JUDGMENT : B.K. Patel, J. - The Petitioners have filed this application u/s 438 Code of Criminal Procedure for their release on anticipatory bail in I.C.C. Case No. 477 of 2007 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhadrak. 2. Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioners and learned Counsel for the State. 3. Admittedly, in the present case, after taking cognizance of commission of offences under Sections 341, 323, 294, 379, 354 and 506 read with 34 I.P.C., summons have been issued against the present Petitioners for their appearance. 4. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bharat Choudhary and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in (2003) 26 OCR (SC) 641 : 2003 (II) OLR (SC) 575 and of the Delhi High Court in P.V. Narasingha Rao v. State reported in 1997 Cri. L.J. 961, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that there is no bar for the Court of Session or the High Court to exercise jurisdiction u/s 438 Code of Criminal Procedure even though summons have been issued against the Petitioners for appearance as accused persons in Court. It is submitted on behalf of the State that in Bharat Choudhary and Anr. (supra), it has simply been held that jurisdiction u/s 438 Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of anticipatory bail can be exercised even when cognizance is taken or charge-sheet is filed. In the present case, which is a complaint case, cognizance of offences having been taken, summons, not warrants of arrest, for appearance have been issued. It is contended by the learned State counsel that there being no reason whatsoever for the Petitioners to believe that they may be arrested in connection with the present case, the application u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is misconceived. 5. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates grant of anticipatory bail where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. 5. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates grant of anticipatory bail where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. The provisions relevant for the purpose of resolving the legal issue raised in the present application occurring in Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure read: (1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this Section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, xxxx xxxx either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail; xx xx xx xx (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail, and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Sub-section (1). 6. The Petitioners no where in the anticipatory bail application aver that there is reason to believe that they may be arrested. The specific averment of the Petitioners is, rather, that they apprehend to be detained in judicial custody. The averments of the Petitioners at paragraph 2 and 9 are as follows: 2. That, the present Petitioners are apprehending of detained in judicial custody pursuant to the summons for their appearance issued by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhadrak in I.C.C. No. 477 of 2007. (sic) xxxx 9. That, the present Petitioners are only earning member of their family. If they are detained in judicial custody on their appearance. They are put into hardship and their family members face great trouble (sic). 7. Anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest for non-bailable offences. In Adri Dharan Das Vs. State of West Bengal, it has been pointed: 7. The facility which Section 438 of the Code gives is generally referred to as "anticipatory bail". They are put into hardship and their family members face great trouble (sic). 7. Anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest for non-bailable offences. In Adri Dharan Das Vs. State of West Bengal, it has been pointed: 7. The facility which Section 438 of the Code gives is generally referred to as "anticipatory bail". This expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st Report is neither used in the Section nor in its marginal note. But the expression 'anticipatory bail' is a convenient mode of indication that it is possible to apply for bailing anticipation of arrest. Any order of bail can be effective only from the time of arrest of the accused. Wharton's Law Lexicon explains 'bail' as to set at liberty persons arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance'. Thus bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly the custody of police. The distinction between an ordinary Order of bail and an order u/s 438 of the Code is that whereas the former is granted after arrest, and therefore means release from custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest. (See Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others Vs. State of Punjab, Section 46 (1) of the Code, which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same 'shall actually touch or confine the body of the persons to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action'. The order u/s 438 of the Code is intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch as envisaged by Section 46(1) of the Code or any confinement. The Apex Court in Balchand Jain v. State of M.P. AIR 1977 SC 366 has described the expression' anticipatory bail' as a misnomer. It is well known that bail is ordinary manifestation of arrest, that the Court thinks first to make an order is that in the event of arrest a person shall be released on bail. Manifestly there is no question of release on bail unless the accused is arrested, and therefore, it is only on an arrest being effected the order becomes operative. Manifestly there is no question of release on bail unless the accused is arrested, and therefore, it is only on an arrest being effected the order becomes operative. The power exercisable u/s 438 is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that the person may be falsely implicated or where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to otherwise misuse his liberty, then power is to be exercised u/s 438. The power being of important nature it is entrusted only to the higher echelons of judicial forums i.e. the Court of Session of the High Court. It is the power exercisable in case of an anticipated accusation of non-bailable offence. The object which is sought to be achieved by Section 438 of the Code is that the moment a person is arrested, if he has already obtained an order from the Court of Session or the High Court, he shall be released immediately on bail without being sent to jail. 8. Sections 438 and 439 operate in different fields. Section 439 of the Code reads as follows: 439. (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct- (a) that any person accused of an offence an in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in Sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that Sub-section; (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: 9. It is clear from a bare reading of the provision that for making an application in terms of Section 439 of the Code a person has to be in custody. Section 438 of the Code deals with 'Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest'. xxxx 16. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead innocence, since he is not on the date of application for exercise of power u/s 438 of the Code convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The applicant must show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. The applicant must show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression "reason to believe" shows that the belief that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere "fear" is not "belief" for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of vague apprehension that someone is going to make an accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the Court concerned to decide whether a case has been made out for granting of the relief sought. The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest of the accused. A blanket order should not be generally passed. It flows from the very language of the section which requires the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a direction should not issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". Such "blanket order" should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity. An order u/s 438 is a device to secure the individual's liberty, it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely. On the facts of the case, considered in the background of the legal position set out above, this does not prima facie appear to be a case where any order in terms of Section 438 of the Code can be passed. xxxx 18. ... On the facts of the case, considered in the background of the legal position set out above, this does not prima facie appear to be a case where any order in terms of Section 438 of the Code can be passed. xxxx 18. ... the direction which a Court can issue u/s 438 of the Code is that in the event of arrest of an accused on an accusation of committing a non-bailable offence, he shall be released on bail subject to such conditions as the Court may deem fit to impose. An application u/s 438 of the Code can be moved only by a person who has not already been arrested. Once he is arrested, his remedy is to move the Court concerned either u/s 437 or Section 439 of the Code. In the very nature of the direction which the Court can issue u/s 438 of the Code, it is clear that the direction is to be issued only at the pre-arrest state. The direction becomes operative only after arrest. The condition precedent for the operation of the direction issued is arrest of the accused. 8. The principles have been reiterated in D.K. Ganesh Babu Vs. P.T. Manokaran and Others, . 9. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra) it has been categorically held that Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the applicant to show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. The rationale of a direction u/s 438(1) is the belief of the applicant founded on reasonable grounds that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. It is unrealistic to expect the applicant to draw up his application with the meticulousness of a pleading in a civil case and such is not requirement of the section. But specific events and facts must be disclosed by the applicant in order to enable the Court to judge of the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the exercise of power conferred by the section. 10. As has been pointed out in Roshan Beevi v. Joint Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1984 Cri. 10. As has been pointed out in Roshan Beevi v. Joint Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1984 Cri. L.J. 134 by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, in every arrest, there is custody but not vice-versa and that both the words 'custody' and 'arrest' are not synonymous terms. Though 'custody' may amount to an arrest in certain circumstances but not under all circumstances. It may be pointed out that arrest necessarily results in, and is followed by, custody may not in all cases be preceded by arrest. 11. The term 'arrest' is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure The word 'arrest' is derived from the French 'Arrester' meaning 'to stop or stay' and signifies a restraint of the person. Lexicologically, the meaning of the word 'arrest' is given in various dictionaries depending upon the circumstances in which the said expression is used. On the basis of the meaning given in text books and laxicons, it is observed that the word 'arrest' when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension or restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go wherever he pleases. When used in the legal sense in connection with criminal offences, an 'arrest' consists in the taking into custody of another person under authority empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing the commission of a criminal offence. The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the above sense are that there must be an intent to arrest under the authority, accompanied by seizure or detention of the person in the manner known to law, which is so understood by the person arrested. 12. There are various Sections in Chapter V of the Code titled "Arrest of persons" of which Sections 41, 42, 43 and 44 empower different authorities and even private persons to arrest a person in given situation. Section 41 deals with the power of a police officer to arrest any person without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. There are various Sections in Chapter V of the Code titled "Arrest of persons" of which Sections 41, 42, 43 and 44 empower different authorities and even private persons to arrest a person in given situation. Section 41 deals with the power of a police officer to arrest any person without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. Section 42 deals with the power of a police officer to arrest any person who in the presence of a police officer has committed or has been accused of committing a non-cognizable offence and who refuses on demand "to give his name and residence or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false." Section 43 empowers any private person to arrest any person who in his presence commits a non-cognizable offence, or any proclaimed offender. Section 44 provides the circumstances under which only there may be 'arrest by Magistrate'. It reads: (1) When an offence is committed in the presence of a Magistrate, whether Executive or Judicial, within his local jurisdiction, he may himself arrest or order any person to arrest the offender, and may thereupon, subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, commit the offender to custody. (2) Any Magistrate, whether Executive or Judicial, may at any time arrest or direct the arrest, in his presence, within his local jurisdiction of any person for whose arrest he is competent at the time and in the circumstances to issue a warrant. 13. The procedure for effecting a lawful arrest, i.e. 'arrest' in the legal sense, has been provided u/s 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads: (1) Arrest how made.