintiff by means of a registered sale deed and delivered the suit schedule land to the plaintiff and thus the plaintiff has became the absolute owner of the said property and used to enjoy the same. While so, on 27.3.1995 the court was pleased to decree the suit O.S. No. 20 of 1992 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants restraining them to enter into the suit schedule land. While passing the decree, the court observed that the defendants are restrained until the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant in pursuance of Ex. B-3 i.e., sale deed dated 19.2.1994 executed by Taddi Ramu in favour of the plaintiff are decided. By virtue of the said order, again the plaintiff did not enter into the said schedule land. About three months back the said Ramu died, thereafter about two month back, the defendant entered into the plaint schedule land and raised paddy crop. Hence the plaintiff filed the suit for the reliefs as mentioned supra. 12. The defendant filed his written statement denying the averments of the plaints and contended, inter alia, that the father of the plaintiff Taddi Chandrayya had two brothers by name Taddi Chinnayya @ Chinnmnaidu and Tadi Ramu. The three brothers divided their joint family property and began to live separately. Tadi Ramu had no issues. 12. The defendant filed his written statement denying the averments of the plaints and contended, inter alia, that the father of the plaintiff Taddi Chandrayya had two brothers by name Taddi Chinnayya @ Chinnmnaidu and Tadi Ramu. The three brothers divided their joint family property and began to live separately. Tadi Ramu had no issues. So he adopted Taddi Musalayya @ Musalionaidu, who is the natural son of his elder brother Taddi Chinnayya, executed a registered adoption deed dated 9.10.1986 in token of adopting this defendant as his son. Since then, this defendant was treated by the said Taddi Ramu as his adopted son. The father of the plaintiff did not like his younger brother Taddi Ramu taking this defendants as his adopted son, as he asked the said Ramu to adopt one of his sons. But, much against the wish of Taddi Chandrayya, Ramu had taken this defendant as his adopted son. So Taddi Chandrayya and his family members including the plaintiff herein were enmically disposed of towards this defendant as his adoptive father Taddi Ramu. Out of the said enmity, the plaintiff, his father and his other brothers tried to trespass into the plaint schedule land using force. So, the defendant herein and his adoptive father Ramu filed the suit O.S. No. 20 of 1922 on the file of the District Munisif Court, Gajapathinagaram against the plaintiff herein, his father and other members of the plaintiff’s joint family. While the suit O.S. No. 20 of 1992 was pending, the plaintiff, his father and other family members prevailed upon Taddi Ramu and whom him over their side. So, this defendant alone continues the suit transposing his adoptive father Taddi Ramu as D-4 in the said suit. However, the said the plaintiff herein, his father, his brother and D-4 in respect of the suit schedule property therein, which is the subject matter of this suit. During pendency of the said suit O.S. No. 20 of 1992, the plaintiff, herein, his father Chandrayya and other defendants contended therein that they got a registered sale deed 19.2.1994 for the plaint schedule land. But, the court did not believe the recitals in the sale deed dated 19.2.1994 executed in favour of the plaintiff herein. The sale deed is not supported by any consideration and it appears that it has bee executed nominally. But, the court did not believe the recitals in the sale deed dated 19.2.1994 executed in favour of the plaintiff herein. The sale deed is not supported by any consideration and it appears that it has bee executed nominally. This defendant is not a party to the said registered sale deed, even though he is a coparcener of the joint family consisting of this defendant and his adoptive father Ramu. The consideration of Rs. 26,000/- obtained under the sale deed dated 19.2.1994 was not paid to Taddi Ramu. Further, Taddi Ramu also did not figure as a witness in the said suit O.S. No. 20 of 1992 since the plaintiff and his father failed to pay any consideration to the said Ramu after getting the registered sale deed dated 19.2.1994. So, the said sale deed is not binding on this defendant. This defendant and his adoptive father Taddi Ramu constitute a Hindu joint family and there was no partition between them. Taddi Ramu died intestate in undivided status with this defendant. Since the plaintiff alleged that he purchased the undivided interest of Ramu in the plaint schedule land, he has to file a suit for general partition of all the properties of Taddi Ramu and get the plaint schedule property allotted to Ramu and thereby get the plaint schedule property allotted to Ramu by having a notional partition. Instead of doing so, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his title of the plaint schedule land, which is not maintainable and consequently the plaintiff also cannot seek for possession of the plaint schedule land. The Court had passed the decree in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 in favour of this defendant and against the plaintiff and others for the very land described in the schedule attached to the plaint. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the decree and judgment passed by the court in another suit and it has no power to set aside its own judgments rendered on merits. So the relief asked by the plaintiff to set aside the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Gajapathinagaram, cannot be granted. The father of the plaintiff viz., Taddi Chandrayya, the wife and daughter of the plaintiff’s deceased brother Taddi Satyam are necessary parties to the suit. So the relief asked by the plaintiff to set aside the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Gajapathinagaram, cannot be granted. The father of the plaintiff viz., Taddi Chandrayya, the wife and daughter of the plaintiff’s deceased brother Taddi Satyam are necessary parties to the suit. Similarly, Koyyana Yerrayyamma w/o. Ramana of Denkada village who filed a suit in O.S. No. 146 of 1995 for recovery of certain amount alleging that Taddi Ramu borrowed the said suit during his life time is a necessary party as she can proceed against the assets of the deceased Taddi Ramu, if the suit is decreed in her favour. So the suit bad for non-jointer of parties. 13. On the strength of these pleadings the following issues and additional issues had been settled before the trial court: 1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 2. Whether the court fee paid by the plaintiff is true and correct? 3. Whether any partition took place between the defendant and his adoptive father Taddi Ramu? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek the relief of his set aside decree and judgments in O.S. No. 20 of 1992 on the file of this court is maintainable or not? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek the relief of declaration of title and possession of the plaint schedule property as prayed for? 7. To what relief? Additional Issues: 1. Whether the adoption set up by the defendant that he is the adopted son of Taddi late Ramu is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? 2. Whether the defendant is entitled to a share in the plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaint schedule property is ancestral property of Taddi late Ramu and that the defendant is entitled to a share in the plaint schedule property is true or not? 4. To what relief? 14. During the course of trial, on behalf of plaintiff P. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-4 were marked and on behalf of defendant D. Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-5 was marked. Exs. X-1 to X-3 was also marked as already referred to supra. 4. To what relief? 14. During the course of trial, on behalf of plaintiff P. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-4 were marked and on behalf of defendant D. Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-5 was marked. Exs. X-1 to X-3 was also marked as already referred to supra. Though initially the suit was disposed of, the learned District Judge, Vizianagaram in A.S. No. 88 of 1998 made an order of remand. After the order or remand, again the suit was decreed. It appears after the remand was made certain further documents had been marked. 15. Section 16 of the Act reads as under: “Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoptions:- Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved” Ex-B-1 is the registered adoption deed dated 9.10.1986. The words “the court shall presume that the adoption has been made incompliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved” would some importance. Section 13 of the Act deals with right of adoptive parent to dispose of their properties subject to any agreement to the contrary, an adoption does not deprive and adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter vivo or by will. Section 13 of the aforesaid Act confers absolute power to dispose of property by adoptive father or mother when there is no agreement to the contrary. There is evidence to show that this property is self-acquired property of the adoptive father, the alleged adoptive father. It is pertinent to note that the adoption is in dispute. Even otherwise concurrent findings had been recorded relating to the validity of adoption and the said adoption was held to be invalid, not being in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act. Section 6 of the Act deals with requisites of a valid adoption. Section 7 deals with capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption. Section 8 deals with capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption. Section 6 of the Act deals with requisites of a valid adoption. Section 7 deals with capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption. Section 8 deals with capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption. Section 9 deals with persons capable of giving in adoption. Section 10 deals with person who may be adopted. Section 11 deals wit other conditions for a valid adoption. Section 12 deals with effects of adoption. In the light of the admission made relating to the nature of the property being self-acquired property of the alleged adoptive father, in the light of Section 13 of the aforesaid Act, the validity of Ex-A.1, needs no elaborate discussion. 16. But, however, since the counsel on record made elaborate submissions in relation to Ex. B-1 and further in the context of Exs B-2, B-3, B-4 and B-5 as well, this Court is inclined to discuss this question a bit further. D.W.1 claims to be adoptive son of Taddi Ramu. Ex. B-1 is the registered adoption deed dated 9.10.1986. D.W.2 is the father-in-law of D.W.1. D.W.3 is the attester of Ex. B-1. The evidence of D.W.2 would go to show that the intention of executing Ex. B-1 was to give the daughter of D.W.2 and with that view only the said deed came into force and D.W.2 also deposed that by the time of adoption, no profit officiated and no formalities had taken place. Thus the evidence of D. W. 2. would go to show that there was no giving or taking and the other essential ceremonies of adoption had not been observed at the time of adoption. Except the evidence of D.W.2 and D.W.3 apart from the evidence of D.W.-1, no other evidence had been placed before the court to prove adoption. Further on appreciation of evidence finding also had been recorded that Ex. B-1 was executed and further finding had been recorded that Ex. B-1 was executed and further finding had been recorded that the alleged adoptive son being the only son could not have been given in adoption. Certain findings had been recorded relating to want of consent of natural parents inclusive of the mother and also the non-examination of natural parents to prove the factum of adoption. 17. B-1 was executed and further finding had been recorded that the alleged adoptive son being the only son could not have been given in adoption. Certain findings had been recorded relating to want of consent of natural parents inclusive of the mother and also the non-examination of natural parents to prove the factum of adoption. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant no doubt placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in P. Ramaswamy v. K. Surya Prakasa Rao 1993(2) ALT 503 wherein the learned Judge at para 2 observed as under: “With utmost respect to the learned Judge I have to point out that the above quoted passage overlooks the statutory provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Section 16 of the Act contemplates a statutory presumption. The wording of Section 16 is very significant. Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person given and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.” 