Smti. Anima Hazarika, J.;- Challenge is made in the instant revision petition to the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 09.03.98 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati in C.R. Case No.2423 of 1996, confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Guwahati on 03. 12.2001 in Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1998 whereby and whereunder the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs, 20,0007-(Rupees twenty thousand) and in default, simple imprisonment of 3 (three) months in a case initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (as amended). 2. At the commencement of hearing submission has been made by the counsel of the accused petitioner drawing the attention of the Court of the evidence of PW1 wherein he, during the trial, had stated that he was ready to accept the cheque amount which was returned for insufficiency of the fund and accordingly the petitioner herein is ready and willing to pay the amount for which the prosecution was launched and sentenced as aforesaid, the offence being made compoundable but the said offer has been turned down by the opposite party. Therefore, the case proceeded for hearing on merit. 3. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows- The complainant is a partnership firm represented by Shri Subhash Sethi, PW1 dealing with cloth materials, wheras the accused petitioner is a businessman and deals in cloth materials and carried his business in the name and style M/s. Prince Textile, Ganeshguri Chariali, Dispur, Guwahati, who had issued an Account Payee Cheque for Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) in favour of the complainant being cheque No. 260699 dated 20.10.96 drawn upon Central Bank of India, Dispur Chariali Branch, Guwahati against part payment of the balance standing in his debit account against purchase of cloth materials by him on credit from time to time. The said cheque was presented for encashment on three dates but it was dishonoured and returned to the drawer with endorsement that the cheque could not be honoured for want of sufficient fund. The complainant therefore, issued a registered legal notice on 05.11.96 to the accused petitioner which was duly served upon him on 12.11.96. However, the accused petitioner paid Rs. The complainant therefore, issued a registered legal notice on 05.11.96 to the accused petitioner which was duly served upon him on 12.11.96. However, the accused petitioner paid Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) on 02.12.96 and the remaining balance amount, the accused did not pay in spite of notice served upon him and hence a criminal case was tiled by the complainant against the accused under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Summon was issued to the accused for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, he appeared before the Court and pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 4. During the trial the complainant has examined himself as PW1 and other three P Ws were examined to bring home the charge under Section 138 of the Act. PW4 Postal Inspector was brought to prove as to whether the notice was duly served on the accused petitioner or not. The learned trial Court in order to determine the case formulated three points which are quoted hereunder- (1) Whether the complaint is maintain­able under the law? (2) Whether the requisite notice as provided under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act has been served upon the accused person? (3) Whether the accused person has committed any offence as alleged? 5. The learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the complainant held that the accused had issued a cheque of Rs. 20,000/- which was dishonoured and after receipt of legal notice the accused paid an amount of Rs. 10,000/- but failed to pay the balance amount as required under Section 138 of the Act. In regard to service of legal notice the learned trial Court has held that on careful reading of the Exts. 9,10 as well as 11, whereby the postal department informed that the notice was duly delivered to the addressee (accused) on 12.11.96, it could well be presumed that he had received the same. The said witness PW1 was not cross-examined challenging the veracity of the evidence. The accused has, however, denied to have received the notice Ext. 9. The stand taken by the accused is that the postal receipt having not been properly addressed, it cannot be presumed under the law that the notice has been duly served. The said witness PW1 was not cross-examined challenging the veracity of the evidence. The accused has, however, denied to have received the notice Ext. 9. The stand taken by the accused is that the postal receipt having not been properly addressed, it cannot be presumed under the law that the notice has been duly served. However, the learned trail Court after going through the entire evidence on record has answered the point Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative and against the defence. 6. In determining the point No.3 the learned trial Court has considered the submissions made by the acused that the cheque was issued vide Ext-1 in favour of the complainant on the understanding that the complainant will present the cheque in question for clearance after three months. In support of his submissions the defence has examined one witness Shri Jagadish Prasad Aryaas DW 1 who deposed that on 20.10.96 the accused issued the cheque with the understanding that the cheque will be presented after three months for clearance, meaning thereby that the cheque was post dated which in fact, was not a post dated cheque, more so when the accused made payment of Rs. 10,000/- on 02.12.96 before the period of payment agreed by the parties as alleged and therefore the learned trial Court answered the point in the affirmative and against the accused. 7. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence adduced in the case has held that the accused failed to pay the amount and thereby he had committed an offence punishable under Section 13 8 of the Act. The Court hence convicted the accused and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/-(Rupes twenty thousand) in default S.T. for 3 (three) months. 8. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence the appellant preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1998 before the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati. The learned appellate Court after detailed dissension of the materials on record and the submissions made thereto confirmed the order of conviction and sentence on 03.12.2001 passed by the learned trial Court holding mat no case is made out for interference. 9. The learned appellate Court after detailed dissension of the materials on record and the submissions made thereto confirmed the order of conviction and sentence on 03.12.2001 passed by the learned trial Court holding mat no case is made out for interference. 9. The aggrieved accused invoked the Revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challen­ging the legality and validity of the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup. Guwahati affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court as aforesaid. 10. Heard Mr. R.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party/ complainant. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the accused petitioner would submit that the accused had, in fact, issued the cheque on 20.10.96 with the understanding that the complainant would present the same for clearance after three months as agreed by the parties and therefore he cannot be fastened with the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, more so, when he had parted with an amount of Rs. 10,000/-on02.12,96and the remainaing amount of Rs. 10,0007-would have been paid had there been no initiation of case. 12. The counsel would further argue that the mandatory provision under Section 13 8 of the Act has not been proved to the effect that the notice was not duly served on the accused. The counsel has drawn the attention of the Court relating to Ext. 9 and 10 i.e. postal receipt and the evidence of PW 4, Postal Inspector, Admittedly, in the postal receipt i.e. Ex 1.10, the name of the accused and address was only written "at Guwahati". Therefore it cannot be exclusively proved that the legal notice Ext. 9 was served upon the accused, more so when PW 4 could not satisfy the Court confronted with such questions and therefore urged that the interference is required in exercise of Revisional jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Countering the submission made by the counsel appearing for the accused appellant, the counsel appearing for the opposite party would submit that the issue of cheque of debt and dishonour of the same for insufficieny of fund is not disputed by the accused petitioner. 13. Countering the submission made by the counsel appearing for the accused appellant, the counsel appearing for the opposite party would submit that the issue of cheque of debt and dishonour of the same for insufficieny of fund is not disputed by the accused petitioner. The only point disputed by the accused petitioner is service of demand notice upon him as required under Section 138(b) of the Act. In regard to service of demand notice the counsel has drawn the attention of the evidence of P W1 and PW 4. The demand notice under Section 138(b) of the Act sent by Registered Post with Acknowledgement due was sent on 05.11.96 vide Ext. 9 and the postal receipt vide Ext. 10. The notice was addressed to Md. Muslim, proprietor of M/s. Prince Textile, Ganeshguri Chariali, Dispur. However the A/D card was not received back to which he gave a letter on 05.12.96 whereby the Sr. Postmaster, Guwahati GPO was requested to make an enquiry as to whether the demand notice was delivered to the petitioner by the postal department. Vide Ext. 11 the Sr. Postmaster confirmed service of Registered letter No. 4231 dated 05,11.96 to the addressee (i.e. the petitioner) on 12.11.96 and therefore urged that service of demand notice was duly served, moreso, thereafter the accused made payment of Rs. 10,000/- on 02.12.96 after issue of notice and before filing of the complaint case on 19.12.96. Learned counsel therefore urged that there is no scope for interference with the impugned judgment and orders. The counsel would further refer the provision of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 whereby the meaning of "Service by Post" is specified as well as Sections 16 and 114 of the Evidence Act. In support of his contentions the counsel has referred the following decisions- (1) AIR 1971 Kerala 23l : Ayisabuvi Vs. Aboobakker. (2) AIR 1974SC517:Swantraj Vs. State of Maharshtra. (3) (1996) 7SCC523:StateofM.P, Vs. Hiralal & Ors. (4) AIR 1998 SC 1057 :Modi Cement Ltd. Vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, (5) (1999) 7 SCC 510 : K. Bhakaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr.' (6) (1999) SLT 254 (SC): NEPC Micon Ltd Vs. Meghna Leasing Ltd. (7) AIR 2001 SC 518 ; Ratan Lal Agarwal Vs. State of Assam (8) (2002) 10 SCC 538 : Harban Singh Vs. State of Delhi & Anr, (9) (2004) 11 SCC 398 : Subhash Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr.' (6) (1999) SLT 254 (SC): NEPC Micon Ltd Vs. Meghna Leasing Ltd. (7) AIR 2001 SC 518 ; Ratan Lal Agarwal Vs. State of Assam (8) (2002) 10 SCC 538 : Harban Singh Vs. State of Delhi & Anr, (9) (2004) 11 SCC 398 : Subhash Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. 