- In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action. (2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest. (3) Nothing in the section gives a right to cause the death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or with imprisonment for life. (3) Nothing in the section gives a right to cause the death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or with imprisonment for life. (4) Save in exceptional circumstances, no woman shall be arrested after sunset and before sunrise, and where such exceptional circumstances exist, the permission of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed or the arrest is to be made. 14. Thus there being clear statutory provisions regarding the manner in which arrest is made as well as circumstances under which anticipatory bail can be granted, there is no scope to read into such statutory provisions any circumstance not contemplated u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of anticipatory bail to a person. It is well settled that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. If a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid downs the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. It is well understood rule of the law that if a thing is to be done in a particular manner it must be done in that manner or not at all. Other modes of compliance are excluded. If the statute makes itself clear on any point, then no more question arises. Only when statute is silent, then the law, may, in a given case, make an application and apply the principle of natural justice. The duty of the Court is to interpret the words that the Legislature has used; those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited. In this context, reliance is placed on AIR 1936 253 (Privy Council), Deep Chand Vs. The State of Rajasthan State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh and Others Narbada Prasad Vs. Chhaganlal and Others State of Gujarat Vs. Shantilal Mangaldas and Others Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad and Others Bharatbhai @ Jimi Premchandbhai Vs. The State of Rajasthan State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh and Others Narbada Prasad Vs. Chhaganlal and Others State of Gujarat Vs. Shantilal Mangaldas and Others Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad and Others Bharatbhai @ Jimi Premchandbhai Vs. State of Gujarat Ram Phal Kundu Vs. Kamal Sharma, and Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2004 S.C. 486 . 15. Therefore, while invoking power u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person in whose favour such power is called upon to be exercised has to satisfy that he has reason to be believe that he may be arrested in the manner provided u/s 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 'Summons' is one of the processes to compel appearance under Chapter-VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure Summons and warrant of arrest are alternative modes of processes to compel appearance. Appearance may be secured consequent upon service of summons or execution of warrant of arrest. Appearance of a person in Court may be effected by issuance of summons or effecting arrest. Therefore, summons and arrest are distinct and different mode to ensure appearance. Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure has no reference to the expression 'summons' or 'custody'. Specific circumstance or condition precedent under which power u/s 438 Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised is the existence of reason to believe, or apprehension, of being arrested. 16. In Niranjan Singh and Another Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others, while interpreting the word 'custody' appearing in u/s 439 Code of Criminal Procedure it has been held: Where the accused had appeared and surrendered before the Sessions Judge, the Judge would have jurisdiction to consider the bail application as the accused would be considered to have been in custody within meaning of Section 439. Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in Court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when he surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions. 17. He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when he surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions. 17. Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inter alia, provides that when any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence appears before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail subject to the restrictions contained therein. The meaning of the term "custody" being physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in Court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and order of the Court, an accused can be stated to be in judicial custody as soon she surrenders before the Court and submits to its direction. When a person accused of or suspected of the commission of a non-bailable offence appears before the Magistrate and surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court, he is in custody. Once an accused is in custody consequent upon appearance or surrender, the Magistrate may either admit him to bail in accordance with Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or remand him to custody, or to detain him by way of remand in custody, in accordance with the provision under Sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads: (2) If the Court after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may be a warrant remand the accused if in custody: Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this Section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: xxxx xxxx 18. It may be noted that provision under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes Judicial Magistrate detention of an accused in custody forwarded to Court. 19. It may be noted that provision under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes Judicial Magistrate detention of an accused in custody forwarded to Court. 19. Such being the statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements with regard to the scope and ambit of the expressions 'arrest', 'custody' and 'summons', in the present case as soon as the Petitioners appear in Court in response to the summons received by them, they would be in judicial custody. They may either be released on bail or remanded in custody by the Magistrate. In neither event, there is scope for any apprehension that the Petitioners may be arrested. In view of judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, the reliance of the Petitioners on the decision in P.V. Narasingha Rao (supra) is misplaced. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there being no scope for the Petitioners to entertain any reason based on law to believe that they may be arrested at any point of time consequent upon the issuance of summons, the petition u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is misconceived and not maintainable. Therefore, the anticipatory bail application is rejected. Accordingly the BLAPL is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed