Judgment : Oral Order: This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner/tenant against the common order and decree, dated 16-11-2005, in R.C.A.No.4 of 2002 (along with R.C.A.Nos.2, 3, 5 and 6 of 2002), passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Kadapa, (for brevity “the lower appellate Court”), dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner/tenant against the common order and decree, dated 28-6-2002, in R.C.C.No.2 of 1999, passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa (for brevity “the trial Court”). 1. 2. For the sake of convenience, in this order, the parties are referred to as “the tenant” and “the landlords”. 2. 3. It appears that the landlords have filed batch of eviction cases against different tenants, including the tenant herein, which were registered as R.C.C.Nos.2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of 1999, before the trial Court on the ground of willful default and the same were decided against the respective tenants, by order dated 28-06-2002. Each of the tenant preferred appeals before the lower appellate Court being R.C.A.Nos.2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 2002. So far as the present revision petition is concerned, it arises out of R.C.A.No.4 of 2002 preferred against the order in R.C.C.No.2 of 1999. Under the impugned common order, dated 16-11-2005, the appeals of all the other tenants were allowed, whereas the present tenant’s appeal R.C.A.No.4 of 2002 was dismissed. 3. 4. The brief facts as they appear on record are that one late G. Ranga Reddy was the original owner of the scheduled premises. He was survived by a son Sri G.Pratap Reddy and two daughters. The present tenant and the other tenants in the batch of cases referred to above were all tenants, who were paying the rents to the said landlords. Sri G.Pratap Reddy had entered into an agreement of sale in favour of one Sri P.Chandrasekhar Reddy on 03-04-1998 and delivered possession to the said P.Chandrasekhar Reddy on the same day itself making it further clear that he had attorned all the tenants to the said agreement holder. Later, Sri G.Pratap Reddy died and his legal heirs, who are the landlords in this batch of cases, seem to be disputing the said agreement of sale and the rights of Sri P.Chandrasekhar Reddy. This has resulted in filing of a suit for specific performance by the said agreement holder Sri P.Chandrasekhar Reddy, which is said to be pending. Later, Sri G.Pratap Reddy died and his legal heirs, who are the landlords in this batch of cases, seem to be disputing the said agreement of sale and the rights of Sri P.Chandrasekhar Reddy. This has resulted in filing of a suit for specific performance by the said agreement holder Sri P.Chandrasekhar Reddy, which is said to be pending. Meanwhile, the landlords herein filed eviction cases referred to above against each of the tenants, primarily on the ground of willful default, and as mentioned above, so far as the tenant herein is concerned, the eviction order passed by the trial Court was confirmed by the lower appellate Court under the impugned order. 4. 5. Learned counsel for the tenant contends that the impugned order of the lower appellate Court is based upon the only alleged admission of the tenant extracted in the last paragraph at page-11 of the impugned order and the relevant portion reads as follows: “………Madras Venkata Krishna admitted in the cross examination that PW.1 is entitled to evict him from the R.C.C. Schedule room as he has not paid the amount and as she is legal heir of Gosula Pratapreddi and Gosula Ranga Reddi. This admission of M.Venkata Krishna is binding on M.Venkata Krishna who is appellant in R.C.A.4/2002 (R.C.C.No.2/1999) because M.Venkata Krishna is admitting that PW.1 is entitled to evict him from R.C.C. building schedule room, his appeal in R.C.A.No.4/2002 is dismissed confirming the order of the Lower Court passed in R.C.C.No.2/1999.” 1. 6. Learned counsel for the tenant contends that by taking the aforesaid admission out of context and without referring to any other material and the other grounds urged by the tenant, the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the present tenant. 2. 7. Though the landlords are served, there is no appearance on their behalf in this revision petition. 3. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the tenant and I have examined the pleadings as well as the evidence of R.W.1 (the tenant herein), which is appended as material paper to the revision petition. 4. 9. The aforesaid extracted statement of the tenant herein, on which the lower appellate Court had placed reliance, appears to be a suggestion given towards the end of cross-examination of R.W.1. 4. 9. The aforesaid extracted statement of the tenant herein, on which the lower appellate Court had placed reliance, appears to be a suggestion given towards the end of cross-examination of R.W.1. It is possible, as contended by the learned counsel for the tenant, that instead of writing the suggestion in the negative form, the answer of the witness is recorded in a positive form. In other words, the learned counsel contends that instead of recording the answer to the said suggestion as “It is not true”, what was recorded is “It is true”. 5. 10. On the facts of the present case also, the lower appellate Court has committed a similar error, which needs correction by this Court in the revisional jurisdiction. 6. 11. While one cannot rule out the aforesaid possibility, I feel that it is always appropriate to consider the evidence of the witness in its entirety rather than picking out a stray sentence and basing the decision on that stray sentence. The lower appellate Court ought to have considered that the tenant herein is contesting the eviction proceedings like all other tenants and in normal circumstances, it is improbable to expect a tenant to admit that he is liable to be evicted on the ground that he has not paid the rents. .12. Keeping in view the consistent conduct of the tenant, to rest a judgment basing on his alleged admission would be highly unjustified. The entire evidence of R.W.1 proceeds to claim that he had paid the rents to Sri G.Pratap Reddy till April, 1998 and thereafter on the instructions of Sri G.Pratap Reddy, he has been paying the rents to Sri P.Chandrasekhar Reddy. In the cross-examination, he denies the suggestion that he has colluded with Sri P. Chandrasekhar Reddy and deposing falsely. The next suggestion appears to be the one on which the lower appellate Court placed reliance, which, in normal course, would have been in similar negative terms. The case of the tenant herein, like all other tenants who have succeeded before the lower appellate Court, therefore, cannot be .singled out merely on the basis of the alleged admission. .13. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently had an occasion to consider a similar circumstance in S. VENUGOPAL vs. A.KARRUPPUSAMI & ANOTHER ( AIR 2006 SC 1930 ). The case of the tenant herein, like all other tenants who have succeeded before the lower appellate Court, therefore, cannot be .singled out merely on the basis of the alleged admission. .13. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently had an occasion to consider a similar circumstance in S. VENUGOPAL vs. A.KARRUPPUSAMI & ANOTHER ( AIR 2006 SC 1930 ). In the said case, the landlord who had filed a suit for eviction of the tenants, was conducting jewellery business from rented premises and he wanted to shift his business from rented premises to his own premises and sought eviction on the ground of default as well as for demolition and re-construction of the building for personal requirement to locate his own business. While assessing the personal requirement, the High Court had found that the landlord was conducting jewellery business from rented premises, but his personal requirement was not accepted on the basis of one sentence appearing in his deposition, which was extracted in paragraph-4 of the judgment. The said statement of the landlord-P.W.1 was as follows: .“I cannot do business if I got possession of the existing shops.” 7. 14. On the basis of the said admission, the High Court disallowed the requirement pleaded. The Supreme Court considered the entire deposition of P.W.1 and in paragraph-5 has dealt with the requirement pleaded in the following manner: “We have read the deposition of PW 1. We notice that the recording of evidence is rather unsatisfactory, and most of the sentences are not even complete. The evidence has been recorded in a rather abbreviated manner. However, the landlord has clearly stated that he needed one shop for carrying on his own jewellery business and the premises in question were located in a commercial area in the city of Coimbatore. In very categorical terms, he stated that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his own occupation from where he wanted to conduct his gold jewellery shop. He again reiterated the same by saying that he required the premises for his own occupation. Only thereafter the so-called admission appears on which great emphasis had been laid by the High Court. In fact, later in the same paragraph, he has stated that most important reason for claiming eviction was his need of the premises for his own occupation. He again reiterated the same by saying that he required the premises for his own occupation. Only thereafter the so-called admission appears on which great emphasis had been laid by the High Court. In fact, later in the same paragraph, he has stated that most important reason for claiming eviction was his need of the premises for his own occupation. Reading the deposition as a whole, it would appear that the landlord, in categorical terms, has repeatedly asserted that he needed the premises in question for running his own business in jewellery. He has emphasized the fact that the premises is located in a commercial locality and he, more than once, stated that he needed the premises for his own occupation. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the recording of evidence of PW 1 was not accurate, wherein it has been recorded that he could not do business if he got possession of the existing shops. Perhaps what he must have stated is that he cannot do business "unless" he got possession of the existing shops. The admission clearly goes against the general tenor of the landlord's deposition, which strengthens our apprehension that the same is the result of faulty recording of evidence. We, therefore, have no doubt that the High Court was in error in rejecting the claim of bona fide personal need of the landlord merely on the basis of the so-called admission made by the landlord in his deposition, which appears to be a result of faulty recording of his evidence.” 1. 15. The lower appellate Court, therefore, ought to have examined the entire material produced by the tenant herein in support of his appeal and ought to have decided the appeal by taking into consideration all other circumstances. The manner in which the present tenant’s appeal is dealt with, in the brief paragraph, which is extracted above, therefore, deserves to be set aside. 2. 16. Learned counsel for the tenant also brought to my notice an order, dated 12-04-2004, passed by this Court in C.R.P.No.1652 of 2004, arising out of the same batch of cases i.e., R.C.C.No.4 of 1999 and R.C.A.No.2 of 2002 preferred against the orders thereon by another tenant. 2. 16. Learned counsel for the tenant also brought to my notice an order, dated 12-04-2004, passed by this Court in C.R.P.No.1652 of 2004, arising out of the same batch of cases i.e., R.C.C.No.4 of 1999 and R.C.A.No.2 of 2002 preferred against the orders thereon by another tenant. It appears that all the rents are being deposited before the trial Court since September, 2002 and the tenant herein claims that he is also complying with the said direction and depositing the rents before the trial Court. There is a reference to the aforesaid orders of this Court at page-10 of the impugned order. 3. 17. For the foregoing, the impugned order of the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside. 4. 18. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed, setting aside the common order, dated 16-11-2005, insofar as it relates to R.C.A.No.4 of 2002, and the said appeal is remanded to the lower appellate Court with a direction to consider and dispose of R.C.A.No.4 of 2002 on its own merits, after giving opportunity to both the parties and after considering the entire material available on record. There shall be no order as to costs.