ORDER: Disobedience of an order of a Court, whether prohibitive or mandatory, whether made ex-parte or upon hearing both parties, or interim or perpetual, amounts to contempt, if it is calculated or tends to interfere with the administration of justice, or brings it into disrespect or disregard, (Jagarlmudi Chandramouli v. Appa Rao), for it strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of an effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar). 2. Rule of law is the foundation of democratic society and the judiciary is its guardian. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, as such, is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect its dignity against insult or injury as the expression 'contempt of court' may seem to suggest, but to protect and vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. It is of paramount public interest that the people, after obtaining an order of the court, should not feel helpless or without remedy when such order is flouted. If orders of the court are disobeyed with impunity by those who owe an obligation to the society to preserve the rule of law, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute. (Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries; Bijay Kumar Mahanty v. Jadu). Every one, howsoever high he may be, is bound to implement the orders of Court. Those who disregard the Court's order do so at their own peril for no one is above the law. (Court on its own motion v. N.S.Kanwar). 3. Heard Sri D.Ramakrishna, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the first respondent. 4. Those who disregard the Court's order do so at their own peril for no one is above the law. (Court on its own motion v. N.S.Kanwar). 3. Heard Sri D.Ramakrishna, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the first respondent. 4. The present Contempt Case is filed to summon the 1st respondent and punish him under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for not complying with the orders of this Court in W.P.No.21397 of 1997 dated 12.02.2007. The order of this Court required the 1st respondent to consider the case of the petitioner, in the light of the order of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.13552 of 1996 dated 21.04.1997 and G.O.Ms.No.1 Education (PS.I) Department dated 01.01.1999, and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 5. A copy of the order of this Court was, admittedly, received on 13.03.2007 and, as such, the 1st respondent ought to have considered the case of the petitioner within three months thereafter i.e. on or before 13.06.2007. This Contempt Case was filed on 30.11.1997 and notice before admission, returnable in three weeks, was ordered by this Court on 23.01.2008. When the matter was listed on 13.02.2008, time was granted to the learned Government Pleader to enable a counter affidavit to be filed by the first respondent. On 20.02.2008, this Court noted the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioner that no orders had been passed by the 1st respondent till date, and of the Learned Government Pleader that no instructions had been received in the matter. On being satisfied, prima facie, that the 1st respondent had violated the order of this Court dated 12.02.2007, the Contempt Case was admitted and notice in Form-I was issued. The Notice in Form-I requires the contemnor to be present in Court in person. When the Contempt Case was listed on 19.03.2008, the respondent- contemnor was not present in Court, despite the notice in Form-I having been served upon him. As such, a bailable warrant of arrest was issued to secure his presence and the matter was posted to 31.03.2008. The Notice in Form-I requires the contemnor to be present in Court in person. When the Contempt Case was listed on 19.03.2008, the respondent- contemnor was not present in Court, despite the notice in Form-I having been served upon him. As such, a bailable warrant of arrest was issued to secure his presence and the matter was posted to 31.03.2008. C.A.No.259 of 2008 was filed to recall the warrant issued against the first respondent and, as he was present in Court on 26.03.2008, the warrant issued earlier was recalled and his presence for the next date of hearing was dispensed with. It is only on 31.03.2008 that the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent dated 12.03.2008 was placed before this Court wherein it was stated that orders were passed on 10.03.2008. While the time stipulated by this Court required the order to be passed on or before 16.06.2007, the order was, in fact, passed nearly nine months thereafter only after the Contempt Case was admitted and the Notice in Form-I was served on the 1st respondent. 