JUDGMENT 1. - In this bunch of writ petitions, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 18/1/2008 passed by the Estate Officer (Assistant Commissioner), Devasthan Department, Rishabdev, Tehsil Kherwada District Udaipur, whereby, he has allowed the application filed by the respondent no.3. 2. Since the point involved in these cases is common, therefore, this court is deciding these writ petitions by this common order and for convenience facts of S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.1527/2008 are taken into consideration. 3. The facts of the case are that an application under Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 (for short `the Act of 1964') was filed by the non-petitioner no.3 in the year 1999 in which following prayers were made:- " ( d ) fd mij of.kZr lEink ls vizkFkhZ dks csn[ky fd;k tk;sA ( [k ) fd mDr lEink dk cdk;k fdjk;k ,oa fnukad 1-2-1999 ls lEink dk dCtk fnyokus dh rkjh[k rd dk gtkZ bLrsekyh 6000@& :i;k izfrekg dh nj ls e; C;kt fnyk;k tkosA " 4. The petitioner filed reply to the said application and after considering his reply, the matter was finally decided by respondent no.2 vide judgment dated 7/2/2004, whereby, the petitioner was directed to vacate the shop no.9 and he was further directed to handover the possession within a period of 30 days to the Inspector (Incharge, Temple Rishabhdev), Devasthan Department, Rishabdev. 5. Against the said judgment, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the District Judge, Udaipur. The said appeal was finally decided vide judgment dated 1/9/2007 and the District Judge, Udaipur remitted the case to respondent no.2 with the following directions: " mi;qZDr foospukuqlkj ;g vihy Lohdkj dh tkdj vk{ksfir vkns'k vikLr fd;k tkrk gS vkSj i=koyh bl funsZ'k ds lkFk izfrizsf"kr dh tkrh gS fd ekuuh; jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; }kjk mij of.kZr vuqlkj fn;s x;s funsZ'kksa ds vuq:i vihykFkhZ ds izR;qRrj ds ifjizs{; esa fdjk;k fu/kkZj.k ds fcUnq ij mHk;i{k dks lqudj oLrqfu"B rjhds ls fof/k vuqlkj fu"d"kZ vfHkfyf[kr djrs gq, izdj.k dk u;s fljs ls fuLrkj.k fd;k tkosaA " 6. Upon remand of the case, an application was filed on 19/12/2007 by the respondent no.3 stating therein that the earlier notice issued to the petitioner was not in accordance with law and, therefore, fresh notice ought to have been issued under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1964. 7. Upon remand of the case, an application was filed on 19/12/2007 by the respondent no.3 stating therein that the earlier notice issued to the petitioner was not in accordance with law and, therefore, fresh notice ought to have been issued under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1964. 7. The petitioner filed reply to the said application and stated that the appellate court remanded the case with specific direction and the respondent no.2-Estate Officer has to decide the matter as per the remand order only and prayed that the application filed by respondent no.3 may be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the Estate Officer vide impugned order dated 18/1/2008 allowed the said application filed by the non-petitioner no.3 and rejected the objection raised by the petitioner by a nonspeaking order and without considering the grounds taken in reply to the said application. 9. It is further argued that the order Annex 8 dated 18/1/2008 passed by the respondent no.2, Estate Officer, is totally erroneous and has been passed by exceeding its jurisdiction. It is submitted that the Estate Officer was required to decide the matter as directed in remand order passed by the District Judge, Udaipur in appeal but the Estate Officer while exceeding its jurisdiction allowed the said application filed by respondent no.3 and issued notice under Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1964 to the petitioner. 10. In this regard, it is submitted that as per the settled proposition of law when remand order is passed with specific direction then the lower court is required to decide the matter as per the direction of the higher court and it cannot usurp the jurisdiction beyond the scope of the remand order. Therefore, it is submitted that the order impugned is totally in contravention of settled proposition of law. 11. Further, it is submitted that the respondent no.2 while allowing the application filed by respondent no.2 has not considered the contentions raised in reply in right perspective that the application of non-petitioner no.3 itself is not maintainable. 12. It is further argued by the Learned counsel for the petitioner that when an authority makes an order in exercise of quasi-judicial function, he is required to record reasons in support of the order. 12. It is further argued by the Learned counsel for the petitioner that when an authority makes an order in exercise of quasi-judicial function, he is required to record reasons in support of the order. In the present case, the respondent no.2 being quasi judicial authority was required to decide the application of the respondent no.3 after considering the contentions raised by the petitioner in his reply and was under legal obligation to give cogent reasons for allowing the said application. But the impugned order is not reasoned order so also has been passed without following the basic principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem. The quasi judicial authorities are required to observe the said principle in its true spirit and mere pretence of compliance would not satisfy the requirement of law. Therefore, the order impugned has been passed in contravention of settled principle of law. 13. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited the attention of the Court towards the following judgments rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court and of this Court: 1. (1976) 2 SCC 981 The Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Of India Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. 2. 1993 (2) WLC (Raj.) 549 Nanne Khan v. Ram Dass 3. 2004 AIR SCW 537 Jamshed Hormusji Wadi v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai and others . 4. AIR 1976 Calcutta 38 Scientific Instruments Co.Ltd. v. Collector of Customs & Anr. 5. 2005 AIR SCW 4581 Union of India v. M/s Krimpex Synthetics Ltd. 6. AIR 1987 (Raj.) 75 Chote Lal v. Kalyan Prasad & Others . 14. While citing the above judgments, it is vehemently argued that when remand order is passed by the Higher Court in appeal, the subordinate court is required to decide the matter in its true spirit. Therefore, upon perusal of order impugned, the respondent no.2 has committed an error of law while passing order to issue fresh notice under Section 4(1) of the Act, therefore, order dated 18/1/2008 is without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of the remand order. 15. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the entire record as well as judgments cited by learned counsel. 16. 15. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the entire record as well as judgments cited by learned counsel. 16. After perusing the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, first of all it is required to be observed that in none of the case it is directed by any of the court that while deciding the matter after remand provisions of law shall not be followed. 17. The ratio of all the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that upon remand, the original authority is required to decide the matter within the scope of the directions issued by the higher authority. 18. In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia's case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the controversy with regard to the judgment in question passed by Division Bench of Mumbai High Court upon remand by the Apex Court held in para 22 as under:- "22. We have set out in the earlier part of this judgment, the order of remand dated 31-10-1995 made by this Court. A careful reading of the judgment of the High Court and the order of remand passed by this Court together significantly reveals that none has cast any reflection - much less any adverse only - on the report of Kirloskar Consultants and the decision of the Board based thereon. The only consideration which prevailed with the High court and this Court was one of the reasonability and the need for striking a balance before taking a long leap in the direction of an upward revision of rates. The stand throughout taken by the Board has to be appreciated. It has been agreeable to every reasonable suggestion made by the Court and has never treated the issue as to revision of rent as a matter of its prestige or with the ego of a landlord. This Court made a remand to the Division Bench of the High Court persuaded by the consideration that there were a few aspects of paramount significance which needed the attention of the Division Bench of the High Court. This Court made a remand to the Division Bench of the High Court persuaded by the consideration that there were a few aspects of paramount significance which needed the attention of the Division Bench of the High Court. The fact remains that in the quest for an amicable, and if not so, then at least a reasonable resolution of the dispute, the Division Bench of the High court as well as this Court have proceeded on an assumption that for the future, the settlement whether mutual or by dictum of the Court, shall centre around the Compromise Proposals. This Court wanted the court to be assured for itself and the lessees to be satisfied for themselves that the Compromise Proposals were not just an arrow shot in the dark but were capable of being illuminated by assigning reasons. At the same time, though all the lessees were to be treated alike so far as laying down of common standards governing different classes of leases was concerned, care had also to be taken to redeem the grievances of certain individual lessees who could make out a case for further legitimate reduction in rates on account of peculiarities attaching with the land or lease held by them. Later, while delivering the 2000 judgment, which is impugned herein, the Division Bench certainly assumed a wider field of jurisdiction than the one which had been permitted by this Court and entered into examining the whole controversy afresh and as if all the contentions of all the parties were open before it which view of the High Court, in our opinion, cannot be countenanced on a reading as a whole of the order of remand passed by this Court along with the judgment of the Division Bench which was impugned then." 19. Similarly, in the case of M/s Krimpex Synthetics Ltd (supra) in para 12 it is held that upon remand, the High Court was not supposed to entertain any fresh material. Para 12 reads as under:- "12. The respondent has filed the Special Leave Petition No.22036 of 1997 claiming the maximum subsidy for the sum of Rs.25 lacs. It was submitted by Shri Gopal Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, that the respondent was entitled to maximum subsidy available under the scheme to the tune of Rs.25 lacs. Mr. Para 12 reads as under:- "12. The respondent has filed the Special Leave Petition No.22036 of 1997 claiming the maximum subsidy for the sum of Rs.25 lacs. It was submitted by Shri Gopal Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, that the respondent was entitled to maximum subsidy available under the scheme to the tune of Rs.25 lacs. Mr. Jain, fairly conceded before us that the material which was placed along with the additional affidavit before the High Court had not been placed before Mrs.Karan, Joint Secretary. We agree with the view taken by the High Court that the only material which could be taken into consideration was the one which was produced before the Joint Secretary as this Court had remanded the case to the High Court to take the final decision keeping in view the order passed by the Joint Secretary. From the remand order it can be deciphered that the High Court was not supposed to entertain fresh material. An opportunity was given to the claimants to file their representations to the Joint Secretary along with the material on the basis of which decision was taken by the Joint Secretary regarding the eligibility of the claimant to get the subsidy. The material which was sought to be produced before the High Court should have been produced before the Joint Secretary and it was for the Joint Secretary to take the decision on the same. Since the material had not been placed before the Joint Secretary the same could not be taken into consideration by the High Court and the contention raised by the respondent to the contrary has rightly be rejected." 20. In Chote Lal' s case (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court while considering as many as seven judgments held that when remand is with specific direction for specific purpose then it is not open to the Court to proceed as if there is no restriction on its power. It has to act according to the specific directions. In para 13 of the said judgment, it is observed that: "However, if the order of the first appellate court is such which can be said to have placed limitations on the powers of the trial court then the trial court cannot go beyond the directions given by the appellate Court." 21. In para 13 of the said judgment, it is observed that: "However, if the order of the first appellate court is such which can be said to have placed limitations on the powers of the trial court then the trial court cannot go beyond the directions given by the appellate Court." 21. In para 14 of the said judgment, the learned Single Judge made it very clear that the trial court has to proceed in a specified manner which is to admit a particular document in evidence and allow the parties to lead evidence to prove or disprove the same. Such a direction cannot be said to be said to be open remand so as to allow the parties to reopen other matters and permit the Court to accept other documents which have not been admitted in evidence according to the directions of the first appellate court. 22. While citing the above judgments, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Estate Officer-respondent no.2 has proceeded to pass the order dated 18/1/2008 contrary to the directions issued by the appellate court and wrongly accepted the application filed by the respondent no.3 for issuing fresh notice under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1964, whereas, as per remand order the question of determination of rent was to be decided upon the material on record. 23. In my considered opinion, there is no quarrel with law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court in aforesaid judgments but the facts of present case are distinguishable. 24. It is not in dispute that the respondent no.2 initiated proceedings against the petitioner under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1964 for eviction and recovery of rent. The matter was decided vide judgment dated 7/2/2004 and eviction order was passed but upon filing appeal by the petitioner, the matter was remanded to the respondent no.2, as stated above. Upon perusal of the order passed by the appellate court, it is revealed that in operative portion of the order it is observed that while deciding the matter afresh from initial stage the directions issued by the Rajasthan High Court in the order passed in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4155/98 Nakesh Menaria & Ors v. State of Raj.& Ors. Upon perusal of the order passed by the appellate court, it is revealed that in operative portion of the order it is observed that while deciding the matter afresh from initial stage the directions issued by the Rajasthan High Court in the order passed in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4155/98 Nakesh Menaria & Ors v. State of Raj.& Ors. upon the question of determination of rent shall be considered and while giving finding, matter may be decided afresh objectively from initial stage in accordance with law. Meaning thereby, after remand, at the time of deciding the matter afresh, the respondent no.2 is under obligation to decide the question of determination of rent as per direction of High Court passed in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4155/98 dated 12/10/2000 in accordance with law from initial stage. 25. Likewise, in the order passed in earlier writ petition on 12/10/2000 it was specifically ordered by this Court that; " the petition is pending for last two years. Interest of justice would be met if the petitioner is directed to make a fresh representation of his grievance to the respondents. The respondents will consider the matter objectively at their earliest possible and decide the same in accordance with law." 26. Therefore, after remand, the quasi judicial authority-respondent no.2 is required to decide the matter afresh from initial stage after determination of rent as per order of appellate court and in consonance with the directions of High Court. Therefore, respondent no.2 has allowed the application filed by the respondent no.3 in which it is admitted that the earlier notice under Section 4(1) was not in consonance with the law, therefore, before deciding the matter afresh as per remand order the fresh notice has been issued vide impugned order for deciding the controversy. The petitioner also filed reply to the application in which it is stated by him that the matter may be decided as per the directions of the High Court so also by the appellate court. Thus, the respondent no.2 for deciding the matter afresh rectified the lacuna pointed out by the respondent no.3 vide impugned order so as to decide the matter in accordance with law. Thus, the respondent no.2 for deciding the matter afresh rectified the lacuna pointed out by the respondent no.3 vide impugned order so as to decide the matter in accordance with law. Therefore, in my opinion, the respondent no.2 has not committed any illegality, more so, upon perusal of the order impugned, it is clear that the procedural irregularity has been rectified to base the decision in accordance with law as directed by the appellate court while remanding the matter for which it is not necessary to assign any reason. The respondent no.2 rightly proceeded to rectify the procedural irregularity for deciding the controversy afresh in accordance with law. When mistake of law is apparent on the face of record, then quasi judicial authority is not required to give reasons because it is the duty of the Court to proceed only in accordance with law. Therefore, in my opinion, the Estate Officer has proceeded in right direction for deciding the matter afresh as directed by the appellate court. 27. In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, it cannot be said that any error of law has been committed by the respondent no.2 in allowing the application filed by the respondent no.3. The appellate court has remanded the matter to be decided afresh from initial stage keeping in view the judgment passed by this Court in writ petition no. 4155/98 for determination of rent in accordance with law. In these circumstances, the plea of the petitioner that appellate court has remanded the case for determination of rent only is misconceived because the appellate court has remitted the case for deciding the matter as a whole afresh from initial stage, therefore, admittedly earlier notice under Section 4(1) was not in consonance with law then respondent no.2 has rightly passed an order for issuing proper notice in accordance with law. Therefore, in doing so, it cannot be said that the respondent no.2 has acted against the provisions of law which requires any interference by this Court. 28. In this view of the matter, all the writ petitions are dismissed.Writ petitions dismissed. *******