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2008 DIGILAW 788 (KAR)

State of Karnataka v. Vithal Ramamigouda Shinikhed

2008-12-18

B.V.NAGARATHNA, MANJULA CHELLUR

body2008
JUDGMENT Nagarathna, J. This appeal is filed by the State being aggrieved by the Judgment of acquittal passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Bijapur in Spl. Case No. 40/2001. The respondent herein is the accused in the Special case and he has been acquitted of the charge of having committed the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and also under Section 3(i), (xii) and 3(2)(v) of SC & ST (P.A) Act, 1989. 2. The essential facts of the case leading upto the filing of this appeal with reference to the rank of the parties before the Trial Court are as follows: It is the case of the prosecution that PW.1-the prosecutrix the complainant is married to one Srishail' Bajentri of Kannoor and has a daughter by name Renuka out of the said wedlock, who as on the date of incident was about three years old. After the birth of Renuka the complainant suffered from a deformity in vison which led to a decrease in the long sight and because of this there were strained relations between her and her husband. Since he had deserted her, she had stayed with her parents at Halagunaki village. The victim's parents were residing on their land which is about half a kilometer from N.H. 30 and PW. 1 resided with her parents along with her sister Yamunamma. 3. According to the prosecution, on 1.4.2001 PW.l's sister and her father had been to Nandaragi and her mother Bhagirathi-PW.3 had been to Chowdihal village where her sister Yellavva was residing. At about 12 noon when P.W. 1 was alone, the accused came to the hut and asked for water, as he was thirsty. After drinking water he continued to sit and seeing that the accused was still there, PW 1 came out of the hut but the accused pushed her and as a result she fell down. Thereafter he closed her mouth and committed the offence of rape by having sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter the accused left towards his land. In the evening PW.1 mentioned to PW.3 about the commission of offence of rape by the accused and they went to the house of Malakanna (CW. 10) who asked them to approach the police. Thereafter they went the police station at Horti and lodged a complaint. Thereafter the accused left towards his land. In the evening PW.1 mentioned to PW.3 about the commission of offence of rape by the accused and they went to the house of Malakanna (CW. 10) who asked them to approach the police. Thereafter they went the police station at Horti and lodged a complaint. Alter the complaint was registered, the police sent PW.1 to hospital at Bijapur and she was examined by the doctor-PW.2 and her clothes were seized as per Ex.P5- mahazar. PW.8 then visited the scene of offence and at 10.30 p.m. the accused was produced before him and he arrested the accused and sent him for medical test and PW.8 drew up mahazar with regard to the seizure of the clothes of the accused as per EX.P7 and on 2.4.2001 he visited the scene of offence and drew up mahazar and seized bangle pieces from there as per Ex. P6. He then recorded the statement of PW. 1, her father, mother, Yamunavva, Jakkavva and others and he addressed a letter to the Village Accountant to produce the record of right in respect of land where the scene of offence was situated. On 3.4.2001 he secured one Malakanna and his statement was recorded. He then sent the clothes of the victim to the F.S.L for examination. The report of the F.S.L was received as per EX.P3. Then the sketch in respect of the scene of offence was drawn by the Assistant Engineer, PWD, Indi, on the request of PW. 8 who then filed the charge sheet against the accused for having committed the offence punishable under Section 376 read with Section 3(i), (xii) and 3(2)(v) of SC & ST (P.A) Act, 1989 and accordingly acquitted the accused for the said offences by its Judgment dated 9.7.2003. Being aggrieved by the said Judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred this appeal. 4. We have heard Smt. Anuradha Desai, learned State Public Prosecutor for the appellant State and Smt. L.K. Hema, learned amicus curiae, appearing for the respondent/accused. 5. Learned State Public Prosecutor has taken us through depositions of PWs 1 to 10 and the contents of documents as per Exs. P1 to P10 got marked by the prosecution and submitted that the Judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is erroneous. 5. Learned State Public Prosecutor has taken us through depositions of PWs 1 to 10 and the contents of documents as per Exs. P1 to P10 got marked by the prosecution and submitted that the Judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is erroneous. She submits that the reasons given by the Trial, Court for acquittal are not in accordance with law in as much as the Trial Court has held that since there was no injury on PW. 1, therefore, it could he assumed that there was no resistance from her and hence would amount to consent. The Trial Court has further recorded that there was no medical evidence to support the offence under Section 376, which is contrary to material on record. The Trial Court further reasoned that since the clothes of the accused and the victims were not seized under panch, the guilt of the accused was not proved. She submits that the aforesaid reasoning is contrary to the evidence on record and therefore requests this Court to reverse the finding, as according to her the evidence of the witnesses who have been examined by the prosecution have not been properly appreciated by the Trial Court in the proper perspective and hence the Judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside and the accused is liable to be convicted for having committed the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(i), (xii) and 3(2)(v) of SC & ST (P.A) Act, 1989. 6. On the other hand, the learned amicus curiae appearing for the respondent accused submitted that the case of the prosecution is inherently improbable and that the evidence of the witnesses is inconsistent, not cogent and does not prove the guilt of the accused and therefore, the Judgment of acquittal does not warrant interference in this appeal. She also submits that the evidence of PWs. 2 and 4 are such that the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC cannot be attributed to the accused. She further submits that the adjoining landowners who were working on the fields have not been examined and that the victim's evidence is also not trust worthy, in fact she was a consenting party and offered no resistance to the accused. She has also submitted that Malkanna who was informed about the incident by PW. She further submits that the adjoining landowners who were working on the fields have not been examined and that the victim's evidence is also not trust worthy, in fact she was a consenting party and offered no resistance to the accused. She has also submitted that Malkanna who was informed about the incident by PW. 1 & 3 has not been examined and hence submits that the appeal ought to be dismissed. 7. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned State Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and the learned amicus curiae appearing for the accused and scrutinized the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Trial Court and perused the Judgment passed by the Trial Court. 8. Having regard to the contentions urged, the points that arise for our consideration are as follows: "1. Whether the finding of the Trial Court that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC Section 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of SC & ST CPA) Act, 1989 is justified or calls for interference in this appeal? 2. Whit order?" 9. We answer the above points as follows: Point No. 1: The finding of the Trial Court acquitting the accused for having committed the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC is erroneous and is liable to be set aside as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence under Section 376 of IPC. Point No.2: The accused is liable to be sentenced for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC as per the final order for the following: 10. PW. 1 is the victim in the instant case as well as the complainant. She has stated that about five years prior to the incident she was married to Srishail and out of the said wedlock has a daughter by name Renuka. Since she had a problem in her vision (eye deformity) she started residing with her parents as her relationship with her husband was strained. She has stated that about five years prior to the incident she was married to Srishail and out of the said wedlock has a daughter by name Renuka. Since she had a problem in her vision (eye deformity) she started residing with her parents as her relationship with her husband was strained. She has stated that she knows the accused who stays at Halagunaki village and that on the date of incident at about 11 a.m when her father and sister had been to a jaatra at Nandaragi village and her mother and her daughter had been to the house of her sister, she was all alone in the house. She was filling up jowar in the bag, at that time the accused came to the house and requested for water and she gave him water. She felt that accused was staring at her and she wanted to come out of the house as she apprehended the accused would assault her. But he pushed her and she tell down and he fell on her body and lifted her clothes and he slept beside her and removed his lungi and thereafter lifted both her legs, closed her mouth. He threatened her with dire consequences and had sexual intercourse with her. She then quarreled with him, as she did not consent for the act of the accused. 11. She then came out to the remote end of the land and found Jakkavva-CW.9 who is none other than the wife of the accused and informed her about the commission of offence of rape by her husband, but she did not listen to her. In the evening PW.1's mother returned and she spoke to the mother about the commission of offence. She and her mother went to the house of CW. 10-Malakanna, who asked them to approach the police. They then went to the police station at Horti sand lodged a complaint (Ex.Pl). Thereafter she was sent by the police to the hospital at Bijapur for medical examination. 12. In her cross-examination she has stated that adjoining their house, there are other landed properties and there are houses on the said properties, but the inhabitants of those houses are not on talking terms with her. At the time of incident, none of the neighbours were present in their respective houses (Metagi). 12. In her cross-examination she has stated that adjoining their house, there are other landed properties and there are houses on the said properties, but the inhabitants of those houses are not on talking terms with her. At the time of incident, none of the neighbours were present in their respective houses (Metagi). She has also stated that her mother might have informed Bheemaiah and Malkanna about the incident. Then complaint was lodged by the complainant and on the same day the police sent' the victim to the hospital for medical examination where a lady medical officer examined her at about 10.00 p.m. She has also stated that she had sustained injury on her back, shoulder and no other injuries. She has also denied the suggestion that at the instance of Bheemaiah and Malkanna she had lodged a police complaint against the accused. 13. PW.3 is the mother of the victim who has stated that on the date 01 incident she had gone to Chowdihal village along with her granddaughter and that PW. 1 was alone in the house and that after she returned at 5.00 p.m. on the same day, PW. 1 narrated about the incident. They went to Malakanna and narrated the incident to him who advised them to got to police station and lodge a complaint. Accordingly, a complaint was lodged. She has also stated that the police recorded the statement of the date of incident and has also denied a suggestion that at the instance of Malakanna, a false complaint was lodged against the accused. 