6. After the Contempt Case underwent further adjournments on 31.03.2008, 18.04.2008, 21.04.2008, 28.04.2008 and 12.06.2008, W.P.M.P.No.17397 of 2008 was filed on 25.06.2008 requesting this Court to extend the time, granted by it in its order dated 12.02.2007, by another ten months. In the affidavit filed in support of the W.P.M.P, the very same reasons stated in the counter-affidavit dated 12.03.2008, for not complying with the order of this Court within time, are reiterated. It is further stated that though this Court had granted three months time the Government had to call for records and reports from the concerned officers for passing final orders, that despite bonafide efforts being made to comply with the orders of the Court, there was a delay due to administrative reasons and that the time granted by the Court was not sufficient. It is also stated that there was no deliberate inaction in passing orders and, therefore, time may be extended. 7. A petition seeking extension of time to comply with the orders of Court should, ordinarily, be filed before the expiry of the time stipulated by the Court or at least soon thereafter. It is also stated that there was no deliberate inaction in passing orders and, therefore, time may be extended. 7. A petition seeking extension of time to comply with the orders of Court should, ordinarily, be filed before the expiry of the time stipulated by the Court or at least soon thereafter. The present W.P.M.P, seeking extension of time to comply with the order of this Court, was filed only after the Contempt Case was admitted, Notice in Form-I was served on the respondent-contemnor, the counter affidavit was filed by him in the Contempt case and more than three months after orders were passed in compliance with the orders of this Court. This petition, seeking extension of time, is only to avoid contempt proceedings and, as the only reasons given in support thereof are of administrative delay, I see no reason to extend the time as sought for. The W.P.M.P. seeking extension of time is, accordingly, dismissed. 8. Having admitted receipt of the order of this Court, and being conscious of the time stipulated therein, failure on the part of the first respondent- contemnor to comply with the order of this Court within the time stipulated, undoubtedly, constitutes disobedience of the order of this Court. However, in order to constitute contempt of court, disobedience of the order must be willful and proof of mere disobedience is not sufficient (S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa; Indian Airports Employees' Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee; Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh). While the violation of the Court's order may not be intentional, it must be wilful in order that it may amount to civil contempt. (Jagarlamudi Chandramouli1). In the purposes of judging 'civil contempt' intention or mens rea is not relevant. The question is only whether the breach was on account of wilful disobedience i.e, whether it was not casual or accidental and unintentional. (V.C. Govindaswami Mudali v. B.Subba Reddy). Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah). 9. (V.C. Govindaswami Mudali v. B.Subba Reddy). Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah). 9. If a party who is fully in the know of the order of the Court, or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the Court's order, ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held that the disobedience is wilful. It may not be possible to prove the actual intention behind the act or omission. A Court can approach the question only objectively and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed to intend the probable consequence of his act. (N.S.Kanwar). To establish that disobedience was wilful it is not necessary to show that it was contumacious in the sense that there was a direct intention to disobey the order. Effective administration of justice would require some penalty for disobedience to the order of the Court if disobedience is more than casual, accidental or unintentional. (Heatons Transport Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers Union10;N.S.Kanwar). 10. In order to examine whether, or not, violation of the order of this Court was willful, the justification put forth by the first respondent, in not complying with the order of this Court within time, must be examined. In his counter affidavit dated 12.03.2008, the respondent-contemnor submits that the order of this Court dated 12.02.2007 was received on 13.03.2007, that, on receipt of the orders, the Director of School Education was requested, vide Memo dated 15.03.2007, to submit necessary proposals along with his recommendations, that the recommendations of the Director of School Education was not received, that in the meanwhile the petitioner had submitted a representation on 11.12.2007 seeking implementation of the orders of this Court, that on receipt of the said representation the Director of School Education was again requested to submit his report in the matter, that the Director of School Education had submitted a report on 01.02.2008, that, vide Memo dated 05.02.2008, certain records were called for from the District Educational Officer, Nalgonda and, on verification and careful examination of the matter, the Government had issued Memo dated 10.03.2008. The 1st respondent would submit that the delay in issuing the order was because of these administrative reasons and that, vide Memo dated 10.03.2008, the order of this Court had been implemented. The 