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2008 DIGILAW 765 (GAU)

Radheshyam Singhal v. State of Assam

2008-10-30

I.A.ANSARI

body2008
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By judgment and order, dated 16.7.2007, passed, in Compliant Case No. 1453/98, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, the accused-petitioners were convicted under Section16 read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (the PFA Act) and each of them stood sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay fine of Rs. 1,000 and, in default of payment of fine, suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentence passed against them, the two convicted persons preferred an appeal, which gave rise to Criminal Appeal No. 59/2007. By judgment and order, dated 13.8.2008, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) No. 1, Kamrup/Guwahati; as the appeal has been dismissed, the petitioners have, now, impugned their conviction and the sentence passed against them in this revision. 2. I have heard Mr. O.P. Bhati, learned Counsel for the accused-petitioners, and Mr. V.S. Singh, Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam. 3. The case of the prosecution may, in brief, be described, thus : On 10.3.1998, the Senior Food Inspector of the district of Kamrup along with some other officers of his Department and an Executive Magistrate visited the godown of M/s. Saraighat Export and Import House situated at Fancy Bazar, Guwahati. In the godown, the inspection team found accused Radheshyam Singhal present, who introduced himself as Manager of the said godown and he also disclosed the name of accused Pawan Kumar Singhal as proprietor of the said business establishment. The Food Inspector inspected the stock of Vanaspati, which were lying, at the godown, for sale for human consumption. Suspecting the quality of the Vanaspati, the Food Inspector, adhering to the relevant provisions of law, took, in presence of witnesses, sample of Vanaspati and divided the same into three different parts, packed and sealed the same. Accused Radheshyam told the Food Inspector that the said Vanaspati had been purchased from M/s. Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., Nepal, by bill No. 157, dated 23.2.2008. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, who, upon examining the same, submitted a report revealing his finding and opinion that the sample of Vanaspati (Tulsi Brand) was slightly rancid and, hence, did not conform to the standards. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, who, upon examining the same, submitted a report revealing his finding and opinion that the sample of Vanaspati (Tulsi Brand) was slightly rancid and, hence, did not conform to the standards. All the requisite materials seeking consent for prosecution of not only the Manager and Proprietor of the said business establishment, but also of Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., Nepal, who had allegedly sold the said Vanaspati to the proprietary concern of Pawan Kumar Singhal, were, then, laid before the Local Health Authority. On consent being accorded, a complaint was accordingly lodged by the Food Inspector in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup. 4. During trial attendance of accused No. 3, namely, Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., Nepal, could not be procured; hence, the case in respect of the said accused was split up by order, dated 12.11.1998, and proceeded against the remaining two accused, namely, Radheshyam Singhal and Pawan Kumar Singhal. 5. To the charge framed under Section 16 read with Section 7 of the PFA Act, the accused-petitioners pleaded not guilty. In support of their case, prosecution examined three witnesses. The accused-petitioners were, then, examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. and, in their examination aforementioned, the accused-petitioners contended that the food item had been purchased from the accused No. 3, namely, Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., and that they had purchased the said food item with warranty and, hence, their prosecution, under the scheme of the PFA Act, and the Rules framed thereunder was not permissible. Several other defences were taken by the accused-petitioners at the time of trial. The learned trial court having, however, found the two accused guilty of the offence charged with, convicted them accordingly and passed sentence against them as indicated above. As the appeal, preferred by the accused-petitioners, has also not yielded any favourable result to them, they are, now, before this Court with the help of this revision. 6. The learned trial court having, however, found the two accused guilty of the offence charged with, convicted them accordingly and passed sentence against them as indicated above. As the appeal, preferred by the accused-petitioners, has also not yielded any favourable result to them, they are, now, before this Court with the help of this revision. 6. Though a number of grounds have been taken in the revision petition, the conviction of the accused-petitioners have been challenged, at the time of moving this revision, on three specific grounds, namely, (i) that there was no adequate material to hold that the sample, in question, was adulterated within the meaning of the PFA Act and the PFA Rules; (ii) that there was violation of Section 13(2) of the PFA Act and, hence, conviction of the accused-petitioners is bad in law and (iii) that the accused-petitioners had discharged the burden of proving of warranty and, hence, they ought not to have been, in the light of the provisions of Section 19(2) of the PFA Act, convicted. 7. While considering the present revision, what needs to be borne in mind is that the grounds, on which the conviction of the accused-petitioners stands, now, challenged, were also raised in the learned appellate court and these grounds have been turned down by assigning cogent reasons. If, therefore, the reasons, so assigned, are found to be legally sustainable or not wholly irrational, interference with the conviction of the accused-petitioners may not be possible. 8. Bearing in mind what has been indicated above, let me, now, turn to the question as to whether or not the sample, in question, was proved to be adulterated, for, the very prosecution of the accused-petitioners would be held to be without jurisdiction if the sample, in question, was not proved to be adulterated. What, now, needs to be pointed put, in this regard, is that according to the opinion of the Public Analyst, the sample of Vanaspati (Tulshi Brand) did not conform to the standards. We have to, now, test the correctness of this opinion. It may be noted that as regards the quality of Vanaspati, standard has been laid down under heading A.19(ix) of Appendix B of the PFA Rules. According to A.19(ix), the product, on melting, shall be clear in appearance and shall be free from staleness or rancidity and pleasant to test and smell. It may be noted that as regards the quality of Vanaspati, standard has been laid down under heading A.19(ix) of Appendix B of the PFA Rules. According to A.19(ix), the product, on melting, shall be clear in appearance and shall be free from staleness or rancidity and pleasant to test and smell. From the standards, so laid down, it becomes, as correctly noted by the learned trial court, clear that if a sample is found to have given even 'slightly positive' test in respect of rancidity, the sample must be held to have failed to conform to the standards. 9. Keeping in view the above requirement of standard of Vanaspati, when I revert to the report of the Public Analyst, what I notice is that according to this report (Ext. 11), the test of 'rancidity', carried out, revealed that the sample had tested 'slightly positive'. In other words, the report shows that the sample tested 'slightly positive' in respect of rancidity'. In the face of the fact that A.19(ix), as pointed out hereinbefore, requires that the sample shall be free form, amongst others, 'rancidity', it logically follows that since the sample had tested 'slightly positive' in respect of 'rancidity', the sample was rightly opined to have not conformed to the standards. In such circumstances, the learned courts below were, in the firm view of this court, wholly justified in concluding that the sample of Vanaspati had been proved to be adulterated. 10. The second ground of challenge to the conviction of the accused-petitioners is, as already indicated above, that there was violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 13(2) of the PFA Act inasmuch as prosecution did not, according to Mr. Bhati, prove that the Public Analyst report had been received by the two accused-petitioners and, hence violation of Section 13(2), it is contended, in the light of the decision in State of Orissa v. Gauranga Sahu 2002 (2) FAC 110 : (2003) Cri. LJ 3077 (SC), must be held to have vitiated the whole trial held against the present accused-petitioners. 11. Referring also to the decision in Mohan Chandra Deka v. State of Assam 2005 (2) FAC 91, Mr. LJ 3077 (SC), must be held to have vitiated the whole trial held against the present accused-petitioners. 11. Referring also to the decision in Mohan Chandra Deka v. State of Assam 2005 (2) FAC 91, Mr. Bhati submits that this court, in Mohan Chandra Deka (supra), has clearly held that mere dispatch of the report of the Public Analyst to a vendor is not adequate compliance with the mandates of Section13(2) and that the prosecution has the additional burden of proving that the Public Analyst's report had, as a matter of fact, been received by the vendor in order to sustain the vendor's prosecution. In the present case, however, contends Mr. Bhati, there is no proof of the fact that the report, in question, had been received by the accuser-petitioners. In such circumstances, submits Mr. Bhati, the conviction of the accused-petitioners ought not to have been sustained. 12. While considering the above aspect, of the matter, what is of utmost importance to note is that in Gauranga Sahu (supra), the question raised was, on finding that the mandate of Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the PFA Act had not been complied with, whether the High Court ought to have acquitted the accused by holding that a statutory valuable right, available to the accused, had been taken away. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Apex Court observed and held, at para 4, as follows: 4. It is argued on behalf or the accused that mere dispatch of the report is not enough; and that the prosecution is further obliged to prove that the letter so dispatched had reached the addressee, i.e., the accused. We agree with this submission, as we believe that forwarding a copy of the report is not only a ritual, but also a statutory requirement to be mandatorily observed in all the cases. Dispatch of such a report is intended to inform the accused of his valuable right to get the other sample analysed from the Central Food Laboratory. 13. In the light of the observations made and the law laid down in Gauranga Sahu (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that a mere proof of the fact that the Public Analyst's report had been dispatched to the correct address of the vendor would not be complete compliance of the provisions of Section 13(2) if the accused denies receipt of the report. In such a case, the prosecution also has the onus to prove that the report, so dispatched, had, in fact, been received by the vendor. If the proof of the fact of receipt of the report is not available from the materials on record in such a case, the trial of the accused-petitioner must be held to have stood vitiated. It is no part of the duty of the accused to prove, in such a case of non-compliance, that due to non-receipt of the report, he had been prejudiced. 14. In Ratanlal Agarwalla v. State of Assam 1993 (1) FAC 146, a Full Bench of this Court had construed the word 'forward', occurring in Section 13(2), to indicate that the obligation of the prosecution is merely to 'send' notice to the place or destination of the accused person concerned and it is no part of the duty of the prosecution to prove that the report-so sent, dispatched or forwarded - had been received by the accused person concerned. The Full Bench, in Ratanlal Agarwalla (supra), thus, took the view that the word 'forward', occurring in Section 13(2), does not mean serve or deliver. The Full Bench further held that it is enough if the prosecution proves that the report had been forwarded, sent or dispatched to the accused and it is not for the prosecution to prove receipt of the report by the accused, for, the accused may, whenever he happens to appear for trial, ask for sending one of the samples to the Central Food Laboratory and unless the sample is opined by the Central Food Laboratory to have become unfit for analysis, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the accused and, in such a case, the trial of the accused cannot be held to have been vitiated. Having so construed, the Full Bench concluded that Section 13(2) is directory and its noncompliance would not per se vitiate the trial. 15. Having so construed, the Full Bench concluded that Section 13(2) is directory and its noncompliance would not per se vitiate the trial. 15. In view, however, of the fact that the Supreme Court has subsequent to the decision in Ratanlal Agarwalla (supra), held in Gauranga Sahu (supra), that the prosecution's burden is not discharged merely by sending the notice under Section 13(2) but it must also ensure that the notice is received by the accused, for, the purpose of dispatch of the report is really to 'inform' the accused of his valuable right to get the sample analysed from the Central Food Laboratory ('the CFL'), there can be no escape from the conclusion that Section 13(2) is mandatory and non-compliance thereof would per se vitiate the trial. Since the object of Section 13(2) is really to 'inform' the accused that he has the option to get the sample analysed from the CFL, it is clear that for achievement of this object, the condition precedent is that the notice under Section 13(2) be received by, and/or served upon, the addressee. Hence, if the report of the Public Analyst is merely sent with a forwarding letter and even if the same is received by the addressee, the provisions of Section 13(2) will not be complied with, for, mere receipt of the report by the addressee does not fulfill the object of Section 13(2) until the information is also given to the addressee that he has the option to get the sample analysed by me CFL. 16. Since the object of Section 13(2) is to inform the accused of his right to get the sample analysed from the CFL, its non-compliance will, as already mentioned above, per se vitiate the trial inasmuch as prejudice will be implicit in such non-compliance, for, the accused would not be knowing that he has the right to get sample analysed and the report, (which the Public Analyst has given) can be superseded by the result,' which the analysis of the sample by the CFL will render. The lack of 'information', on the part of the accused, is, in it self, a cause of prejudice and the same is sufficient to vitiate the trial. 17. The lack of 'information', on the part of the accused, is, in it self, a cause of prejudice and the same is sufficient to vitiate the trial. 17. From what have been held by the Apex Court in Gauranga Sahu (supra), it is abundantly clear that the prosecution, besides proving that a copy of the Public Analyst's report had been 'forwarded' to the accused in terms of Section 13(2) of the PF Act, must also prove that the notice/letter, dispatched in terms of Section 13(2), had reached the addressee, i.e., the accused, for, this obligation is not a mere ritual, but a statutory mandate, which must be observed in all cases. The law, so clearly laid down by the Apex Court, leaves no room for doubt that if a vender denies receipt of the report, compliance of Section 13(2) will not be treated complete unless the prosecution discharges its additional obligation of proving, by adducing cogent evidence, that the notice issued under Section 13(2) has been served upon, and/or received by, the accused. The object, as the decision in Gauranga Sahu (supra) reflects, is to 'inform' the accused about his valuable right to get the sample analysed from the Central Food Laboratory. Whether in the facts of a given case, the notice can be treated to have been served on an accused or not will, however, be a question of fact, which has to be determined on the basis of the facts of the given case. In the set of facts proved in Gauranga Sahu (supra), the Apex Court held that the letter, issued in terms of Section 13(2) stood proved to have been received by the accused. 18. In the light of the position of law laid down clearly, in Gauranga Sahu (supra), to the effect that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that the Public Analyst's report had been forwarded to the accused, but that prosecution also has the onus to prove that the report, so forwarded, had been, in fact, received by the accused, when I turn to the case at hand, what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that the Food Inspector has deposed that after receiving Public Analyst's report, he had sent a copy of the report to each of the accused persons by registered post, Ext. 16 being a copy of the forwarding report, where under report of the Public Analyst had been sent to the accused persons. Ext. 17, Ext. 18 and Ext. 19 were proved to be postal receipts showing dispatch of the copies of the report by registered post to the three persons, who had been named as accused in the complaint. At the trial it was not disputed that the addresses, mentioned at the relevant postal receipts, so far as the same related to the accused-petitioners, were correct. This shows that the letters were sent with correct addresses by registered post to the present accused-petitioners. It was also not contended, at the time of examination of the Food Inspector, that the Public Analyst's report had not been received by the accused persons. 19. What surfaces, as the essential requirements of Section 13(2) are, thus, broadly speaking, three, namely, (i) that the Local (Health) Authority has the obligation to send the report of the Public Analyst to the vendor and also to such persons, whose name(s) might have been disclosed by the vendor under the provisions of Section 14A; (ii) the Local (Health) Authority must send the report along with such letter as would enable the addressee to know that he has a right to get the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory; and (iii) that the report, sent along with the letter as aforementioned, was received by the addressee. 20. In the present case, the fact that the report was sent has not been in dispute. The fact that the report was sent along with the letter informing all the accused persons informing them of their right to get the report analysed by the Central Food Laboratory is also not in dispute. It was also not disputed, when the Food Inspector was examined, at the trial, that the Public Analyst's report had been received by the accused persons. In the background of these admitted facts, let me proceed further with this revision. 21. It has, now, been contended, on behalf of the accused-petitioners, that prosecution has failed to show that the accused-petitioners had received the said report of the Public Analyst. In the background of these admitted facts, let me proceed further with this revision. 21. It has, now, been contended, on behalf of the accused-petitioners, that prosecution has failed to show that the accused-petitioners had received the said report of the Public Analyst. While considering this aspect of the grievances of the accused-petitioners, what needs to be noted is that when a letter is sent by registered post at the correct address of an addressee, presumption of law, under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, is that the addressee has received the letter addressed to him. This presumption is, however, rebuttable presumption meaning thereby that even a mere denial by the addressee that he had received the letter would shift the burden to the opposite party to prove receipt of the letter by the addressee. When, however, a letter, sent by registered post at the correct address of an addressee, is not disputed to have been received by the addressee, the court will be acting, within the ambit of its powers, if it chooses to draw the presumption that the letter, in question, had been received by the addressee. 22. In the present case, it is not in dispute that during the course of examination of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, the Food Inspector, it had not been contended by the defence that the reports, sent to the two accused-petitioners, were not sent to their correct addresses and/or that the letters and/or the report, in question, had not been received by the addressees. 23. Thus, there was absolutely no denial, at the time, when the prosecution witnesses were examined, that the accused-petitioners had received the letters and/or the reports, in question. In such circumstances, the law of presumption, as embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, permitted the learned courts below to draw a presumption that the letter as well as the report had, indeed received by the addressee concerned. The law of presumption, it may be noted, helps a party to discharge its burden of proof. In such circumstances, the law of presumption, as embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, permitted the learned courts below to draw a presumption that the letter as well as the report had, indeed received by the addressee concerned. The law of presumption, it may be noted, helps a party to discharge its burden of proof. When the law permits a court to raise presumption and the court raises its presumption subject to the conditions to which such presumption can be raised, it cannot be contended that notwithstanding the presumption, which the court was entitled to draw, the party, which has the onus to prove receipt of the letter, must independent of what the law of presumption intends to achieve, prove, by adducing independent evidence, that not only that the letter was correctly addressed, but also that the letter had been received by the addressee concerned. There is, therefore, no substance in the submissions made, now, on behalf of the accused-petitioners, that notwithstanding the fact that during the course of examination of the Food Inspector, none of the accused-petitioners had contended that the letter and/or report aforementioned had not been received by the addressee concerned, there ought to have been independent evidence showing receipt of the letter as well as the report by the accused persons. 24. It is also quite pertinent to note that it was only, at the stage of their examination under Section 313(1)(b), CrPC, that the accused-petitioners had, for the first time, contended that they had not received the report of the Public Analyst. While considering this aspect of the case, what needs to be noted is that the presumption, in the present case, is a rebutable presumption and this presumption has to be rebutted, when the evidence is adduced by the prosecution and not thereafter. If the receipt of the letters and/or reports, in question, was not disputed at the time, when the witnesses concerned were examined, the mere fact that the accused-petitioners had contended, during the course of their examination under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C., that the letters and/or the reports had not been received by them, is valueless. If such an approach is allowed, it will, certainly, defeat the ends of justice. If such an approach is allowed, it will, certainly, defeat the ends of justice. When a presumption is a rebuttable presumption, denial must be at the time, when the evidence, for the purpose of raising the presumption, is adduce and if it is not disputed and the prosecution closes its case, the accused cannot be held to have rebutted the presumption by merely making a statement of denial, at the stage of his examination under Section 313(1)(b), Cr.P.C., for if such rebuttal, of presumption is allowed, it would cause irreparable prejudice to the prosecution. The accused may, however, remain at liberty to get the relevant prosecution witnesses recalled if the court so permits, in a given case, in exercise of its powers under Section 311, Cr.P.C., and/or to adduce evidence to enable the court hold that the presumption stands rebutted. In short, rebuttal of presumption is not possible by making a mere statement of denial, at the stage of examination, under Section 313(1)(b), Cr.P.C., if no foundation for denial of such a presumption is laid at the time, when the relevant witness was examined by the prosecution. 25. Situated thus, it becomes clear that accused-petitioners, having not denied receipt of the Public Analyst's report, at the time, when the report was sought to be proved by the prosecution by examining the Food Inspector and, especially, when the evidence on record, as adduced by the Food Inspector, was cogent and specific that the report along with the forwarding letter had been sent to the accused-petitioners by registered post, the learned court below was wholly justified in raising presumption of receipt of the letters by the addressees concerned. Thus, no infringement and/or breach of the provisions of Section 13(2) can be said to have been proved in the present case. 26. So far the defence of warranty taken by the accused-petitioner is concerned, it may be pointed out that it is Section 19 of the PFA Act, which provides for the defence of warranty. A warranty is nothing, but a certificate given by the manufacturer, distributor or dealer to a vendor as regards the nature and quality of the article of food given/sold to the vendor. When a person, who has received an article of food, under a warranty, sells the same, does he commit any offence? The answer is furnished by Section 19 of the PFA Act. When a person, who has received an article of food, under a warranty, sells the same, does he commit any offence? The answer is furnished by Section 19 of the PFA Act. The relevant provisions of Section 19 read as follows: (2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves - (a) that he purchased the article of food - (i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer, (ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it. 27. From a bare reading of the above provisions of Section 19 it is abundantly clear that if a vendor of an article of food had purchased the article of food form a manufacturer with a warranty in the prescribed form and if the article of food, while in the possession of the vendor was properly stored and that the article of food was sold in the same state m which it was purchased, such a vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of the adulterated or misbranded article of food. 28. In other words, the defence of warranty, as envisaged by Section 19 and as indicated hereinabove, can be available to a vendor if the vendor satisfies the following three conditions: (1) that the manufacturer/distributor/dealer has given a warranty in the prescribed form, (2) that the article of food, while in the possession of the vendor, remained properly stored, and, (3) that the vendor sold the article of food in the same state in which he had purchased it. 29. 29. From a careful reading of the relevant provisions of Section 19, it also becomes transparent that a warranty, if available to a vendor in the prescribed form, and if the vendor proves that not only that while he was in the possession of the article of food, in question, he had kept the same properly stored, but that he sold the article of food in the same condition in which he had purchased, it would furnish a complete defence to the prosecution of such a vendor under the PFA Act. 30. Coupled with the above, it is also worth pointing out that Section 14 of the PFA Act obliges every manufacturer, distributor and dealer to give warranty. The proviso to Section 14 also lays down that a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article, to the vendor thereof, shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer. It is also imperative to note that Section 14A makes it mandatory for every vendor of an article of food, if so required, to disclose to the Food Inspector the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom he purchased the article of food. It is also necessary to point out that Rule 12A lays down that every manufacturer, distributor or dealer selling an article of food to a vendor shall give either separately or in the bill, cash memo or a label, a warranty in Form VIA. It may be noted that Form VIA, which has been framed under Rule 12A, reads: FORM VIA Invoice No... place.... Date... To... Date of Sale Nature and quality of Article/Brand Batch No. or Code No. Name if any Quantity Price, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. I/We hereby certify that food/foods mentioned in this invoice is/are warranted to be of the nature and quality which it/these purports/purport to be. .............. Signature of Manufacturer, Distributor or Dealer 31. place.... Date... To... Date of Sale Nature and quality of Article/Brand Batch No. or Code No. Name if any Quantity Price, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. I/We hereby certify that food/foods mentioned in this invoice is/are warranted to be of the nature and quality which it/these purports/purport to be. .............. Signature of Manufacturer, Distributor or Dealer 31. While considering the question of warranty, it needs to be noted that Section 14, originally, (as the same stood before it underwent amendment by the Act 34 of 1976, with effect from 1.4.1976), required that in order to avail the defence of warranty, the warranty, which a vendor seeks to rely upon, must have been given, in writing, in the prescribed form. This form has been prescribed under Rule 12 as form VIA. By the proviso, which has been added by the Act, 34 of 1976 to Section 14, even a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor or, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof, shall be deemed to be a warranty. It is of some significance to bear in mind that though Section 14 was amended as indicated hereinbefore, the corresponding change in form VIA has not been made. The effect is that a warranty shall, ordinarily, be in the prescribed form, i.e., in form VIA, but even a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor or, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof, shall nevertheless be deemed to be a warranty notwithstanding the fact that such a bill, cash memorandum or invoice does not bear a warranty, in writing, in the prescribed form. 32. It has been correctly pointed out by the learned trial court that during the visit of the Food Inspector at the business premises of the accused-petitioners, accused Radhe Shyam Singhal informed the Food Inspector that the Vanaspati, in question, had been purchased from M/s. Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., Nepal, arid that in support of this information, accused Radhe Shyam Singhal also furnished a copy of bill No. 157 dated 23.2.1998, to the Food Inspector. In the offence report (Ext.14), the bill No. 157, dated 23.2.1998, clearly stands mentioned. In the offence report (Ext.14), the bill No. 157, dated 23.2.1998, clearly stands mentioned. While cross-examining the Food Inspector, nothing was put to him by the defence to show that the bill number, in question, was incorrect or erroneous. 33. Thus, when the Food Inspector was being examined or cross-examined as a witness of the prosecution, the defence case remained that it was by means of bill number 157, dated 23.2.1998, that the Vanaspati, in question, had been purchased, from Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., Nepal. While, however, deposing as a witness at the trial, DW1 stated that the Vanaspati had been purchased vide Ext.A. Thus, Ext.A. was claimed to be the warranty. Ext.A. is, however, bill No. 154, dated 23.2.1998. Thus, the bill, which had been produced before the Food Inspector, was different from the one, which has been relied upon by the witness at the time of adducing defence evidence. It has also been noted by the learned trial court that there were overwritings on the bill number of the bill produced, in the court, by the defence. Situated, thus, Ext.A. was held to be not original of the bill, which had been produced by accused Radhe Shyam Singhal before the Food Inspector at the time, when the sample was taken. In these circumstances, the learned trial court has held that it is difficult to relate Ext.A, with the purchase of Vanaspati by the accused-petitioners from Shree Ram Oil Products (P.) Ltd., Nepal. The question is to whether Ext.A. is a warranty or not is, in the context of the facts of the present case, entirely a question of fact and this question has been decided against the defence by assigning cogent reasons by the learned trial court and the reasonings, so assigned by the learned trial court, have been upheld by the learned appellate court. I find no reason to differ from the views expressed by the learned courts below and the conclusion drawn by them in this regard. In short, thus, the accused-petitioners had failed to prove that Ext.A, was the bill through which they had purchased the Vanaspati, in question. 34. What emerges from the discussions, held as a whole, is that none of the grounds, on which the findings of guilt reached against the accused-petitioners has been impugned, is sustainable in law. In short, thus, the accused-petitioners had failed to prove that Ext.A, was the bill through which they had purchased the Vanaspati, in question. 34. What emerges from the discussions, held as a whole, is that none of the grounds, on which the findings of guilt reached against the accused-petitioners has been impugned, is sustainable in law. This Court is, therefore, of the firm view that this revision is wholly without merit and must fail. 35. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision stand", dismissed. The accused-petitioners are hereby directed to, forthwith, surrender in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, in order to serve the sentence of imprisonment passed against them. 35. With the above observations and directions, this revision shall stand disposed of. Petition dismissed.