JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, C.J. - This writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner; Central Division, Cuttack dated 15.3.2002 by which he has reversed the order of the Additional District Magistrate, Jajpur dated 29.9.2000 remanding the case to the Tahasildar for fresh disposal after giving opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that Petitioners encroached upon the Government land and claimed settlement over the said land measuring 3.75 decimals. The settlement was made in their favour vide orders 28.3.1977; 18.7.1979 and 9.5.1983. Being aggrieved, the villagers of the said village approached this Court by filing OJC No. 9863 of 1993 for cancellation of the settlement of the said land in their favour, pointing out that they could acquired knowledge of the said settlement order only in 1991, during the Consolidation Proceedings. This Court disposed of the said writ petition vide judgment and order dated 24.8.1994 directing the Tahasildar to decide the matter afresh. However, the Court observed that in case it is found that the land in dispute has ever been the part of the communal land, the settlement would be annulled. In pursuance of the said order of this Court the Tahasildar re-considered the matter under the provision of Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act, 1972 ( hereinafter called 'the Act') and canceled the settlement vide order dated 24.7.1996. Being aggrieved, Petitioners preferred appeal u/s 12(1) of the Act which was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate vide order dated 16.6. 1998. The said order was challenged by filing revision u/s 12(2) of the Act before the Revisional Authority who vide its order dated 29.9.2000 set aside the said orders with a direction to the Tahasildar to re-consider the whole case after holding de-novo enquiry and giving opportunity of hearing to Petitioners. 3. Being aggrieved, the private opposite parties approached the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (hereinafter called 'the Commissioner') u/s 12(3) of the Act by filing OPLE Revision No. 1/01, and vide order dated 15.3.2002 said order of the Revisional Authority has been reversed and the order of the courts below have been upheld. Hence this writ petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the order of the Commissioner impugned denied the right of hearing to the Petitioners. Hence this writ petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the order of the Commissioner impugned denied the right of hearing to the Petitioners. Admittedly as the Tahasildar has decided the matter without giving the opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners. The orders have been passed behind their back by the Tahasildar. The order of the Tahasildar and of the appellate authority are bad in law. More so, the order passed by the Commissioner is without jurisdiction as the revision was not maintainable against the order of the Revisional Authority at the behest of private opposite parties. Revisional power of the Commissioner can be exercised suo motu. Thus the impugned judgment and order of the Commissioner is liable to be set aside. 5. On the contrary the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties have vehemently opposed the petition contending that the Statute provides the remedies which have been available to the parties herein and unless statutory rules are challenged the Petitioners cannot be permitted to agitate such technical issues. It is not permissible for the Court to entertain such submissions. Admittedly the matter in dispute had been earmarked for communal use and the question of settlement of such land could not arise. The matter does not deserve to be considered as the settlement in favour of the Petitioners was outside the scope of the statutory provisions and as such had been void. The petition is without any merit and thus, is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. The documents on record make it crystal clear that the land had been an "Anabadi" land. It had been earmarked for communal use. This factual situation has not been disputed by the learned Counsel for Petitioners. Rather he fairly conceded that the land settled in favour of the Petitioners had been earmarked for communal use. It was admittedly "Anabadi" land. In such a fact situation giving opportunity of hearing or observance of the principles of natural justice would be an empty formality. 7. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Om Prakash Gupta the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed that Courts have to examine whether the non-observance of any statutory provision or principle of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. In S.L. Kapoor Vs. 7. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Om Prakash Gupta the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed that Courts have to examine whether the non-observance of any statutory provision or principle of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. In S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and Others the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where from admitted or undisputed fact, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one course is permissible to be adopted, the Court should not enforce the observance of principles of natural justice for the reason that it would amount to issuing a futile writ. 8. In A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: The aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in the areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it Whenever a complaint is made before the Court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. (emphasis added) 9. Therefore, whether the principles of natural justice should be applied in a given case, depends upon the facts and circumstances of that case. In case the principles of natural justice have not been applied but if even after their observation result could have been the same, enforcing the observance of such principles would be a futile exercise. (Vide Khem Chand Vs. The Union of India (UOI )and Others, ; and Laxmi Shankar Pandey Vs. Union of India and others, . 