18. Sri. K. Kanakarau, learned counsel representing the respondent placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Lakshman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar AIR 1961 SC 1378 wherein the Apex Court observed as paras 10 and 11 as under: “The lay may be briefly stated thus: Under the Hindu Law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption is absolutely to secure due publicity. To achieve this object it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it. The exigencies of the situation arising out of diverse circumstances necessitated the introduction of the doctrine of delegation; and, therefore, the parents, after exercising their volition to give and take the boy in adoption, may both or either of them delegate the physical act of handing over the boy or receiveing him, as the case may be, to a third party. In the present case, none of the aforesaid conditions has been satisfied. The High Court found that Zalim Singh and Moti Singh did not decide to take the boy in adoption on February 14, 1923. The High court further found that their common intention was to take the boy in adoption only after he was admitted in Gurukul or thereafter. The documents filed and the oral evidence adduced in the case establish that the adoptive father did not delegate his power to give the body in adoption to Moti Singh to Hira Lal and that Moti Singh did not receive the boy as a part of the ceremony of adoption, but only received him with a view of send him to Gurukul. We, therefore, hold that the ceremony of giving and taking which is very essential for the validity of an adoption, had not taken place in this case.” 19. The counsel also relied on a decision in Sawan Ram v. Mst. Kalawanti and others AIR 1967 SC 1761 wherein the Apex Court at para 3 observed as under: “This point raised on behalf of the appellant is negatived by the evidence on the record. There is oral evidence of adoption which has been accepted by the lower Courts, and it shows that Deep Chand was given in adoption by both the parents to Smt. Bhagwani. Even the deed of adoption dated 24th August, 1959 on which, reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant in support of this argument, does not bear out the suggestion that Deep Chand was given in adoption by his mother and not by his father. Even the deed of adoption dated 24th August, 1959 on which, reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant in support of this argument, does not bear out the suggestion that Deep Chand was given in adoption by his mother and not by his father. The deed clearly mentions that “the parents of Deep Chand have, of their own free will, given Deep Chand to me, the executants, today as my adopted Son,” This recitation is followed by a sentence which states: Mst. Kala Wanti, mother of Deep Chand, has put her thumb-mark hereunder in token of her consent.” It was from this solitary sentence that inference was sought to be drawn that Deep Chand had been given in adoption by his mother, Kalawanti and not by the father. The deed, in the earlier sentence quoted above, clearly mentions that Deep Chand had been given in adoption by his “parents” which necessarily includes the father. This later sentence, it appears was put in the deed, because S. 9(2) of the Act mentions that the father is not to exercise his right of giving his child in adoption, save with the consent of the mother. “The consent of the mother” having been used in the Act which was applicable, the draftsmen of the deed included in it the fact the Dee Chand’s mother had actually given her consent and obtained her thumb impression in token thereof. This mention of the consent cannot, in these circumstances, be held to show that it was the mother who, in fact, gave the child in adoption and not the father.” 20. In A. Ragavamma V. A.Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136 the Apex Court held that it is well settled that a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity and further held that it is well known that ordinarily an only son is neither given nor taken in adoption. The learned counsel also placed reliance on a decision reported in Dhanraj v. Smt. Suraj Bai AIR 1975 SC 1103 . In Madan Lal V. Mst. The learned counsel also placed reliance on a decision reported in Dhanraj v. Smt. Suraj Bai AIR 1975 SC 1103 . In Madan Lal V. Mst. Gopi AIR 1980 SC 1754 the Apex Court held that the deed of adoption was invalid as the adopter could not be said to be in a fit state of mind to execute the deed of adoption. 21. It is no doubt true that presumption is available under Section 16 of the Act in relation to the registered adoption deed. But, however, the words “the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved” would assume some importance. It is no doubt true an attempt was made to prove the adoption deed in question by examining D.W.1, D.W.2 and D.W.3, the attester. 22. When the evidence available on record had been taken into consideration and the fact that the alleged adoptive son was the only son of the natural parents being not in serious controversy and on appreciation of the evidence available on record further findings had been recorded that by the date of adoption he was a married person and further finding had been recorded the giving and taking and other ceremonies of adoption had not been established and absolutely no acceptable evidence had been placed in there regard such findings recorded, despite the fact of registered deed of adoption is in existence, by both the courts below in relation to the validity of adoption normally not to be disturbed in the second appeal. 23. No doubt certain submissions were made to the effect that no specific plea relating to the validity of adoption as such had been taken in the plaint. It is needless to say this question was put into the issue. Further it is not as though for the first time this question had been raised even in the prior litigation the said question was raised. But, however, while disposing the prior suit liberty was given to the plaintiff to agitate his rights on the strength of the title deed Ex. A-1 by an appropriate proceeding. 24. On a thorough examination of the evidence recorded by both the courts of first instance and also the appellate court inasmuch as the suit had been decreed relating to the declaration of title on the strength of Ex. A-1 by an appropriate proceeding. 24. On a thorough examination of the evidence recorded by both the courts of first instance and also the appellate court inasmuch as the suit had been decreed relating to the declaration of title on the strength of Ex. A-1 title deed and since the said property was the self-acquired property of the alleged adoptive father at the relevant point of time and he had the power of dispossession of the property, such findings do not suffer from any illegality warranting interference in second appeal. The findings recorded by the courts below are hereby confirmed. 25. Accordingly, the second appeal shall stand dismissed with costs.