JUDGMENT Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J. 1. Plaintiff Brij Lal filed a suit for possession, mandatory injunction and recovery of damages against the defendants alleging therein that the plaintiff was owner and landlord of property bearing no. 414 (old No. 11-12), Ward No. 18 Kashmere Bagh, Kishan Ganj, Delhi as he had purchased the property from Sh. Ashok Kumar s/o Sita Ram vide registered sale deed dated 5th December, 1991. Sh. Ashok Kumar was beneficiary under a Will executed by late Sahib Ditta Mal, the original owner and the landlord of the property. The plaintiff stated that Sahib Ditta Mal, during his lifetime had instituted an Eviction Petition No. E-9/84 against the defendant. However, the learned ARC dismissed the petition vide order dated 3rd February, 1992 on the ground that letting in this case was in respect of open land and the Court of Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. 2. Another petition filed by Sahib Ditta Mal against the defendants was dismissed in default. The plaintiff pleaded since letting was held in respect of open land, only Civil Court had jurisdiction so a Civil Suit was filed for possession and claiming damages from the defendants. 3. The defendants no. 2 and 3 filed written statement and stated as under: The true facts are that the property was originally owned by Sh. Mohammad Siddique Batlla who had leased out to the defendant no. 1. Thereafter property was transferred to Sh. Goddar Mal who had also admitted defendant no. 1 as his lessee in the year 1957. The lease in respect of plot was a perpetual lease and defendant no. 1 with consent of Goddar Mal raised superstructure at his own costs and expenses. Thereafter, the property was inherited by Sh. Sahib Ditta Mal and Sh. Sita Ram from their father Goddar Mal. Sh. Sahib Ditta Mal was not exclusive owner of the property but he and Sh. Sita Ram were the joint owners and both of them jointly filed the petition under Section 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(b) of DRC Act and these petitions were dismissed. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Sh. Sahib Ditta Mal had no right to execute any Will in favour of Sh. Ashok as he was not the exclusive owner of the suit property. The sale deed dated 5th December, 1991 executed by Sh. Ashok Kumar was null and void. .4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Sh. Sahib Ditta Mal had no right to execute any Will in favour of Sh. Ashok as he was not the exclusive owner of the suit property. The sale deed dated 5th December, 1991 executed by Sh. Ashok Kumar was null and void. .4. The defendants in para 2 of the written statement again reiterated the facts as under: The true facts are that in the year 1982, defendant no. 1 with consent of Sh. Sahib Ditta Mal, sold superstructure built by him to defendant no. 2 and transferred the leasehold rights in the plot to defendant no. 2, and as such defendant no. 2 stepped into the shoes of the defendant no. 1. The Eviction Petition under Section 41(1)(e) was filed jointly by Sh. Sahib Ditta Mal and Sh. Sita Ram claiming themselves to be the joint owners. 5. Defendants no. 2 and 3 also claimed themselves to be owners in possession of the premises bearing no. 414, Kashmere Bagh, built over land measuring 35 sq.yds. Defendants no. 2 and 3 are father and son and took the stand that defendant no. 1 had constructed a superstructure with his own expenses with consent of Sh. Goddar Mal, father of Sahib Ditta Mal and Sita Ram. 6. The written statement was filed by the defendants in November, 1998. When the case was at the stage of evidence and plaintiffs evidence had concluded and defendants evidence was under progress, the defendant made an application in 2001 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of written statement and in this application, defendants wanted to take a plea that in first week of January, 2001, a survey was conducted by DDA(Slum) and it came to the knowledge of defendants no. 2 and 3 that the property in their possession was bearing no. 413, Kashmere Bagh and the property belonged to DDA(Slum), who was absolute and exclusive owners of the property. So in the amended written statement defendants no. 2 and 3 wanted to take a plea that plaintiff had got no right whatsoever to file suit for possession and recovery of damages and mesne profits as plaintiff was not the owner of the suit property and suit property belonged to DDA(Slums). Thereafter, defendant filed another application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC stating that the area where the property was situated has been transferred from DDA (Slums) to MCD, JJ Wings. Thereafter, defendant filed another application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC stating that the area where the property was situated has been transferred from DDA (Slums) to MCD, JJ Wings. Therefore the amendment application be allowed to be amended to say that the property belonged to MCD, JJ Wings. 7. The application was opposed by the plaintiff on the ground that defendant cannot be allowed to retract the admissions made by them and the averment of the defendants that they learnt from a notice issued by DDA regarding the property belonging to DDA (Slums) was false and fabricated averment and amendment should not be allowed. 8. The learned Trial Court observing the defendant were unaware of the existing state of affairs and only want to rectify the pleading so as to make it in accordance with circumstances prevailing between the parties and also that amendment may be necessary to decide the real question in controversy between them, allowed the amendment of the written statement, subject to costs of Rs.500/-. 9. The plaintiff has filed this petition challenging the order of the Trail Court on the ground that such an amendment could not have been allowed and the order of the Trail Court was a perverse order, contrary to the settled legal position. It is submitted that the Trial Court acted beyond jurisdiction to allow such an application. .10. A tenant who admits relationship of landlord and tenant cannot challenge the title of the landlord, nor can set up the title of another person over property or claim his own title over the property. If he sets up title of another person, he should first surrender his tenancy rights in favour of the person from who he got tenancy rights and then only challenge the title of the person over the property. Even a trespasser may induct a tenant into the property. Such a tenant has no right to dispute the title of the person who inducted him as a tenant on the ground that the landlord himself was a trespasser. Similarly, a tenant may induct subtenant with or without authority of the landlord. The sub-tenant cannot directly atone to the owner/landlord without the consent of the tenant. Such a tenant has no right to dispute the title of the person who inducted him as a tenant on the ground that the landlord himself was a trespasser. Similarly, a tenant may induct subtenant with or without authority of the landlord. The sub-tenant cannot directly atone to the owner/landlord without the consent of the tenant. Under Section 108 Clause (q) of the Transfer Property act, in the absence of contract or local usage to the contrary, it is an obligation of the tenant to put his lessor into the possession of the property on termination of lease. Section 116 of Evidence Act which codifies the common law and Rule of estoppel between landlord and tenant provides that no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny the title of landlord to such immovable property. The rule of estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenant does not restore the possession by surrender of property to his landlord. The rule of estoppel ceases to have applicability once the tenant has been evicted or he has surrendered the possession. 11. The Supreme Court in [2002]1SCR171 Vashu Deo v. Bal Kishan observed as under: The shop which is the suit property was owned by a Trust. The trust leased out the shop to the tenant. The tenant subsequently inducted a sub-tenant. The sub-tenant fell into arrears. A suit for recovery of arrears and also for eviction was filed by the tenant against sub-tenant. The trust also filed a suit for eviction against the tenant on ground of illegal sub-letting. In the suit filed by tenant against sub-tenant, the subtenant raised a plea that subsequent to the institution of suit by the Trust against the tenant, the sub-tenant has directly attorned in favour of the trust and entered into a direct tenancy agreement and therefore the right of the tenant to recover rent after date of attornment and secure eviction of the sub-tenant had come to an end. The suit premises was admittedly governed by the Rent Act. The Honble Supreme Court held that during subsistence of sub-lease and without vacating the premises, the sub-tenant could not have attorned to the trust-the paramount title holder-merely because the trust had filed eviction suit against the tenant. The suit premises was admittedly governed by the Rent Act. The Honble Supreme Court held that during subsistence of sub-lease and without vacating the premises, the sub-tenant could not have attorned to the trust-the paramount title holder-merely because the trust had filed eviction suit against the tenant. The plea of eviction by paramount title is not available to the sub-tenant for three reasons. Firstly it cannot be said that the trust is armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted by the tenant or to which he has no defence. Secondly the attornment was voluntary and not under compulsion. Thirdly the trust cannot be said to have such good and present title against tenant so as to hold the sub-tenant liable to be evicted against his will. 12. In the present case, the defendants had admitted that the premises was taken on rent from the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff. Although, they challenged the title of the plaintiff on different grounds. The challenge to the title of plaintiff was made on the ground that the Will executed in favour of the seller was executed only by one of the co-owner and not by both the owners. But the defendants had not set up a title of the third party. The defendants rather had made a claim that they themselves became owner of the property. The issues in the suit were framed on the basis of these pleadings. Now once the evidence is almost over, the defendant could not have been allowed to set up a new case by way of amendment of written statement so as to bring in a third party as paramount owner and say that it was not the plaintiffs predecessor who was the original owner but it was some third party namely DDA or MCD who was the owner of the property. Neither the defendants could be allowed to change their stand on the identification and number of the property. It was not the case of the defendant that the property let out was not 414. The case of the defendant was that property no. 414 was let out to them. It was a vacant land and they had made construction over it out of their own funds. They now want to plead that it was not property no. It was not the case of the defendant that the property let out was not 414. The case of the defendant was that property no. 414 was let out to them. It was a vacant land and they had made construction over it out of their own funds. They now want to plead that it was not property no. 414 but some other property which was in their possession of which DDA or MCD was the owner. Amendment in the pleadings are allowed so that the Court are able to do justice between the parties and to secure proper administration on justice. The Court cannot allow those amendments which intend to destroy the very case pleaded by a party and to set up a new case. One distinct cause of action cannot be substituted by another, by way of an amendment neither one distinct defence taken by the defendant can be allowed to be substituted by another defence. The defendant in this case had taken the defence that plaintiffs title was not perfect, although the origin of the title as claimed by the plaintiff was not denied. By the amendment, the defendant wanted to deny even the origin of the title and wanted to take the plea that Sahib Ditta Mal and all other from whom he took the premises on tenancy were not at all the owners of the premises and it was DDA (slum)/MCD, JJ Wing who was the owner of the property. Such an amendment could not have been allowed by the Trial Court. 13. The respondent has relied upon Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh wherein the Supreme Court had observed that inconsistent pleas can be raised by the defendants in Written statement although same may not be permissible in case of the plaint and application for amendment of written statement cannot be rejected on this ground. The facts of this case are altogether different from the present case. Neither the relationship between the landlord and the tenant, nor the principle of estoppel were considered in this case. I find that the Trial Court exceeded jurisdiction and passed the order in total disregard of law regarding landlord and tenant. The petition is allowed. The amendment application of the defendant is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Application dismissed