JUDGMENT: 1. GRIEVANCES of the petitioner may briefly be stated as follows: -The petitioner is the proprietor of the firm named M/s. Prakash Brick field. On 31st December, 2001 the petitioner submitted an application along with requisites seeking grant of Quarry Permit for running the brickfield. The petitioner firm started functioning since January, 2002. The business of "brickfield" is a seasonal business. It ordinarily starts from the month of november and continues till the month of April. The labour strength during the seasonal period goes upto 20. For the rest of the year, it remains below 20. The petitioner-firm was registered with Employees Provident Fund Organization having Code No. WB/37435 under the provisions of the Employees Provident funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The petitioner used to deposit along with its contributions and file monthly and/or yearly returns before the competent authority in due time in accordance with the provisions of the EPF and MP Act, 1952. In response to a letter from respondent No. 2 dated 06. 12. 2005 whereby allegations were made regarding default in payment of deposits, the petitioner sent a letter dated 23rd December, 2005 annexing thereto copies of challans for the period under consideration. But in spite of the same, the respondent No. 2 issued the notice dated 19. 1. 2006 under Section 7a of the said Act. The authority thereby claimed the amount of Rs. 1,28,524/- for the period from 1/2004 to 11/2005 without giving details of calculation and/or clarification of the computation of the amount. The petitioner in response to summons communicated a representation dated 6. 2. 2006 and sought for an adjournment. It was adjourned to 28. 2. 2006. The petitioner failed to appear on 28. 2. 2006 due to his indisposition. A notice was thereafter issued being notice dated 9. 3. 2006 upon the petitioner informing him of the next date of hearing. It was fixed on 23. 3. 2006. The petitioner sent a representation on 23rd March, 2006 through Fax along with xerox copies of deposited challans and returns for the period from 1/2004 to 12/2005. A copy of the medical certificate was also sent. The certificate issued by the local member of the Legislative Assembly and the office of Banhat Gram Panchayet to the effect that the Prakash Brickfield had remained closed since December, 2003 were also sent. 2. PRODUCTION in the petitioner-Firm stopped in the end of 2002. A copy of the medical certificate was also sent. The certificate issued by the local member of the Legislative Assembly and the office of Banhat Gram Panchayet to the effect that the Prakash Brickfield had remained closed since December, 2003 were also sent. 2. PRODUCTION in the petitioner-Firm stopped in the end of 2002. The brickfield remained completely closed on and after 31st December, 2003 after disbursing the stock already produced during 2001-2002. It was completely shut down in or around April, 2004. In spite of closure of the Firm since 31. 12. 2003 the petitioner continued to pay the contribution under the said Act upto december, 2005. Subsequently, the Birbhum Brick Field Owners Association named CHIMNEY and the office of the BL and LRO, Rampurhat-1, Birbhum issued certificate on 3. 6. 2007 and 8. 3. 2007 respectively mentioning that such brickfield had remained closed since 31. 12. 2003. Ignoring all such steps taken by the petitioner, the authority concerned passed an ex parte order dated 10. 10. 2006/11. 10. 2006 directing, inter alia, the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs. 1,28,524/- as amount due to the respondent-authority for the period from 1/2004 to 11/2005 without passing any reasoned order and observing that the petitioner remained absent on all dates of hearing. This was followed by issuance of a notice dated 24th April, 2007 by respondent no. 2 for recovery of the said amount. 3. IT was alleged that the show cause notice dated 19. 1. 2006 served on the petitioner under Section 7a of the said Act is devoid of required particulars which formed the basis of conclusion. The ex parte order dated 10. 10. 2006 was passed illegally and in defiance of the principles of natural justice. The order dated 10. 10. 2006 passed by the respondent-authority under Section 7a of the said Act is thus liable to be set aside. In such circumstances, the petitioner had to approach this court for redressal of his grievances. 4. ON behalf of the respondent-authority, it was specifically claimed that in view of availability of efficacious alternative remedy, the writ petition does not deserve to be entertained. It was categorically submitted that the petitioner failed to respond despite repeated intimation. It appears that the petitioner applied for Quarry permit for running the brickfield on 31st December, 2001. On 31st December, 2003, the brickfield was closed. It was categorically submitted that the petitioner failed to respond despite repeated intimation. It appears that the petitioner applied for Quarry permit for running the brickfield on 31st December, 2001. On 31st December, 2003, the brickfield was closed. The petitioner submitted a representation to respondent No. 3 on 23rd december, 2005. On 19th January, 2006 respondent-authority issued summons. In response to further notices, the petitioner again submitted a representation on 23rd March, 2006 along with all necessary papers. On 3rd June, 2007, the Brick field Owners Association issued a certificate regarding closure of the brickfield. The BL and LRO also confirmed such status of the petitioner by its certificate dated 8th June, 2007. 5. EVEN thereafter, the respondent No. 3 passed an order dated 10th October, 2006. On 24th April, 2007, notice was issued for recovery. 6. LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent-authority did not bother to go through the relevant papers and materials before issuing notice. It was further submitted that the order dated 10th October, 2006 was thus passed without appreciating all the materials. It was then contended that the issuance of summons dated 19th January, 2006 was also without application of mind and the deposits made by the petitioner during the period from 1/2004 to 11/2005 were not taken into consideration. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that Section 7a is not applicable to the facts of the present case since the brickfield had remained closed since 31st December, 2003. It was categorically mentioned that the order dated 10/11. 10. 2006 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the notice dated 24th April, 2007 are thus liable to be quashed and set aside. On behalf of the petitioner it was emphatically submitted that Section 7a of the Employees" Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 cannot be attracted since the establishment under reference in this case remain closed and no enquiry was held as required. 7. LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner referring to the decision in the case of prem Chand vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jaipur., reported in [2003 (96) FLR 630] submitted that it was the duty of the respondent-authority to enquire into the matter and decide the point relating to applicability of the Act. 7. LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner referring to the decision in the case of prem Chand vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jaipur., reported in [2003 (96) FLR 630] submitted that it was the duty of the respondent-authority to enquire into the matter and decide the point relating to applicability of the Act. The learned Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the said case dealt with a matter where the petitioner raised dispute regarding the applicability of the Act of 1952. 8. IN the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. ESI Corporation., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1494, it was held that the Employees" State insurance Act recognizes the existence of immediate employer and as such, opportunity of hearing is required to be given to both the principal employer and the immediate employer. There could be no order of determining authority without giving opportunity of hearing to the principal employer in regard to the names and particulars of contractors. Though it was submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner that the principles laid down in the said case would squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not think that such principle lends any effective support to the writ petitioner in the present case. 9. THE Apex Court in the case of Food Corporation of India vs. Provident fund Commissioner and Ors., reported in (1990) 1 SCC 68 held that the power under Section 7a to the Commissioner is to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion. It was further held that it is the legal duty of the Commissioner. 10. IT was categorically mentioned on behalf of the writ petitioner that the authority concerned was not at all justified in proceeding with the matter without holding any enquiry as to the applicability of the Act itself. In this case reference was made to the decision in the case of M. P. State Agro Industries development Corporation Ltd. and Ors vs. Jahan Khan reported in 2008 (1)SLR, page 5. In this case reference was made to the decision in the case of M. P. State Agro Industries development Corporation Ltd. and Ors vs. Jahan Khan reported in 2008 (1)SLR, page 5. The Apex Court in the said case held that if the order under challenge is per se illegal being violative of the principles of natural justice, it cannot be said that the High Court is not justified in entertaining the writ petition. On behalf of the respondent-authorities, the learned Counsel Mr. Kundu, submitted that the remedy of appeal having been provided, the writ petition is not maintainable. Deriving inspiration from the Division Bench of this court in the case of Asstt. P. F. Commissioners, Employees" Provident Fund organization vs. Pawan Kumar Agarwala and Ors., reported in 2008 (1) CHN 469 , it was submitted that the High Court ought not to entertain a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution when an adequate alternative remedy of appeal is provided in the statute itself. The learned Division Bench in the said case held that " this may not be an absolute bar but it is not to be lightly ignored or by-passed". In the factual background of the said case, the learned Division bench observed that there is yet another alternative remedy available to the petitioner under Section 7b of the Act. 11. REFERENCE was made to the decision in the case of M/s. Popcorn entertainment and Anr. vs. City Industrial Development Corpn. and Anr., reported in 2007 Air SCW 2010. 12. THE Apex Court relying upon the principles laid down in the case of whirlpool Corpn. vs. Registrar of Trademarks. Mumbai and Ors., reported in ( 1998 (8) SCC 1 ) held that the writ petition in the said case was maintainable. The observation of the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation, as admitted by learned Counsel for both parties, continues to be the guiding principles in this regard. It was observed in the said case that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. It was observed in the said case that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy as consistently held by the Supreme Court does not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the writ petition in certain circumstances may be maintainable but not entertainable. Whatsoever is maintainable may not necessarily be entertainable. If the grievance ventilated in a writ application relates to enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, this writ court will certainly be not justified in remaining indifferent. If there are allegations that the order or proceedings are without jurisdiction, the writ court may not have any option but to entertain such an application. The complexion will remain identical where the vires of an Act is challenged. 13. SO far the present case is concerned, none of the aforesaid circumstances arises herein. But the order and the proceedings have been challenged on the ground that there had been violation of the principle of natural justice. 14. IT cannot be denied that the writ petitioner was given repeated opportunities to respond to the summons and to present his case. The proceedings were adjourned on a number of occasions in order to accommodate the writ petitioner. Thus, it cannot be suggested that the writ petitioner was not given a proper opportunity of hearing. The materials on record rather harmoniously combine so as to suggest that the writ petitioner left no stone unturned while evading the process of law. Question was raised that without a proper enquiry the initiation of proceeding under Section 7a was not justified. Thus, it cannot be suggested that the writ petitioner was not given a proper opportunity of hearing. The materials on record rather harmoniously combine so as to suggest that the writ petitioner left no stone unturned while evading the process of law. Question was raised that without a proper enquiry the initiation of proceeding under Section 7a was not justified. Having regard to the materials available on record, I find it difficult to accept such grievance. Moreover, this point can very well be raised by preferring an appeal as against the impugned order. So far the need for an enquiry is concerned, it is for the authority to conduct if it is deemed necessary. The categorical submissions made on behalf of the respondent-authority that the writ petitioner could very well prefer an appeal or file an application for review cannot just be brushed aside. There is, no doubt, that there is alternative statutory forum and in such backdrop, I do not find any rational justification for entertaining the present application. 15. ACCORDINGLY, the instant application being W. P. No. 19048 (W) of 2007 fails and be dismissed. There is no order as to costs. It may be mentioned that this court has not really gone into the merits of the grievances and the same is left open for adjudication, if and when situation so demands.