T.N.K. Singh, J.;- 1. The writ appellants, who are the unsuccessful writ petitioners of WP(C) No. 1419 of 2002, filed the present appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15.6.2007 for dismissing WP(C) No. 1419 of 2002 assailing the order of the commandant 9th Bn. Manipur Rifles (M.R), dated 15.1.2001 for dismissing the writ petitioners from their service as Riflemen and also the order of the appellate authority, i.e., the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II) Manipur, Imphal being No. W-4/103/99-DIG (Ops-II) dated 5.4.2001 for dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants/writ petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. B.P. Sahu and Mr. Kh. Tarun Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners as well as Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned GA appearing for the respondents. 3. Factual Background: The appellants/writ petitioners were serving as riflemen of the 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles. On 16.10.1998 the appellants/writ petitioners and six other personnel of 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles were detailed for Kangpokpi Chalwa weekly escort convoy and on returning from Maknilong Village at about 5.30 p.m. when they reached near Gelbung Village on I.T. Road, the convoy was ambushed by suspected Kuki Militants. In that ambush the extremists killed ten civilians and one rifleman on the spot itself and snatched away arms and ammunitions issued to the appellants/writ petitioners. For -that incident the commandant, 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles, Government of Manipur issued an order being No. B2/2/9MR/36 Taphou the 19th October, 1998 for placing the appellants/writ petitioners and three others under suspension with immediate effect in contemplation of a Departmental Enquiry against them for handing over of their issued arms and ammunition without any retaliation of the firing or resistance to suspected Kuki militants on 16.10.1998 at about 5.30 p.m. 4. The Commandant, 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles issued a memorandum being No. B2/2/97-9MR, Taphou, the 27th October, 1998 to each of the appellants/writ petitioners for holding Departmental Enquiry against the petitioners for the three articles of charges, i.e., CHARGE Nos. The Commandant, 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles issued a memorandum being No. B2/2/97-9MR, Taphou, the 27th October, 1998 to each of the appellants/writ petitioners for holding Departmental Enquiry against the petitioners for the three articles of charges, i.e., CHARGE Nos. (1) the appellants/writ petitioners failed to retaliate by firing from their issued service weapons to the militants; (2) the appellants/writ petitioners handed over the issued arms and ammunitions without any resistance to the militants who were freely allowed to climb up the 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles Tata Truck with the height of 5 to 6 it where the appellants/writ petitioners and others were boarding; and (3) the appellants/writ petitioners suffered cowardice by surrendering their issued arms and ammunitions to the militants without any retaliation and resistance by the appellants/writ petitioners. For holding Departmental Enquiry for the said articles of charges against the appellants/writ petitioners, firstly one Shri E. Tolendra Singh, MPS, Dy. Comdt. 9MR Taphou; and later on Shri A. Sarat Kumar Singh, MPS, Asst. Comdt., 9 MR Taphou were appointed as Enquiry Officers. The appellants/writ petitioners also submitted their written statements of defence denying the charges framed against them. The Enquiry Officer submitted enquiry report to the disciplinary authority stating that the said charges against the petitioners had been proved. 5. The appellants/writ petitioners also submitted representation or/ objection in writing against the findings of the Enquiry Officer to the disciplinary authority stating that many illegalities/irregularities had been committed by the Enquiry Officer during the course of the inquiry. The disciplinary authority, i.e., the Commandant 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles, basing on the report of the Enquiry Officer, issued the impugned order being No. B2/2/200-9MR/375, Taphou the 15th January, 2001 for dismissing the appellants/writ petitioners from their services. It may not be out of mention that the Assam Police Manual is adopted by the State Government of Manipur. The appellants/writ petitioners preferred appeals under rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-III against the said dismissal order dated 15.1.2001 before the appellate authority i.e., the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur. The relevant portions of rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill, dealing with appeals, are quoted hereunder; "66. Proceedings to be drawn up in cases of major punishment. IV. The relevant portions of rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill, dealing with appeals, are quoted hereunder; "66. Proceedings to be drawn up in cases of major punishment. IV. The punishments prescribed in rule 2 to the extent specified in column 4 of the schedule to these rules may be awarded to the police officers mentioned in column I by the authorities mentioned in column 3 subject to appeal to the appellate authority mentioned in column 5. V. A member of the service shall be entitled to appeal from an order imposing on him any of the penalties specified in rule II for major punishment.- (a) if such order was passed by an authority specified in the relevant column of the schedule, to the authority specified in the last column thereof, (b) if such order was passed by an authority higher than that specified in the relevant column of the schedule, to the higher authority to whom the former authority is administratively subordinate, provided that no appeal shall lie beyond the Inspector General of Police. VI. In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any penalty specified in rule II, the appellate authority shall consider- (a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and (c) whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate; and after such consideration shall pass order as if thinks proper. VII. An authority from whose order an appeal is preferred under rule V shall give effect to any order made by the appellate authority. VIII. Every person preferring an appeal shall do so separately and in his own name. IX. Every appeal preferred under rule V shall contain all material statements and arguments relied on by the appellant, shall contain no disrespectful or improper language and shall be complete in itself. Every such appeal shall be submitted through the head of the office to which the appellant belongs or belonged and through the authority from whose order the appeal is preferred. No appeal shall be considered by the appellate authority, if it was not preferred within six months after the date on which a copy of the order appealed against was communicated to the appellant and no reasonable cause is shown for the delay." 6. No appeal shall be considered by the appellate authority, if it was not preferred within six months after the date on which a copy of the order appealed against was communicated to the appellant and no reasonable cause is shown for the delay." 6. On bare perusal of clauses IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX of the rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill, it is crystal clear that the appellate authority in the case of an appeal against an order imposing major penalty of dismissal from service shall consider (a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and (c) whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate; and after such consideration shall pass order as if thinks proper. The appellate authority, i.e., the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur, who had the bounden duty under rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill to consider the facts on which the dismissal order was passed had been established or not and also whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking necessary action, had passed the order dated 5.4.2001 for dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants/ writ petitioners. The cryptic order of the appellate authority dated 5.4.2001 read as follows : "Government of Manipur Police Department Orders By The Deputy Inspector General Of Police (Ops-Ii), Manipur Imphal, the 5th April, 2001 No. W-4/103/99-DIG (Ops-II): Whereas, Ex-Rfn. No. 09941014, Chungjalen Misao of 9-MR preferred an appeal to the undersigned to reinstate him to his former post of Rfn. Vide his letter dated 17.3.2001. Whereas, the undersigned asked CO-9MR to furnish his parawise comments on the basis of the application submitted by the Ex-Rfn. Accordingly, CO-9MR furnished his parawise comment along with the D.E. file vide his letter No. B-2/5V2001-9MR/877 dated 2.4.2001. Vide his letter dated 17.3.2001. Whereas, the undersigned asked CO-9MR to furnish his parawise comments on the basis of the application submitted by the Ex-Rfn. Accordingly, CO-9MR furnished his parawise comment along with the D.E. file vide his letter No. B-2/5V2001-9MR/877 dated 2.4.2001. Whereas, on perusal of the comments and D.E. file submitted by the CO-9MR, it is seen that the Ex-Rfn No. 09941014, Chungjalen Misao was dismissed from service after a regular D.E. for his grave misconduct and dereliction to duty on 16.10.1998 at about 5.20 pm in between Gelbung and Gelnel Village, I.T. Road, he failed to use his arms and ammunitions when he was confronted by the UG elements and surrendered his arms and ammunitions issued to him without offering any resistance whatsoever, which is not expected from the member of disciplined force like Manipur Rifles. Now, therefore, I Shri D. Mishra, IPS, in exercise of the power vested in me by the relevant provisions of Assam Police Manual Part-Ill, hereby reject the appeal preferred by the Ex-Rfn No. 09941014, Chungjalen Misao of 9-MR. (D. Mishra, I PS) Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II) Manipur, Imphal." 7. The appellants/writ petitioners filed joint writ petition being WP(C) No. 1419 of 2002 assailing the said dismissal order dated 15.1.2001 and also the order of the appellate authority dated 5.4.2001 dismissing the appeals. In the writ petition the appellants/writ petitioners had categorically pleaded that this court (Division Bench) vide common judgment and order dated 25.9.2002 passed in a batch of writ petitions had directed the concerned authority/respondents to reinstate the writ petitioners to their respective posts within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the order by setting aside/quashing all the dismissal orders including the order dated 15.1.2001. Thus, similar benefit may also be extended to the appellants/writ petitioners by directing the respondents/concerned authorities to reinstate the appellants/writ petitioners to their posts of riflemen with all the consequential benefits by setting aside the dismissal order dated 15.1.2001. In the writ petition the appellants/writ petitioners had categorically pleaded that there was no fair procedure in the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/ writ petitioners by the Enquiry Officer for the said three articles of charges framed against the appellants/writ petitioners. 8. The respondents also filed their affidavit in opposition denying all the allegations and assertions of the appellants/writ petitioners in the writ petition. 