1st respondent expresses great respect for the Court and submits that there was no willful disobedience on his part. 11. At the fag end of these proceedings, an additional counter affidavit was filed by the 1st respondent on 25.08.2008, wherein it is stated that there are about 10 lakh employees of the State Government of which nearly 2.5 lakh employees are in the School Education Department, that the challenges faced by the personnel had resulted in sizable litigation and, in several cases, officials of the Department were directed to consider and dispose of the cases within a time frame fixed by the Tribunal and the Court, that, despite best efforts, sometimes there was delay in complying with the orders of Courts, for which he tendered his sincere apology and that, with a view to avoid delay, various proposals were being examined including the proposal to appoint an officer/officers to monitor implementation of the orders of the Court in time. The averments in the counter-affidavit filed earlier, with regards the order passed by this Court, receipt of the order, reminders sent to the Director of School Education etc. are reiterated. It is further stated that the Director of School Education had called for a report from the District Educational Officer, Nalgonda, but the D.E.O. Nalgonda had submitted his report on 20.04.2007 to the Director of School Education who, in turn, had forwarded the same to the 1st respondent but, unfortunately, the said report was not received in his office and that this aspect was also being inquired into. It is further stated that the Director of School Education, vide letter dated 01.02.2008, had sent the reports of the District Educational Officer, Nalgonda dated 20.04.2007 and 04.01.2008, that, after perusing the report, the 1st respondent had sought certain clarifications pursuant to which a detailed report was submitted on 17.02.2008 by the D.E.O. Nalgonda through the Director of School Education, Hyderabad and that, on a careful perusal thereof, he had passed orders on 10.03.2008. According to the 1st respondent, the delay in compliance with the orders had occurred in these circumstances, that it was neither willful nor wanton, that a petition seeking extension of the time fixed by the Court ought to have been filed and that he was tendering his sincere apologies for not filing such a petition in time. The 1st respondent reiterates that he has great respect for the rule of law and for Courts and that he had not willfully violated any order of Court. 12. While failure to comply with orders of Court, on the excuse that the contemnor had to consult his superiors before complying with such orders, has been held to be of no avail when he is asked to show cause why he should not be convicted for contempt, (Taluri Seshaiah v. M.Narayana Rao; N.S.Kanwar), curiously, in the present case the first respondent, who is a Principal Secretary to the Government, claims to be awaiting reports from his subordinates who, for reasons which this Court has not been informed, chose not to abide by his orders and send their reports in time. The counter affidavits are silent as to why the 1st respondent chose not to take any action against these officers if, as contended by him, it was their inaction which had resulted in his failure to comply with the orders of Court within time. The contention that the School Education Department has 2.5 lakh employees, and that sizeable litigation had resulted in delay in complying with the order of the Court within time, is also no justification for the inordinate delay in complying with the orders of Court. Nothing prevented the first respondent from forthwith seeking extension of time if he was of the view that the time granted by this Court was insufficient. It ill behoves the first respondent, a senior officer of the Government, in not adhering to the time fixed by this Court on the specious plea that reports from his subordinates were awaited or that his department is overloaded with litigation. Failure on the part of the first respondent to comply with the orders of this Court cannot be said to be casual, accidental or unintentional or for reasons of genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. It must, necessarily, be held that disobedience of the orders of this Court is willful. 13. Failure on the part of the first respondent to comply with the orders of this Court cannot be said to be casual, accidental or unintentional or for reasons of genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. It must, necessarily, be held that disobedience of the orders of this Court is willful. 13. It is no doubt true that the 1st respondent, both in the counter affidavit dated 12.03.2008 and in the additional counter affidavit dated 25.08.2008, has expressed his apology. An apology is not intended to operate as a universal panacea. (M.Y. Shareef Vs. Judges of Nagpur High Court; Pravin C. Shah Vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) through the Amicus Curiae Vs. Ashok Khot). It is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of the offence but is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoer's power. (Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction). The apology tendered by the contemnor, to be accepted by the Court, should be a product of remorse. (M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India). While it is open to the Court, in an appropriate case, to accept an unconditional apology based on the factual position, dropping the proceeding of contumacious acts deliberately done, after accepting the apology offered, would be a premium for such flagrant violation. (Ram Autar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla) 14. In L.D. Jaikwal Vs. State of U.P.18, the Supreme Court held:- ".........We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the "slap-say sorry-and forget" school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying "sorry" does not make the person taking the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to "say" sorry-it is another to "feel" sorry......" (emphasis supplied). 15. The apology tendered by the 1st respondent is neither a product of remorse nor is there any evidence of real contrition on his part. It is but an expression intended to avoid being committed for contempt. I see no reason to accept such an apology. Consequently, the 1st respondent must be held guilty of contempt. 16. 15. The apology tendered by the 1st respondent is neither a product of remorse nor is there any evidence of real contrition on his part. It is but an expression intended to avoid being committed for contempt. I see no reason to accept such an apology. Consequently, the 1st respondent must be held guilty of contempt. 16. The next question which arises for consideration is the nature and extent of penalty to be imposed on his being found guilty of contempt. It is evident from Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances, (Smt. Pushpaben Vs. Narandas V. Badiani), and that a sentence of imprisonment should be restricted to the "rarest of rare" cases, wherein the contumacious act is, per se, so gross and reprehensible that a sentence of fine would be wholly disproportionate to its gravity. To put it differently, a sentence of fine should be the rule and imprisonment an exception. (District and Sessions Judge, Aurangabad Vs. Deelip Balaram Bedekar). 17. While awarding sentence on a contemnor, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of law and to ensure that the unflinching faith of the people in Courts remains intact. If the guilty are let off, and their sentence remitted on grounds of mercy, people would lose faith in the administration of justice. The Court is duty-bound to award proper punishment to uphold the rule of law, how so high the person may be. (J. Vasudevan Vs. T.R. Dhananjaya). There cannot be any laxity, as otherwise law courts would render their orders to utter mockery. Tolerance of law courts there is, but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond. (Anil Ratan Sarkar). The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope. (Jennison Vs. Baker). 18. Tolerance of law courts there is, but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond. (Anil Ratan Sarkar). The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope. (Jennison Vs. Baker). 18. While the willful disobedience of the order of this Court may well have necessitate imposition of the punishment of fine, it must also be borne in mind that the jurisdiction in contempt is of a drastic character and its very usefulness depends on the restraint with which it is used and on the refusal of the Courts to use it except when they find that, in addition to failure to comply with their orders, obstruction has been caused to their primary function of administering justice as authorities charged with that function. While it is necessary to exercise the jurisdiction in contempt on proper occasions, it is of equal importance that the integrity of the proceedings in the contempt ought to be maintained by taking the utmost care that it is not used on occasions or in cases to which it is not appropriate. (Dulal Chandra Bhar V. Sukumar Banerjee). 19. Bearing in mind that the 1st respondent is a senior officer of the Government, that any punishment imposed by this Court may mar his career, and in the light of the assurance given by him that he was examining proposals to appoint an officer/officers to monitor implementation of the orders of Court in time, it is wholly unnecessary to penalize him with imposition of fine. 20. While holding him guilty of contempt, the Supreme Court in All Bengal Excise Licensees' Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh, and the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in N.S.Kanwar, severely reprimanded the contemnor therein and let him off with a severe warning. While the first respondent is, undoubtedly, guilty of contempt, I consider it inappropriate to impose any substantive sentence on him. It would suffice if he is let off with a severe warning. The first respondent shall, however, pay costs of Rs.1,000/-, (Rupees One Thousand only), to the petitioner. 21. W.P.M.P.No.17397 of 2008 is dismissed and C.C.No.1177 of 2007 is disposed of accordingly.