14. PW.2 is the Lady Medical Officer who examined PW. 1. on 2.4.2001 at, about 10.30 p.m when she was brought by the police constable with the history of sexual intercourse. She states that she examined the victim and there were no external injuries. On P.V. Examination, vagina admitted easily two fingers and she found that there was no discharge from the vagina. Two smeers and two swabs were taken for examination and the clothes of the victim and pubic hair and nails were sent for the .expert opinion to the FSL. After seeing the report of the FSL the doctor opined that there might have been penetration without ejaculation. She has given a certilicale as per Ex.P2 and the FSL report is at Ex.P3. She has also stated that PW. After seeing the report of the FSL the doctor opined that there might have been penetration without ejaculation. She has given a certilicale as per Ex.P2 and the FSL report is at Ex.P3. She has also stated that PW. I narrated that she was subjected to an act of rape in the farm house at about l1.a.m by the accused. In the cross-examination PW.2 states that there were no injuries on the private part, on the thigh or on the back. EX.P2 is the report issued by PW.2. EX.P3 is the FSL report, which states that there is presence of seminal stains in the petticoat of P.W. 1. 15. PW.4 is the doctor who examined the accused on 1.4.2001 at about 11.45p.m and on physical examination he found that the accused was capable of performing an act like that of sexual intercourse and on genetalia examination he found the evidence of recent intercourse i.e., within 24 hours since the glands of male genetalia was exposed and prepucial skin was retracted upwards which is possible whenever there is a fresh sexual intercourse. He has also stated that the following are the signs of struggle during a forcible sexual intercourse. "1. Banian: Inner cloth over the chest is torn over the less part of the shoulder. Its side is torn and the back side in the stichs. 2. Banian which is torn in the right scapular region which corresponds with nail scratch mark over the back side in the right scapular region. Injuries over the back of the accused, there is a scratch mark in the right scapular region which is reddish in colour, curviliner in course in the back side going down, towards the interior aspect. One scratch mark is present in the left inter scapular region, the colour is reddish brown and green looking wound. 3. One more scratch mark reddish in colour in the left infra scapular region. Age of the wound-within 24 hours. All injury noted on him are simple in nature and might have been caused by nail scratch. All the clothing of the accused person which he was putting were collected for the purpose of sending them to the FSL. Accordingly, he issued the certificate, marked as Ex P4. On 1.10.2002 medical opinion on the basis of Ex.P2-FSL Report are issued. All injury noted on him are simple in nature and might have been caused by nail scratch. All the clothing of the accused person which he was putting were collected for the purpose of sending them to the FSL. Accordingly, he issued the certificate, marked as Ex P4. On 1.10.2002 medical opinion on the basis of Ex.P2-FSL Report are issued. Having regard to the contents of EX.P4- certificate seminal stain was present over the petty coat. Accordingly, he gave his opinion as per Ex.P5. 16. PW.5 is the panch witness with regard to the seizure of clothes of the accused who turned hostile, PW.6 is also panch witness who along with Co-panch Parashuram Talakeri were present with regard to the seizure of broken bangle pieces from the spot and have signed mahazar at Ex. P6. 17. PW.7 is the Head Constable who took PW. 1-victim to the Medical Officer, District Hospital, Bijapur on 1.4.2001. PW.8 is the Investigating Officer who conducted the spot mahazar and recorded the statement of Malakanna and sent the clothes of PW. 1 to the FSL and filed the chargesheet against the accused. He also seized the petticoat of the victim and secured the caste certificate. Rough sketch was drawn by the Assistant Engineer, PWD, Indi. PW.9 is the PSI who recorded the complaint of PW. 1 and registered the same and sent PW. 1 for medical examination. PW. 10 is the Tahsildar who issued the Caste Certificate in respect of PW. 1 and stated that she belongs to Scheduled Caste and that the accused came from lingayath caste. 18. The learned Trial Judge in his Judgment of acquittal has stated that except the evidence of the prosecutrix i.e., the victim PW. 1, there was no corroborative evidence to show that there was any offence of rape committed by the accused on PW. 1 and that the lady Medical Officer who has been examined as PW.2, on medical examination of PW. 1 found that there were no external injuries found on PW. 1 and that PW. 1 had no injuries on her vagina or other parts of the body. On Per Vagina (P.V.) Examination PW.2 stated that vagina admits easily two fingers and that there was no discharge of vagina at the time of examination. According to the learned Judge, though the FSL Report states that there was seminal stains on petticoat of PW. 1 had no injuries on her vagina or other parts of the body. On Per Vagina (P.V.) Examination PW.2 stated that vagina admits easily two fingers and that there was no discharge of vagina at the time of examination. According to the learned Judge, though the FSL Report states that there was seminal stains on petticoat of PW. 1, there was nothing against the accused in the FSL Report, which could hold him guilty of the offence of rape. He has relied upon the statement made in Ex. P2 by PW .2 that there were no recent signs of sexual intercourse and held that the medical opinion has not supported the case of the prosecution. 19. In our view the learned Judge was not right in concluding as above only because PW.2 found that there were no external injuries on PW. 1 and therefore the offence could not have been committed by the accused. As per Ex.P2, on internal examination of PW. 1, PW.2 has stated that the vagina admitted two fingers easily which means that PW. 1 being a married lady who had delivered a child could not have sustained any injury as such when the offence was committed by the accused. If this fact had been kept in mind, the factum of absence of injuries on the body of PW. 1 would become insignificant. The fact that there was no discharge from vagina is also not a significant tact. On the other hand the FSL Report at Ex.P3 clearly states that there were seminal stains on the petty coat (langa) of PW. 1. The version of the prosecutrix cannot be branded as false on the ground that the prosecutrix has no injuries on her vide (State of Maharashtra Vs. Priya Sharan Mahara) reported in AIR 1997 SC 2041 ). In the case of rape of a married woman habituated to sexual intercourse, injury on private parts is not likely as in the instant case. On the other hand what is relevant is the deposition of PW.2 who has admitted that in the instant case, there could have been penetration without ejaculation. This evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. The Trial Court having noted that could not have concluded the fact that the offence was not committed on PW 1. Mere penetration is an offence according to explanation to Section 375 of IPC. This evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. The Trial Court having noted that could not have concluded the fact that the offence was not committed on PW 1. Mere penetration is an offence according to explanation to Section 375 of IPC. For a rape to be an offence ejaculation of semen is not needed. Nevertheless semen stains in vaginal cavity or on pubic hair or on wearing apparel of the victim or of accused can be corroborative material supporting the evidence of the prosecutrix. Therefore, the evidence of PW.2 and the report at EX.P2 cannot be conclusive of the fact that the accused could not have committed the offence of rape on PW. 1. The sole testimony of the victim cannot be dis-believed merely because the doctor who examined her did not find sign of rape. 20. As opposed to this, the contents of EX.P4 which has been issued by PW.4 after examination of the accused states that there was evidence of recent intercourse (within 24 hours intercourse since the glan of the male genital was exposed and prepucial skin had retracted upwards which is possible where there is a flesh intercourse) is significant and compared to the injuries sustained on the back of the accused which were less than 24 hours and which were in the nature of nail scratch marks, supports the case of the prosecution. 21. The Trial Judge has also considered as to whether the sole testimony of prosecution alone could be believed to be true, that it is his reasoning that a women who is married and has got a child of three years old, cannot be said to be raped unless she had consented to it or otherwise she would have sustained injuries on her back, but in the instant case there was not a single injury caused to her as per PW.2. According to the learned Judge, if she had resisted to the act of the accused, then certainly there would have been injuries either on her back or on her face and since she bad not sustained any injury, it is not possible to believe the case of the prosecution. The learned Trial Judge while further proceeding has reasoned as follows: "It is impossible unless a woman falls unconscious to commit an offence of rape on her. The learned Trial Judge while further proceeding has reasoned as follows: "It is impossible unless a woman falls unconscious to commit an offence of rape on her. If she is not unconscious, then either she must have consented for the act or if she has not consented, certainly she would have received certain injuries. When she has not sustained any injury, there is reason to believe that she has consented for it. In this case, when there are no Signs of sexual act, I am of the opinion that the accused has not committed rape on PW 1. Even assuming that he has raped, there is no reason to say that she did not consent to it" 22. Section 114-A of the Evidence Act states that it the raped victim in her evidence states that she did not consent to the, sexual intercourse, the onus to prove consent lies on the accused. The fact of sexual intercourse is however, required to be established by the prosecution. However, absence of injury on the private parts of prosecutrix would not be a material fact in the case of a rape of a married lady particularly when she has delivered a child and absence of injury cannot imply that there was consent or lack of resistance by the prosecutrix. Despite non-existence of injury on the victim, if the factum of the offence is established, it can lead to conviction of the accused. (Rafiq Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 559 ). Similarly the absence of visible injury on the prosecutrix does not always Warrant a presumption of consent on her part. Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix is not necessarily an evidence of falsity of the allegation or an evidence of consent on the part of the prosecutrix. Therefore, absence of injuries is not conclusive one way or the other. In the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Mehabooba reported in ILR 1986 Karnataka 4150 it has been held that absence of injury on a married woman subjected to forcible coitus does not necessarily spell out consent. 23. Therefore, absence of injuries is not conclusive one way or the other. In the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Mehabooba reported in ILR 1986 Karnataka 4150 it has been held that absence of injury on a married woman subjected to forcible coitus does not necessarily spell out consent. 