8. The respondents also filed their affidavit in opposition denying all the allegations and assertions of the appellants/writ petitioners in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge by passing judgment and order dated 15.6.2007 dismissed the writ petition (C) No. 1419 of 2002. The present writ appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, dated 15.6.2007 is filed, on the inter alia, grounds that: (A) For that, the learned Single judge failed to take note of the fact that as the petitioners belong to the lower rung category of riflemen, the disciplinary authority (the Commandant 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles) are bound to inform the writ appellants of their rights to engage a defence assistant to assist them during the departmental enquiry contemplated against them. It has been a settled position of law that officers belong to the lower rung category shall be informed of their right to engage a defence assistant to assist them during the departmental enquiry so as not to cause prejudice to the charged official and also to respect the Principles of Natural justice. It has also been a well settled law of this land that the doctrine of Principles of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. However, in the present case, the departmental enquiry was proceeded without informing the writ appellants/petitioners of their rights to engage their defence assistant. Thus, the whole proceeding of the departmental enquiry is liable to be set aside as the same was concluded in violation of the principles of natural justice. (B) For that the Id. Singe judge failed to take note that the well settled law is that the enquiry officer cannot act as a judge as well as a prosecutor. In the case in hand no presenting officer was appointed to present the prosecution/disciplinary side. Without the assistance of the presenting officer, the enquiry officer himself examined the writ appellants/petitioners as well as the witnesses. Therefore, he took the role of a judge as well as a prosecutor. Hence, the whole process of the departmental enquiry is vitiated and is liable to be set aside. (C) For that, the writ appellants/petitioners could not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses including his higher officials as they were not properly assisted by a defence assistant and also as they does not have the technical knowledge of cross-examination in a departmental enquiry. Hence, the whole process of the departmental enquiry is vitiated and is liable to be set aside. (C) For that, the writ appellants/petitioners could not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses including his higher officials as they were not properly assisted by a defence assistant and also as they does not have the technical knowledge of cross-examination in a departmental enquiry. Therefore, a serious prejudice was caused to them and they could no defend their cases properly during the departmental enquiry. It has also been a well settled position of law that denial of proper cross-examination amounts to the violation of the principles of natural justice. Thus, as the appellants could not cross-examine, the findings of the enquiry officer was full of irregularities and perverse and, therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. (D) For that, it has been a well settled law that the appellate authority is duty bound to assign reasons for rejecting the departmental appeal if the charged officials took various grounds in his departmental appeal in his appeal. But in the instant case, the appellate authority (the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II) failed to record his reasons for rejecting the departmental appeal preferred by the writ appellants/petitioners. Therefore, the order of the appellate authority is against the well settled law of this land. (E) For that, there was no eye witness to prove the charges levelled against the writ appellants/petitioners. But the enquiry officer came to his findings that the charges levelled against the writ appellants/ petitioners were found proved though there were no material/ evidences to prove the charges against the writ appellants/ petitioners. The findings of the enquiry officer were based on no evidence. Hence, perversity was evident and the whole process of the departmental enquiry was vitiated and liable to be set aside. (F) For that, the learned Single Judge failed to follow the well settled law of this land that the Principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. Even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the rules made there under, there could be nothing wrong in spelling out the Principles of Natural justice. Even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the rules made there under, there could be nothing wrong in spelling out the Principles of Natural justice. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the Principle of natural justice, such statutory silent is taken to imply compliance with the Principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of Natural justice becomes presumptive unless found excluded by expressed words of statute or necessary intendment. Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas no covered by any law validly made. In the present case also, there is no provision for appointment of defence assistant and Presenting Officer in the rule 66 of the Part-Ill of the Assam Police Manual. Therefore, by following the settled position of law in this regard, Presenting officer should be appointed and the writ appellants/petitioners should be informed of their right to engage their defence assistant. But, though such thing were complied by the respondents, the learned Single Judge came to its conclusion and findings that there was neither procedural lapses nor violation of Principles of natural justice during the departmental enquiry proceeded against the writ appellants/petitioners. Therefore, the finding of the Single judge is liable to be set aside. (G) For that, while passing the judgment and order dated 15.6.2007 in WP(C) No. 1419 of 2002 which is under challenge, the learned Single Judge of this court did not consider the irregularities/procedural lapses/non observation of Principles of natural justice that have been committed by the respondents during the course of the departmental enquiry contemplated against the appellants/ petitioners. 9. As directed by this court, the learned Government advocate also placed the relevant file containing the departmental proceedings against the appellants/writ petitioners for the said three articles of charges and this court also carefully perused the proceedings of the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners. 10. At the very outset of the argument, Mr. 9. As directed by this court, the learned Government advocate also placed the relevant file containing the departmental proceedings against the appellants/writ petitioners for the said three articles of charges and this court also carefully perused the proceedings of the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners. 10. At the very outset of the argument, Mr. Tarun Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners by drawing attention of this court to the impugned order of the appellate authority, i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur, dated 5.4.2001 for dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants/writ petitioners, strenuously contends that the appellate authority is duty bound to assign reasons for rejecting the appeals inasmuch as under rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill, relevant portion of which had been quoted above, the appellate authorities are bound to give reasons. The impugned order of the appellate authority, i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur dated 5.4.2001 is cryptic and no reason had been given for accepting the dismissal order dated 15.1.2001 for dismissing the petitioners from their services and as such, there is non-application of miitd by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur in passing the impugned order dated 5.4.2001 for dismissing the appeals. 11. Mr. Tarun Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners, in order to substantiate the case of the appellants/writ petitioners that there is non-application of mind by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur in passing the cryptic impugned order dated 5.4.2001 and also that reasons should be recorded for considering the case of the appellants/writ petitioners in compliance with rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill, while considering the appeal filed by the appellants/writ petitioners against the dismissal order dated 15.1.2001 has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in (1) Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 713 , (2) Director, Marketing, Indian Oil Corpn Ltd. and Anr. v. Santosh Kumar, (2006) 11 SCC 147 . 12. The Apex Court in Narinder Mohan Arya's case (supra) had discussed the issues as to what extent the appellate order should be a speaking order for dismissing the appeal raising serious contentions and held that the appellate order must contain reasons so as to enable the writ court to ascertain whether there was application of mind to the point required by the relevant rules. Para Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the SCC in Narinder Mohan Arya's case (supra) read as follows : "33. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under rule 37 of the rules. 34. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this court stated: (SCCp.770,paral6) "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities." (emphasis supplied) 35. The appellate authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 36. The order of the appellate authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The appellate authority, when the Rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as to enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression "consider" is of some significance. In the context of the Rules, the appellate authority was required to se as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the Rules was complied with; (ii) the enquiry officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (hi) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. 37. In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 651 this court opined : (SCCp.654, paras 4-5) "4. The word 'consider' in rule 27(2) implies 'due application of mind'. 37. In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 651 this court opined : (SCCp.654, paras 4-5) "4. The word 'consider' in rule 27(2) implies 'due application of mind'. It is clear upon the terms of rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing, etc., the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. "5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of rule 27(2) viz whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 13. Coming back to the present case, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur is duty bound to apply his mind to the points required by rule 66 VI of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill which read as follows : "VI. Coming back to the present case, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur is duty bound to apply his mind to the points required by rule 66 VI of the Assam Police Manual Part-Ill which read as follows : "VI. In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any penalty specified in rule II, the appellate authority shall consider- (a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and (c) whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate; and after such consideration shall pass order as if thinks proper. On bare perusal of the impugned appellate order dated 5.4.2001 which had been quoted above, it is clear that there is non-application of mind by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur in passing the appellate order inasmuch as the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur had utterly failed to give reasons so as to enable the writ court to ascertain whether there was application of mind to the points required by rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-III. 14. This court, for the aforesaid reasons is of firm view that as there was non-application of mind by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur in passing the impugned appellate order dated 5.4.2001, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside accordingly, we hereby, set aside the impugned order dated 5.4.2001 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur. In the result, we interfere with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15.6.2007 for not interfering with the impugned order of the appellate authority, i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur dated 5.4.2001. 15. Now the question is what will be the effect of setting aside the impugned appellate order dated 5.4.2001. It is fairly well settled that the order of the disciplinary authority, in view of the statutory provisions, merged with the order of the appellate authority as the appellate proceedings are in continuation of the original proceedings and, thus, the doctrine of merger shall apply. Reference : Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 . It is fairly well settled that the order of the disciplinary authority, in view of the statutory provisions, merged with the order of the appellate authority as the appellate proceedings are in continuation of the original proceedings and, thus, the doctrine of merger shall apply. Reference : Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 . Therefore, the setting aside of the impugned order of the appellate authority dated 5.4.2001 shall have the consequence of setting aside of the impugned dismissal order dated 15.1.2001 passed by the disciplinary authority, i.e., the commandant, 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles and remitting the matter back to the disciplinary authority for consideration of the matter afresh on merit. From what stage the disciplinary proceedings is to be started afresh is being decided in the latter part of this judgment. 16. On perusal of the relevant file containing the proceedings of the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners for the said three articles of charges, it is clear that there was no Presenting Officer in the departmental proceedings. It is settled law that fair procedure should be adopted in a Departmental Enquiry against the delinquent and also that non-appointment of Presenting Officer is a clear violation of the rule of fair procedure in the Departmental Enquiry. 17. Mr. Tarun Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners contends that as there was no Presenting Officer in the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners for the said there articles of charges there was complete violation of rule of fair procedure in the Departmental Enquiry. Mr. Ibohal, learned G.A. appearing for the respondents contends that the point of non-appointment of Presenting Officer in the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners cannot be agitated for the first time in the present appeal. To the contra, Mr. Tarun Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents/ appellants contends that non-appointment of Presenting Officer in the Departmental Enquiry against the petitioners could be raised for the first time in appeal inasmuch as it is a point of law for which examination of evidence for fresh investigation of the fact is not absolutely required in the given case of the present case. He further contends that it is a matter of record which could not be denied by the respondents that there was no Presenting Officer in the Departmental Enquiry against the. appellants/writ petitioners for the said three articles of charges. Mr. He further contends that it is a matter of record which could not be denied by the respondents that there was no Presenting Officer in the Departmental Enquiry against the. appellants/writ petitioners for the said three articles of charges. Mr. Tarun Kumar, in order to substantiate his submission had pressed into service the decisions of the Apex Court in (1) State of Punjab and Ors. v. Dr. R.N. Bhatnagar and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 330 , (2) Surendernath Sud (Dead by LRs. v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. and Ors., (Now Hindustan Petroleum Corpn), (1977) 2 SCC 408 , (3) Swami Ratanbabu v. Wamanrao Shankarrao Deshmukh, (1994) Supp (3) SCC 738, (4) Rajeswari Amma and Anr. v. Joseph and Anr., (1995) 2 SCC 159 , (5) Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshi v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvati and Anr., AIR 2007 SC 248 . 18. The Apex Court in Dr. R.N. Bhatnagar's case (supra) held that pure question of law in absence of any disputed question of fact could be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. Para 15 of the SCC in Dr. R.N. Bhatnagar's case (supra) read as follows : "15. We may, however, mention at the outset one primary objection pressed into service by Shri Rao, learned senior counsel for the intervenor in this connection. He submitted that this alternative contention in any case should not be entertained for the first time in this appeal as such a contention was not canvassed before the High Court in the writ petition. That may be so. However, we fail to appreciate how a pure question of law centering round the construction of the proviso to statutory rule 3 cannot be agitated by learned counsel for the respondent for our consideration in these proceedings. No disputed question of fact arises for consideration as wrongly assumed by learned senior counsel for the intervenor. Accepting the facts as well established on the record, the only question which would become relevant for considering this alternative contention would be the correct scope and ambit of the proviso to stator rule 3 of the Rules. For raising such a pure question of law, therefore, the respondent's learned counsel, cannot be told of the gates. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled." 19. The Apex Court in Rajeswari Amma's case (supra) held that new plea regarding question of law could be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. For raising such a pure question of law, therefore, the respondent's learned counsel, cannot be told of the gates. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled." 19. The Apex Court in Rajeswari Amma's case (supra) held that new plea regarding question of law could be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. 20. The Apex Court in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshi's case held that "A question of law would arise when the same is not dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or jurisdictional facts were not brought on record." 21. Mr. Tarun Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/ writ petitioners also strenuously asserted that as far as possible the substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of procedural irregularity and also for the reasons that pleadings are inartistically drafted. In support of his contention he referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in (1) Surendernath Sud's case (supra), (2) United Bank v. Naresh Kumar and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 660 . Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court, Mr. Tarun Kumar contends that the question of law regarding the illegality or otherwise of the Departmental Enquiry in absence of Presenting Officer should not left to be considered by this court merely because of pleadings of the appellants/writ petitioners in the writ petition are inartistically drafted. 22. For the aforesaid discussions we are of considered view that the question of law regarding illegality or otherwise of the departmental proceedings in the absence of Presenting Officer and also violation of the law of fair procedure in the absence of Presenting Officer in the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners in the given case of the present writ appeal could be raised for the first time in the present writ appeal. 23. This court, i.e., learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench in a number of cases held that in the absence of Presenting Officer, Enquiry Officer himself examines witnesses and exhibited documents and that the inquiry officer cannot assume the role of a Judge and also the prosecutions and it would be violative of the rules and fundamental principles of natural justice. Some of the cases are : (I) Dr. Some of the cases are : (I) Dr. Rajyamallu Buzarbarua v. The Assam Administrative Tribunal and Ors., (1983) 1 GLR (NOC) 71 (Division Bench), (2) Chelfrumog v. State of Tripura and Ors., (2002) 2 GLR 604, (3) Baharulislam (CT) v. Union of India and Ors., 2001 (1) GLT 621 and (4) State of Manipur and Ors. v. Chongtham Homendro Singh (Division Bench) : 2005 (3) GLT 154 and writ appeal No. 84 of 2005 : Shri W. Birbal v. The State of Manipur and Ors., (Division Bench). Thus, it is the unanimous decisions of different Benches of this High Court in a number of cases that non-appointment of the Presenting Officer in the disciplinary enquiry against the delinquent shall vitiate the finding of the inquiry. 24. The Apex Court in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija and Ors. v. The Collector, Thane, Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 261 held that in a multi judge court judges are bound by precedents and procedures. Judicial decorum and legal propriety demanded where a Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction matter shall be referred to larger Bench. The Apex Court is of similar view in (1) Shridhar s/o Ram Dular v. Nagar Palika Jaunpur and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 307 and (2). Dr. Vijoy Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish, (2001) 2 SCC 247 (3 Judges Bench). Para 17 and 20 of the AIR in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija's case (supra) read as follows : "17. It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court. One must remember that pursuit of the law, however, glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi judge court, the judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench. It is a subversion of judicial process no to follow this procedure. 20. The Chief Justice Pathak, in a recent decision stressed the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a Court. It is a subversion of judicial process no to follow this procedure. 20. The Chief Justice Pathak, in a recent decision stressed the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a Court. Speaking for the Constitution Bench Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754 ; AIR 1989 SC 1933 learned Chief Justice said (at p.766) (of SCC): (at p. 1939 of AIR): "The doctrine of binding.precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore, the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court." Cardozo propounded a similar thought with more emphasis : "I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and artificial exceptions unless for some sufficient reason, which will commonly by some consideration of history or custom or policy of justice. Lacking such a reason, I must be logical just as I must be impartial, and upon like grounds. It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another" (The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardozo p.33). In our system of judicial review which is a part of our constitutional scheme, we hold it to be the duty of judges of superior courts and Tribunals to make the law more predictable. The question of law directly arising in the case should not be dealt with apologetic approaches. The law must be made more effective as a guide to behavior. It must be determined with reasons which carry convictions within the courts, profession and public. Otherwise, the lawyers would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions. The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimately falls into disrepute." 25. Otherwise, the lawyers would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions. The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimately falls into disrepute." 25. Since we are in complete agreement with the earlier decisions of this court in the cases discussed above that non-appointment of Presenting Officer in a departmental proceedings shall vitiate not only the proceedings but also its findings, no question of referring to the larger Bench arises in this case. We may further add one more decision of the Apex Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 182 in order to fortify the earlier decisions of this court about the illegality of the Departmental Enquiry in the case of non-appointment of Presenting Officer. The Apex Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd.'s case (supra) held that non-appointment of Presenting Officer will tantamount to a total miscarriage of justice. The fact of the case spelt out in paras 6 and 22 of the SCC in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd's case (supra) read as follows : "6. The factual score depicts that the enquiry officer, however, on supposed examination of the records and admittedly without giving any notice and without fixation of any date or time or any venue for the inquiry or for examination or cross-examination of the witnesses and upon purported consideration of the so-called reply of the respondent herein as noticed above, proceeded to complete the inquiry. Even no presenting officer was appointed and as a matter of fact the report itself says that the enquiry officer dealt with the matter himself without any assistance whatsoever. It is significant to note at this juncture that a larger number of letters were sent to the authority concerned by the respondent with a fervent prayer for inspection so as to enable the respondent to send an effective reply to the show-cause notice, but the same was denied to the respondent. It is significant to note at this juncture that a larger number of letters were sent to the authority concerned by the respondent with a fervent prayer for inspection so as to enable the respondent to send an effective reply to the show-cause notice, but the same was denied to the respondent. Shortly the situation, thus, runs out in the manner following : (i) (a) a show-cause notice was sent; (b) since no documentary evidence was available a rough reply was sent as against the show cause notice and the entire inquiry proceeding was based thereon; (ii) no charge sheet was given; (iii) no explanation was sought for by the enquiry officer; (iv) no oral evidence was taken, thus, question of any cross-examination would not arise; (v) no date, time and place was fixed by the enquiry officer for hearing of the mater; (vi) no presentation officer was appointed; and it is on the basis of situation as above the inquiry stood complete. 22. The sixty five page report has been sent to the Managing Director of the Nigam against the petitioner recording therein that the charges against him stand proved-what is the basis? Was the enquiry officer justified in coming to such a conclusion on the basis of the charge sheet only? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative; if the records have been considered, the immediate necessity would be to consider as to who is the person who has produced the same and the next issue could be as regards the nature of the records-unfortunately there is not a whisper in the rather longish report in that 'regard. Where is the presenting officer? Where is the notice fixing the date of hearing? Where is the list of witnesses? What has happened to the defence witnesses? All these questions arise but unfortunately no answer is to be found in the rather longish report. But if one does not have it can it be termed to be in consonance with the concept of justice or the same tantamount to a total miscarriage of justice. The High Court answers it as miscarriage of justice and we do lend pur concurrence therewith. But if one does not have it can it be termed to be in consonance with the concept of justice or the same tantamount to a total miscarriage of justice. The High Court answers it as miscarriage of justice and we do lend pur concurrence therewith. The whole issue has been dealt with in such a way that it cannot but be termed to be totally devoid of any justifiable reason and in this context a decision of the King's Bench Division in the case of Denby (William) and Sons Ltd. v. Minister of Health, (1936) 1 KB 337 may be considered. Swift,while dealing with the administrative duties of the Minister has the following to state : "I do not think that it is right to say that the Minister of Health or any other officer of the State who has to administer an Act of Parliament is a judicial officer. He is an administrative officer, carrying of the duties of an administrative office, and administering the provisions of particular Acts of Parliament. From time to time, in the course of administrative duties, he has to perform acts which require him to interfere with the " rights and property of individuals, and in doing that the courts have said that he must act fairly and reasonably; not capriciously, but in accordance with the ordinary dictates of justice. The performance of those duties entails the exercise of the Minister's discretion, and I think what was said by Lord Halsbury in Sharp v. Wake field; 1891 AC 173 (AC at p. 179) is important to consider with reference to the exercise of such discretion. He there said : "'Discretion' means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion : Rooke case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b, lOOa; according to law and not humour. It is to be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself." 26. For the aforesaid discussions, we, with great reluctance, are persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15.6.2007 passed in WP(C) No. 1419 of 2002. It is to be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself." 26. For the aforesaid discussions, we, with great reluctance, are persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15.6.2007 passed in WP(C) No. 1419 of 2002. Having no alternative, we hereby set aside the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 15.6.2007. In the result, the impugned dismissal order dated 15.1.2001 passed by the Commandant, 9th Battalion Manipur Rifles for dismissing the present appellants/writ petitioners from their services and also the order of the appellate authority, i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-II), Manipur dated 5.4.2001 are hereby set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the appellants/ writ petitioners in service forthwith without prejudice to the fresh Departmental Enquiry against them pursuant to this judgment and order. 27. The disciplinary proceedings against the appellants/writ petitioners be remitted back to the disciplinary authority for consideration of the matter afresh on merit. Keeping in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Ajit Jain v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., and Ors., (2002) 10 SCC 580 , we further direct that the inquiry proceedings shall be relegated to the stage where the infirmity had crept in. In other words, the Departmental Enquiry against the appellants/writ petitioners should be started afresh from the stage of appointment of the Presenting Officer. Writ appeal is allowed. Parties are to bear their own costs.