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2008 DIGILAW 764 (AP)

Mahagopal Singh (died) Per L. R. v. Neela Singh

2008-09-12

A.GOPAL REDDY, S.ASHOK KUMAR

body2008
JUDGMENT (Per A.Gopal Reddy, J.) These two intra court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent by the plaintiffs are against common judgment dt. 3-4-2000 passed in CCCA Nos.38 and 53 of 1986 whereunder a learned single Judge of this court allowed CCCA NO.38/1986 filed by the defendant No.1 and set-aside the judgment of the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (Temporary) dt. 31-12-1985 passed in as No.132/1984 and dismissed the suit as No.132/1984 filed by the plaintiffs for partition and separate possession of the suit house and dismissed CCCA No.53/1986 filed by the plaintiffs. 2. Since both the appeals arise out of the same judgment, they were clubbed together and were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to these appeals will be referred to as arrayed in the suit. 4. Factual backdrop of the appeals, which are relevant for their disposal, needs to be noted in brief: The plaintiffs, Maha Gopal Singh and Nehal Singh and the first defendant, Neela Singh, are the sons and defendants 2 and 3 are the daughters of late Sardar Maha Singh, who died on 12-5-1972. The plaintiffs filed the suit for partition of suit schedule house into three shares and allot 2/3 share to the plaintiffs and the remaining 1/3 share to the defendants stating that late Sardar Maha Singh who was employed in the office of the Director General of Police of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad was retired from. service on 31-3-1947 on a pension of Rs.41-51 paise having drawn a pay of less than Rs.1001- per month. Late Maha Singh spent all his savings for the marriage expenses of the first plaintiff and his first daughter while he was in service. He also commuted a portion of his pension to meet the family expenses and also for the marriage of the second plaintiff. He celebrated the marriage of his first daughter in the year 1944. For the said purpose, he had to sell the ancestral joint family house situate at Warangal. Thus, he had no assets by the end of 1954. Due to commutation, his pension was also reduced to RS.209-94 per month. He celebrated the marriage of his first daughter in the year 1944. For the said purpose, he had to sell the ancestral joint family house situate at Warangal. Thus, he had no assets by the end of 1954. Due to commutation, his pension was also reduced to RS.209-94 per month. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 joined employment in the year 1943 and 1945 respectively and they have been regularly contributing funds for the maintenance of the joint family till the death of their father in May, 1972. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 left the family house in 1953 and 1954 respectively for want of accommodation by allowing their parents and other members of the joint family to live comfortably. The suit house, in which the family was living, originally was a rented house and it belonged to the City Improvement Board and their late father used to pay monthly rent at RS.7-2-0. The tenancy was in the name of late Maha Singh. The suit house was offered to late Maha Singh on hire purchase agreement. The plaintiffs with a view to acquire the residential house for the benefit of the joint family and to keep their parents comfortably persuaded their father to apply for purchasing the suit house in his name and got the same under hire purchase agreement in the name of their father. In furtherance of the same, the plaintiffs paid a total sum of RS.3023-81 to the City Improvement Board, which later became A.P. Housing Board. The suit house was also registered in the name of their father on 30-6-1970. The father of the plaintiffs and the first defendant, namely, Maha Singh died on 12-5-1972. After his death, the plaintiffs have been requesting the defendants to have the suit house partitioned by metes and bounds and the defendants have been evading the same.The plaintiffs got issued a registered notice demanding partition, which has been replied by the defendants with false allegations stating that the plaintiffs did not contribute anything for the purchase of the suit house and their father executed a registered will bequeathing the suit house in favour of the first defendant in a sound state of mind. Disputing the will as not true and invalid and since the property is joint family property, the plaintiffs filed the above suit for partition of the suit house and allotment of 2/3'd share to the plaintiffs. 5. Disputing the will as not true and invalid and since the property is joint family property, the plaintiffs filed the above suit for partition of the suit house and allotment of 2/3'd share to the plaintiffs. 5. The first defendant resisted the suit denying the plaint averments. In his written statement, the first defendant stated that the plaintiffs got themselves separated from their father, Maha Singh, as long back as in the year 1953 and 1954 respectively and during the life time of their father, he (Maha Singh) purchased the suit house bearing N.133. B/11-5-49 situate at New Mallepalli from A.P. Housing Board and paid all the installments. Maha Singh did not take any help or contribution from the plaintiffs for 24 the purpose of acquiring the suit schedule house. Late Maha Singh performed the wedding of the second and third defendants who are the sisters of the plaintiffs and the first defendant. It is the case of the first defendant that during his life time, Maha Singh executed a registered will dt. 28-1-1972 in his own hand writing with his free will and on his own volition, which fact was informed by him to his son, the first defendant, through a letter dt. 8-2-1972 and later on Maha Singh got the holograph will registered in favour of the first defendant. Under the will, he conveyed the suit schedule house in favour of the first defendant. In view of the registered will in favour of the first defendant, the suit for partition is not maintainable. 6. The defendants 2 and 3, who are sisters of the plaintiffs and the first defendant, filed a written statement while supporting the case of the first defendant contended that the plaintiffs never contributed anything for the purpose of the suit schedule house as they got themselves separated long back during the life time of their father in the year 1953 and 1954 respectively. The first defendant succeeded to the property under the will executed by their father. 7. On the above pleadings, the following issues were settled: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate possession of suit schedule properties 2. Whether the suit is valued properly? 3. Whether there is any cause of action for filing the suit? 4. To what relief? 8. On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-50 were marked. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate possession of suit schedule properties 2. Whether the suit is valued properly? 3. Whether there is any cause of action for filing the suit? 4. To what relief? 8. On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-50 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.8-1 to 8-70 were marked and Exs.X-1 and X-2 were marked through D.W.2. 9. Learned trial court found that though the will is registered will, PW.3, the attesting witness, did not prove the execution of the will and so holding decreed the suit for partition. 10. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the first defendant filed CCCA No.38/1986. Whereas aggrieved by the finding that the suit schedule house is not the joint family property but it is a self acquired property of Maha Singh, the plaintiffs filed CCCA No.53/1986. 11. The learned single Judge of this court on construing will Ex.B-48, which is in the handwriting of the father of the plaintiffs and the first defendant set-aside the finding of the trial court that Ex.B-48 will has not been properly attested. He further held that the holograph will EX.B-48 is true and genuine and late Sardar Mahan Singh had executed the will in a sound state of mind bequeathing the suit schedule house in favour of the first defendant and so holding while dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiffs, allowed the appeal preferred by the first defendant and consequently dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs for partition. 12. Sri P.V. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that when Maha Singh sold ancestral property in the year 1954 for the purpose of the marriage of his daughter and left with no assets and he was drawing a pension of RS.20/- and odd, he had no means to pay the instalments to acquire the suit schedule house. Further, when Maha Singh was unable to pay and D-1's payments were inadequate, the trial court ought to have accepted the plea that the plaintiffs not only contributed money for acquiring the suit schedule house but also contributed payment towards instalments, thersfore, the suit property is a joint family property but not the self acquired property of late Maha Singh. Further, when Maha Singh was unable to pay and D-1's payments were inadequate, the trial court ought to have accepted the plea that the plaintiffs not only contributed money for acquiring the suit schedule house but also contributed payment towards instalments, thersfore, the suit property is a joint family property but not the self acquired property of late Maha Singh. When the plaintiffs laid foundation and established that Maha Singh had no means to pay instalments, the version of the first defendant in his reply notice EX.A-3 dt. 6-4-1981 and his evidence in examination-in-chief that Maha Singh purchased the property cannot be believed. The evidence produced by defendant No.1 does not satisfy the requirement to prove the will as per Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. In support of the said contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of Khusbir Singh v. State1. As per proviso to Sec. 68 of the Evidence Act unless attesting witness is examined and attestation is proved, the property cannot be bequeathed under the will. To buttress the said submission he placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. Joyce Primrose Prestor v. Vera Marie VaS' 2. Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee 3. N. Kamalam (Dead) v. Ayyasamy 4. Bhagat Ram v. Suresh Since P.W.3 examined to prove the will he is not attestor but only an identifying witness when EX.B-48 will was presented for registration. Since he is not an attesting witness to the will, which requires attestation, the trail court rightly held that will has not been proved and rejected the same. As a consequence, the will bequeathing the property is not valid. Even assuming if the plaintiffs have not contributed the monies for acquiring the suit schedule house, the same will be the self acquired property of late Maha Singh, in which the plaintiffs and the first defendant will have 1/5 share each along with their sisters. In view of the same, learned single Judge ought to have decreed the suit at least for 1/5 share. In support of the said submission, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Daft Singh. 13. In view of the same, learned single Judge ought to have decreed the suit at least for 1/5 share. In support of the said submission, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Daft Singh. 13. Per contra, Sri C. Ramesh Sagar, learned counsel for the respondents while sustaining the judgment of the learned single Judge contended that once P.W.1 admitted the will, which is in the handwriting of Maha Singh and his signature on EX.B-48 and letters written by Maha Singh,Exs.B-2 and B-3, wherein he made it clear for bequeathing the property in favour of the defendant No.1, no suspicious circumstances can be inferred.Further merely because D-1 is present at the time of registration, it cannot be presumed that he actively participated in getting the document EX.B-48 registered. When trial court gave a finding in its judgment in paragraph 26 that Maha Singh went to the registered office on 11-5-1972 and presented the document for registration and admitted its execution before the Sub-Registrar, the holograph will, which is in the handwriting of Maha Singh, clearly established that he was in a sound and disposing state of mind and the said evidence has become final, which has not been questioned by the appellants-plaintiffs. Valid attestation has been proved by D-1 as per Sec. 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 by examining D.W.3. P.W.3 who admitted his affixture of his signature on EX.B-48 on the bottom of it is also an identifying witness. In view of the same, learned single Judge rightly held that the will has been proved. He fulfilled the requirement of attestation. In support: of the same, he placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam 2. Mrs. Joyce Primrose Prestor (Nee Vas) v. Miss Veramarie Vas (2 supra). 14. In the light of the submissions referred to above, the only point that arises for our consideration in these appeals is: "Whether the will deed, Ex.B-48, relied upon by D-1 is true and has been validly executed and attested by late Maha Singh? 15. Mrs. Joyce Primrose Prestor (Nee Vas) v. Miss Veramarie Vas (2 supra). 14. In the light of the submissions referred to above, the only point that arises for our consideration in these appeals is: "Whether the will deed, Ex.B-48, relied upon by D-1 is true and has been validly executed and attested by late Maha Singh? 15. The trial court though gave a finding that the will EX.B-48 was executed by late Maha Singh, and all the suspicious circumstances have been satisfactorily dispelled and disposition under EX.B-48 is natural and is in consonance with the Maha Singh's relationship with his son held that the will has not been properly proved as contemplated under Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. 16. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "attestation", which reads as under: "attested" in relation to an instrument, means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has seen some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark or of the signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant, but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. From the above definition, it is clear that document attested is to ensure that there is no fraud or other vitiating circumstance in the execution of a document. To attest is to bear witness to a fact. 17. In Abdul Jabbar v. Venkata Sastri8, the Supreme Court held thus: "... Briefly put, the essential conditions of a valid attestation under Section 3 are: (1) two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign the instrument or have received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature; (2) with a view to attest or to bear witness to this fact each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. It is essential that the witness should have put his signature animo attestandi, that is, for the purpose of attesting that he has seen the executant sign or has received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature. 18. Section 63 (c) of the Indian Evidence (sic. Succession) Act reads as under: "The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary." 19. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner in which proof of execution of document is required by law to be attested, which reads as under: "68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested-If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of providing its execution, if there bean attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence: Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied" 20. The learned trial Judge gave a finding that Ex.B-48, which in Urdu language was executed by Maha Singh in a sound state of mind and all suspicious circumstances have been satisfactorily dispelled and disposition under EX.B-48 is natural and in consonance with the Maha Singh's relationship with his son. Since EX.B-48 will has not been properly attested as contemplated under Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the same was held to be void and invalid document for want of attestation. 21. Since EX.B-48 will has not been properly attested as contemplated under Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the same was held to be void and invalid document for want of attestation. 21. Before we consider the evidence on record as appreciated by the court below, we deem it appropriate to consider the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts in this regard. 22. The Supreme Court in Kishore Chandra v. Ganesh PrasacJ9 while repelling the contention that EX.A-1 mortgage bond was not properly attested and that it was consequently void as the mortgage deed was executed at Berhampur on 3-4-1923, that the attesting witness did not see him execute the deed, attestations must have been taken subsequently at Cuttack and that EX.A-1 was not duly attested held that once the witness deposed that he attested the mortgage bond executed by the mortgagor in favour of the mortgagee and others also attested the bond, the other attestors also witnessed the execution, which was not subjected to cross-examination, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of law as to valid attestation and the decision of the courts below on this point must be upheld. 23. In Girja Datta (6 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "It cannot be presumed from the mere signatures appearing at the foot of the endorsement of registration of a will that they had appended their signatures to the document as attesting witnesses or can be construed to have done so in their capacity as attesting witnesses. Section 68, Evidence Act requires an attesting witness to be called as a witness to prove 1he due execution and attestation of the will. This provision should be complied with in order that those two persons might be treated as attesting witnesses." 24. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Amir Husain v. Abdul SamacJ1°, where the mortgagor has merely not admitted the execution or attestation of the document and has put the mortgagee to proof, then there being no specific denial of attestation, the attestation of one witness is regarded by the Full Bench in Lachhman Singh v. Surendra Bahadur Singh (AIR 1932 Allahabad 527) as being sufficient. In the case where there is not only a want of an admission but a specific denial of the validity' of the mortgage that the mortgagee is called upon to prove attestation of two witnesses. Once there is no specific denial of the validity of the mortgage on the ground that want of proper attestation, the proof of one attestation in view of the opinion expressed by the Full Bench was quite sufficient. It has been laid down by the Full Bench that neither the registering officer nor the witnesses identifying the executant at the time of registration signed as attesting witnesses and they cannot therefore be treated as such for the purpose of the validity of the mortgage. 25. The decision in Mt. Hira Bibi v. Ram Hari Lal , as referred to by the learned trial Judge was prior to amendment to the definition of "attestation" defined under Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act by Amending Act 10 and 12 of 1927, therefore, the principle laid down in the said decision cannot be of any use. 26. Justice Y. K. Sabharwal (as he then was) in Khusbir (1 supra) after considering Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act and after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Naresh Chanran Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta ( AIR 1955 SC 363 ) held that disinheritance of second wife and her daughter could not bar for bequeathing the properties in favour of his son through his first wife by the testator cannot be treated as suspicious circumstance, in the absence of any evidence on record that the beneficiary had taken any part in execution of the will . Further, the Delhi High Court after considering the evidence produced by son and the evidence adduced by the profounder of the will and after considering the evidence of Dr. Deep Kaur, who did not depose that the writing and signature on the will were not of her late husband though her daughter made such a statement and after referring to the proposition laid down by Justice Gajendragadker in H. Venkatachala Iyenger v. D.N. Thimmajamma (AIR 191)9 SC 443), namely, "a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty" held that there was nothing unnatural in not examining the handwriting expert when the petitioner produced the evidence of both attesting witnesses and accepted the case of the petitioner for grant of probate 27. Learned single Judge of this court after considering the evidence of both parties and after adverting to the canons of construction of will laid down by the Supreme Court in Gnambal Ammal v. Raju Ayyar ( AIR 1951 SC 103 ), Ram Gopal v. Aplna Kunwar (AIR 1922 PC 360) and a Division Bench of this court in R. Kameswara Rao v. B. Surya Prakasa Rao ( AIR 1962 AP 178 ) and after considering Exs.B-53-letter dt. 8-2-1972 and B-49-draft will dt. 28-1-1972 which is identical with will EX.B-48 held that Maha Singh was clear in his mind in executing the registered will and transferring the suit schedule house in favour of the first defendant. 28. D.W.3, the then Sub-Registrar, deposed that Ex. B-48 dt. 10-5-1972 is the document, which has been registered by him. The executant Maha Singh produced the document before him for registration. He went through the document before registration. There were no signatures of attesting witnesses on the document when it was produced before him. When he asked the executant about the absence of signatures of attestors, he did not reply. Then he returned the document to the executant to bring along with two identifying witnesses. The executant brought two witnesses. He took the signatures of the identifying witnesses on the endorsement of the registration made by him. Maha Singh and two witnesses signed before him on the endorsement. The executant Maha Singh admitted before him that the document was written by him and signed by him. The executant admitted his signature on the document executed and the two identifying witnesses were present when the executant so admitted. When a question was put to D.W.3 that "When the document was presented before you? Did you question for what purpose the document was presented to him?", he gave answer that "I questioned them whether the executant wanted to have the document registered. When he answered that identifying witnesses were present". When a question was put to D.W.3 that "When the document was presented before you? Did you question for what purpose the document was presented to him?", he gave answer that "I questioned them whether the executant wanted to have the document registered. When he answered that identifying witnesses were present". To another question "Did you question the identifying witnesses as to whether they know executant and as to what was document?", D.W.3 gave answer that "Yes. I asked both the questions. They replied it was will deed. The document presented on 11-5-1972 and registered on 12-5-1972." 29. P.W.3 who signed EX.B-48 is an identifying witness. He identified his signature on Exs.B-48(a) and B-48(b) appended on 11-5-1972. He testified that when he went to the Registrar's office to enquire the procedure for getting his relative's registration done, one Sardar Ji came to him from the chambers of the Registrar and told him that a will was to be registered and one witness was required and he requested him to sign as a witness. He told him that he did not know him. Then they said one witness by name M. K. Shareef was already there and enquired him whether he knows him. He knows M.K. Shareef who told him that he knows SardarJi and requested him to sign as a witness. He further testified that will was not read over to him. 30. Pentakota Satyanarayana (7 supra) is a case which went from our own High Court. Justice AR. Lakshmanan speaking for the Bench held as under: ""... the testator could not be examined as he was not alive at the time of trial. All the witnesses deposed that they had signed as identifying witnesses and that the testator was in sound disposition of mind. Thus, in our opinion, the appellants have discharged