23. With regard to the subsequent conduct of the prosecutrix the learned Judge had stated that since the incident occurred at around 12.00 noon PW.1 did not tell anybody till her mother came in the evening and that natural conduct of a woman would have been in such a case to disclose it to somebody else and that the complainant's behaviour was normal till evening. Therefore, according to the learned Judge in the absence of any positive evidence against the accused to show that he is guilty of committing offence of rape on PW. 1 he has staled that "it would be unsafe to believe that an act of rape was committed, that too against a woman, who had begotten child and who is around 21 years of age. No act of sex is proved. No violation on the person of PW.1 is proved." 24. In the case of Bhogin Bhai Vs. State of Gujarath reported in AIR 1983 SC 753 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the evidence of victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the probabilities factor does not render in unworthy credence as a general rule, there is no rule to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence. Therefore, the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix can be a basis for conviction. Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in compromising position and there is likelihood of her having leveled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self preservation or when the 'Probabilities factor' is bound to be out of tune. 25. Under the circumstances the learned Trial Judge was of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring out the charge that the accused had committed the act of rape against PW.1 and had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and the sole testimony of PW. Under the circumstances the learned Trial Judge was of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring out the charge that the accused had committed the act of rape against PW.1 and had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and the sole testimony of PW. 1 could not be accepted as she had failed to establish that she had resisted onslaught made on her by the accused and thereby acquitted the accused for the offences with which be is charged. 26. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but if a prosecutrix is an adult having full understanding, the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. (State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand reported in AIR 1990 SC 658 . 27. In fact the Supreme Court has also stressed that the evidence of the victim of rape stands on par with the evidence of the injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained injury is not likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. 28. Generally speaking unexplained delay in lodging FIR is fatal to prosecution; But in the case of sexual offence, delay stands generally explained because time is generally consumed in deciding a the factum of rape should be public or not? 2.9. Unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, Courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused when her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, amounts to adding insult to injury. (State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh reported in AIR 1996 SC 1393 ). 30. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, amounts to adding insult to injury. (State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh reported in AIR 1996 SC 1393 ). 30. If the prosecutrix is believed to be truthful witness, in her deposition no further corroboration is insisted. Corroboration is admittedly only a rule of credence. AIR 1999 SC 3916 ). 31. Where the prosecutrix evidence is corroborated by another witness and medical evidence, the case of forcible rape is proved and accused has to be convicted. In a case where the accused entered house of the prosecutrix which was proved by evidence on record, Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the judgment of acquittal and set aside the same. (State of Rajasthan Vs. Biram Lal reported in AIR 2005 SC 2327 ). 32. In the said case, it has been held that it is not the law that in every case version of the prosecutrix must be corroborated by independent evidence on record. It all depends on the quality of evidence of the prosecutrix. If the Court is satisfied that the evidence of the prosecutrix is free from blemish and it is implicitly reliable, then on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, conviction can be recorded. In appropriate cases, the Court may look for corroboration or from the circumstances of the case before recording an order of conviction. On the basis of the evidence of PWs.2, 3 and 7 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case convicted the accused holding that mother of prosecutrix and other witness supported the case of the prosecution and corroborated the version of the prosecutrix and reverse the finding of acquittal given by the High Court and convicted the accused under Section 316 of IPC and upheld his conviction under Section 450 of IPC pertaining to criminal trespass. 33. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Chimdraprakash Kewalchand Jain reported in AIR 1990 SC 658 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that while dealing with a case under Section 376 of IPC what is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires to look for corroboration. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. The standard of proof to be expected by the Court in such cases must take into account the fact that sex offences are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. 34. In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh &, Others reported in AIR 1986 SC 1393 the Hon'ble Supreme Court re-iterated that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict the accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found reliable. It further held that in sexual offences delay in lodging the FIR is due to variety of reasons as it touches upon the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of her family. Even if there is some delay in lodging FIR in respect of offence of rape if it is properly explained and the explanation is natural in the facts and circumstances of the case, such delay would not matter. 35. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Lekh Raj and Another reported in AIR 1999 SC 3916 . Hon'ble Supreme Court went to the extent of stating that any minor discrepancies, which are of a trivial nature not amounting to contradictions cannot render the prosecution evidence doubtful. 36. On re-appreciation of the evidence on record, we find that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is not only perverse but also erroneous and warrants interference in this appeal. 36. On re-appreciation of the evidence on record, we find that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is not only perverse but also erroneous and warrants interference in this appeal. It is well-settled that even in an appeal against acquittal, this Court has power to re-appreciate the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Trial Court if the Trial Court has ignored the material facts and the finding arrived at by the Trial Court is not reasonable or the one which could not have been arrived at the same is liable to be set aside. In the present case, having regard to the above said material on record, it is clear that the only finding that could be arrived at in the present case is that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused of having committed the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and the reasoning of the Trial Court holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused is clearly erroneous and not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence on PWs. 1 and 4. Having regard to the above said material on record including the evidence of PWs. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 it is clear that the only conclusion that could be arrived at in the present case is that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused and accordingly, we hold that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is liable to be set aside and that the prosecution has proved the changes against accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is held guilty of the offences for which he was charged of having committed the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. Accordingly we answer point No I convicting the accused for an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. 37. As far as Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST (P.A) Act, no material is forthcoming disclosing the fact that accused committed rape on the victim only for the reason that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Therefore, no offence is made out by prosecution under Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST (P.A) Act. MCJ & BVNJ: 19.12.2008 ORDERS REGARDING SENTENCE 38. Heard regarding sentence. 39. As far as Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST (P.A) Act, no material is forthcoming disclosing the fact that accused committed rape on the victim only for the reason that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Therefore, no offence is made out by prosecution under Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST (P.A) Act. MCJ & BVNJ: 19.12.2008 ORDERS REGARDING SENTENCE 38. Heard regarding sentence. 39. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submits that the circumstances in which the offence took place and also the fact that accused took undue advantage of the victim being alone in the farm house of her parents, there are no mitigating circumstances which would call for reduction of minimum sentence prescribed for the offence in question. 40. Learned Amicus curiae for the respondent accused submits he is the only earning member in the family having wife and two children depending upon him and therefore, his imprisonment for minimum period of sentence would work out hardship on the family and she also contends that he is only 30 years of age, therefore, leniency must be shown while awarding the sentence. 41. We have applied our mind to the submissions made at the bar and having regard to the fact that the respondent/accused taking undue advantage of the precarious position in which the victim was placed and committed the offence on her was the very reason to indicate his well planned intention of committing the offence as such. There are no circumstances which would point out some sort of provocation on the part of the victim ultimately resulting in the offence in question. The Apex Court has time and again said financial crisis or young age or dependency of the family members cannot be mitigating circumstances so far as the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC is concerned. The respondent accused was a married person having children when he committed the offence in question. Taking into account all the circumstances, we are of the opinion, there axe no grounds to give benefit of the proviso of the Section showing leniency while awarding the sentence. Accordingly, the following: ORDER The accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. The accused shall surrender before the Trial Court to serve the sentence imposed. The Trial Court shall see that the accused is taken to custody to serve the sentence imposed above. The fee of the amicus curiea is fixed at Rs. Accordingly, the following: ORDER The accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. The accused shall surrender before the Trial Court to serve the sentence imposed. The Trial Court shall see that the accused is taken to custody to serve the sentence imposed above. The fee of the amicus curiea is fixed at Rs. 3,000/-.