JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, C.J. - An application has been filed to recall the judgment and order dated 17.1.2006 passed by this Court on the ground that the matter has been disposed of in the,,absence of the Appellant Petitioner. The appeal filed by the applicant has been dismissed in spite of the fact Mr. R.K. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the applicant has stated before the Court that he had no instruction. The client should not suffer for the fault of the counsel as he had been paid his fees etc. and his appeal should not be dismissed without giving any notice to him. 2. Mr. S.P. Misra, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent-opposite party has submitted that there is nothing in the appeal as the learned Civil Court has passed a mandatory injunction which had been set aside by the learned Single Judge. Once the counsel of the applicant-appellant pleaded no instruction, the Court rightly dismissed the appeal. The said order does not warrant any interference. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. It is settled legal proposition that for the fault of the counsel, client should not suffer. The reason being that after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the case personal hearing of the parties not required nor it is useful. In such situation if the lawyer does not perform his duty, the client may suffer from irreparable loss. (Vide Rafiq and Another Vs. Munshilal and Another, ; Goswami Krishna Murarilal Sharma v. Dhan Prakash, (1981) 4 SCC 574 ; Smt. Lachi Tewari and Others Vs. Director of Land Records and Others, ; Bani Singh and ohters Vs. State of U.P., and G. Raj Mallaiah and Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, .) In case a counsel pleads no instructions, the case can not be dismissed in default but it is duty of the Court/Authority to issue notice to the client to engage another counselor appear in person but the case can not be dismissed only on the ground that the counsel appearing for him has pleaded no instructions (Vide Malkiyat Singh and Anr. v. Joginder Singh & Ors, AIR 1998 SC 258 ), as in such a case it can not be held that the client has been negligent or careless in defending or prosecuting their case as they had engaged a counsel and were following the proceedings and, in such circumstances, the client can not be held responsible and they should not suffer for the fault of their counsel. While deciding the same, Hon'ble Supreme Court had placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangani and others Vs. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani and another wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in case a client is not present in the Court on a particular date and his counsel pleads no instructions, it is always in the interest of justice that notice for actual date of hearing should be sent to the parties but, in no case, the case should be dismissed in default. 5. In view of the above, we are satisfied that as the Order Dated 17.1.2006 has been passed without giving notice to the Appellant-petitioner, same is liable to be recalled and order is passed accordingly. The writ appeal is restored to its original position. 6. With the consent of the counsel for the parties we heard the matter on merit, immediately after recalling the order dated 17.1.2006. 7. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that both Appellant and Respondent entered into an agreement according to which Respondent agreed to make supply of cold drinks to the Appellant as the Appellant had been appointed as an agent by the Respondent creating a exclusive right in its favour. For the reasons of non-payment by Appellant, supply was stopped by the Respondent. Being aggrieved the Appellant filed a civil suit No. 83 of 2004 for restraining the Respondent from stopping the supply along with an application for interim relief under Order 39, Rule 1, of the CPC ( hereinafter called 'Code of Code of Civil Procedure) for a direction to the Respondent to supply the cold drinks and the Appellant-plaintiff undertook to make the payment for future supply. The Civil Court considered the application for interim relief, i.e.,CMA No; 107 of 2004 and disposed it of vide its order dated 15.5.2004 directing as follows: So far as the benefit of the consumers of soft drinks in and around Jagatsinghpur, during this scorching summer, the O.P. shall resume supply and the Petitioner shall make advance payment. The O.P. shall resume supply and the Petitioner shall make advance payment. The disputed amount if amicably settled between parties, this Court welcomes it. If not, it will be decided in the main suit. This is a very simple matter and it appears that the Petitioner as well as the O.P. have made a mountain out of mole hill. Miss-information/misunderstanding should not be converted into court battle. Form the aforesaid observation, with direction both the parties, to Petitioner to pay outstanding and the O.P. to continue supply soft drinks.-It is hereby ordered as follows: Order Both the parties are directed to maintain status quo Ante in respect of the suit property till disposal of the CS 83 of 2004:xxx 8. It appears that in spite of such mandatory order the supply was not made to the Appellant though certain amount was also deposited by the Appellant with the Respondent. Appellant filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC raising the grievance of non compliance of the order 15.5.2004. During pendency of the said application, the Appellant filed an application i.e. CMA No. 62 of 2005 u/s 151, Code of Civil Procedure. The said application was disposed of vide order dated 15.4.2005 partly allowing the prayer of the Appellant directing the Respondent to supply it the cold drinks on receipt of advance money. The Court directed the Respondent to ensure compliance of the order passed in CMA No. 107 of 2004 rejecting the contention of the Respondent that no order could be passed on the said application during pendency of the application for initiating contempt proceeding under Order 39, Rule 2A, CPC observing that disposal of the said application would take a long period. 9. The Respondent being aggrieved filed a writ petition which has been allowed by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned judgment and order dated 24.6.2005. Hence this writ appeal. 10. 9. The Respondent being aggrieved filed a writ petition which has been allowed by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned judgment and order dated 24.6.2005. Hence this writ appeal. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the Civil Court passed the interim order which had not been complied with by the Respondent and therefore, the Appellant was forced to file an application under Order 39, Rule 2A, CPC for initiating a contempt proceeding against the Respondent and enforcing the said interim order and as it was likely to take a long time an application u/s 151, CPC was also filed which had rightly been allowed by the Civil Court. The learned Single Judge erred in passing an order reversing the order of the Civil Court. Therefore, the writ appeal deserves to be allowed. 11. On the contrary, Mr. S.P. Misra, !earned Senior Counsel for the Respondent has vehemently opposed the appeal on the ground that the manner in which the application under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC filed by the Appellant had been disposed of by the Civil Court is not known to law and in passing such order the Civil Court had taken into consideration the factors which were extraneous to the statutory requirement. More so, during pendency of the application under Order 39, Rule 2A, Code of Civil Procedure, the application u/s 151, CPC could not have been entertained for the reason that the scope of application under Order 39, Rule 2A, CPC is much wider and the Court can enforce its order by all means. More so, there was no occasion for the Civil Court to pass an mandatory injunction for the reason that the relief granted to the Appellant-plaintiff had been of a final nature and if the interim order is given effect to, it is beyond imagination as what relief can be granted to the Appellant-plaintiff at the time of disposal of the suit. The dispute was regarding the outstanding dues of the Respondent for which the Respondent has neither filed a suit for recovery nor any cross-objection in the suit. Nor the Respondent has ever claimed any relief from the Civil Court. Therefore, the interim injunction passed by the Civil Court was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. The dispute was regarding the outstanding dues of the Respondent for which the Respondent has neither filed a suit for recovery nor any cross-objection in the suit. Nor the Respondent has ever claimed any relief from the Civil Court. Therefore, the interim injunction passed by the Civil Court was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside both the orders passed by the Civil Court and thus the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. We have given serious thoughts to the issues raised by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. Undisputedly the suit had been filed for restraining the Respondent from stopping supply of cold drinks. The Appellant Plaintiff filed an application under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC which ought to have decided by the Civil Court taking into consideration the relevant factors which the Court is supposed to take under the said statutory provision. The Court had taken into consideration, factors un-heard and unknown to law. The prime consideration which weighed in the mind of the Civil Court for passing the interim order was that the public at large would suffer for want of supply of cold drinks in summer. This factor could not have been taken into consideration by the Civil Court for the reason that an agent of cold drinks manufactured by the Respondent company was the Plaintiff and it was not a suit under the provisions of Section 91, CPC in the interest of public at large. More so, we fail to understand as under what circumstances the Court could pass a mandatory injunction. 14. In S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 2114 , the Supreme Court considered the principle governing the grant of temporary injunction, observing that the three basic principles, i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, have to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case and in case the principles have not been properly applied, the appellate court can interfere with interlocutory proceeding under 0.39 Rules 1 and 2 Code of Civil Procedure. 15. In Anand Prasad Agarwalla Vs. 15. In Anand Prasad Agarwalla Vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad and Others the Supreme Court re-stated the principles for grant of temporary injunction, but observed that it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction. That was a case where the temporary injunction was refused to a person who was in possession of the land. 16. In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd. the Supreme Court held as under: We, however, think it fit to note herein below certain specific considerations in the matter of grant of interlocutory injunction, the basic being non -expression of opinion as to the merits-of-the matter by the Court, since the issue of grant of injunction usually, is at the earliest possible stage so far as the time-frame is concerned. The other considerations which ought to weigh with the court hearing the application or petition for the grant of injunctions are as below: i. Extent of damages being an adequate remedy; ii. Protect the Plaintiffs interest for violation of his rights though however having regard to the injury that may be suffered by the Defendants by reason therefore; iii. The court while dealing with the matter ought not to ignore the factum of strength of one party's case being stronger than the others; iv. No fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of grant of injunction but on the facts and circumstances of each case- the relief being kept flexible; v. The issue is to be looked from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the injunction the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the parties' case; vi. Balance of convenience or inconvenience ought to be considered as an important requirement even if there is a serious question or prima facie case in support of the grant; Vii. Whether the grant or refusal of injunction will adversely affect the interest of general public which can cannot be compensated otherwise. 17. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sri Sriman Narayan and Another the Supreme Court explained the purpose of grant of temporary injunction, observing as under: It is elementary that grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of the legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. 17. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sri Sriman Narayan and Another the Supreme Court explained the purpose of grant of temporary injunction, observing as under: It is elementary that grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of the legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion the court normally applies the following tests: (i) whether the Plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the Plaintiff; and (iii) whether the Plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The discretion whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at the time when the exercise of the legal right asserted by the Plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and remain -uncertain till they are established on evidence at the trial. The relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the Plaintiff during the period before which that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the Plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the Defendant to be protected against the injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against another and, determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. (See M/s. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others Vs. Coca Cola Company and others, )." 18. A similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in D. Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Educational Society and Others, ; and Ajay Mohan and Others Vs. H.N. Rai and Others, . 19. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund Vs. Kartick Das the Apex Court held that ex-parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. A similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in D. Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Educational Society and Others, ; and Ajay Mohan and Others Vs. H.N. Rai and Others, . 19. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund Vs. Kartick Das the Apex Court held that ex-parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh for grant of injunction are -(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the Plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater injustice than grant of it would involve; (c) even if ex-parte injunction should be granted, it should only be for limited period of time; and (d) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the Court. 20. In Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid.(S) Vs. Phundan Singh and Others, ; and Satyam Infoway Ltd. Vs. Sifynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd., ; the Supreme Court held that it is one thing to conclude that the trial court has not made its prima facie satisfaction on merits but granted temporary injunction and it is another thing to hold that the trial court has gone wrong in recording the prima facie satisfaction. 21. In Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. Prahlad Singh and others the Supreme Court explained the scope of material circumstances, observing as under: The phrases 'prima facie case', 'balance of convenience' and' irreparable loss' are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts rest eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. 22. The logic behind this remains that the ill-conceived sympathy emasculates as interlocutory judgment exposing judicial discretion to criticism to degenerating private benevolence and the Court should not be guided by misplaced sympathy, rather it should pass interim orders making accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. The Court should not embrace the authorities under the Statute by taking over the functions to be.performed by the Statutory Authorities. 23. In Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. The Court should not embrace the authorities under the Statute by taking over the functions to be.performed by the Statutory Authorities. 23. In Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar and Another, ; the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of grant of interim relief which amounts to final relief, observing that High Court should exercise its discretion while granting interim relief reasonably and judiciously, and if loss can be repairable or the loss can be satisfied by giving back wages etc. in the end, if petition ultimately succeeds, it is not desirable that the relief should be granted by interim order. Apex Court further observed as under: It should be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the damage cannot be repaired, for the reason that if no relief for continuance in service is granted and ultimately his claim.....is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting him all those monetary benefits which he would have received and he continued in service. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such cases it would be imprudent to grant interim relief. 24. Similar view has been reiterated in A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another, ; State of Jammu & Kashmir Vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and Others, ; U.P. Junior Doctors' Action Committee Vs. Dr B. Sheetal Nandwani and Others, ; Guru Nanak Dev University Vs. Parminder Kr. Bansal and another, ; St. John's Teacher Training Institute (for Women), Madurai, Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, etc. etc., ; Dr. B.S. Kshirsagar v. Abdul Khalik Mohd Musa 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 593; Bank of Maharashtra Vs. Race Shiping and Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. and another, ; Commissioner/Secretary, Government of Health and Medical Education Department v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 214; Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Shree Ganesh Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. and Another, ; AIR 1997 993 (SC); C.B.S.E. and Another Vs. P. Sunil Kumar and Others, ; Union of India v. Era Educational Trust AIR 2000 SC 1573 ; Council for Indian School Certificate Examination Vs. Isha Mittal and Another, ; State of U.P. and Others Vs. Modern Transport Company, Ludhiana and Another, ; State of U.P. and Another Vs. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Karamchari Sangharsh Morcha and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Isha Mittal and Another, ; State of U.P. and Others Vs. Modern Transport Company, Ludhiana and Another, ; State of U.P. and Another Vs. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Karamchari Sangharsh Morcha and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Modiluft Ltd., ; Regional Officer, C.B.S.E. Vs. Ku. Sheena Peethambaran and Others, ; State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi AIR 2004 SCW 6955 ; and Prem Singh Chaudhary and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. (2005) 11 SCC 567 . 25. Mandatory injunction should be granted in rarest of the rare cases as it amounts to granting the final relief. It can be passed only to restore status quo and not to establish a new state of things, differing from the state which existed at the date, when the suit was instituted. (Vide Nandan Pictures Ltd. Vs. Art Pictures Ltd. and Others, ; Rajalekshmi Amma and Another Vs. Kunjipillai Amma and Others, ; The University of Bihar and Another Vs. Rajendra Singh, ; Dyneshwar Hari Masurkar v. Atmaram Babusso Pednekar and Ors. AIR 1980 Goa 30 ; U.P. State Electricity Board v. R. Wheeler and Anr. AIR 1983 All 8 ; Indian Cable Company Limited Vs. Smt. Sumitra Chakraborty, ; Bala Din Yadav and another Vs. Ramdulare and others, ; and Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another Vs. Praveen Kumar Singh, ). 26. In Dorab Cawasji Warden Vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and others the Apex Court, discussing the principles to be kept in mind in considering the prayer for interlocutory mandatory injunction, observed as under: The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm. Courts have evolved certain - guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The Plaintiff has a strong case for trial. Courts have evolved certain - guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The Plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as a pre-requisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion. It is settled law that even if all the necessary ingredients are established, the court may refuse to grant an interim injunction. 27. If the order passed by the learned Civil Court is examined in the aforesaid settled legal proposition, we are of the opinion that the Civil Court exceeded its jurisdiction granting such an interim and none of the relevant factors, which are required to decide the application was taken into consideration by the Civil Court. In this case, no order of mandatory injunction could have been passed. More so, such an interim order tantamounts to granting of final relief. We fail to understand how initially such an order could be passed by the Civil Court as it amounts to deciding the suit itself. 28. More so, we are unable to accept how another application u/s 151, CPC could be entertained during pendency of the application under Order 39, Rule 2A, Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that in case the order passed on the application u/s 151, CPC is also not complied with, ultimately the Court would be bound to pass an order initiating proceeding under Order 39, Rule 2A, Code of Civil Procedure. This was unwarranted simplification of the problem by the Civil Court brushing aside the averments made by the Respondent - Defendant that the Court should not decide the application u/s 151 CPC during the pendency of application under Order 39, Rule 2A, Code of Civil Procedure. This was unwarranted simplification of the problem by the Civil Court brushing aside the averments made by the Respondent - Defendant that the Court should not decide the application u/s 151 CPC during the pendency of application under Order 39, Rule 2A, Code of Civil Procedure. The power of the Civil Court in such a matter is much wider. The powers u/s 151 CPC can be exercised for doing justice and for purposes of which no specific provision has been made, i.e, as for consolidation of suits etc. (Vide Chitivalasa Jute Mills Vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement, ; Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., ; and National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences Vs. C. Parameshwara, ). 29. Order 39 Rule 2-A deals with the power to enforce the order passed by the court and impose the punishment. It is settled legal proposition that sale deeds so executed are a nullity as having been executed in disobedience of the interim order of the Court. In Mulraj Vs. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj, the Supreme Court considered the effect of action taken subsequent to passing of an interim order in its disobedience and held that any action taken in disobedience of the order passed by the Court would be illegal, subsequent action would be a nullity. 30. A similar view has been reiterated in Surjit and others Vs. Harbans Singh and others etc. etc., ; and Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. Gudepu Sailco and Others, . 31. In Samee Khan Vs. Bindu Khan the Supreme Court held that in exercise of the power under Of. 39 Rule 2A of the Code, the civil court has a power either to order detention for disobedience of the disobeying party or attaching his property and if the circumstances and facts of the case so demand, both steps can also be-resorted- to. 32. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in The State of Bihar Vs. 39 Rule 2A of the Code, the civil court has a power either to order detention for disobedience of the disobeying party or attaching his property and if the circumstances and facts of the case so demand, both steps can also be-resorted- to. 32. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in The State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, has categorically held that the said provisions deal with the willful defiance of the order passed by the civil court, and order of punishment be passed unless the court is satisfied that the party was, in fact, under a misapprehension as to the scope of the order or there was an unintentional wrong for the reason that the order was ambiguous and reasonably capable of more than one interpretation or the party never intended to disobey the order but conducted himself in accordance with the interpretation of the order. The purpose of such proceedings is to enforce and effect the order passed by the court. 33. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others the Apex Court has emphasized that where there is a defiance of order of the court, the contemnor must be dealt with a heavy hand. However, there should be a clear violation of the court's order since the contempt proceedings may have a far reaching consequences. The Court observed as under: Disobedience of the court's order strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which Indian system of governance is based. Power to punish for contempt is for the maintenance of effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who refuses to comply with court's order or disregards the order continuously. No person can defy court's order. Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. 34. Similar view has been reiterated in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and another Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc., and All Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs. Raghabendra Singh and Others, . 35. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that interim relief sought by the Appellant - Plaintiff could not have been granted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc., and All Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs. Raghabendra Singh and Others, . 35. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that interim relief sought by the Appellant - Plaintiff could not have been granted in the facts and circumstances of the case. More so, it was not a case where the Civil Court ought to have granted mandatory injunction which ultimately tantamounts to grant of final relief. The application u/s 151, CPC could not have been entertained during pendency of the applicator under Order 39, Rule 2A, Code of Civil Procedure. The exercise of its powers by the Civil Court was nothing but abuse of power of the Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in deprecating the practice of passing such order by the Civil Court. Appeal lacks merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. B.N. Mahapatra, J. 36. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed