Judgment ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. (1) ALL these three appeals involve identical question of fact and law and as such are disposed by this common judgment. (2) THE facts are almost identical in all these three cases. The respondents properties were requisitioned by the State under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as Act II). The properties were taken over possession in 1967, 1975 and 1979 respectively. In all three cases the State also intended to acquire the said lands under section 4 of Act ii and issued respective notices on January 01. 02. 1981, March 07, 1981 and July 26, 1983 respectively. (3) AS per the Act II the State was entitled to take possession of any land in question by requisitioning the said property in exchange of payment of rental compensation. However, if any requisitioned land was required by the State and State intended to acquire the same the State was entitled to issue necessary notice under section 4 (1a). After such notice was issued there was detailed procedure with regard to assessment and payment of compensation under Act II. (4) IN all three cases State did not take any effective step for assessment and payment of compensation after expressing their intention to acquire the said land by giving notice under section 4 (1a). This situation continued for long. In 1994 the legislature amended the said Act by the West Bengal land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994. Under the said amending Act it was provided that section 3 which gave power to the State to requisition any property would stand withdrawn with effect from april 01, 1994. It was also provided that such withdrawal or omission would not affect the pending cases. Since section 3 gave the power to requisition the land which was the principal basis of the Act II, although the said Act was not repealed in toto the purpose and/or benefit of the said Act as envisaged in section 3 was withdrawn with effect from April 01. 1994. (5) IN 1996 the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1996 came into force by which a new section was incorporated in the parent Act of the Act II by incorporating section 7a which is set out as follows: "7a. 1994. (5) IN 1996 the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1996 came into force by which a new section was incorporated in the parent Act of the Act II by incorporating section 7a which is set out as follows: "7a. Award by Collector.-The Collector shall make an award under sub-section (2) of section 7 within a period of three years from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1a) of section 4 (hereinafter referred to as the said notice) and if such award is not made within the period as aforesaid, the said notice shall lapse: provided that in a case where the said notice has been published more than two years before the commencement of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, (West Ben. Act 14 of 1994), the award shall be made within a period of one year from the date of commencement of that Act. Explanation.-In computing the period of three years or one year as the case may be, under this section, the period during which an action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said notice is stayed by an order of a Court having jurisdiction, shall be excluded." (6) HENCE, on a combined reading of Act II so amended in 1994 and then in 1996 if would appear that the Government was debarred from requisitioning any property after April 1, 1994. However, the pending cases were kept alive for a definite period. Under section 7a the Collector was directed to complete the pending cases within a stipulated period. It provided that the Collector would have to publish an award within three years from the date of notice issued under section 4 (1a) and if no such award was made within that period, that case would automatically lapse. It was further provided that in a case where notice had been published more than two years before 1994 amendment, the award must be made within a period of one year from the date of commencement of "that Act". In explanation it was clarified that if there was any order of injunction or order of stay by any competent Court, such period must be excluded for the purpose on computation. In explanation it was clarified that if there was any order of injunction or order of stay by any competent Court, such period must be excluded for the purpose on computation. (7) HENCE, in our considered view, any notice under section 4 (1a) issued prior to 1994 was to be brought to logical conclusion by publishing an award either within one year from the date of commencement of 1994 Act i.e. 1995 where notices were issued prior to 1992 or within three years from the date of notice in case such notice was issued after 1992. On a combined reading we find that there could be no two opinion that pre 1992 case where award was not published under Act II within 1995 stood lapsed. (8) THIS was the situation till March 31, 1997 when a new Act being the land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act 1997 came into force. The said Act was given effect on May 2, 1997. The said Act of 1997 amended the land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to Act I). By bringing such amendment all pending cases under Act II were brought under Act I, meaning thereby the cases, where award could not be published by 1995, were revived by amendment of Act I. Some of the provisions of such amendment being relevant herein are quoted below: 3. Amendment of section 9 of Act I of 1894.-In section 9 of the principal Act, after subsection (3), the following sub-sections shall be inserted: (3a) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (West Ben. Act 2 of 1948) (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said Act) as re-enacted by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Re-enacting Act, 1977 (West Ben. Act 2 of 1948) (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said Act) as re-enacted by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Re-enacting Act, 1977 (West Ben. Act 15 of 1977)and, in every such case, the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, section 5, section 5a, section 6, section 7 and section 8 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with: provided that the date of notice under this sub-section shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act: provided further that when the Collector has made an award under section 11 in respect of any such land, such land shall upon such award, vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (3b) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the said Act and notice for acquisition of such land has also been published under subsection (1a) of section 4 of the said Act, and, in every such case, the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 5a, section 6, section 7, section 8 and section 16 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with: provided that the date of publication of notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act: provided further that in every such case, the Collector shall make an award under section 11 in respect of such land only for the purpose of payment of due compensation to the persons interested in such land has, upon the Collector taking possession thereof, already vested absolutely in the Government, free from encumbrances. 4. Amendment of section 11a.-In section 11a of the principal Act, after the proviso, the following proviso shall be added: provided further that in respect of the acquisition of the land referred to in sub-section (3a), and sub-section (3b) of section 9, the award shall be made within a period of two years from the date of the issue of the public notice under section 9." 5. Amendment of section 23.-To sub-section (1a) of section 23 of the principal Act, the following proviso shall be added:- "provided that in respect of the acquisition of the land referred to in subsection (3a), and sub-section (3b), of section 9, in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of taking possession of the land to the date of the award of the Collector." 6. Insertion of new section 54a.-After section 54 of the principal act, the following section shall be inserted:- "54a.-Act to apply to acquisition of land referred to in subsections (3a) and (3b) of section 9.-Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3b) of section 9, the second proviso to section 11a and the proviso to sub-section (1a) of section 23, the provisions of this Act shall apply to the acquisition of the land referred to in sub-section (3a) and sub-section (3b) of section 9 mutatis mutandis." (9) BEFORE analyzing the aforesaid provisions let us take a close look to the Act I. Under Act I the State is entitled to acquire any property upon payment of appropriate compensation. Under section 4 the State has to express their intention in a public notice that they intend to acquire the said land and/or property as according to the Government, the said property is needed for public purpose. Immediately after such notice is given, the government is entitled to enter upon, survey and take levels of the land, to dig, bore or sub-soil or to set out boundary. Under section 5a any person interested in the said land which has been notified under section 4, is entitled to raise objection and his objection must be disposed of by the appropriate authority. In case the objection is overruled, a declaration has to be issued under section 6 to the effect that the land is required for public purpose and thereafter a detailed provision has been made in the said Act for assessment and payment of compensation. In case the objection is overruled, a declaration has to be issued under section 6 to the effect that the land is required for public purpose and thereafter a detailed provision has been made in the said Act for assessment and payment of compensation. Under section 17 in case of urgency special power has been given where even award is not complete the State is entitled to take possession of the said land and on such possession being taken on the expiration of fifteen days from the date of notice under section 9, such land would also absolutely vest upon the Government free from encumbrances, provided the State deposits 80% of the estimated compensation with the Collector. (10) LET us now analyze the Amending Act of 1997. Under section 6 section 54a was introduced under which all pending cases under Act II were brought within the fold of Act I. (11) BY amending section 9 sub-sections (3a) and (3b) were incorporated. Under subsection (3a) the Collector is to give notice to the owners of the land whose lands were taken under section 3 of Act II and kept under requisition so long the said Act survived. By such provisions the requirement of compliance of sections 4, 5, 5a, 6, 7 and 8 have been done away with and the Collector has been empowered to issue notice under section 9 and proceed to publish an award and in such cases cut off date for assessment of compensation would be the date of notice under section 9. (12) UNDER sub-section (3b) the Collector has also been empowered to deal with cases where not only possession was taken under section 3 on requisition, but also notice of acquisition under section 4 (1a) was given. In such cases similarly the Collector has been empowered to do away with the requirement of sections 4, 5, 5a, 6, 7, 8 and 16 and has been empowered to proceed for publishing an award under section 11 like the other cases under sub-section (3a). The only distinguishing feature in subsection (3b) is that in such cases the date of publication of notice under section 4 (1a) would be the cut off date and not the date of notice under section 9. (13) ABOVE is our understanding of the subject law on a combined reading of the relevant provisions of the statute. The only distinguishing feature in subsection (3b) is that in such cases the date of publication of notice under section 4 (1a) would be the cut off date and not the date of notice under section 9. (13) ABOVE is our understanding of the subject law on a combined reading of the relevant provisions of the statute. On perusal of the decision of the learned Single Judge in all three cases we find that His Lordship also approached the problem in the same direction. His Lordship directed compensation to be given to the respondents/writ petitioners from the respective dates of notice under section 9. Hence, these appeals by the State. (14) MR. A.N. Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing for the State has contended before us that in all three cases before us the State not only issued necessary orders of requisition under section 3 of Act I but also issued notices under section 4 (1a) by expressing their intention to acquire the property much prior to 1994 when Act II was very much in force. In all three cases at all material times possession was with the State. Hence, all three cases must be guided under sub-section (3b) and not under subsection (3a). According to Mr. Banerjee, the respective dates on which notices were issued under section 4 (1a) should be the relevant cut off dates which should be the basis of assessment of compensation. In all three cases award was published by taking into account the relevant dates on which notices were issued in respective cases. The learned Judge should not have upset the same. (15) IN support of his contention Mr. Banerjee heavily relied on a Single bench decision of this Court in the ease of Samarendranath Pal vs. West Bengal Housing Board reported in 2000 volume 2 CHN page 771 and a division Bench decision in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Soumendra mohan Dey reported in 2003 volume 1 ILR, Calcutta series page 410. Relying on the said two decisions Mr. Banerjee has contended that the learned Judge erred in interpreting the relevant provisions of the statute. In any event, this Division Bench being a co-ordinate Bench should follow the earlier division Bench decision and allow all three appeals. (16) MR. Relying on the said two decisions Mr. Banerjee has contended that the learned Judge erred in interpreting the relevant provisions of the statute. In any event, this Division Bench being a co-ordinate Bench should follow the earlier division Bench decision and allow all three appeals. (16) MR. Debayan Bera, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/ writ petitioner in FMA No. 798 of 2007 has contended that the relevant provisions of the statute were not properly dealt with and/or discussed by the decisions cited by Mr. Banerjee. Hence, those should be ignored by this bench being per incurium. Mr. Bera has relied upon an unreported decision of a Single Bench in the case of Ideal Sunrise Properties Private Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal as well as another Single Bench decision in the case of lila Deb Chowdhury vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2002 Volume 1 CLT page 278. (17) RELYING on the said two decisions Mr. Bera has contended that once a notice under section 4 (la) was issued in 1981, the State was obliged to complete the acquisition proceeding under Act II within the stipulated period provided therein. By 1996 amendment the Collector was obliged to complete the proceeding positively by 1995. Having not done so the State was not entitled to rely upon the notice under section 4 (1a) which stood lapsed by virtue of the amending Act of 1996. (18) MR. Bera however, in his usual fairness contends that such lapsed cases stood revived immediately on amendment of Act I in 1997 by which all cases pending on requisition under section 3 were brought under Act I by incorporation of section 54a. Once section 54a was incorporated, his case stood revived and was to be dealt with by the Collector from the stage of section 9. Since there was no valid notice under section 4 (1a), his case should have been considered as a case pending on requisition under section 3 and should be dealt with under sub-section (3a) and not under sub-section (3b). The learned Single Judge rightly held so. (19) MR. Bidyut Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent in FMA No. 41 of 2008 has adopted the submissions made by Mr. Bera. He has contended that he is equally placed and circumstanced with Mr. Bera. (20) MR. The learned Single Judge rightly held so. (19) MR. Bidyut Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent in FMA No. 41 of 2008 has adopted the submissions made by Mr. Bera. He has contended that he is equally placed and circumstanced with Mr. Bera. (20) MR. Bhaskar Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent in FMA No. 486 of 2007 has adopted the submissions made by Mr. Bera. In addition he has contended that in his case the State treated notice under section 4 (1a) issued in 1981 as lapsed as would appear from their subsequent conduct. Pertinent to note, in his case the State issued a fresh notice dated February 21, 1997 published on March 11, 1997 under section 4 (1a) and by such conduct the earlier notice stood replaced by a fresh notice. Mr. Ghosh has also drawn our attention to Ground I in the memorandum of appeal which is quoted below: "i. For that the Honble Judge failed to take into consideration the fact that in this case notification under section 4 (1a) of Act -II of 1948 was published in Calcutta Gazette on 10.01.1981 and that notification having been lapsed a fresh notification under section 4 (1a) under Act -II of 1948 was published on 11.03.1997 in pursuance of Government Order No. 6496 (19) L.A./3m-13/88-III dated 16.10.1996 issued by the L.A. and L.R. Department, L.A. Branch, Government of West Bengal Notice under section 9 (3b) was issued on 17.04.2000 and the same as challenged by the writ petitioner being No. 13189 (W)/2001. " (21) MR. Ghosh has contended that once the State issued a fresh notice, they were not entitled to rely upon the earlier notice. Moreover, they approached this court by taking the above ground wherein they admitted such fact. Hence, the earlier notice could not have been made basis of assessment of compensation in his case. Mr. Ghosh has also contended that since there was no valid notice under section 4 (1a), his case should also be treated as pending on requisition under section 3 and should be dealt with under section 9 (3a) and compensation should be paid accordingly. (22) DEALING with the contentions of the respective respondents/writ petitioners Mr. Banerjee in reply has contended that the notice subsequently issued in the case of Mr. Ghosh was under a wrong notion. In fact the earlier circular issued in that regard was withdrawn subsequently. (22) DEALING with the contentions of the respective respondents/writ petitioners Mr. Banerjee in reply has contended that the notice subsequently issued in the case of Mr. Ghosh was under a wrong notion. In fact the earlier circular issued in that regard was withdrawn subsequently. Mr. Banerjee has also contended that he is not pressing Ground I quoted (supra). According to him, once the property was taken possession of under section 3 and the State expressed their intention to acquire the said land by giving notice under section 4 (1a), those cases must be dealt under section 9 (3b) by taking into account the respective dates of notices issued under section 4 (1a). Mr. Banerjee has also contended that once a notice was issued under Act II in terms of section 4 (1a), no limitation was prescribed for lapsing the said notice. According to him, pending cases were to be completed by 1995 as per provisions of section 7a of Act II. However, by bringing amendment in Act I, specially by incorporating section 54a, all those cases stood revived and no limitation could be applied with regard to notice issued under section 4 (1a). (23) WE have considered the relevant statute. We have also discussed the law on a combined reading. We have carefully perused the decisions cited at the bar. Out of three Single Bench decisions we find two of them have already been taken note of by the Division Bench in the case of Soumendra Mohan Dey (supra). We thus propose to deal with the Division Bench decision only. Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the said decision being relevant herein are quoted below: "14. For convenient disposal of this appeal we have already narrated the relevant facts and the laws which have been amended from time to time. Therefore, the question before us is what should be the crucial date for determination of compensation for acquisition of the present property. It is very unfortunate that the State has taken a very casual attitude after requisitioning and acquiring the property. They have not taken care to bring the proceeding to its logical conclusion and allowed to prolong the proceeding resulting in great hardship to the land holder and depriving the land holder from using his land. It is very unfortunate that the State has taken a very casual attitude after requisitioning and acquiring the property. They have not taken care to bring the proceeding to its logical conclusion and allowed to prolong the proceeding resulting in great hardship to the land holder and depriving the land holder from using his land. The Act of 1994 extended the life of act II of 1948 but the Government after realising the agony of the people realized that this kind of proceeding should come to an end. Therefore, by the amending Act of 1996 section 7a was introduced to Act II of 1948 where a period was prescribed for making the award. Our attention was invited to some inconsistency in proviso to section 7a inserted by the 1996 Amendment. It is provided that the Collector shall make an award under sub-section (2) of section 7 within a period of three years from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1a) of section 4 and if such award is not made within the period as aforesaid, the said notice shall lapse. Then in proviso to section 7a it was provided that in a case where the said notice has been published more than two years before the commencement of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, the award shall be made within a period of one year from the date of commencement of that Act. The expression that here does not mean the Act of 1994, because if that is to be taken then the proviso will be totally unworkable because this Amending Act of 1996 has to come into effect from October 8, 1996 and the proceedings have to be completed within one year from that Act, that is the Act of 1994 and that will make this proviso redundant as the period of one year shall stand expired in 1995 from the Act of 1994. Therefore, the expression that here means the Amending Act of 1996 and the idea was that the proceeding should come to an end where notice has been published within one year from the date of commencement of the Act of 1996 and that one year has to be counted from October 8, 1996, that is, it should be over by October 7, 1997 and if it is not over within October 7, 1997 then proceedings shall lapse on that count. 15. However, both the decisions of the learned Single Judges in cases of ideal Sunrise Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. and Sabitri Devi and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. have taken the view that since the authorities have failed to complete the proceeding within one year from the date of the amending Act of 1996, the proceedings lapsed and the incumbent is entitled to compensation as if the notification has been issued under section 4 (1a) of Act II of 1948 on the date of pronouncement of the judgment in the case of Ideal Sunrise properties and in the case of Savitri Devi from the date of notice under section 9 and compensation should be determined on the basis thereof. In the present case the learned Single Judge observed that compensation should be determined from the date of the Amending Act of 1996, i.e. from October, 1996. 16. After going through all these three Single Bench judgments we have to decide that what should be the correct date for determination of compensation. It is true that it is very harsh that proceedings have continued for a long time nonetheless we cannot loose sight of the effect of legislation. Keeping in view all the four Single Bench judgments we shall again review the legislative history of Act II of 1948 to come to conclusion as to what should be the correct date for determination of compensation. It is admitted fact that the land in question was requisitioned under section 3 of Act II of 1948 and thereafter on August 9, 1982 notice under section 4 (1a) was issued. Thereafter, the Amending Act of 1994 came into force extending the life of the Act II of 1948 up to March 31, 1997 and then the Amending Act of 1996 came into force and section 7a was introduced to Act II of 1948. Thereafter, the Amending Act of 1994 came into force extending the life of the Act II of 1948 up to March 31, 1997 and then the Amending Act of 1996 came into force and section 7a was introduced to Act II of 1948. In section 7a a period was prescribed within which award should be made. As far as the present case is concerned, the compensation should have been determined within a period of one year and failing which the proceeding would have lapsed. But before the proceeding could be lapsed in terms of section 7a of the 1996 Amending Act; the Amending Act of 1997 came into force from May 2, 1997 and by virtue of section 54a all the proceedings pending were deemed to have been pending under the Land Acquisition act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1894). By this Amending act of 1997 sub-sections (3a) and (3b) were added to section 9 of the Act of 1894. By this Amending Act of 1997 provisos were added to section 11a and section 23 and a new seccion, i.e. section 54a was newly inserted. By virtue of sub-section (3a) of section 9 the Collector shall serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the Act ii of 1948 and in every such case, the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, section 5, section 5a, section 6, section 7 and section 8 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with. It was further provided that the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land shall be the date of the notice and it was further provided that award shall be made under section 11 and upon such award land shall absolutely vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. It was further provided that the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land shall be the date of the notice and it was further provided that award shall be made under section 11 and upon such award land shall absolutely vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3b) of section 9 which is relevant for our purpose lays down that the Collector shall serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the Act of 1948 and notice for acquisition of such land has also been published under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the Act of 1948 and in every such case, the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 5a, section 6, section 7, section 8 and section 16 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with. The proviso further provided that the date of publication of notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this act. Therefore, if we revert back to the history of Act of 1948 it will clearly transpire that the effect of section 7a in the present case will not have the effect of lapse of the proceeding. Section 7a provided a period of one year by virtue of the Amending Act of 1996 and if the authorities have not taken any action by October 7, 1997 perhaps then the result would have been followed and the proceeding would have lapsed. But before expiry of the period of one year another legislation came into force on May 2, 1997 whereby all the proceedings which were pending under Act 27 of 1948 were deemed to be proceedings under the principal Act, i. e. Land Acquisition act, 1894. By virtue of this Act of 1997, all the proceedings which were pending under earlier enactment stood transferred under this Act, i.e. Act of 1894 therefore all the proceedings now shall be deemed to be under the principal Act that is Land Acquisition Act, 1894. By virtue of this Act of 1997, all the proceedings which were pending under earlier enactment stood transferred under this Act, i.e. Act of 1894 therefore all the proceedings now shall be deemed to be under the principal Act that is Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is true that if we take the view as was taken by the Learned Single Judges that by virtue of the amending Act of 1996 the proceeding has come to an end, then their conclusion is correct and it is open to the discretion of the Court to award compensation from a particular date looking to the hardship to the parties but that would be possible only if we ignore the effect of the Amending Act of 1997. When the Legislature in their wisdom has passed the Amending act of 1997 and inserted section 54a in the Act of 1894 we cannot loose sight of that as in no uncertain terms it has expressed that all the proceedings under Act of 1948, as amended from time to time, shall be deemed to be under the Act of 1894, then the clear intendment of the legislature is writ at large. Section 54a which was inserted in the Act of 1894 by the amending Act of 1997 makes it very clear. It may not be out of place to reproduce section 54a, which will make the intention of the legislature obvious. Section 54a reads: "54a. Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3a) and sub-section (3b)of section 9 the second proviso to section 11a and the proviso to subsection (1a) of section 23, the provisions of this Act shall apply to the acquisition of the land referred to in sub-section (3a) and sub-section (3b) of section 9 mutatis mutandis. " (24) THE Division Bench considered the 1994 Amendment and 1996 amendment in the paragraphs quoted supra. According to the Division Bench, the word that in section 7a means the Act of 1996 and not the Act of 1994. Hence, the award in terms of section 7a was to be published within one year from 1996 Act being 1997 and once 1997 Act amended Act I by incorporating section 54a, all those pending cases under Act II stood transferred to be dealt with under Act I. The plea of lapsing of notice under section 4 (la) was however, negated by the Division Bench. (25) PERTINENT to note, the Division Bench also discussed the judgment impugned before us in FMA No. 798 of 2007 and ultimately held that the learned Judge was not correct in interpreting the provisions of the statute. Hence, although the Division Bench did not deal with the present appeal, in effect the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge impugned herein was overruled by the Division Bench in the case of Soumendra Mohan Dey (supra) by implication. (26) LET us first dispel our doubt with regard to the interpretation of the word that. The Division Bench held that the word that in Amending Act of 1996 should be construed as Act of 1996 and not any other Act. We have perused the 1996 Act carefully. In subsection (1) of section 1 it is stipulated, this Act may be called the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1996. (27) SO on a plain reading of the said sub-section it appears that the legislature meant that 1996 Act as this Act". Hence, in section 3 of the same statute the word "that" in proviso to section 7a can in no stretch of imagination be called as "this". We have consulted Blacks Law Dictionary meanings of "this" and "that" which are quoted below: "this - When "this" and "that" refer to different things before expressed, "this" refers to the thing last mentioned, and "that" to the thing first mentioned, Russell vs. Kennedy, 66 Pa. 251. "this" is a demonstrative adjective, used to point out with particularity a person or thing present in place or in though. Stevens vs. Haile, Tex. Civ. App. 162 S. W. 1025, 1028. " "that" - A relative pronoun equivalent to who or which, either singular or plural, Dunn vs. Bryan, 77 Utah 604, 299 P. 253, 255. " (28) EVEN on a plain grammatical meaning we find that "this" means the present thing which is being dealt with, whereas "that" refers to some other thing or deed, not being the present one. The Division Bench in paragraph 14 observed that otherwise there would be no harmonious construction. Rules of interpretation permit a Court to give its clear grammatical meaning if there is no ambiguity. We find no ambiguity in the amending section. Hence, we are not entitled to give any other meaning to maintain the harmony. It is no part of our job. Rules of interpretation permit a Court to give its clear grammatical meaning if there is no ambiguity. We find no ambiguity in the amending section. Hence, we are not entitled to give any other meaning to maintain the harmony. It is no part of our job. We are also not competent to do so. (29) THE Division Bench also negated the contention of the respondents/ writ petitioners on interpretation of section 4 (1a) and its applicability in the instant case. In our view, when under the 1994 Act the power of the State to requisition any property under section 3 was withdrawn by the legislature with effect from April 01, 1994, the said Act survived with effect from that date only with regard to the pending cases. On a combined reading of 1994 act and 1996 Amendment and on incorporation of section 7a those cases must be completed by 1995. We fully appreciate the difficulty faced by the division Bench to give other meaning of the word "that". There is no ambiguity in the statute. Hence, we do not import any other meaning to make it harmonious. The legislature in their wisdom declared the old cases as lapsed by implication by incorporating section 7a where cases were not disposed of beyond 1995. The legislature by amending 1997 Act revived those cases under Act I. Hence, the State was entitled to carry on the acquisition proceedings in respect of all cases where requisition was made under section 3 prior to April 01, 1994 irrespective of the fact whether the notice under section 4 (1a) was given or not. Notice under section 4 (1a) becomes relevant only for the purpose of assessment of compensation. A notice under section 4 (1a) as stipulated in the amending provision of the statute would certainly mean a valid notice. By bringing 1996 amendment the cases where awards were not published beyond 1995 stood lapsed. To maintain harmony legislature thought it fit to bring further amendment and as such section 54a was incorporated in Act I. On a plain reading of section 54a we find all cases pending requisition under section 3 of Act II stood revived and were to be dealt with either under section 9 (3a) or under section 9 (3b). To maintain harmony legislature thought it fit to bring further amendment and as such section 54a was incorporated in Act I. On a plain reading of section 54a we find all cases pending requisition under section 3 of Act II stood revived and were to be dealt with either under section 9 (3a) or under section 9 (3b). Section 9 (3a) empowers the Collector to deal with cases where only section 3 notice was given and the Collector has been empowered to assess compensation on the basis of his notice issued under section 9 of Act I. In the other type of cases meaning thereby where award has not been published despite notice under section 4 (1a) given under Act II the Collector has been empowered to assess the compensation by taking into account the date of issuance of such notice. In our humble opinion such notice as contemplated in sub-section (3b) should be a valid notice. If we ignore 1997 Act we would find that admittedly the cases before us in hand stood lapsed in 1995 on expiry of one year period contemplated in the said Act. Even if we accept the view expressed by the other Division Bench that it should be considered as 1996 Act even then it stood expired in 1997. Hence, these cases were revived only by bringing 1997 amendment, meaning thereby the pending case under Act II would be dealt with by the Collector in terms of the power granted under section 54a. The Collector has to start the proceeding afresh from the stage as contemplated in Act I as amended in 1997. He must take into account all valid action taken under the Act II. If there was no valid notice on the day when notice under section 9 was given by the Collector by virtue of power conferred upon him under section 54a, such notice could be of no consequence. Hence, we are inclined to accept the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned before us. (30) WITH dippest regard we have for the learned Single Judge in the case of Samarendra Nath Paul and Ors. vs. West Bengal Housing Board (supra)and the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Soumendra Mohan Dey (supra) may we, with all humility, differ with Their Lordships on this score. (30) WITH dippest regard we have for the learned Single Judge in the case of Samarendra Nath Paul and Ors. vs. West Bengal Housing Board (supra)and the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Soumendra Mohan Dey (supra) may we, with all humility, differ with Their Lordships on this score. (31) ONCE the notice under section 4 (1a) stood lapsed in view of delay in publishing the award, in terms of amended section 7a of Act II by way of automatic fiction the acquisition proceeding did not survive. However, requisition under section 3 still remained valid and was to be dealt with under Act I in view of section 54a thereof. Hence, those type of cases should be dealt with under section 9 (3a) and not under section 9 (3b). Here, we join issue with the view expressed by the Division Bench in the case of Soumendra Mohan Dey (supra). (32) SINCE we are not in a position to be ad litem with the other Division bench we refer these appeals for being considered by a larger Bench and for this purpose let the appeals be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench. (33) URGENT xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, may be given to the parties on priority basis. Appeals referred to Honble CJ.