10. In The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Another Vs. Ramjee, the Court has observed that natural justice is not an unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference of the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference of the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. The Courts cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can they fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity, the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures. 11. In Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible. 12. In Hira Nath Mishra and Others Vs. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and Another the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions. 13. It is equally well settled that the principles of natural justice must not be stretched too far and in this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Others Vs. Smt. Asha Devi Gupta and Others, ; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others Etc. Etc., and Canara Bank and Others Vs. Shri Debasis Das and Others, . 14. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., made reference to its earlier decisions and observed: ...concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Union of India (UOI) and Others Etc. Etc., and Canara Bank and Others Vs. Shri Debasis Das and Others, . 14. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., made reference to its earlier decisions and observed: ...concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointedfor that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. (Emphasis added ). 15. In U.P. Junior Doctors' Action Committee Vs. Dr B. Sheetal Nandwani and Others the students had got admission in M.B.B.S. Course by making misrepresentation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the plea of applicability of the Rules of Natural Justice observing that under the circumstances in which such benefit had been taken by the candidates concerned, do not justify attraction of the Rules of Natural Justice by providing them an opportunity of hearing. Even in a case where an applicant may not be responsible for playing fraud, his appointment can, also, be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to him in case the Authority comes to the conclusion that the appointment had been made by playing fraud by the Members of the Selection Committee though the candidate had not played any part/mischief in the said selection. 16. In Krishan Yadav and another Vs. State of Haryana and others the Apex Court observed that when the entire selection was stinking "conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit", individual's innocence has no place as fraud unravels everything. In such a case principles of natural justice do not require to be observed. 17. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf. 17. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf. Where order admittedly has been passed in contravention of statutory rules and the party admits the same, observance of principles of natural justice is not warranted. 18. The scheme of the Act clearly stipulate that if any encroachment on public land is found, it becomes the duty of the Statutory Authority to remove the same. In exceptional circumstances even the person having encroachment may claim settlement of the said land. However, there is complete prohibition of settlement of land in favour of the encroacher, if it is set apart for the common use of the villagers in view of provision u/s 7 (2) of the Act. Further such person liable for unauthorised use or occupation of the land must be imposed penalty as required u/s 6 of the Act. 19. Section 12(1) of the Act provides for appeal against the order of eviction and the Collector may revise the said order of the appellate authority u/s 12(2) of the Act. Section 12(3) reads as under: (3) The Revenue Divisional Commissioner having jurisdiction may call for and examine the records of any proceedings under this Act before any officer in which no appeal or revision lies and if such officer appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) while acting in the exercise of his jurisdiction to have contravened some express provision of law affecting the decision on the merits, where such contravention has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice, it may after giving the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such order as it deems fit. Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 empowers the -Commissioner to exercise extra-ordinary power in exceptional circumstances where he comes to the conclusion that the order has been passed in contravention of the Statutory provisions or has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. This power can be exercised by the Commissioner suo motu. Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 12 empowers the -Commissioner to exercise extra-ordinary power in exceptional circumstances where he comes to the conclusion that the order has been passed in contravention of the Statutory provisions or has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. This power can be exercised by the Commissioner suo motu. The only requirement is that it should be exercised within a reasonable time and reasons should be recorded. 20. In Chaitanya Mahapatra Vs. Member, Board of Revenue and Others, a Division bench of this Court examined a case where the Commissioner exercised the powers of Board of Revenue u/s 12(3) of the Act. The Court held that such a power could not have been exercised by the Commissioner because the Act provided that it was the Board of Revenue which could exercise such power. The powers had been so conferred on the Board of Revenue being the helm of revenue administration and to correct only the peculiar errors where the orders have been passed in contravention of the Statute and there has been miscarriage of justice. The Court declared that the order passed by the Commissioner was without jurisdiction. Subsequent to the said judgment, the Act was amended in 1982 substituting the Board of Revenue by Revenue Divisional Commissioner. 21. A Division Bench of this Court in Laxman Kanda v. State of Orissa and Ors. 72 (1991) CLT 49; held that u/s 12(3), the Commissioner can exercise the powers suo motu within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Similar view has been reiterated in Umesh Ch. Mishra Vs. State of Orissa and Others, . 22. In Smt. Rabeha Khatun Vs. State of Orissa and Others the Division Bench of this Court observed that this provision "confers revisional jurisdiction to check illegality and impropriety in orders of settlement or denial of settlement of land." In Smt. Sarojini Mallick v. State of Orissa and Ors. 2005 (1) OLR 666 ; this Court held that "the power of suo motu revision u/s 12(3) is completely different from the power of re vision to be exercised u/s 12(2) of the Act." 23. The object of revisional Jurisdiction is to confer upon the Authority a kind of supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct the miscarriage of justice arising out of misconception of law, irregularity of procedure which resulted into some undeserved hardship to an individual or public at large. The object of revisional Jurisdiction is to confer upon the Authority a kind of supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct the miscarriage of justice arising out of misconception of law, irregularity of procedure which resulted into some undeserved hardship to an individual or public at large. Undoubtedly, such powers should be exercised sparingly and with most circumspection only in appropriate cases where there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law resulting in a flagrant mis-carriage of justice. The issue of delay or laches in such a case is to be examined from the date of his knowledge of the Revisional Authority and not from the date of the order impugned. (Vide The State of Kerala Vs. Narayani Amma Kamala Devi, ; Rameshchandra J. Thakkar Vs. Assandas Parmanand Jhaveri, State of Maharashtra, ; Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, ; and Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Girdharilal Sapuru and Others, ). 24. The Act empowers the Commissioner to exercise the power suo motu. Such power can be exercised only if such an order is brought to his notice. It may be by any means or source whatsoever. The law does not prohibit receiving such a information even from the persons who may be adversely affected. 25. Even if for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the Commissioner had no power to entertain the matter at the behest of private opposite parties, no explanation has been furnished by their learned Counsel, as to why the Petitioners had not raised any objection before him. Opposite parties approached the Commissioner, and obtained the order reversing the order of the Revisional Authority. Even if Commissioner should not have entertained the revision filed by private opposite parties, set aside the order of the Collector, correctly it does not require any interference, in view of the fact that the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has fairly conceded that the land had been earmarked for communal use which could not be settled in favour of any person. 26. The Apex Court in Mohammad Swalleh and Others Vs. Third Addl. District Judge, Meerut and Another, examined a case where the appeal was decided, though the authority was not competent to entertain the appeal. Appeal is a creation of the Statute. The Statute did not provide for appeal at all. 26. The Apex Court in Mohammad Swalleh and Others Vs. Third Addl. District Judge, Meerut and Another, examined a case where the appeal was decided, though the authority was not competent to entertain the appeal. Appeal is a creation of the Statute. The Statute did not provide for appeal at all. The Court held as follows: It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge. On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the Appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken. 27. It is settled legal proposition that writ Court should not quash the order if it revives a wrong and illegal order. [Vide Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, ; Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar and Others, ; Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, ; and Chandra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, .) 28. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Writ Court to interfere with each and every case on such technicalities. State of Bihar and Others, ; Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, ; and Chandra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, .) 28. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Writ Court to interfere with each and every case on such technicalities. Admittedly Petitioners had been in illegal possession of the land in dispute, by way of encroachment. It was "Anabadi" land i.e. earmarked for communal use. It could not be settled in favour of the Petitioners or any other person. Settlement in Petitioner's favour was in contravention of the Statutory provision. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner could not satisfy the Court that such an illegal order requires to be protected by the equity Court. Thus, the judgment and order impugned, does not warrant any interference in equity jurisdiction. 29. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs. B.N. Mahapatra, J. 30. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed