JUDGMENT: 1. THIS Second Appeal is directed against the judgment of reversal dated 22nd december, 2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Sealdah in title Appeal No. 33 of 1999 reversing the judgment and decree dated 26th february, 1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, 1st Court at sealdah in Title Suit No. 386 of 1988, at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant. The predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs/appellants filed a suit for eviction against the defendant/respondent herein. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was a licensee under them in respect of the suit premises comprising of one bed room with a kitchen and separate bathroom with privy, locker passage and veranda in the ground floor at premises no. 12, Dr. Asutosh Sastri Road, beleghata at a licence fees of Rs. 500/- per month. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant was initially inducted as a licensee in January, 1984 for a fixed period and subsequently the said licence was extended from time to time but ultimately by a letter dated 21st March, 1987 the defendant undertook to vacate the suit premises by 28th February, 1988 but since the defendant failed to vacate the suit premises even after 28th February, 1988, the instant suit was filed. The plaintiffs also made an alternative claim in the said suit by stating inter alia that in the event it is found that the defendant is a tenant in the suit premises then he should be evicted from the suit premises on the ground of section 13 (1) (j) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act as the defendant undertook to vacate the suit premises on the basis of his undertaking as aforesaid. 2. THE defendant/respondent contested the said suit by filing written statement contending inter alia that he is a tenant under the plaintiffs. The defendant denied that he is a licensee under the plaintiffs in the suit property. The defendant claimed that his tenancy consists of one more additional room besides the suit premises and since he was dispossessed from the said room by the plaintiffs, he prayed for recovery of possession of the said room by way of counter claim. The parties have led their evidence in support of their respective claims in the said suit. The defendant claimed that his tenancy consists of one more additional room besides the suit premises and since he was dispossessed from the said room by the plaintiffs, he prayed for recovery of possession of the said room by way of counter claim. The parties have led their evidence in support of their respective claims in the said suit. The learned Trial Judge, after considering the pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence on record ultimately passed a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned Trial Judge, in fact, gave much stress and reliance on the notice which was admittedly given by the defendant on 21st March, 1987 whereby he undertook to vacate the suit premises by 28th February, 1988. The learned Trial Judge held that since the defendant himself in the said letter described him as a licensee in respect of the suit premises and further since he also stated therein that he is not a tenant and will not claim tenancy right in the suit premises, his claim for tenancy right cannot be believed. The learned Trial judge further held that had the defendant been a tenant in respect of the suit premises, then he should have produced the rent receipt to prove his tenancy or in case of non-issuance of rent receipt by the landlord, he should have taken steps for issuance of certificate regarding payment of rent by the controller as per section 25 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956. Since the defendant failed to prove payment of rent to the original plaintiff in respect of the suit premises, the defendant's claim for his tenancy right in the suit premises was disbelieved by the learned Trial Judge. The learned Trial Judge also has drawn adverse inference against the defendant for non-examination of the person who allegedly introduced the defendant with the original plaintiff for negotiation of the terms of such alleged letting. 3. THE learned Trial Judge also refused to give any importance to the assessment register of the Municipal Authority wherein the defendant was described as a tenant in respect of the suit premises at a rental of Rs. 600/- per month by holding inter alia that since the amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for use and occupation of the suit premises was wrongly recorded therein as Rs. 600/- instead of Rs. 600/- per month by holding inter alia that since the amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for use and occupation of the suit premises was wrongly recorded therein as Rs. 600/- instead of Rs. 500/- per month, the other part of the entry in the assessment register cannot be relied upon. The learned Trial Judge further held that the assessment register cannot be relied upon as the same is based on hearsay evidence. Under such circumstances, the learned Trial Judge held that the defendant was a licensee under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property and since he has not vacated the suit premises on the basis of his undertaking, he is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. Accordingly, a decree of eviction was passed against the defendant by the learned Trial Judge. The learned Trial Judge, however, held that the defendant has failed to prove that he was dispossessed from another room which was allegedly let out to him and as such, the defendant's prayer for recovery of possession was rejected by the learned Trial judge. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree, the defendant/respondent preferred an appeal before the learned First Appellate court. The learned First Appellate Court, however, was pleased to set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge by holding inter alia that the defendant is not a licensee in respect of the suit premises. The learned Appeal court held that the defendant, in fact, was a tenant in respect of the suit premises but since the undertaking given in the notice dated 21st March, 1987 was conditional and/or contingent, the said notice cannot be regarded as a notice under Section 13 (1) (j) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act particularly when the original plaintiff did not inform the defendant about her desire and/or intention to receive possession of the suit premises from the defendant. The learned Appeal Court, thus, reversed the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge. 4. The learned Appeal Court, thus, reversed the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge. 4. WHILE reversing the said decree of the learned Trial Judge, the learned appeal Court held that since the parties are not related to each other and further since the other occupants who are there in the other portion of the ground floor of the suit premises under the plaintiff are all tenants and further when the entry of the name of the defendant as tenant in the assessment register has not been objected to by the present plaintiffs though they were aware about such entry in the municipal record, the plaintiff's plea that the defendant was a licensee in the suit premises cannot be believed. Challenging the said decree of the learned First Appellate Court, the instant Second Appeal was filed. The Second Appeal was admitted for hearing by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 22nd March, 2002. The following substantial questions of law were formulated by the Hon'ble Division Bench for hearing of the instant appeal: 1. The learned Lower Appellate Court erred substantially in law by misconstruing and misinterpreting the declaration and undertaking "exhibit 1" dated 21st March, 1987 whereby the respondent gave undertaking to vacate the suit room on February 28,1988. 2. The learned Lower Appellate Court erred substantially in law in not giving plain and simple meaning to the letter in "exhibit 1" whereby and where under the respondent has clearly made known his intention to vacate the suit room on February 28, 1988. The learned Lower Appellate Court failed to consider that the respondent in spite of his giving any undertaking in writing dated 21st March, 1987 that he would vacate the suit room on February 28, 1988 and that the respondent having had failed to do so has no right to occupy the suit room any longer. Let me now consider the merit of the instant appeal with reference to the aforesaid substantial questions of law. Heard Mr. Dasgupta, learned Advocate, appearing for the appellant and mr. Ghosh appeared on behalf of the respondent. Here is the case where there is a conflict between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The learned Trial Judge gave much importance to direct evidence over circumstantial evidence. The learned First Appellate Court, however, gave much importance to the circumstantial evidence than the direct evidence. Ghosh appeared on behalf of the respondent. Here is the case where there is a conflict between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The learned Trial Judge gave much importance to direct evidence over circumstantial evidence. The learned First Appellate Court, however, gave much importance to the circumstantial evidence than the direct evidence. It is settled law that direct evidence should be preferred than the circumstantial evidence. Here is the case where there are both direct and circumstantial evidence of the parties with regard to the status of the defendant. The notice dated 21st March, 1987 being "exhibit 1" is the direct evidence with regard to the status of the defendant in respect of the suit property. Admittedly the said notice was issued by the defendant himself. The defendant is a qualified person having master degree in commerce. He himself in the said notice described him as licensee. He categorically stated therein that he is not a tenant in the suit premises and he will not claim tenancy right in respect of the suit premises. The said letter, thus, makes it clear that he was conscious about the distinction between a tenant and a licensee. The defendant failed to prove that the said letter was procured from him fraudulently or by misrepresentation by the plaintiff. Admittedly he did not raise any protest against the correctness of the said letter from the date of its issuance i. e. from 21st March, 1987 till 28th february, 1988 which was the date fixed by him for vacating the suit premises. 5. THUS, when the defendant who is neither a blind nor an illiterate, issued the said letter consciously and spontaneously, he is bound by the said notices and as such, it operates as a conclusive bar against him not because of the fact that he has not understood the purports of the said letter but because of the fact that he had chosen to execute it. The Privy Council decision in the case of martin Kshin and Ors. Vs. Peter J. Kshin reported in AIR 1938 Privy Council 101, cited by Mr. The Privy Council decision in the case of martin Kshin and Ors. Vs. Peter J. Kshin reported in AIR 1938 Privy Council 101, cited by Mr. Dasgupta clearly lays down that in a case where the person executing the deed is neither blind nor illiterate, where no fraudulent misrepresentation is made to him, where he has ample opportunity of reading the deed and such knowledge of its purport that the plea of non-est factum is not open to him, it is quite immaterial whether he reads the deed or not. It was further held therein that the person executing the deed is bound by the deed because it operates as conclusive bar against him not because he has read it or understands it, but because he has chosen to execute it. It was further held therein that this is equally true (apart from fraud) in equity as at law, excepting those special cases where there is an equitable ground for setting aside or rectifying the deed. In my view the aforesaid principle which was laid down by the Privy council in the said decision is squarely applicable in the facts of the instant case. Thus, when direct evidence being "exhibit 1" containing the admission of the defendant about his status is available before the Court, the Court must give much more importance to such direct evidence than the circumstantial evidence. For proper appraisal of the admission made by the defendant with regard to his status in "exhibit 1", the contents of the said letter is set out hereunder:- Ext. 1 :- Copy of letter from Sakti Ganguly to Sm. Molina Majumdar, dated the 21st March, 1987. From Sri sakti Ganguly, Licensee. To Srimati Molina Majumder, Licensor and owner of the premises no. 12, Dr. Ashutosh Shastri Road, Calcutta " 10. Madam, Sub: Extension of "leave and licence" of the Accommodation of premises no. 12, Dr. Ashutosh Shastri Road, Calcutta " 10 on the Eastern side of the ground floor. In view of the fact that I could not procure a suitable flat so long for my family, of three members, i. e. my son, wife and myself. I would request you to kindly permit me to continue temporarily as a licensee in your accommodation as above for eleven months only from 1st April, 1987 to the 28th February, 1988 on "leave and licence basis" only. I would request you to kindly permit me to continue temporarily as a licensee in your accommodation as above for eleven months only from 1st April, 1987 to the 28th February, 1988 on "leave and licence basis" only. I shall pay you monthly a licence fee of Rs. 500/ (Rupees Five hundred Only) excluding electrical consumption charges, on the first day of every current English calendar month, in cash, in advance, at your office at the third floor. I at any time and will give you peaceful and vacant possession of the said accommodation on the 28th February, 1988 or on an early date, if you so desire and inform me accordingly. Accommodation consist of a bed room, a kitchen, a narrow passage and a bath-privy all next to your two rooms in the same flat. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Dated : 21. 3. 1987 Calcutta. Sakti Ganguly son of Sri Anadi Nath Ganguly. 6. IN my view if this letter is considered carefully, no man of any ordinary prudence, in the absence of fraud and/or misrepresentation, can come to the conclusion that the defendant is a tenant in respect of the suit premises. The learned First Appellate Court ignored the said letter by giving much importance to the circumstantial evidence as all other occupants in the said premises were inducted by the plaintiffs as tenants therein. The learned First appellate Court ought not to have given any importance to the said circumstantial evidence, inasmuch as the defendant has failed to prove his claim for tenancy either by producing any rent receipt or by showing the steps which he took for issuance of certificate by the Controller regarding payment of rent by him, in case of non-issuance of receipt by landlord. This Court also holds that even the entries in the assessment register ought not to have been relied upon by the learned First Appellate Court as part of such entry regarding rent payable by the defendant in respect of the said premises was admittedly not correct. When a part of the document admittedly was not correctly recorded, the learned Court below ought not to have relied upon the said evidence which was prepared on the basis of hearsay evidence, particularly when reliability on such evidence was discarded by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Durga Bala Biswas "vs-Nityananda Roy reported 59 CWN page 367. When a part of the document admittedly was not correctly recorded, the learned Court below ought not to have relied upon the said evidence which was prepared on the basis of hearsay evidence, particularly when reliability on such evidence was discarded by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Durga Bala Biswas "vs-Nityananda Roy reported 59 CWN page 367. In the aforesaid context this Court has no hesitation to hold that the learned Trial Judge was absolutely justified in holding that the defendant was a licensee under the original plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. Let me now consider as to whether the said notice was a conditional and/or contingent one. 7. ON perusal of the said notice this Court finds that the defendant in clear terms stated therein that he will not claim any right of tenancy in the suit premises at any time and he will give peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff on 28th February, 1988. It was further stated by him therein that if the original plaintiff desires to have the suit premises vacated at an early date then he may do so on receiving such information from the original plaintiff. The said letter, thus, makes it clear that unless the original plaintiff informs the defendant about her desire to get the said premises vacated by the defendant on a date earlier than 28th February, 1988, then the defendant will vacate the said premises on 28th February, 1988. Thus, the ultimate date for vacating the suit premises was fixed by the defendant on 28th February, 1988 and as such, this Court holds that the effectiveness of the said notice is not conditional and/or contingent. This Court, thus, holds that when his licence expired with effect from 28th february, 1988, the defendant has no legal right to remain in possession in the suit premises after 28th February, 1988. The defendant is, thus, in illegal occupation of the suit premises after expiry of the notice period and as such he is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. 8. THE Court also finds that the defendant in his said letter being "exhibit 1" has mentioned the extent of his occupation which tallies with the description of the suit property and as such, his client's allegation regarding his dispossession from the other room as claimed by the defendant, cannot be believed. 8. THE Court also finds that the defendant in his said letter being "exhibit 1" has mentioned the extent of his occupation which tallies with the description of the suit property and as such, his client's allegation regarding his dispossession from the other room as claimed by the defendant, cannot be believed. Before parting with I must mention that the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent seriously contended that the questions of law which were formulated by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court are not at all substantial question of law and as such, no interference with the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court is warranted in the facts of the instant case. In support of such submission he has also relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Bharma Rajan and Ors. "vs -. Villi Ammal and Ors. reported in (2008)2 SCC 741 . In my view the said submission has no substance in the instant case as wrong interpretation of a document and drawing conclusion by giving importance to the circumstantial evidence over the direct evidence containing admission of the parties, no doubt, amount to substantial question of law for which interference with the impugned judgment becomes necessary. In the aforesaid context, the judgment and decree of the First Appellate court stands set aside and the decree for eviction passed by the learned Trial judge is, thus, restored. The defendant is, thus, given two months" time to vacate the suit premises and to give vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff within two months from date, failing which the plaintiff/appellant will be at liberty to recover khas possession of the suit premises by evicting the defendant respondent there from in execution of this decree in accordance with law. The instant appeal, thus, stands allowed. Let the Lower Courts records be sent down to the learned Court below immediately.