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2008 DIGILAW 787 (GAU)

Manmohan Singh v. Union of India

2008-11-12

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2008
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. In this writ petition, the Petitioner, a Professor, is questioning the legality of the appointment of the Respondent No. 6, a Reader, as Head of the Centre for Science Education in the North Eastern Hill University, Shillong ("NEHU" for short) by overlooking his case for re-appointment to that post. 2. The material facts of the case, as pleaded by the Petitioner, are that in terms of the resolution No. EC:83:94:5:01 of the Executive Council of NEHU, the following Centres were established in the NEHU, namely, (i) Centre for Adult and Continuing Education, (ii) Centre for Rural Development, (iii) Centre for Cultural and Literary Studies, (iv) Centre for Creative Arts, (v) Centre for Science Education, (vi) Centre for Eco-Development, (vii) Centre for Applied Statistics and (viii) Centre for Distance Education, which are equivalent to Department of Studies within the meaning of Section2(g) of the North Eastern Hill University Act, 1973. According to the Petitioner, only one faculty position of Professor/Reader for NEHU was sanctioned in the 6th Plan. The Petitioner joined the Centre for Science Education as Reader in the year 1984 and was subsequently appointed as the Head of this Centre in September, 1985. It is the case of the Petitioner that as on that date no one else except him was appointed as a Reader in the Centre as only one post of Professor/Reader had been sanctioned by the University Grants Commission. In the year 1991, he was promoted to the post of Professor, and continued to work there as the Head of this Centre till the following development took place. The Respondent authorities vide the Notification dated 4.9.1998 notified a regulation under Ordinance OA-3 and OA-11 of the NEHU Ordinances whereby it was declared that the existing Centres would become units within the new Centres. It was further notified that the Centre for Science Education, Centre for Adult and Continuing Education and Centre for Distance Education would form the Centre for Supportive Learning Systems (CSLS). Consequently, the Respondent No. 6 was appointed as the Unit-in-Charge for the Unit of Science Education vide the notification dated 3.11.2001 issued by the Deputy Registrar, Establishment, NEHU. It was further notified that the Centre for Science Education, Centre for Adult and Continuing Education and Centre for Distance Education would form the Centre for Supportive Learning Systems (CSLS). Consequently, the Respondent No. 6 was appointed as the Unit-in-Charge for the Unit of Science Education vide the notification dated 3.11.2001 issued by the Deputy Registrar, Establishment, NEHU. Terming the action of the Respondent authorities in making the existing Centres as Units within the new Centres as reduction in the status of the Centre for Science Education, he approached this Court in W.P. (C) No. 183 (SH) of 2004 for appropriate relief. It is averred by the Petitioner that the Respondent authorities subsequently realized that the exercise was not in order and accordingly issued the notification dated 14.10.2004 abolishing the newly created Units with immediate effect with the result that the Centre for Science Education came to be revived i.e. by restoring the status quo ante. This notification was followed by the consequential notification dated 8.11.2004 terminating the appointment of the Respondent No. 6 as the Unit-in-Charge of the Unit for Science Education. However, much to his consternation, the Respondent authorities issued Anr. notification dated 8.11.2004 appointing the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of the Centre of Science Education. 3. It is contended by the Petitioner that the Respondent No. 6 could not have been appointed as the Head of the Centre for Science Education upon its revival inasmuch as only one post of Professor/Reader was sanctioned under the 6th plan against which post he was appointed as Professor and that the Respondent No. 6 belongs to Mathematics Department and not to the Centre for Science Education. According to the Petitioner, Statute 7 of the North Eastern Hill University Statutes ("the Statutes" for short) clearly lays down that the Head of any Department of the University is to be appointed from amongst the Professors of the said Department, and in case where there is only one Professor, either the Professor or a Reader can be appointed as the Head of the Department, but nowhere in the Act or Statutes or Ordinances is it mentioned that a person from Anr. Department can be appointed as Head of the Department. Department can be appointed as Head of the Department. It is the contention of the Petitioner that once the status quo ante has been restored following the abolition of the Units so created, the status and position of the Petitioner as Head of the now revived Centre for Science Education should be restored. It is thus contended by the Petitioner that when the Respondent No. 6 does not belong to the Centre for Science Education, his appointment as the Head of this Centre is illegal, and is liable to be quashed. It is also the submission of the Petitioner that as he is the sole appointee in the Centre for Science Education, none but he is entitled to be appointed as the Head of the Centre and that in view of his long and continuous service, he has the legitimate right to be restored to the position of the Head of the Centre, and the appointment of the Respondent No. 6 to the post in question by ignoring his case is, therefore, illegal and is liable to be quashed to make way for his re-appointment. 4. Both the Respondent authorities and the Respondent No. 6 contested the writ petition and filed their respective affidavits-in-opposition. The Respondent authorities deny that the Respondent No. 6 was appointed as the Head of the Centre for Science Education in deviation from the requirements as contained in Statute 7 of the Statutes and assert that when the Petitioner had already completed his term as the Head of the Centre, the question of removing him from the said post does not arise. The Respondent authorities point out that the Petitioner was appointed as Head of the Centre for different periods, namely, for a period of 3 years w.e.f. 11.11.1985, for a period of Anr. three years w.e.f. 11.11.1988 to 10.11.1991, again for a period of 3 years w.e.f. 11.11.1991 and last for the period of three years w.e.f. 11.11.1994 to 10.11.1997. With the re-organization of the Centre into Units, the Petitioner was appointed as the Head of the Centre for Supportive Learning System for a period of three years vide the Notification dated 21.9.2001, while the Respondent No. 6 was appointed as In-charge of the Unit for Science Education vide the Notification dated 3.11.2001, which he joined w.e.f. 8.7.2002. With the re-organization of the Centre into Units, the Petitioner was appointed as the Head of the Centre for Supportive Learning System for a period of three years vide the Notification dated 21.9.2001, while the Respondent No. 6 was appointed as In-charge of the Unit for Science Education vide the Notification dated 3.11.2001, which he joined w.e.f. 8.7.2002. According to the Respondent authorities, the Petitioner did not take over the charge as the Head of the Centre for Supportive Learning System. The Petitioner continued to work as Head of the Centre for Science Education till the year 1998 when it was reduced to a Unit. There was no illegality in re-organizing the Centres into Units, which were done in accordance with the Regulations, Statutes, Ordinance and Act of the University. Similarly, there was also no illegality in abolishing these Units and in reviving the various Centres. It is asserted by the Respondent authorities that the Respondent No. 6 was transferred along with his post from Pachhunga University College (PUC), Aizawl, and was posted in the Centre for Science Education in terms of the Notification dated 7.11.2004, and is accordingly eligible for the Head of the Centre for Science Education. It is the specific case of the Respondent authorities that the Respondent No. 6 became a teacher of that Centre following his transfer along with the post of Reader and is, therefore, qualified to be appointed as the Head of the Centre and that the Petitioner has absolutely no right to continue as the Head of the Centre. It is, therefore, submitted by the Respondent authorities that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed with cost. 5. The case of the Respondent No. 6, as pleaded in his affidavit-in-opposition, is that he is a Reader in the Centre for Science Education, and when there is only one Professor in the Centre i.e. the Petitioner herein, his appointment as the Head of the Centre is in conformity with the provisions of Statute 7(2) of the Statutes, which says that in a case where there is only one Professor, the Executive. Council shall have the option to appoint either the Professor or a Reader as the Head of the Department on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor. Council shall have the option to appoint either the Professor or a Reader as the Head of the Department on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor. According to the Respondent No. 6, he was temporarily posted in the Department of Mathematics in the PUC, Aizawl by the authority vide the Order dated 17.2.1996, which he joined on 1.3.1996 whereafter he was transferred with his post to the Unit for Science Education on 26.7.2002, which he joined on 10.8.2001. He took over the charge of Unit-in-Charge of the Unit for Science Education on 8.7.2002, which he held till his appointment was terminated by the Notification dated 8.11.2004. He was, however, appointed as the Head of the Centre for Science Education in terms of the Notification dated 8.11.2004, and he took over the charge on 19.11.2004, and is still continuing in this post. Though the Respondent No. 6 has pleaded numerous other facts in his affidavit, it is not necessary to reproduce them all as they are not material for this decision; they are, on the contrary, mere reiteration of the pleadings of the Respondent authorities adverted to earlier. Suffice it to say that the Respondent No. 6 emphasizes therein the fact that his posting in the Unit for Science for School Education by the order dated 26.7.2001 was never challenged by the Petitioner and further that a teacher when transferred and posted in the Centre along with his post, he becomes a teacher of the Department/Centre for all purposes. These are the sum and substance of the averments of the Respondent No. 6 in his affidavit-in-opposition. He, therefore, contends that there is no merit in the writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed with costs. 