their burden and established that the Will in question was executed by Srirammurthy and Ext. B-9 was his last Will. It is true that registration of the Will does not dispense with the need of proving, execution and attestation of a document which is required by law to be proved in the manner as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The Registrar has made the following particulars on Ext. B-9 was his last Will. It is true that registration of the Will does not dispense with the need of proving, execution and attestation of a document which is required by law to be proved in the manner as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The Registrar has made the following particulars on Ext. 8-9 which was admitted to registration, namely, the date, hour and place of presentation of the document for registration, the signature of the person admitting the execution of the Will and the signatures of the identifying witnesses. The document also contains the signatures of the attesting witnesses and the scribe. Such particulars are required to be endorsed by the Registrar along with his signature and date of document. A presumption by a reference to Section 114 of the Evidence Act shall arise to the effect that particulars contained in the endorsement of registra1ion were regularly and duly performed and are correctly recorded. In our opinion, the burden of proof to prove the Will has been duly and satisfactorily discharged by the appellants. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and executron of the Will in the manner contemplated by law. In such circumstances, the onus shifts to the contestant opposing the Will to bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus shifts back on the profounder to satisfy the court affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the Will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same. 31. In Joyce Primrose Prestor (2 supra), the Supreme Court held that the case of a holograph will is a speca1 case which requires a different approach stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee ( AIR 1964 SC 529 ) in considering the evidence in the case to find whether the will has been duly executed and attested. After referring to the judgments relied on before the High Court and after considering the evidence adduced by the parties and the findings of the trial court and the findings of the High Court in reversing the findings of the trial court the Supreme Court held that Ex. P-1, "holograph Will" and the facts of the present case are substantially similar to the one in Shashi Kumar Banerjee case. All that was required was to formally prove Ex. P-1, "holograph Will" and the facts of the present case are substantially similar to the one in Shashi Kumar Banerjee case. All that was required was to formally prove Ex. P-1 (Will). The evidence of PW 1, the attestor, which has been accepted by the trial court, is categoric. Nothing was brought out in cross-examination to discredit this witness. The attesting witnesses were frequent visitors to Bangalore and permanent boarders in Hotel "Terra Vera". There was absolutely no cross-examination on the various aspects stated by the witness regarding the due execution and attestation of the Will, as extracted in the earlier paragraphs. The trial court adverted to the above crucial aspects arising in this case as also the admission by the 3rd defendant that the Will is entirely in the handwriting of her mother, that it bears her signature and she found the Will in her father's drawer and handed over Ex. P-1, Will, to DW 3, Advocate. This fact is also corroborated by the advocate, who is examined as DW 3, Advocate. The trial court laid emphasis on such crucial aspects and held that the Will - a holograph Will - was duly executed and attested and the testator was in R sound state of mind when Ex. P-1, Will, was executed, and such finding recorded by the trial court is based on proper application of law and the unassailable evidence available in the case and in the absence of any evidence to show that the profounder exercised undue influence over testator, the finding cannot be reversed by the High Court and accordingly set-aside the judgment of the High Court restoring the judgment of the trial court. 32. The evidence of D.W.3 coupled with the attestor P .W.3 establishes that the testator acknowledged the execution of will and his signature at the time of registration. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the attestation of will has, been proved as contemplated under Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence. Act. It is also significant to note that the first plaintiff examining himself as P.W.2 also admitted that EX.B-48 is a registered will dt. 10-5-1972, which is in the handwriting of his father. He also admitted that Ex. B-49 dt. 28-1-1972-unregistered will is in the handwriting of his father. Act. It is also significant to note that the first plaintiff examining himself as P.W.2 also admitted that EX.B-48 is a registered will dt. 10-5-1972, which is in the handwriting of his father. He also admitted that Ex. B-49 dt. 28-1-1972-unregistered will is in the handwriting of his father. Thus, even the plaintiffs are not able to question the validity of the will. In EX.B-49 the testator has given reasons for bequeathing the ,house in favour of the first defendant. He is eritical of the attitude of the eldest son and that appears to be the reason for late Sardar Maha Singh to give the suit house exclusively to the first defendant. 33. For the aforesaid conclusions reached by us, we have not despite careful consideration of the finding recorded by the learned single judge and objections submitted to now, been able to discern any legal infirmity or error in the decision of the learned single Judge holding that the holograph will is proved and genuine and late Sardar Maha Singh executed the will in sound state of mind bequeathing the suit schedule house to the first defendant. 34. The appeals, which are bereft of any merit, are liable to be dismissed and we accordingly do so. There shall be no order as to costs.