JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amar Saran, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the revisionist and the learned A.G.A. 2. As this case was passed over on last occasion on the request of the Counsel for the opposite party, hence it was directed to be listed peremptorily in the next cause list. Today, it is listed peremptorily. 3. Heard learned Counsel for the revisionist, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 and the learned A.G.A. 4. An order dated 23-3-2005 passed by the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. Act/Additional Sessions Judge, Banda, allowing criminal revision No. 272 of 2003 preferred by the opposite party No. 2 and setting aside the order of the C.J.M., Banda dated 30-10-2003 in Criminal Case No. 506/XII/2003 whereby orders for investigations have been passed by the learned C.J.M., Banda, has been challenged by means of this revision. 5. Firstly it was argued by the learned Counsel for the revisionist that the aforesaid order is not revisable and he has placed reliance on a Single Judge decision of this Court in Vanshu v. State of U.P., 2007 (8) ADJ 277, passed by Hon’ble Vinod Prasad, J., who has relied on his earlier decision in Rakesh Puri and another v. State of U.P., 2006 (56) ACC 516, for this proposition. His Lordship has sought to distinguish a Division Bench decision in the case of Ajay Malaviya v. State of U.P., 2001 Cri LJ 313 and a Single Judge decision in Sabir v. Jaswant, 2002 ALJ 226, by holding that the Division Bench decision in Ajay Malaviya and the Single Judge decision in Sabir were ‘per incuriam’ as according to His Lordship statutory provisions of Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. have been violated. 6. In my view, a Single Judge ought not to have declared a law given by a Division Bench as per incuriam and the proper course in such proceedings was to have referred the matter to a larger Bench, in case he was not in agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench. 7. 6. In my view, a Single Judge ought not to have declared a law given by a Division Bench as per incuriam and the proper course in such proceedings was to have referred the matter to a larger Bench, in case he was not in agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench. 7. However, I am of the opinion that even if I do not go into the question as to the maintainability or not of the criminal revision on merit, in my view this criminal revision deserves to be allowed and the order of the Special Judge S.C/.S.T. Act, in Criminal Revision No. 272 of 2003 deserves to be set aside and the order passed by the C.J.M. dated 30-10-2003 deserves to be affirmed. The reasons for my view are that one ground taken by the Revisional Court for setting aside the order of the C.J.M. was that the C.J.M. had transferred his jurisdiction of P.S. Baberu to which this matter related to another Magistrate and hence he had become divested of the said power to entertain the cases relating to P.S. Baberu. The learned Sessions Judge has relied on Section 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for this proposition. However, Section 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mainly refers to the subordination of Judicial Magistrates to the C.J.M. subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge. The Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules or give special orders, consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of business among the Judicial Magistrates subordinate to him. 8. I think the learned A.G.A. Sri Patanjali Misra is right in submitting that under the provisions of Section 12 and Section 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the C.J.M. has power to assign the case to a particular Judicial Magistrate implicit in the said order is the power of recalling the case from the Magistrate. This result also follows from Section 21 of General Clauses Act, which confers the power to issue orders including the power of varying and rescinding the said orders. The Sessions Judge ought not to have allowed the criminal revision on this ground. 9. This result also follows from Section 21 of General Clauses Act, which confers the power to issue orders including the power of varying and rescinding the said orders. The Sessions Judge ought not to have allowed the criminal revision on this ground. 9. The other ground taken by the learned Sessions Judge for allowing the criminal revision was that an application ought to have been moved under Section 340, Cr.P.C. as the offences were covered under Section 195, Cr.P.C. I may mention here that some of the offences namely under Sections 499, 420, 506 and 120-B, IPC which are also involved in this case do not attract the bar of Section 195, Cr.P.C. Moreover, the question of attracting any power of Section 195, Cr.P.C. arises only at the stage of cognizance and not earlier at the stage of investigation. 10. Thirdly, the fallacy with the order of the learned Sessions Judge is that he seemed to have conducted a full blown trial, at this stage when an order under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. was being passed when all that he needed to see was whether prima facie a case was disclosed and the matter should be sent for investigation and that is precisely what the Magistrate has done. I, therefore, allow this criminal revision and set aside the order of the subordinate Revisional Court and affirmed the order of the learned C.J.M. 11. At this stage, the junior of the learned Counsel for the opposite party has appeared and has filed a supplementary counter-affidavit on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 stating that as the investigation was not stayed in this case a final report has even been submitted after investigation on 6-4-2005, which has been annexed as Annexure CA-I, I, therefore, think that the entire exercise done by me has become academic, as investigation has already been concluded (provided this averment is correct). However, as I have already dictated my orders in the Court Room in open Court, the order shall stand as a statement of the legal position. The revision is partly allowed subject to the aforesaid limitation. ————