6. After hearing Ms. A. Paul, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and Mr. S.R. Sen, the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent authorities, and on perusing the pleadings of the parties and other materials on record, the first question for consideration is whether the Respondent No. 6 can be considered to be a Reader in the Centre for Science Education under the NEHU. It is the contention of Ms. S.R. Sen, the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent authorities, and on perusing the pleadings of the parties and other materials on record, the first question for consideration is whether the Respondent No. 6 can be considered to be a Reader in the Centre for Science Education under the NEHU. It is the contention of Ms. A. Paul, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the Respondent No. 6 was a Reader in Mathematics of PUC, Aizawl before his transfer to the NEHU and when there is separate full-fledged Department of Mathematics in the NEHU, where he should rightfully belong, and when there is only one sanctioned post of Professor/Reader in NEHU, the question of his induction to the Centre for Science Education does not arise. How can he be accommodated in the Centre for Science Education when there is no sanctioned post of Reader therein, questioned the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Moreover, she submits, a Reader in Mathematic cannot be a part of the Centre for Science Education inasmuch as Mathematics subject is a part of the Department of Mathematics under NEHU against which he, as a Reader in Mathematics, could only be accommodated. In my judgment, these two contentions are without merit. As per the order dated 26.7.2001 (Annexure-RXI to the affidavit of the Respondent No. 6), the Respondent No. 6, who was earlier temporarily posted in PUC, Aizawl, was transferred to the NEHU Unit for Science Education, which he joined on 10.8.2001 vide Annexure-RXII whereafter by the notification dated 5.11.2001, he was appointed as Unit-in-Charge of the Unit for Science Education prior to its abolition. The order dated 26.7.2001 was never challenged by the Petitioner, what he challenged in W.P. (C) No. 183 (SH) of 2004 was not this order but the notification dated 4.9.1998 reducing the Centre for Science Education into a mere unit under the Centre for Supportive Learning System. In view of this, it is now too late in the day to question the appointment of the Respondent No. 6 as a Reader in the Centre for Science Education, which took place in 2001. In view of this, it is now too late in the day to question the appointment of the Respondent No. 6 as a Reader in the Centre for Science Education, which took place in 2001. In so far as the contention of the Petitioner regarding the induction of a Reader in Mathematics like the Respondent No. 6 to the Centre for Science Education is concerned, this question is a highly technical issue, and this Court does not have the expertise to examine the same and refrains from doing so. 7. Coming now to the meat of the matter i.e. whether the Respondent authorities acted arbitrarily in overlooking the case of the Petitioner for re-appointment as Head of the Centre for Science Education and in appointing the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of the Centre. It may be recalled that the Petitioner had held the post of the Head of the Centre from 11.11.1985 to 11.11.1997 i.e. initially for two years, which was extended for three years at a time for three times. When the Respondent authorities re-organized the Centre into Units by reducing the status of the Centre for Science Education into a mere unit of the Centre for Supportive Learning System, he filed WP (C) No. 183 (SH) of 2004 before this Court questioning the legality thereof. The Respondent authorities subsequently by the notification dated 14.10.2004 abolished the Units and restored, among Ors., the status of the Centre for Science Education without appointing the Petitioner as Head of the Centre for Science Education but by appointing the Respondent No. 6 to that post. This is the main grievance of the Petitioner. At this stage, it will be beneficial to refer to the provisions of Statute 7 of the Statutes, which are as under: 7.(1) In the case of Departments which have more than one Professor, the Head of the Department shall be appointed by the Executive Council on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancel lor from among the Professors. (2) In the case of Departments where there is only one Professor, the Executive Council shall have the option to appoint, on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor, either the Professor or a Reader as the Head of the Department: Provided that it shall be open to a Professor or Reader to decline the offer of appointment as the Head of the Department. (3) A person appointed as the Head of the Department shall hold office as such for a period of three years and shall be eligible for reappointment: Provided that if the term of the Head ends during the academic session, it shall automatically stand extended up to the end of the concerned semester. Notwithstanding anything contained above a teacher shall cease to be Head on attaining the age of superannuation. (4) A Head of a Department may resign his office at any time during his tenure of office. (5) A Head of a Department shall perform such functions as may be prescribed by the Ordinances. (emphasis mine) 8. Before proceeding further, we may note that the term "Department" is defined by Section 2(g) of the NEHU Act to mean a Department of Studies, and includes a Centre of Studies. Clause 1 of OA-3 of the North Eastern Hill University Ordinances established seven Centres of Studies, and there is no dispute at the bar that the Centre for Science Education is one of the Centres of Studies so established, and is thus one of the Departments contemplated by Section 2(g) of the NEHU Act. Therefore, the appointment of Head of the Centre for Science Education shall have to be made in conformity with the provisions of Statute 7 of the Statutes. A conjoint reading of the various clauses of Statute 7 plainly shows that where there are more than one Professor in a Department, the Head of the Department is to be appointed by the Executive Council as recommended by the Vice-Chancellor from among the Professors; that where there is only one Professor, the Executive Council is given the option to appoint either the lone Professor or a Reader as the Head of the Department on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor; that it is open to the Professor or the Reader to decline the offer of appointment as the Head of the Department and that though the Head of the Department so appointed is to have a tenure of three years, he is, nevertheless, eligible for re-appointment. The Petitioner is admittedly the only Professor in the Centre for Science Education, and is certainly senior to the Respondent No. 6. Clause (3) of the Statute does not indicate the number of terms for which the Head of the Centre so appointed could be re-appointed. The Petitioner is admittedly the only Professor in the Centre for Science Education, and is certainly senior to the Respondent No. 6. Clause (3) of the Statute does not indicate the number of terms for which the Head of the Centre so appointed could be re-appointed. In the absence of upper limit fixed for re-appointment as Head of the Department, it can be safely assumed that the Head of the Department, once appointed, can be considered for re-appointment again and again. It is the cardinal principles of interpretation of a statute that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences on the principle that the words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. The rule is also stated in Anr. form: "When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. The results of the construction are then not a matter for the court, even though they may be strange or surprising, unreasonable or unjust or oppressive. (See Justice G.P. Singh's "Principles of Interpretation of Statutes", 9th Edn., at page 45-47). Consequently, I have no alternative but to hold that there is no upper limit prescribed by the Statutes for reappointing the Petitioner as the Head of the Centre for Science Education. 9. Having said that, it is equally true that there is no vested right with the Petitioner for his re-appointment as the Head of the Centre, after all, all that he can claim is the right to be considered for re-appointment thereto in contradistinction to the right to be re-appointed to that post. This is amply made clear by Clause (2) of Statute 7 which says that where there is only one Professor, the Executive Council shall have the option to appoint, on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor, either the Professor or a Reader as the Head of the Department. This is amply made clear by Clause (2) of Statute 7 which says that where there is only one Professor, the Executive Council shall have the option to appoint, on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor, either the Professor or a Reader as the Head of the Department. In the instant case, the Respondent authorities have fully exploited this provision, or have employed the same as the key to unlock the door for appointing and re-appointing the Respondent No. 6 to the post in question even though he is admittedly junior to the Petitioner and the latter is eligible for re-appointment to that post. The expression "shall have the option to appoint" appearing in Clause 7(2) of the Statute undoubtedly confers a discretionary power upon the Respondent authorities to appoint a Reader as the Head of the Centre even when there is a Professor. On the face of competing claims made by the Petitioner, who is higher in rank and, therefore, senior to the Respondent No. 6, for his re-appointment as the Head of the Centre, the question to be determined is whether this discretionary power can be construed as the power to appoint the Respondent No. 6 at their whims and caprices on the ground that they have been given the option to appoint even a Reader? In other words, whether Clause 7(2) of the Statute confers unfettered power to the Respondent authorities to appoint the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of the Centre when the Petitioner is higher in rank as well as senior to him? No doubt, by the use of the expression "shall have the option to appoint" a Reader in terms of Clause 7(2) even where there is a Professor in the Centre, the Respondent authorities would like to contend that the clause gives them an unfettered discretion to appoint the Respondent No. 6 as Head of the Centre, which cannot be challenged in a writ petition and that even if they should exercise their discretion wrongly, they cannot be questioned in a Court of law. This argument might have held good fifty one years ago. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, there can be no such things as unfettered discretion, absolute power or arbitrary power. This argument might have held good fifty one years ago. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, there can be no such things as unfettered discretion, absolute power or arbitrary power. The very fact that an option is given to the Respondent authorities to appoint either the sole Professor or a Reader in the Department shows that they are by no means given the absolute or arbitrary power to appoint the Respondent No. 6 without any rhyme or reason by overlooking the case of the Petitioner, who is admittedly senior to and higher in rank than the Respondent No. 6, for re-appointment as Head of the Centre for Science Education. I have minutely gone through the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Respondent authorities to find out the reason for appointing the Respondent No. 6 to the post in question without considering the case of the Petitioner for such re-appointment, but none exists whatsoever. The manner in which the Respondent authorities chose to exercise their discretionary powers in the instant case reminds me of the oft-quoted observations of Lord Denning in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade (1977) 2 All ER 182: ...These courts have the authority - and I would add the duty--in a proper case, when called upon, to enquire into the exercising of a discretionary power by a minister or his department. If it is found that this power has been exercised improperly or mistakenly so as to infringe unjustly on the legitimate rights and interests of the subject, then these courts must so declare. They stand, as ever, between the executive and the subject, as Lord Atkin said in a famous passage, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law. To which I would add: alert to see that a discretionary power is not exceeded or misused. 10. The Respondent authorities could not have simply ignored the case of the Petitioner, who is a Professor, for re-appointment as the Head of the Centre and proceeded to appoint a Reader like the Respondent No. 6, who is admittedly junior to him and is holding a lower post, without disclosing any reason. The fact that the Petitioner has already held the post in question for over three terms is no ground for refusing him re-appointment; Statute 7, as found by me earlier, does not say so or put such an embargo. The fact that the Petitioner has already held the post in question for over three terms is no ground for refusing him re-appointment; Statute 7, as found by me earlier, does not say so or put such an embargo. The Respondent authorities are not at liberty to deny re-appointment to the Petitioner on grounds which are non-existent, arbitrary or capricious. Nor because they have personal antipathy to the Petitioner, nor on any irrelevant ground. As noted earlier, it may very well be argued that the decision of the Respondent authorities is administrative or executive in nature and not judicial. But that does not mean that they can do as they like, regardless of right or wrong. Nor does it mean that the courts are powerless to correct them. The Respondent authorities should have good reasons for not re-appointing the Petitioner as Head of the Centre. If no reason is assigned, the court may infer that they have no good reason. In the instant case, the Respondent authorities have not properly applied their mind, and have failed to take into consideration the scope and ambit of Statute 7(2), which merely confers upon them the option to appoint either the Petitioner or the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of the Centre and that this power to exercise option like any discretionary powers does not, and cannot, mean an arbitrary power to ignore the case of the Petitioner for appointment or re-appointment, as the case may be, and to appoint the Respondent No. 6, who is junior to him, and is holding a post lower than his post without any rhyme or reason. Other things being equal, in my judgment, it will be irrational to place the Petitioner under his junior like the Respondent No. 6. The Respondent authorities have also failed to take into account Statute 7(3) which confers upon the Petitioner the right to be considered for reappointment as Head of the Centre. The law is well-settled that exercise of discretion by administrative authority is subject to judicial review; judicial review is open in cases of failure to exercise discretion and excess or abuse of discretionary powers or illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in a particular manner. The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in a particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. But that authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of Anr. body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can be conveniently grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are, however, not mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to Anr. body it acts ultra vires. See State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181 at para 15. In my judgment, in the absence of cogent reason for appointing the Respondent No. 6 by overlooking the case of the Petitioner for re-appointment, the inference is irresistible and the conclusion inescapable that the Respondent authorities have been, or must have been, influenced by extraneous considerations which ought not to have influenced them - or, conversely, must have failed to take into account considerations which ought to have influenced them. At any rate, I am of the firm view that the impugned decision of the Respondent authorities to appoint the Respondent No. 6 by overlooking the case of the Petitioner suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. In this view of the matter, the appointment of the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of Centre for Science Education in whatever form cannot be sustained in law. 11. There is still one aspect of the matter which requires thorough examination. In this view of the matter, the appointment of the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of Centre for Science Education in whatever form cannot be sustained in law. 11. There is still one aspect of the matter which requires thorough examination. Statute 7(3) of the Statutes provides that a person appointed as the Head of the Department shall hold office as such for a period of three years and shall be eligible for re-appointment. The Petitioner is certainly eligible for re-appointment. The maximum limit up to which he can be considered for re-appointment is, however, not prescribed by that provision. Therefore, irrespective of whether he has already held the post in question for three years or more, he can, in terms of Statute 7(3), legitimately claim the right to be considered for re-appointment. In other words, once he has been appointed the Head of the Centre, he has the legitimate expectation that he will be re-appointed again and again. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice or is founded on the sanction of law. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow promised procedure or established practice or the requirement of law even though a legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation (1993) 3 SCC 499, explained the nature and scope of the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" in the following manner: For legal purposes, the expectation cannot the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope not can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However, earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. However, earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. (emphasis mine) It is true that as a ground of relief, the efficiency of the doctrine is rather weak as its slot is just above fairness in action but far below "promissory estoppel". It may only entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause of denial. In the instant case also, there is no doubt that the Petitioner has no vested right to re-appointment as the Head of the Centre for Science Education, but then when he has already held the post and the Respondent No. 6 is holding the post of a Reader which is admittedly a post lower than the post of a Professor and as per Statute 7(3), he is made eligible for re-appointment, he, at any rate, has the right to be considered for re-appointment, and he cannot simply be overlooked for re-appointment to make way for the Respondent No. 6 unless he is given the opportunity to show cause before the expectation of re-appointment is dashed or there is cogent explanation for denying him re-appointment. For example, in M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P. (1999) 7 SCC 592, renewal clause in agreement for distribution of State largesse to selected industrial units as a protective measure is held to give rise to legitimate expectation to the selected industrial units of extension of their protection by giving effect to the renewal clause in usual manner and according to the past practice. The Apex Court therein went to the extent of holding that the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. This is what the Apex Court said: 44. The renewal clause in the impugned agreements executed in favour of the Respondents does not also appear to be unjust or improper. Whether protection by way of supply of sal seeds under the terms of agreement requires to be continued for a further period, is a matter for decision by the State Government and unless such decision is patently arbitrary, interference by the Court is not called for. In the facts of the case, the decision of the State Government to extend the protection for further period cannot be held to be per se irrational, arbitrary or capricious warranting judicial review of such policy decision. Therefore, the High Court has rightly rejected the Appellant's contention about the invalidity of the renewal clause. The Appellants failed in earlier attempts to challenge the validity of the agreement including the renewal clause. The subsequent challenge of the renewal clause, therefore, should not be entertained unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the fact situation has undergone such changes that the discretion in the matter of renewal of agreement should not be exercised by the State. It has been rightly contended by Dr. Singhvi that the Respondents legitimately expect that the renewal clause should be given effect to in usual manner and according to past practice unless there is any special reason not to adhere to such practice. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has been judicially recognized by this Court in a number of decisions. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. (emphasis mine) Though the aforesaid observations are rendered in the context of distribution of State largesse, the underlying principle that a renewal clause in an agreement can give rise to legitimate expectation that the past benefit or right already enjoyed would be continued until and unless the agreement is changed in a manner permissible by law, I have not the slightest doubt, will apply a fortiori and proprio vigore to a provision governing re-appointment in public employment engrafted in a statutory law such as the one in this case. 12. 12. To recapitulate the facts of this case, the undisputed facts on record are that the Petitioner was appointed as Head of the Centre for different periods between 11.11.1985 and 10.11.1997, and continued to hold the post till 1998 when the status of the Centre was reduced to a Unit for Science Education and declined the post of the Head of the Centre for Supportive learning System. In fact, in WP (C) No. 183 (SH) of 2004, he challenged the reduction of the status of the Centre for Science Education to the status of an Unit. The impugned decision therein was subsequently dropped, and the Centre for Science Education was revived with its former status by the Notification dated 14.10.2004. It may be noted that when the Centre was reduced to Unit for Science, the Respondent No. 6, and not the Petitioner, was appointed as the Unit-in-Charge of Science Education. However, when the Centre was revived, the Respondent No. 6, and not the Petitioner, was again appointed as the Head of the Centre for a period of three years by the notification dated 8.11.2004, which is impugned herein. It is stated at the bar that even after the expiry of the Respondent No. 6 as Head of the Centre, he is still continuing in that post as an interim arrangement. Leaving aside the period when the Respondent No. 6 was appointed as the Unit-in-Charge for Science Education, for which the Petitioner did not naturally have any grievance, the Petitioner can nevertheless legitimately claim that before appointing the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of the Centre, he ought to have been considered for re-appointment. In other words, he has the legitimate expectation to be re-appointed as the Head of the Centre and can legitimately question the appointment of his junior like the Respondent No. 6 as the Head of the Centre. In the absence of any cogent reason, the action of the Respondent authorities in appointing the Respondent No. 6 and is not re-appointing the Petitioner as Head of the Centre, is arbitrary and also defeats the legitimate expectation of the Petitioner for re-appointment. In my opinion, the impugned action of the Respondent authorities is an abuse of discretion vested in them by Statute 7(2) and (3) of the NEHU Statutes, and is not sustainable in law. This certainly warrants the interference of this Court. 13. In my opinion, the impugned action of the Respondent authorities is an abuse of discretion vested in them by Statute 7(2) and (3) of the NEHU Statutes, and is not sustainable in law. This certainly warrants the interference of this Court. 13. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this writ petition is allowed. The impugned notification dated 8.11.2004 (Anenxure-7), which might no longer be inoperative by efflux of time, is, nonetheless, hereby declared as illegal and was never operative. The Respondent authorities shall now consider the case of the Petitioner for re-appointment to the post of the Head of the Centre for Science Education in accordance with law and also keeping in mind the observations made by me in the foregoing paragraphs and take a decision thereon within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this judgment. Pending such decision and to avoid administrative or academic inconvenience or chaos in the Centre in the interregnum, the existing arrangement in the Centre shall continue. To remove any doubt, it is made clear that the current appointment of the Respondent 6 as Head of the Centre for Science Education, whether as interim or otherwise, is subject to this judgment. The Respondent authorities shall pay counsel's fees to the Petitioner which is quantified at Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only).