14. Considered the submissions made by the respective counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. Also considered the evidence on record. Admittedly the cheque was issued on 20.10.96 by the accused in favour of the complainant, which, however, was dishon­oured on presentation. The cheque so issued is admittedly by the accused and only argument advanced in regard to service of demand notice on the accused. Exts. 9, 10 and 11 would show that the demand notice was served on the accused as proved by PW 4 Postal Inspector and therefore the Court has no hestitation to hold that the accused is guilty of offence punishable under Section 13 8 of the Act. 15. The cases referred to an relied upon and the provisions of General Clauses Act and Evidence Act have not been discussed as it would burden the judgment in the case when the Court has already found that the accused is guilty of offence punishable under the Act. There is another factor for not interfering with the judgment of conviction and sentence in view of the provisions of the Act. As observed by the Apex Court in Electronic Trade and Technology Develoment Corporation Ltd. Vs. Indian Technologists and Engineers reported in (1996) 2 SCC 739 , the object of bringing Section 138 in the Act is to inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking operations and credibility in transacting business on negotiable instruments. The provison is intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of negotiable instruments in issuing cheques without sufficient funds or with a view to inducing the payee or holder in due course to act upon it. It thus seeks to promote the efficacy of banking operations and ensures credibility in transacting business through cheques. The Negotiable Instruments Act has undergone a change by Amendment Act, 2002 (55 of 2002) whereby punishment and other provisions of the Act have also been amended to promote the efficacy of banking transactions/opeartions and ensures credibility in transacting business through cheques. 16. In Dalmia Cement (Rharat) Ltd. Vs. The Negotiable Instruments Act has undergone a change by Amendment Act, 2002 (55 of 2002) whereby punishment and other provisions of the Act have also been amended to promote the efficacy of banking transactions/opeartions and ensures credibility in transacting business through cheques. 16. In Dalmia Cement (Rharat) Ltd. Vs. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 463 at para 3 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as thus:- "3. The Act was enacted and Section 138 thereof incorporated with a specified object of making a special provision by incorporating a strict liability so far as the cheque, a negotiable instrument, is concerned. The law relating to negotiable instruments is the law of commerical world legislated to facilitate the activities in trade and commerce making provision of giving sanctity to the instruments of credit which could be deemed to be convertible into money and easily passable from one person to another. In the absence of such instruments, including a cheque, the trade and commerce activities in the present day world, are likely to be adversely affected as it is impracticable for the trading community to carry on with it the bulk of the currency in force. The negotiable instruments are in tact the instruments of credit being convertible on account of legality of being negotiated and are easily passable from one hand to another. To achieve the objectives of the Act, the legislature has, in its wisdom, thought it proper to make such provisions in the Act for conferring such privileges to the mercantile instruments contemplated under it and provide special penalties and procedure in case the obligations under the instruments are not discharged. The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, required to be interpreted in the light of the objects intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviations from the general law and the procedure provided for the redressal of the grievances to the litigants. Efforts to defeat the objectives of law by resorting to innovative measures and methods are to be discouraged, lest it may affect the commercial and mercantile activities in a smooth and healthy manner, ultimately affecting the economy of the country." 17. Efforts to defeat the objectives of law by resorting to innovative measures and methods are to be discouraged, lest it may affect the commercial and mercantile activities in a smooth and healthy manner, ultimately affecting the economy of the country." 17. Keeping in view the provisions of the Act and the admitted position out in the facts of the case as well as observations made by the Apex Court in Electronic Trade & Technology (supra) and Dalmia Cement (supra) this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court confirmed by the appellate Court. 18. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. 19. Registry is directed to send down the records immediately.